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I.

THE FUTURE OF CALVINISM.*

THE year 1892 was a year of great importance for the Reformed Churches of the Netherlands. Two influential groups of Churches, both originating in a secession from the Established Church, the one in 1834, the other in 1886, were, after long negotiations, brought together, and in June of that year held their "First General Synod of the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands." For various reasons this event has excited considerable interest. It was something unforeseen and unexpected. Both groups, to be sure, were one in their confession and form of government, and both shared the conviction that a Reformed Christian was in duty bound to his Bible and his confession to break with the Established Church. Still, concerning "the method of reformation," *i. e.*, the manner in which this breach ought to be brought about, there existed an appreciable difference of opinion. This difference in method gave rise to the different attitudes which the two sides assumed in relation to the property of the Established Church and the civil authorities. The Christian Reformed Church, originating in the secession of 1834, had gradually come to consider itself as an entirely new Church, and as having broken off all connection with both the governing bodies and the individual members of the establishment. Consequently it raised no claim in the civil courts to retain or recover the property of the Established Church, and presented itself to the civil authorities as a new and different organization. On the other hand, the so-called

* [Our readers are indebted to Prof. G. Vos, Ph.D., D.D., of Princeton Seminary, for the translation of Dr. Bavinck's paper.—EDITORS.]

II.

ANSELM OF CANTERBURY.*

I. ANSELM'S LIFE AND CHARACTER.

ANSELM OF CANTERBURY (1033–1109), “the father of the Schoolmen,” is one of the greatest and purest men of the mediæval Church. Like Bernard of Clairvaux, he touches the history of his age at every important point. He fought the battle of the Hildebrandian hierarchy against State despotism in England; by

* LITERATURE.

1. ANSELM *Opera omnia*, etc. Bened. ed. by D. GABR. GERBERON, Paris, 1675, reprinted 1721; Venet., 1744, 2 vols. fol. (best ed.); and in Migne's *Patrol. Lat.*, 2 vols. (Tom. 158 and 159, Paris, 1854).

Gerberon and Migne give also the works of Anselm's pupil, chaplain and biographer, EADMER, *De Vita Anselmi*, and *Historia Novorum*. Eadmer is the chief authority for his life, besides about 400 letters of Anselm.

The *Monologium*, *Prologium*, and *Cur Deus Homo* have often been separately edited and translated.

2. F. R. HASSE : *Anselm von Canterbury*, Leipzig, 1843–52, 2 vols. (Abridged transl. by W. Turner, London, 1850). One of the best Church-historical monographs, and the best on Anselm. It supersedes the earlier sketches of MÖHLER (1827, and in his *Vermischte Schriften*, i, 32, *sqq.*), VEDER (1832), and G. R. FRANCK (1842).

CH. DE RÉMUSAT : *Anselme de Cantorbéry, tableau de la monastique et de la lutte du pouvoir spirituel avec le pouvoir temporel*. Paris, 1853, 2d ed. 1868. German translation by Constant Wurzbach, Regensburg, 1854 (384 pp.).

Dean R. W. CHURCH (d. 1890) : *Saint Anselm*. London, 1870 (303 pp.). A good account of his life, but omits his philosophy and theology.

MARTIN RULE : *Life and Times of St. Anselm*. London, 1883, 2 vols.

EDWARD A. FREEMAN : *History of the Norman Conquest*, Vols. iii, iv and v (see Index, Vol. vi); and *The Reign of William Rufus*, London, 1882, 2 vols. (see Index, ii, 694, *sqq.*).

A good article by Canon Stephens in Leslie Stephens' *Dictionary of National Biography*, Vol. ii (1885), pp. 10–31.

The philosophy of Anselm is discussed by BOUCHITTÉ, with a French translation of the *Monologium* and *Prologium*, in his *Le Rationalism Chrétien* (Paris, 1842); by EMIL SAISSET in his *Mélanges d'histoire, de morale et de critique* (Paris, 1859); and in the relevant chapters in *Histories of Philosophy* by RITTER, ERDMANN, UEBERWEG, STÖCKL.

His doctrine of the atonement is ably analysed and criticised by BAUR in his *Geschichte der christl. Lehre von der Versöhnung* (Tübingen, 1833, pp. 142–189), and by RITSCHL in his *Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, 3 vols. (Vol. i, pp. 31–55 of the third ed., Bonn, 1889).

his elevated piety he ranks among the saints; and by his profound speculation he became the founder of scholastic theology, and one of the Doctors of the Church. While St. Bernard was greatest as a monk, Anselm was greatest as a theologian. He was the most original thinker the Church had had since the days of St. Augustin, and stands between him and St. Thomas Aquinas as to time and merit. He bears the name of "the second Augustin," and "the tongue of Augustin."

Anselm was born of noble ancestry at Aosta in Piedmont, on the borders of Lombardy and Burgundy, at the foot of the great St. Bernard, which divides Italy from Western Switzerland.* He was brought up by a pious mother, Ermenberga. His father, Gundulf, was a worldly, rough and violent nobleman, but on his deathbed he assumed the monastic garb to escape damnation.

In his childish imagination, Anselm conceived God Almighty as seated on a throne at the top of the Alps; in a dream, he went up the great St. Bernard to pay God a visit, and was graciously received and refreshed; on the following day he firmly believed that he had actually been in heaven and eaten at the table of the Lord.

Before he was fifteen years of age, he desired to become a monk, but his father protested, and the abbot to whom he applied, refused to receive him. For a while he relaxed his zeal, especially after the death of his mother. A quarrel with his father induced him to leave home and to cross Mt. Cenis to Burgundy and Normandy. He settled in the famous Norman monastery and school of Bec (*Le Bec*), then under the care of his illustrious Lombard countryman, Lanfranc.† "Here," he said, "shall be my resting-place; here God shall be my sole desire, His love my study, His blessed memory my comfort and satisfaction." Here he studied, took holy orders, was chosen prior in 1063, abbot in 1078. Here he wrote most of his works.

In 1093, he was chosen Archbishop of Canterbury against his will, and adorned that see till his death. Although of a mild and gentle disposition, he firmly stood up for the Hildebrandian theocracy, and was exiled by the despotic, profligate and profane King William Rufus, 1097, and was favorably received by Pope Urban II. He prevented the excommunication of the English king. He defended the Latin doctrine of the procession of the Spirit at Bari,

* Church gives in the first chapter of his *St. Anselm*, a graphic picture of "wild Aosta lulled by Alpine rills."

† For a good account of Bec, see Freeman, and Church (Chaps. ii and iii). Pope Alexander II (1061-73) was a pupil of this school, whose greatest ornaments were Lanfranc and Anselm. The last (nominal) abbot of Bec was M. de Talleyrand (Saisset, *Mélanges*, p. 8).

1098, and wrote his *Cur Deus Homo* in exile. He returned to England after the death of Rufus, had a quarrel with Henry I about investiture, refusing to consecrate prelates whom the king had invested, left England again, but was recalled in 1106 and settled the long dispute about investiture in 1107 by a compromise, but chiefly in the interest of the rights and liberties of the Church.

He died peacefully, surrounded by his friends and pupils, "as morning was breaking, on the Wednesday before the day of our Lord's Supper, May 21, 1109, the sixteenth of his pontificate and the seventy-sixth of his life."

Anselm was a man of guileless simplicity, spotless integrity, single devotion to truth and righteousness, firm in defending the right, patient in suffering, and universally revered as a saint before his official canonization.* Freeman, who views him chiefly in his political relations to the English sovereigns, says: "Anselm was before all things a preacher of righteousness, but when need called for it, he could put on the mantle of the statesman and even that of the warrior. Like our own Wulfstan, in many things his fellow, we find him the friend and counsellor of men of a character most opposite to his own. . . . When England, Normandy, France and the Empire, were, as they all were in his day, we can forgive him for looking on the Roman bishop as the one surviving embodiment of law and right."† Dean Church judges that "it would not be easy to find one who so joined the largeness and daring of a powerful and inquiring intellect with the graces and sweetness and unselfishness of the most lovable of friends, and with the fortitude, clear-sightedness, and dauntless firmness of a hero, forced into a hero's career in spite of himself, and compelled, by no seeking of his own, to control and direct the issues of eventful conflicts between the mightiest powers of his time."‡ Dante places him with "Nathan the seer and John Chrysostom" (both famous for rebuking vice in high places) among the spirits of light and power and "the ministers of God's gifts of reason" in the sphere of the sun.§

II. ANSELM'S WORKS.

The dogmatic works of Anselm are chiefly his *Monologium* and *Proslogium* which belong to natural theology, and his answer to the question, *Why God became Man*, || which treats of the atonement.

He wrote also on the Holy Trinity and the incarnation (against Roscelin); on the double procession of the Holy Spirit (against

* Under the infamous Alexander VI, 1494.

† *W. Rufus*, i, 369.

‡ *Saint Anselm*, Preface.

§ *Paradiso*, xii, 137.

|| *Cur Deus Homo*.

the Greek Church); on original sin; on free-will; on the harmony of foreknowledge and foreordination; on the fall of the devil. His meditations and prayers reveal the depth and fervor of his piety; his letters show him in his human relations, his tender sympathy and affection, his courtesy, firmness and patience.

III. ANSELM'S THEOLOGY.

Anselm was one of those rare characters in whom lofty reason and child-like faith work together in perfect harmony. Love to God was the heart of the living man; love to God is the centre of his theology. It was not doubt which led him to speculation, but enthusiasm for truth and the conviction that between the results of true reasoning and the experiences of a pure heart there could exist no discrepancy. The contents of the Christian faith were to him indisputable certainty. His fundamental proposition, which Schleiermacher adopted as a motto for his own theology, is that faith must precede knowledge.* Things divine must be embraced with a pious heart and experienced in actual life before they can be grasped by the intellect. "First the heart must be purified by faith," he says in another place,† "and the eyes must be clarified by submission to the commandments of the Lord, and through humble obedience to the divine Word we ourselves must become like children before we can grasp that knowledge which God has hid from the wise and prudent and revealed to babes (Matt. xi. 25). We must first renounce the flesh and live according to the Spirit before we can undertake to sound the depths of faith, for the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God (1 Cor. ii. 14). The more fully we are nourished by that which Holy Scripture teaches us, and, by obedience, feed ourselves upon it, the more fully we come into possession of that which really satisfies the craving of the soul for knowledge. He who has no faith shall have no experience, and he who has no experience can have no knowledge, for experience is as far above knowledge as knowledge is above mere hearsay."

On the other side, however, Anselm declared himself as emphatically against all blind belief, and calls it a sin of neglect when he who has faith does not strive after knowledge.‡ Man is created,

* *Neque enim quæro intelligere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam (Proslog., i)—Nam qui non crediderit, non experietur, et qui expertus non fuerit, non intelliget (De Fide Trin., 2).*

† *De Fide Trin., c. 2.*

‡ "Sicut rectus ordo exigit, ut profunda christianæ fidei credamus, priusquam ea præsumamus ratione discutere, ita negligentia mihi videtur, si postquam confirmati sumus in fide, non studemus, quod credimus, intelligere" (*Cur Deus Homo? L. 1, 2*).

he says in the *Monologium*, to love God above all and to build up within himself the Holy Trinity. This he cannot do without endeavoring to understand it, for the Holy Trinity is self-consciousness, intelligence and love.* The germ of knowledge has been implanted in man as part of the divine image, and it must be developed through spontaneous exertions. Faith and knowledge are related to each other as cause and effect, as premise and deduction. Hence there can be no real discrepancy between revelation and reason. The contents of our faith must be true according to our reason. When now and then Scripture seems to contradict our understanding, it is the latter which is at fault, and we must trust the former until a deeper search work out a reconciliation.

These views, in which supranaturalism and rationalism are harmonized, form the leading ideas of the theology of Anselm. The sources of knowledge according to him are the Bible and tradition, that is, the teaching of the Church, above all St. Augustin. He would make no assertion which he could not prove from these two sources.† This veneration for the great African teacher and his agreement with him in spirit and method secured for him the name of "the Second Augustin" and "the Tongue of Augustin." But the teaching of the Bible and the teaching of the Catholic Church were to him one, and one with all true philosophy.‡ He denied that theology had made any progress since St. Augustin, or could make any, while yet he himself produced some original ideas which left a permanent impress upon the history of theology.

The three most prominent points of Anselm's literary activity in the fields of philosophy and theology are: his opposition to Roscelin, the nominalist, against whom he wrote *De Fide Trinitatis et de Incarnatione Verbi*; his construction of the ontological proof for the existence of God in the *Proslogium*; and his doctrine of the atonement expounded in the form of a dialogue in *Cur Deus Homo?* He also wrote with great acuteness a defense of the double procession of the Holy Spirit against the Greek Church; treatises on the immaculate conception; on hereditary sin; on the harmony of prescience and predestination, grace and free will, on the fall of the devil. In addition to these scientific works we have from him quite a number of writings of a more practical character, homilies and sermons, some of which, however, are of doubtful authenticity, meditations and orations (*meditationes seu orationes*), an exposition of the secret converse which his soul held with God, and finally four

* *Sui-memoria, intelligentia et amor.*

† Eadmer: "*nihil asserere, nisi quod aut cononicis aut Augustini dictis posse defendi videret.*"

‡ Comp. *De Fide Trinit.*, c. 2.

hundred and twelve letters, in which we see him under the most varied circumstances, as a prelate of the Church, as a pastor of a flock, as a friend.

*Anselm's Doctrine of the Existence and Being of God.
The Ontological Argument.*

In the philosophical development of the idea of God, Anselm opens up a new epoch by his construction of the so-called ontological proof. Traces of such a construction are found already with St. Augustin, and it gradually grew upon Anselm that the existence of God and the attributes of His being could be demonstrated in strictly logical form. Day and night he was haunted by this idea. His devotional exercises were disturbed by it. He tried to throw it aside as a temptation from Satan. But he could not. At last, one night, during the vigil, the argument suddenly stood clear and complete before his mind, as if illuminated by a flash of lightning, and with great joy he now undertook its literary exposition and elaboration. It was given to the world in the *Monologium* or Soliloquy and in the *Proslogium* or Allocution, and these two works form the first striking example of scholastic meditation* or faith seeking knowledge.† They show, as do, indeed, all Anselm's works, that scholasticism was originally rooted in deep piety and devotion.

The *Proslogium* commences with an exhortation to contemplate God:

“Oh vain man! flee now, for a little while, from thine accustomed occupations; hide thyself, for a brief moment, from thy tumultuous thoughts; cast aside thy cares; postpone thy toilsome engagements; devote thyself awhile to God; repose for a moment in Him; enter into the sanctuary of thy soul; exclude thence all else but God, and whatever may aid thee in finding Him. Then, within the closed doors of thy retirement, inquire after thy God. Say now, oh my whole heart, say now to thy God: I seek Thy face; Thy face, oh Lord, do I seek. Therefore, oh Lord, my God, teach Thou now my heart where and how it may seek for Thee, where and how it may find Thee. . . . Teach me how to seek Thee, and while I am seeking, show Thyself to me, because, unless Thou teach me how, I cannot seek Thee, and unless Thou show Thyself, I cannot find Thee. Let me seek Thee by yearning towards Thee; let me yearn towards Thee while seeking Thee. Let me find Thee by loving Thee; let me love Thee in finding Thee. I confess, oh Lord,—and I thank Thee for it,—that Thou hast created in me this image of Thyself in order that I shall remember Thee and contemplate Thee and love Thee. But this image has now become so injured by the wear of vice and so darkened by the smoke of sins that it cannot do any more that which it was made to do, unless Thou wilt renew and reform it. I do not attempt to penetrate into Thy depths. For such a task my intellect is too feeble. But I desire, in some measure, to understand Thy truth which my heart believes and loves. Nor do I seek to understand in order that

* *Exemplum meditandi de ratione fidei.*

† *Fides quærens intellectum.*

I may believe, but I believe in order that I may understand, feeling sure of this, that if I did not believe, I would not understand.”

The author then goes on to prove the existence of God. He shows that it is necessary for the human mind to have an idea of something than which nothing greater can be conceived.* This even the fool, who saith in his heart, There is no God (Ps. xiv. 1), must admit. For when he hears it mentioned, he understands it, or forms a conception of it, and whatever is understood is in the intellect. This greatest thing, however, cannot exist in the intellect alone. For then something still greater could be conceived, namely something which should exist in reality also. “If, therefore, that than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the conception or intellect alone, then that very thing than which nothing greater can be conceived, is something than which a greater can be conceived, which is impossible. There exists, therefore, beyond doubt, both in the intellect and in reality, something than which nothing greater can be conceived. . . . So truly then does something exist, than which nothing greater can be conceived, that it is impossible to conceive this not to exist. And this art Thou, oh Lord our God! So truly, therefore, dost Thou exist, oh Lord my God, that Thou canst not be conceived not to exist. For this there is the highest reason. For, if any mind could conceive of anything better than Thou art, then the creature would ascend above the Creator and become His judge, which is supremely absurd. Everything else, indeed, which exists besides Thee, can be conceived not to exist. Thou alone, therefore, of all things hast being in the truest sense and in the highest degree; for everything else that exists, exists not so truly and has being only in an inferior sense. Why, then, has the fool said in his heart, There is no God? since it is so manifest to an intelligent mind that, of all things, Thine existence is the highest reality. Why? unless it is because he is a fool and destitute of reason.”

The syllogistic form of the argument is defective. Both the *propositio major* and the *propositio minor* rest upon a kind of *petitio principii*. It has force only on the ground of the absolute necessity of the conception of God, and the identity of necessary thought with objective existence. The weak spot of the conclusion was discovered by Gaunilo, a contemporary monk, who wrote against Anselm (*Liber pro Insipiente*) and protested against such an inference from the subjective conception to an objective existence. We cannot, he said, deduce the real existence of a lost island from an imaginative picture of its magnificence. Very true, but Anselm is, nevertheless, right when against this objection he protests (*Liber*

* *Aliquid quo nihil majus cogitari potest.*

Apologeticus) that there is a difference between the incidental conception of something relative and the necessary idea of the absolute.*

The remainder of the *Proslogium* is made up of an exposition of the attributes of God and a solution of the seeming contradictions, that He is omnipotent and still unable to do anything wrong; that He is compassionate and yet impassible; absolutely and supremely just and yet sparing the wicked (with a view to the exercise of compassion), and other questions. Finally the author expounds the mystery of the Trinity and the unspeakable greatness and goodness of God, and concludes with the words (c. 26): "Surely eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath the heart of man conceived in this life the extent to which the pious will know and love Thee in the life to come. Oh Lord, I beseech Thee, let me enter into the joy of the Lord, who is God, three and one, blessed for ever! Amen!"

Anselm's Doctrine of the Atonement.

In the development of the doctrine of the atonement, the celebrated book, *Cur Deus Homo?* begins a new chapter, and at the same time gives the most striking proof of the speculative acuteness of the author. Anselm was, indeed, the first who undertook to prove the necessity of the incarnation and of the death of Christ from the standpoint of pure reason. He tried to answer the question why the world had been redeemed by this means, and not, for instance, by an arbitrary act of God, or through some other person, man or angel; he tried to show that, on account of the burden of sin which pressed upon it, the world could not have been redeemed in any other way. Sin, he defines, to be a withholding of the honor due to God.† The will of the reasonable creature should be absolutely submissive to the will of God. To a created being the will of the Creator must be more than the sum of all besides, and it must be obeyed even though the whole world were thereby destroyed. As disobedience to the will of God and a withholding of the honor due to Him, sin entails an infinite guilt, because the honor of God is greater than the sum of all besides. But guilt and punishment are correlative ideas. As long as man does not give back to God what he has robbed Him of,‡ he remains in guilt and he cannot escape the punishment deserved unless by giving due satisfaction. Due satisfaction, however, does not simply consist in a restitution of that which is robbed. For his offense the sinner must give more than he has taken,§ just as he who has

* A similar answer can be given to Kant's objection to Anselm, in which the sum of one hundred dollars plays the part of Gaunilo's lost island.

† *Non aliud peccare quam Deo non reddere debitum*, c. i, 11.

‡ *Quamdiu non solvit, quod rapuit manet in culpa*.

§ *Pro contumelia illata plus reddere quam abstulit*.

wounded another, must not only heal the wound but also pay damages in order to satisfy the demands of justice.

The question next arises, Can man fulfill these demands and give full satisfaction? That is impossible. Did he lead a perfectly pure and holy life, he would simply be doing his duty and have nothing by which to pay off the debt contracted; and, sin having smitten his powers in their very roots, man can not even do his duty and live a pure and holy life. The case then stands thus: on the one side, man who must give satisfaction but cannot; on the other, God who by the very essence of His being, by His justice, is obliged to demand either satisfaction or punishment. But if God is not to destroy the human race, there is only one way out of the dilemma; and that is, He must become man Himself and give the satisfaction due by going voluntarily through death. For a created being can do nothing more than his duty, God alone *can* give the satisfaction due; but as it is man who *ought to give* the satisfaction demanded for salvation, the satisfaction must be given by the God-man (ii, 6).

God must then assume human nature, and that not in its original constitution, but such as it has become through development in the human race since Adam. In four different ways God can create an intelligent being, namely, through the common process of generation by man and wife; or without man and wife (Adam); or by man without wife (Eve); or by wife without man, which last is the case of Christ. This God-man now, if He shall be able to give full satisfaction, must give to God something which He is not bound to give and which is worth more than the sum of all besides God. He must give His life. Death Christ did not owe, for He had no sin, and death is the wages of sin. When He died, He died by an act of His own will, and by this voluntary self-sacrifice He acquired a claim on a reward. But as everything which the Father has, also belongs to the Son, He transferred on to the human race the merit due to Himself, and that merit, of infinite value because corresponding to the life of the God-man, covers the infinite guilt of mankind and forms the due satisfaction. In this way a reconciliation is established between the justice of God and His mercy (ii, 20).

Such ideas, as that the divine justice demands satisfaction, that Christ was able to give satisfaction because He was the God-man, that the death of Christ has the power to blot out the guilt of sin, were, no doubt, present in the Church before Anselm. But they were vague, without dialectical elaboration, objects of search rather than possession. Anselm was the first to develop them into a consistent and systematic theory. Not that he exhausted the subject and revealed the whole of the great secret, leaving no room for further research. On the contrary, the whole argument

emphasizes, in a one-sided manner, the divine justice in preference to the divine love. It presents the reconciliation of God to man, the idea of justice, completely, convincingly, but it neglects the reconciliation of man to God. The Anselmic theory must be supplemented by the ethical theory, which proceeds from the infinite love of God to man manifested in Christ, and drawing the sinner to Him.

Anselm's Mysticism.

With Anselm knowledge proceeds from faith, scholasticism from mysticism. While the dialectical exposition, the scholastic science, represent his character, as it developed itself by the free acts of his will, the given foundation of his character, the natural disposition, is represented by a rich fund of mysticism. We learn to know this side of his spiritual being especially from his *Meditationes seu Orationes*. In the various editions of his works the *meditationes* are separated from the *orationes*, but from his pen they proceeded promiscuously. The *orationes* are simply prayers; the *meditationes* are meditations in the strict sense of the word. Some thought or observation of life or inner experience is set forth and treated, not dialectically, but contemplatively, in its connection with the personal life of the author. A few of them, as for instance numbers 9, 13 and 15-17, are considered spurious by Gerberon and Hasse.

The style of these meditations is not different from that of the dialectical writings. It is overloaded and strained, and shows very plainly that the author is expressing himself in a dead language, through an entirely artificial medium. But the ideas are often so grand and so simple in their grandeur; the current of sentiment upon which they move is often so pure and in its purity so powerful; and the frame-work of imagination which holds them together is often so sublime and so genuinely creative; that in the impression which these meditations make the devotional becomes blended with the poetical in a way which reminds one of the Prophets. In the first meditation the author makes a long, very long, comparison between human life and a walk across a slender bridge spanning an abyss, from whose unknown depths ghastly horrors and temptations arise all around, while for each step the walker takes, representing one day of human life, one board of the bridge falls off behind him, making a return an impossibility. The execution of this comparison is so minute and painstaking that, to modern taste, it seems pedantic and even awkward. Nevertheless, no novelist could produce a more realistic impression of the danger and dizziness of the walk and, besides this, no reader can help feeling that he who wrote these passages was himself walking across the bridge, seeing

the horrors, conscious of the danger, hearing the boards fall off behind him, one by one, and yet calm, undaunted and full of trust.

In the mysticism of Anselm there is no trace of pantheism. Its character is passionate conviction rather than enthusiastic intuition. The main artery pulsating through the meditations is the idea that man was created in the image of God (Med. i). From this idea, as their root, spring both Anselm's psychology and his ethics. Because we were created in the image of God, we are able to know Him (Med. ix). If we were not created in His image, we should be able only to love Him. But since our knowledge of God depends upon our being created in His image, we not only *can* know Him, but we *shall* know Him. Barrenness of intellect is a sin (Med. ii), for ignorance of God means that the image of Him has been obscured in the soul, that we have lost it, that we have turned away from God, that we are morally fallen. And this idea of withholding from God the honor due to Him, of defiling His image by sin and guilt, is so horrible to the eyes of Anselm that, with an audacity which reminds one of the paradoxes of Meister Eckart, he burst out (Med. xx): "I would rather go innocent to Hell than guilty to Heaven," though he does not forget to add, "if such a choice were possible."

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