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BENJAMIN BRECKINRIDGE WARFIELD,
D.D., LL.D., LITT.D.

A MEMORIAL ADDRESS*

Princeton Theological Seminary is walking today in the shadow of an eclipse which in various degrees of visibility has been observed, I doubt not, throughout the greater part of the Christian world. Men may agree with Dr. Warfield or they may differ from him, but they must recognize his unswerving fidelity to what he believed to be the truth. Students of theology in whatever Christian communions they may be found must recognize him as an earnest co-worker in defending the authority and contents of the New Testament and in vindicating the central doctrines of our common Christianity. Nothing but ignorance of his exact scholarship, wide learning, varied writings, and the masterly way in which he did his work should prevent them from uniting with us today in the statement that a prince and a great man has fallen in Israel.

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I remember the shock which passed through this community when word went out that Dr. A. A. Hodge was dead. He had succeeded his father as his father had succeeded Dr. Archibald Alexander in the Chair of Systematic Theology. Less learned than his father, he was a man of greater genius. He was a deductive theologian. While giving proper regard to the exegetical support in behalf of each doctrine of the New Testament, the fact that it was the obvious and necessary consequence of another doctrine

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A Fragment of the Human Mind. By JOHN THEODORE MERZ, author of "A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century," "Religion and Science." New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1920. \$4.50.

This is the summary and key of the lifework of the author. It is an unusually clear exposition of his kind of idealism.

Insisting upon the use of the synoptic method, or the contemplating of the 'firmament of thought' as a totality rather than the isolation of this or that in the totality, he proceeds to discriminate existence, reality, and value. Whatever is in this totality exists, and nothing else exists; for only that exists for me which I think of. Hence to exist is the same as to be thought of, to exist for me is to be thought of by me, that is, to be embraced in my firmament of thought. "Existence belongs to everything that enters into our stream of thought; Reality belongs only to those experiences which have, as it were, a double existence, not only as features in our individual experience, but also as supposed to have an existence outside of this." And values are experiences which come or have come into our firmament of thought with a fringe of emotional satisfaction.

Our author refuses to use the terms matter and substance, and thus escapes from the necessity of distinguishing between matter and spirit, substance and quality. He identifies experience and the experient, making the ego the totality of experiences. And by making exist the same as exist for such and such an experient, he shakes himself free from the trammels of Common-Sense. Even the external world becomes merely certain features in the totality of each man's experience.

If one finds satisfaction in this species of speculation, and is willing to choke out the breath of Common-Sense and live a ghostly idealism, he will find Merz's work as fine a sleight-of-mind performance as any. Those who accept Merz's philosophy can go on living in the real world in which they have grown up and practising the same religious faith in which their characters have hitherto been nourished.

The *Fragment* deserves to be ranked high in this class of speculative compositions both for content and for style.

A few observations may not be out of place.

1. The assumption that 'exist' means just the same as 'exist for me,' which is contrary to the fact in the usage of language, enables the author to give a twist to 'real' and to 'value.' As a matter of fact, 'exist' is a predicate as applicable to that which exists outside of my experience as to that which exists within my experience; 'real,' is a predicate applicable to that which does exist as over against that which is conceived but does not exist; and 'having value,' is a predicate applicable to that whose value has not come to be appreciated as well as to that whose value has come to be appreciated. Why should philosophers endeavor to spin out systems of twisted terms?

2. Conspicuously this system of Merz, as all similar systems, denies the validity of some beliefs which human minds cannot but have, even that of the author while combatting them. This is an absurdity.

3. It yet remains for some philosopher to arise, who will use language consistently with its fixed intent and, once fixing a technical meaning for a term, will adhere to that exact meaning and not waver between that and some other meaning of the term; who will live his intellectual life in the fearless faith that he is not by nature a constituted dupe instead of attempting to enlarge his comprehension by shearing away some of his inescapable convictions; and who will use every available source and means of learning new beliefs, of criticizing and correcting his existing beliefs and the statements of them, and of organizing them into a complete system, instead of standing aloof from certain facts.

If Christianity is true, no philosophy can be true that is not in harmony with Christianity; if Christianity is false, no philosophy can be true that does not deny Christianity. Since the philosophy of this book, which the author modestly calls a fragment, might be held by a mind that has not decided about Christianity and by a mind that has decided about Christianity, it is not a system of philosophy but an intellectual plaything.

Staten Island, N. Y.

F. P. RAMSAY.

A Handbook to the Septuagint. By RICHARD R. OTTLEY, M.A. London: Methuen & Co.

"The object of this work is to induce people to read the Septuagint." The author tells what the Septuagint is, its age, its manuscripts, its history, the modern study of it, especially of its text, the character of the translation and the value of it in the study of the Old Testament. In conclusion, he shows how to work at it and gives a summary of the best books to use in its study.

To those who are familiar with Prof. Swete's "Introduction to the Old Testament in Greek," it will be evident that this book covers approximately the same ground as the earlier volume. It supplies a large number of new illustrations especially in the region of grammar and textual criticism. It is a valuable suggestion, that the Greek future is frequently employed in a representative capacity as the equivalent of the Hebrew imperfect and the Greek aorist for the Hebrew perfect.

We think Mr. Ottley sometimes finds variants in the texts where no variant really exists. Thus, in Ps. civ. 17 the Greek as it stands is a good rendition of the Hebrew, if we read בְּרוֹשִׁים for בְּרָאשִׁם. This phrase *berosh* is translated by some form of ἡγέομαι in Deut. i. 13, Mi. ii. 13, 2 Chr. xx. 27. "The stork's house leads them," or (as the Vulgate has it) *herodii domus dux est eorum* makes good sense and is a literal translation of the Hebrew with changes only in two vowel letters.

The Hebrew phrase in Isa. xxi. 20 which the English version, following the Vulgate, renders "like a wild bull in a net," the Greek translates by "like half-baked beets." If we can extend the meaning of σεντλιον so as to mean *herbs*, the Hebrew word תֹּמָא may be the equivalent of the Babylonian *tu'utu* "victuals," a synonym of *iptennu* "meal" and *makalu* "food." The root *ta'au* is a synonym of *akalu* = אָכַל