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THE NEW TESTAMENT TERMINOLOGY OF "REDEMPTION"

The most direct, but not the exclusive,¹ vehicle in the Greek of the New Testament of the idea which we commonly express in our current speech by the term "redeem" and its derivatives, is provided by a group of words built up upon the Greek term *λύτρον*, "ransom."² The exact implications of this group of words as employed by the writers of the New Testament have been brought into dispute.³ It seems desirable therefore to look afresh into their origin and usage sufficiently to become clear as to the matter, and the inquiry may perhaps be thought to possess enough in-

¹ Compare, for example, the use of *ἀγοράζω* 1 Cor. vi. 20, vii. 23, 2 Pet., ii. 1, Rev. v. 9, xiv. 3, 4; *ἐξαγοράζω* Gal. iii. 13, iv. 5; *περιποιέομαι* Acts xx. 28.

² *λύτρον* Matt. xx. 28, Mark x. 45; *ἀντίλυτρον* 1 Tim. ii. 6; *λυτροῦσθαι* Lk. xxiv. 2, Tit. ii. 14, 1 Pet. i. 18; *λύτρωσις* Lk. i. 68, ii. 38, Heb. ix. 12; *ἀπολύτρωσις* Lk. xxi. 28, Rom. iii. 24, viii. 23, 1 Cor. i. 30, Eph. 1, 7, 14, iv. 30, Col. 1, 14, Heb. ix. 15, xi. 35; [*λυτρωτής*] Acts vii. 35.

³ Cf. what Johannes Weiss says in his comment on 1 Cor. i. 30b (Meyer series): "Whereas heretofore the notion of *ἀπολύτρωσις* has been carefully investigated with reference to its shade of meaning (whether it is to be taken simply generally as = 'Deliverance,' or—because of the *λυτρο*—as = 'Ransoming') and also with reference to the particular relations of the notion (Who was the former owner? What is the ransom price? Who pays it? Why is it of so great value?), the tendency of the day is to push all these questions aside as wrongly put: Paul uses here a common *terminus technicus*, as a piece of current coin, with regard to which he reckons on a ready understanding; it is approximately = *σωτηρία*; accordingly it is translated simply 'Deliverance,' and no questions are asked with respect to a more exact explanation. This is generally right." . . . Weiss himself conceives the term to be used primarily of the eschatological salvation, but to have received (like others of the kind) a certain predating and not to have lost entirely the idea of ransoming, though laying the stress on the effects rather than the means.

2. With our author's high Anglicanism, which meets us at almost every turn in the book, we are, as might be supposed, utterly out of sympathy: but we do not criticize; for it has no bearing on his position as to "the origin and authority of conscience." From his statement, however, that "the notion that the Church ought to follow, not to lead, public opinion, a notion which is the negation of Christ's instruction to his Church, is fostered by those Nonconformist bodies, which, being financially dependent on popular support, can only (for the most part) lead public opinion in the direction in which it wants to go"—from this opinion we must unqualifiedly dissent; and especially when our author adds that 'this time-serving spirit is more obvious in America than even in England.' Not to speak of his own country, the reviewer is much mistaken if in Scotland the United Free Church is not more independent and has not more initiative than the Established Church; and he would remind our author that when he conditions the leadership of his Church, even by implication, on her independence of popular financial support, he denies utterly her apostolic character and claims.

3. It is a serious, though well meaning, mistake that "the State on its commercial side, if it is to be Christian, must carry on its business on the basis of the idea of the family." It is as serious a mistake as that it must do so on "the basis of a struggle for existence resulting in the survival of the strongest." As the family is "the institute of the affections" so the state is "the institute of rights." It is God's instrument for securing justice for all; and God's purpose in the state is set aside when its function is conceived to be otherwise. Paternalism, therefore, is immoral. An enlightened public conscience would protest against it.

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Faith Justified by Progress. Lectures delivered before Lake Forest College on the Foundation of the late William Bross. By HENRY WILKES WRIGHT, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy in Lake Forest College. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1916.

Henry Wilkes Wright, Ph.D., is professor of philosophy in Lake Forest College; and his book is one of those produced on the Bross foundation, an endowment for the purpose of stimulating the best books and treatises "on the connection, relation, and mutual bearing of any practical science, the history of our race, or the facts in any department of knowledge, with and upon the Christian Religion," "to demonstrate the divine origin and the authority of the Christian Scriptures."

Dr. Wright's special aim is "to describe certain types of social life important enough to be regarded as leading stages in social or moral evolution, and to find out if possible the part played by religious faith in each one."

He accepts the philosophy known as pragmatism, "that all belief, in science as well as in religion, depends upon practice for its verifica-

tion"; or that "truth belongs to those beliefs which, when taken for guides of action, contribute to the ultimate good of humanity," that is, to 'the realization of the personal capacities of every human individual, the fullest personal development of humanity.'

He has his own special doctrine of the will. He says, that 'will is fundamental to human personality, the root of human activity, the source of human progress'; that 'it is the cause of all our human development,' or 'the true cause of all man's progress'; that it is "the ability to *venture*"; and that it is "the capacity for faith." And faith, he tells us, is "belief that the ideals of personal life can be realized, a belief which is affirmed and acted upon in advance of proof from actual experience"; and 'faith creates for man his world.' Or, to put his doctrine of will and his doctrine of faith together with his doctrine of pragmatism, the sole cause of human progress is man's ability to choose to act upon a hypothesis as true before having adequate evidence that it is true, his power of believing and of choosing to act accordingly, antecedent to proof that the belief is true, or his power to choose what to believe without evidence.

Proceeding to inquire what part has been played by religious faith, he reviews the chronologically successive stages of social evolution, as he makes them out to be: primitive; natural; supernatural; universal.

In the primitive life man was absorbed in the gratification of momentary desire, acting upon the postulate of faith that "particular objects exist which, when attained, will exhibit certain characteristic qualities." "It is just this faith," says Wright, "whether justified or not, which creates for man his first world," that is, the world which primitive man has. It is primitive man's ability to believe such unverified hypotheses and to act upon them which is the true cause of his progress out of the primitive stage. His faith became distinctively religious when he conceived and believed such hypotheses as that this or that god could and would help man to attain to this or that object if properly appealed to for his favor.

Two doctrines are involved: one, that polytheism was necessarily the primitive type of religion; the other, that moral evil as distinguished from physical evil consisted in the conflict of human wills. Accordingly, primitive man attributed power to his gods, but not ethical attributes.

The next stage above and after the primitive is, according to Wright, the natural life. When man found his religious faith turning out to be fallacious, that is, not succeeding in leading him to the expected gratification, then he turned to the observed sequences in nature and sought by control of what we call natural forces to attain that which he could not attain by worship of his gods. But faith still remained the cause of all human progress in this natural man. Its postulate was that "events occur in fixed sequences which when followed out enable man to provide for his own future comfort and safety." Put the emphasis on "his own" and "future." But here man inevitably uses social organization to attain his ends, and social organization is rooted in

compact. The moral evil is violation of such compacts, or injustice. Nor are the gods done away. Rather they become more stable in their purposes and less limited to particular objects in their powers; and these gods are yet to be appealed to in matters beyond man's ability to attain through natural means. Now man conceives his gods as social, as faithful to compacts, as just. Faith in deities abides, because such faith is still necessary to human progress.

Wright calls the next stage the supernatural life. Here we must not misunderstand what he means by spiritual. He does not mean to use the epithets material and spiritual as not applicable to the same subjects; but with him the same subject may be called material and spiritual. A spring, for instance, is material when thought of as situated in a definite place and the effect of certain causes, but spiritual when thought of as the means of slaking human thirst. But to think of a spring as thirst-quenching is to think of it as a universal, that is, as participating in a quality with other things. Spiritual objects are ends to be attained, man's conceived good ends which he has chosen to believe desirable and attainable. The spiritual system, then, is a system determined by rational volition. The real spiritual objects are those objects which have been realized, that is, have been attained and found to give the satisfaction expected; the ideal spiritual objects are objects not yet attained. Chief among these ideals is that of a perfected human society. But when men assumed the ideal as already a reality, as the Stoics and the medieval Christians, a reality to which this or that individual might come, but already existing, they set aside the natural world as not so fully real as this their supernatural world.

Now the postulate of faith in this stage of social evolution is belief in "the existence of a complete system of ends in whose permanent reality man can, through the exercise of his reason, participate."

Since this postulate contradicts the seeming facts of the natural world of experience, the Stoic through reason as over against sense must come to participate in the ideal world of complete ends; and the medieval Christian, finding the social world of his experience so contradictory of the ideal, must through the mediatorial redemption of Christ escape out of the natural into the supernatural world by faith in the divine grace as guaranteeing this deliverance. To these spiritual supernaturalists God is preeminently transcendent and apart from the present and actual human society, is holy; and the supreme virtue is such a withdrawal and sanctity.

Finally Dr. Wright brings us up to the universal life, whose postulate of faith is that "the actual world contains potencies of adaptation and growth, of which human intelligence may avail itself in the establishment of a universal spiritual life." That is, the religion of modern civilization has escaped from the exaggeration of medieval Christianity upon grace and the supernatural, by discovering the unity of the natural and the supernatural. There is one Universal Will, or Purpose, an ideal not yet attained, but attainable through the cooperation of

God and men in the same faith and through the same suffering. The faith of the modern man is that man and God working together can attain the ideal of the perfect society. Hence benevolence is the supreme virtue in man and in God.

He sums up his discussion thus: "Thus we reach our final conception of human progress. We see it as the work of volition, the effort of Universal Will to expand the sphere of its activity by availing itself of all the opportunities for further expression offered by the nature of things. But actual conditions prove refractory and unyielding. Volition is frequently checked and frustrated in its endeavor to bring them under control; it is confronted by the problem of natural evil. In overcoming these difficulties Universal Volition gains great advantage by dividing itself into a vast number of individual wills. Each of these individuals is able to concentrate its effort upon the exploitation of that particular one out of the many possibilities of nature with which it is in a position most effectually to deal. The achievements of individuals in the mastery of natural conditions are made permanent possessions of the Universal Will through communication and cooperation. But the individuals frequently prove obstinate and self-centered. They refuse to make the results they have gained means to enlarge the scope of others' activity; they prefer a transient independence of action to a permanent participation in the universal achievement. The very conditions of individuation thus constitute another source of evil; the problem of moral evil is added to that of natural. This difficulty can be met only by imparting to individuals added personal power from the Universal Source, in order that the intrinsic universality belonging to all volition may serve to counteract the exclusive tendency of individuality. If this effect is not secured, the result of making individuals more powerful will of necessity be to make them more potent and mischievous in their independence. Thus universal progress is essentially a venture; as an enterprise of will its outcome is uncertain and fraught with possibilities of disaster and failure. But much ground has already been gained. Volition is constantly annexing new territory and thus enlarging the theater of its activity; it is successfully liberating itself from hampering conditions that circumscribe its activity, thus enlarging the scope of the free personal life for which in fulness it yearns. We are justified in hoping, therefore, that the will which is striving in universal evolution will not fail in its endeavor; that universal progress will not come short of its goal. We have found reason to believe, moreover, that the course of progress is not like the passing of a torch onward from one generation to the next, each generation falling into oblivion when its task is done, but rather like a rising tide, a tide of personal life constantly being augmented by the contributions of individuals who, having had a share in its labors, have won a right to participate in the satisfaction of final fulfilment, of complete self-realization."

To understand Wilkes it is necessary to note also some other positive statements of his, and some of his silences.

Necessarily it is with him a question whether Christianity is the final religion. And his answer is that so far as our Christianity is prudential (the religion of the natural life) or mystical (the religion of the supernatural life), it must give place to democracy; but so far as our Christianity is the religion of the universal life, it will persist, probably; for we cannot be certain whether even this form of religion may be but a passing stage of human evolution. The religion of the future, then, so far as we can forecast, will be social. "But this" (that 'the life of human personality in its universal aspect is more permanent, more potent, more real than the existence of the private individual or his private interest') "cannot be proved; it must remain a matter of faith. On the existence of this faith democracy is altogether dependent, but is of itself powerless to produce it. Here, then, is the new need created by democracy, which religion can alone fulfil—the need of faith in the superior reality of the social community, the community of persons united through mutual understanding, service, and sympathy, over that of natural individuality, with its narrow interests and exclusive ambitions. Here, too, is the function of religion in a democracy—that of giving supernatural sanction or, better, spiritual reality, to those social values which have become supreme in the course of human progress." Such a religion must teach "the immortality of the human person conditioned by his devotion to inclusive social ends," etc. It must teach 'the existence of a spiritual community' of such persons after their death. And it must teach "The immanence and efficacy of God as the guiding spirit of social progress, the leader in the work of human betterment, who strives and suffers with us in the cause of universal evolution." Jesus Christ, of course, is not to Wright a redeemer by atonement, but only a savior by teaching.

Dr. Wright is silent on many questions that he might have answered in the course of his discussion. He does not say whether he believes that the Bible records are true, that Jesus rose from the dead, or that he is now a living mediator; nor does Dr. Wright say anything concerning "the authority of the Christian Scriptures;" nor is there ground to infer from his book that he believes in their authority.

Some observations may here be added. And first comes to mind the futility of endowments for the propagation of the donors' beliefs. The managers of the Bross Fund and Dr. Wright would, I suppose, agree that Dr. Wright's book is antagonistic to beliefs that Bross intended his gift to promote. This departure of trustees from the purpose of donors is a frequent thing in our day, and necessarily must be in all times. Whatever may be said about the obligation of trustees in this matter, it is a simple fact that the people of the future are going to use their inheritances to promote their own beliefs. When Christians come into the possession of heathen temples, they will use them in the worship of Christ. Protestants, when they come into the possession of Cathedrals built in the Dark Ages for Roman Catholic purposes, do not hesitate to use them for Protestant purposes. The present trustees of Harvard University are not trying to promote the beliefs of the

John Harvard who originally endowed the institution; and when the trustees of Harvard University come themselves to believe false the beliefs that present donors of millions to Harvard hold, the University of Harvard will not then promote these beliefs. It is futile for givers to endeavor to direct the future use of their gifts.

The philosophy of Dr. Wright is open to some objections. Its fundamental principle is the postponement of certainty. Ultimate verification of any belief is impossible until its ultimate working is observable. So belief in this pragmatism cannot be verified this side of eternity. Not only so; but if pragmatism works within the sphere of my observation and knowledge, it may not work in the rest of the universe; and I can never know that pragmatism is true until my knowledge of its working extends over the whole universe and over all duration. Therefore pragmatism is the suicide of certainty.

In particular, the belief in "God as the guiding spirit of social progress" may turn out to be a mistake, even if it works within the limits of my time and place; for beyond these limits there may be other gods with other dispositions, or there may be some universal god or tendency whose policy it is to dispense altogether with this little god of mine and his temporary undertaking.

The underlying demand of this pragmatism must not be granted, that a system of philosophy is condemned as unsound unless it explains everything. If there is that which is inexplicable, then a true philosophy will include the recognition of the inexplicable. If the universe and God and the course of universal evolution can all be comprehended so that there is nothing inexplicable left, well; but surely this feat is not yet possible before we have verified or can verify this solvent of all questions.

And even Dr. Wright's pragmatism admits an inexplicable, the "nature of things." His God does the best that he can in the circumstances imposed upon him by the nature of things. What advantage in a comprehensible God who is himself controlled by Something inexplicable back of him, the Nature of Things, over an incomprehensible God with nothing back of him to dominate him?

Closely associated with Dr. Wright's philosophy of pragmatism is his hypothesis of evolution, which includes the dogmas, that no product of evolution is ever inferior to its source; that nothing arises except by evolution; that polytheism necessarily precedes monotheism; and that God himself is in process of evolving, it being now unknowable to him or us what he will turn out to be in the future.

Look at the first of these dogmas, that evolution is always upward. It is obvious that the offspring is not in every instance superior to the parents. Admit that natural selection and the other factors of evolution tend to eliminate the inferior and to secure the survival of the superior, it is certain that some inferiors do also survive. Deterioration is as certain a fact as amelioration. May not the multiplication of inferiors in some cases create an environment in which the inferior type has the advantage, that is, becomes the fittest to survive? Or

even if the trend is upward now over the whole field of human observation, how can we be certain that there are not other fields beyond the field of observation that have in them deterioration prevailing instead of the upward movement? Maybe the totality of the universal evolution is downward rather than upward; who can tell? We may choose to believe his dogma of progress; but belief does not make a dogma true in any realm of speculation, pragmatic assumption to the contrary notwithstanding.

Take the second dogma, that nothing arises except by evolution. Suppose it were true that nothing within the field of human observation has arisen except by evolution, even if we stretch inference beyond observation, there still remain immeasurable areas before and after and beyond the field of human knowledge, in which unknown areas evolution may never occur at all. For pragmatism must not here forsake its only process of verification and adopt the to it superstition of necessary primary beliefs. The denial of all creation as over against evolution is impossible to any system that knows no adequate proof and verification except observed results. On any theory our actual familiarity with origin by evolution ought not to prejudice us against there being some other mode of origin.

Take the third dogma, that polytheism necessarily precedes monotheism. There is no known instance of monotheism being derived from polytheism. People who once were polytheists have become monotheists, and *vice versa*: and Democrats have become Republicans, and Republicans Democrats: but this mere succession does not prove derivation. There is one credible record of man's original faith concerning the divine, the opening of the book of Genesis, and this certifies that primitive belief to have been monotheism. But, of course, Dr. Wright rejects the credibility of this account, largely just because it does so certify, choosing to believe his dogma rather than this account. It is a fact that all monotheistic peoples are able to keep records, and that all peoples who cannot keep records are polytheistic. If, then, any people is polytheistic, it may not present record of its 'decline into polytheism, if it be so that it did originally have a monotheistic faith. Why determine such a question by assumptions? So far as the present writer knows, there is not one scintilla of proof of the existence of any people whose ancestors were never monotheistic: and monotheism is as old as any trustworthy human records.

Look also at the fourth dogma, that God is now in process of evolution, it being impossible for us or him to know into what he will evolve. This is, of course, but a dogma, that is, a venture of faith, and may turn out in the long run not to be true, but it is very helpful thus to believe for those who have the will thus to believe. As this belief has never been tried on any large scale, only a few in our time having, under the lead of James and Dewey, come to this belief, it is yet a ticklish venture on the brink of the future! When there has been a succession of generations teaching this belief in an evolving deity to their children, and for several generations whistling this faith to keep

their courage up through the long and terrible shiver of uncertainty, then, it can be seen whether this uncertain confidence in a leader doing the best he can in the nature of the obstacles to his growth, but liable, so far as we know, to arrested development, can nourish eternal courage. Many of us are ready to quit now, if this is the best sort of a God we are permitted to believe in. It may be that we have become cowardly through long certainty of assurance in the confidence of Jesus in the Heavenly Father. This certainty has led many after Jesus to every sort of self-sacrifice and to death; and we had thought it could make heroes, as we have seen them triumphing in the flames with Golgothic courage. Now we are told that the truly heroic faith is a volitional belief in a growing God who may or may not succeed! The present writer for one does not choose to take the venture to which he is thus invited. He will stand fast on the rock of fact, the resurrection of the sinless Christ. If that fact is swept away, he will drown but will not float as a pragmatic fish on the foam of an evolving deity.

The psychology of Dr. Wright is open to objections. He exalts will over cognition and judgment unduly, making will the sole cause of human progress. Others have made knowledge the chief thing; and others, judgment or belief. The truth is that these three are inseparable, aspects of one personal life. The motive to this undue glorification of will is to open the way to the dogma hidden in the phrase "the will to believe." Thus one gets a fancied liberation from the control of evidence over belief, and the freedom of the judgment promised by the supremacy of will seems, from some angles, most alluring.

Closely associated with this exaltation of will is the weakening of the meaning of faith, so that the true nature of faith, or belief, is obscured. By using faith as implying uncertainty, as belief guided by volition rather than by evidence, attention is diverted from the nature of faith, or belief, that there is faith only in such degree as the feeling of certainty accompanies it. Where there is no certainty there is no belief but only doubt; where there is full certainty there is belief and no doubt; where there is a state or attitude between these extremes there is some belief and some doubt. Now doubt is not belief but interrogation. The faith of Dr. Wright is not belief, but interrogation. If he had said that man's ability to ask questions, to remain in doubt till he receives adequate evidence in answer to his questions, holding back from full belief till he receives adequate evidence, and yet making experiments in search of answers to his questions, if he had said that man's power of interrogation is an indispensable condition of human progress, no one could complain. But faith is neither interrogation nor belief without evidence. Nor is faith a venture; the believer is not a gambler.

But we have not yet touched the heart of this new apologetic. Men who are unwilling to give up their Christ but yet find themselves constrained by the arguments of criticism to give up their belief in more or less of the facts stated in the Bible, who have been brought to doubt or even to disbelieve the facts set forth in the Gospels, including

the resurrection of Jesus, are seeking some way to save the essence of Christianity without the facts that were once supposed to base it. Christ and what he can do and does do in saving men is too precious to be let go at the thrust of criticism overturning a few supposed facts.

This attitude of mind is not irrational. There are sorts of evidence besides external historical evidence. Men are caught in our time in the strong grasp of criticism and unable honestly to shake loose its hold who love Christ and know him as their Savior. These lovers of Christ, believing in him, not without evidence, but without the ability to present that evidence to their satisfaction, welcome a theory which would enable them to keep their precious faith in spite of the destructive criticism which they cannot deny. Others who do not have this inner friendship with Christ may be willing to push such philosophies to the front; but certainly such philosophies find a welcome in some of the most Christlike minds of our time. Those who have put Christ to the test and found him true have evidence for their faith, the evidence of inner experience; whether the external evidences for past facts be strong or weak.

But this evidence is not precisely the same as the verification of a scientific hypothesis. No belief is necessary to the making of an experiment in physical science. If two investigators have the same hypothesis to test, whether a given serum will prevent infantile paralysis, it makes no difference that one of them believes that the experiment will prove the hypothesis and the other that it will disprove it, nor would it make any difference if both had no belief on the question. The important thing is that each carry through the experiment and note the result. But if an investigator has a hypothesis that faith in Jesus Christ (faith, i.e., trust and commitment) will bring peace and righteousness, but does not himself have this faith in Jesus Christ, but only the question concerning it, the hypothesis, he cannot himself make the experiment. The only thing that such an investigator can do scientifically is to observe what result follows in a case of this genuine faith in Jesus Christ. Now men who have themselves already accepted Christ and experienced in themselves his saving power may afterwards inspect their own case and scientifically infer from it in favor of Christianity. But thus to infer from an observed experience is not to make an experiment.

Here now is the error in the new apologetic: it is the assumption that the only sort of evidence, or rational ground of belief, is verified experiment. To this Dr. Wright adds the error of confounding the interrogation of the experimenter with the faith of the believer. Thus denying the possibility of religious beliefs based on adequate evidence, the Wright pragmatism sends us to beliefs mothered by choice.

But Christianity is a religion of facts. Take its central fact, the resurrection of the sinless Jesus. In this fact be disproved, if belief in this as a fact is rooted out of men's minds, Christianity must perish. Some who have already come to faith in Christ and to an inner experi-

ence of him may continue to hold to this faith after destructive criticism has constrained them no longer to assent to the fact of the resurrection; but this experience will become impossible in generations that have lost belief in the fact.

Or even if some in spite of critical skepticism have vital faith, there is a logical necessity demanding belief in the fact as a condition of faith in the Person. There can be no Christianity without Christ; and a Christ who has ceased to be is no Christ at all.

Let us therefore face the issue and emphasize its nature, that either Christianity is a delusion or the history given in the Gospels is true.

Let us become the severest of critics, searching for every possible evidence and weighing it with the one supreme will to believe just according to the evidence, to continue Christians if the Gospels are trustworthy or to give Christianity up as a delusion if the Gospels are a fiction.

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Is Christianity Practicable? Lectures delivered in Japan by WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN, PH.D., D.D., Union Seminary Lecturer on Christianity in the Far East. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1916. 12 mo. Net \$1.25.

It is always a difficult matter to attempt the interpretation of the Gospel to those of an alien race and creed. The difficulty of finding a common basis of belief must be overcome. The difficulty of choosing terms of expression that are worthy of the subject but yet intelligible to the hearer must be met. The temptation to flatter the Non-Christian and to eliminate from the discussion terms and truths that might displease him is ever present. This task becomes ten fold harder when the so-called Christian nations are at war. To such a labor was Dr. Brown assigned. He seeks to meet and overcome the objections raised by the war to Christianity as a world religion.

The first chapter takes up the world crisis as a challenge and as an opportunity. Fairly and clearly the arguments against Christianity as a social, world transforming religion are stated. It is claimed by those who have lost faith in the power of the Gospel, that its ideals which may work in individual cases fail when applied nationally and internationally; that the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of man are impossible; that Redemption through Christ has not made the warring nations Christlike; that the Church has failed of its universal mission and has become in each land an apologist for war and a defender of the existing government and its actions.

If it is argued that the work of the Church was never intended to be social, and that the world must of necessity grow worse, a remnant only being saved, Dr. Brown ably shows how unsatisfactory such a position must be. For we know ourselves as more than individuals, as members of society. The Scriptures expressly teach our responsibility for the establishment of righteousness. This appears in the doctrine