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I.

THE PLAN OF THE NEW BIBLE REVISION.

WITHIN a few weeks past there has appeared a volume which has for some time been looked for with great and growing interest. This is the New Testament as revised by a number of British and American scholars, which is now given to the world without waiting for the Old Testament, the completion of which is not expected for two or three years to come. In the next number of this REVIEW there will be a careful critical estimate of the characteristic features of this interesting and important volume. What is now proposed is to give some account of the origin and progress of the whole movement for revision, and to consider the plan upon which it has been and is to be conducted.

In regard to the authorized version there has been for a long time a substantial agreement among all the learned upon two points: first, that in point of fidelity and elegance, the English Bible, as a whole, is equal if not superior to any other version, ancient or modern; but, secondly, that in particular places it is defective, owing to the progress made in grammar, lexicography, exegesis, criticism, and archæology since the days of King James, and also to the inevitable changes in the meaning and use of many English words and phrases. Attempts, therefore, at a new version in whole or in

ures; Trinitarian Theology; Anthropology; The Trinity as related to Creation, Providence, and Redemption; Soteriology; Pneumatology, or the Work of the Holy Spirit; Ecclesiology; and Eschatology.

A table of contents has not the interest or instructiveness of a book, and yet this little volume has much interest and instructiveness for any one versed in theological knowledge. It is a fine piece of analysis, and evinces that the classes at Lane Seminary are made to do thorough work both within and without the lecture-room. When the system shall be given to the public, it will be marked by comprehensiveness, accuracy, vigor, and freshness, if the nature of it is to be deduced from these *indicia*.

One or two negative criticisms occur on perusal. It strikes us that the fourth part contains some matter, such as eternal generation, etc., that naturally belongs to the second. To discuss the trinitarian relations again after anthropology seems to be going over ground a second time. Dr. Morris, as does Dr. Hodge, discusses the Person of Christ under the head of Soteriology. This latter properly includes only the work, and not the person. The proper term is either Christology or Soteriology. There is the same objection to bringing the person of Christ under the head of his work, that there would be to bringing the persons of the Godhead under the head of a divine work: to discussing the Trinity under the head of Creation or Providence.

Occasionally the author's catch-words might convey a different impression regarding his theological position from what his discussion does. "Man," he says (p. 21), "is endowed with ability, though fallen and depraved." But this must be taken in connection with the statements on p. 20, that "sin is more than an act; a tendency, disposition, purpose, state"; and that "depravity contains within itself no principle of restoration." These statements also qualify the statement on p. 20, that "the true seat of sin is not in nature, but in character."

W. G. T. SHEDD.

THE HUMILIATION OF CHRIST. By A. B. BRUCE, D.D. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, and Scribner & Welford, New York.

This able treatise has passed to a second edition, to which the author has added a lecture upon the Modern Humanistic Theories of Christ's Person. The volume is a fine example of learning, compression of matter, and reasoning. The student can obtain from this single book a satisfactory acquaintance with the subject of Christ's humiliation as it has been discussed in the Patristic, Mediæval, Lutheran, and Reformed churches. It is the only English work that gives anything like a thorough view of the Kenotic theories.

The author first makes a rapid sketch of the Christology of Apollinaris, Cyril, Nestorius, Eutyches, Leo, and John Damascene; marking the peculiarities of the Monophysite, Monothelite, and Adoptian controversies. The view of Aquinas is touched upon, and then the writer passes to the Lutheran statements by Brentz and Chemnitz and the Giessen and Tübingen theologians; then to those of Zanchius and Hulsius of the Reformed Church; and lastly to those of Thomasius, Gess, Ebrard, and Martensen.

Dr. Bruce stands by the Reformed Christology, though regarding it as too briefly and imperfectly treated. He describes the Lutheran Christology as a "deification of humanity rather than a descent of God into humanity, investing the human nature of Christ with all divine attributes, even with such metaphysical ones as are commonly regarded and described as incommunicable" (p. 3). He has, however, not only a candid, but a somewhat kindly feeling toward the Lutheran Kenotic theories, and attributes to some of the objections urged from this quarter against the Chalcedon Christology more weight in our judgment than they are entitled to. He has given more attention, apparently, to the Lutheran than to the Reformed Christology. We see no reference, for instance, to the careful discriminations of Turretin under this

locus, or to the abundant material furnished by De Moor or Marck. We think that stronger replies to the Lutheran charge of a double personality as necessarily implied in the double natures of Christ might have been found in these and similar sources.

We have not the time to enter into an extended examination of this valuable treatise, and must content ourselves with two remarks suggested by it.

1. In the first place, the difference between the Reformed and the Later-Lutheran Christology, is the difference between union and transmutation. The former affirms that Jesus Christ is constituted of two diverse natures united together without change; the latter, that He is constituted of two diverse natures, one interpenetrating and *altering* the other. The Lutheran asserts that the divine nature communicates some of its properties to the human; the Reformed denies this. According to the Reformed view, the human nature after the incarnation is still a pure and simple humanity. It has no divine properties by communication from the divine essence. It is greatly exalted in its degree of excellence by its union with deity, but not changed in kind. The human is only human, and that forever. The Lutheran, on the contrary, ascribes to the human nature when assumed by the Logos certain new properties—such as omnipresence, omnipotence, and omniscience—which expel the old finite properties of locality, weakness, and ignorance, so that the human nature is transmuted into the divine. This is more than simple union of two natures; it is transmutation of one into the other.

This substitution of transmutation of natures for union of natures arose from an erroneous conception of personality. The Lutheran supposes that if there is to be only one person, there must be only one nature. This is the reason for his strenuous endeavor to convert the two natures into one nature. This was the false notion of the old Monophysitism. If two natures, then two persons; if one nature, then one person. This was the postulate. But a self-conscious person may be constituted of one nature, or of two natures, or of three natures. A person may be either simple or complex. A trinitarian person, for example, is constituted of only one nature. He is wholly spiritual and immaterial. The second person in the Godhead is the divine essence in a particular mode of subsistence. He is pure spirit, without body, parts or passions. Here is a case of a single self-consciousness with only a single nature. A human person, again, is constituted of two natures: a soul and a body. A man is not, like God the Father or God the Son, purely and only spirit. He is composed of two substances as diverse as mind and matter. And yet there is only one self-consciousness. One and the same man is conscious of the spiritual feelings of his soul and of the physical sensations of his body. The former spring out of his immaterial nature, the latter out of his material. Having double natures, he has double consciousness and a single self-consciousness. Here a human person differs from a trinitarian person. The latter can have only one mode or form of consciousness, namely, a spiritual form. The former can have two modes, namely, one spiritual and one physical. A divine person has but one mode of consciousness and one self-consciousness; a human person has two modes of consciousness and one self-consciousness.

And yet even a human person, like a trinitarian person, can have self-consciousness with only one nature. When, for example, the human body is separated from the human soul at death, the self-consciousness continues; but only one form of consciousness is now possible. The soul without the body cannot experience physical sensations. The experience of the disembodied state must be wholly mental or spiritual. There can be no sensuous elements in it, because the body with the five senses is temporarily separated from the soul. The man must now get his consciousness through only his immaterial nature. There is a recollection of past sensuous experience, but no present actual sensation through the bodily senses. Not until the resurrection of the body and its reunion with the soul, can both modes of consciousness—the physical and mental—be experienced again together. This

proves that a single self-consciousness is possible, either with one or with two natures; only, the elements of it will not be so varied in one case as in the other.

A theanthropic person is still more complex than a human person. He has three diverse natures, each yielding their diverse modes of consciousness, and yet only a single self-consciousness. The Lord Jesus Christ is constituted of three substances distinct and different in kind from each other. He is composed of one infinite spirit, one finite spirit, and one finite body. The God-man is the divine Essence, a reasonable soul, and a true body, in union. Why should such a diversity of components be thought to be incompatible with a single self-consciousness? If two natures or substances, as diverse in kind from each other as a man's immaterial spirit and his material body, can constitute only one person, and yield a single self-consciousness with its doubleness of experiences or consciousnesses, why is it so difficult, as the Kenosist asserts it is, to believe that three natures or substances as diverse as the divine essence, a man's spirit, and a man's body, should likewise constitute only a single person, and yield a single self-consciousness with its threefoldedness of experience or consciousness; namely, those of the divine essence, of a rational soul, and of a sensuous body? If it is not necessary to assert that spirit is changed into body, or body into spirit, in order to account for a single personality in the case of a man, why is it necessary to assume that the human nature must be transmuted into the divine, in order that there may be a single personality in the instance of a God-man? If complexity of natures is not incompatible with self-consciousness in human psychology, why is it in theanthropic psychology? Had more notice been taken of the complexity and diversity of nature found in our own ordinary human personality, in the discussion, it seems to us that the assumption that began in Apollinarism, and has run on through the whole history of the controversy: namely, that personality necessarily implies simplicity of structure and singleness of nature, and is incompatible with complexity and duality, would have been invalidated more readily.

2. In the second place, the Reformed theologians emphasize and the Lutheran neglect—though they do not deny—the distinction between a nature and a person. The charge of the latter that the Reformed Christology, as well as the Chalcedon before it, is Nestorian and doubles the personality of Christ, springs out of this omission. According to the Scriptures, the second person of the Trinity assumed into union the "seed" of the woman, the "seed" of Abraham, the "seed" of David, the "flesh and blood" of the Virgin. Inspiration thus guards against the supposition that the Logos united himself with an individual person. This "seed" or "human nature" is impersonal until it is personalized by the personality of the Logos with whom it is united. It gets its personality through the trinitarian personality. When, and not till when, the Logos unites himself with the seed of the woman, is there an individual man, Jesus Christ. Prior to this act and instant, there is only an individualized "seed," "flesh and blood," or human substance. Hence, only one single person results from this union. This "flesh and blood" of man might have been individualized by ordinary generation—the usual mode of personalizing a transmitted portion of human nature. In this case, the resulting individual would have been a distinct and separate person and a sinful person. Had the Logos united himself with *this*, he would have been two persons, and one of them would have been sinful. But this was not the manner in which God the Son and a human nature were united. "The Son of God," says Hooker, v. 52, "did not assume a man's person into his own person, but a man's nature to his own person; and therefore he took semen, the seed of Abraham, the very first original element of our nature, before it was come to have any personal subsistence." Similarly, Owen (Holy Spirit, ii. 3), says that "the Son of God, in his assuming human nature to be his own, did not take an individual person of any one into a near conjunction with himself, but preventing [anticipating] the personal subsistence of human nature in that flesh [of the Virgin] which he assumed, he gave it its subsistence [*i. e.*, its personality] in his own per-

son, whence it hath its individuation and distinction from all other persons whatever." This miraculous conception and personalizing of the human nature perfectly sanctified it, so that the instant it was assumed into union with the Logos, it was that "holy thing" spoken of by the angel Gabriel, and described by the apostle as "holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners."

It is frequently assumed that individuality is a necessary property of human nature, and that there is no such entity as a human nature that is not also a human individual. But this is not so. Individuality relates to the *form* of a substance or nature, and not to its intrinsic properties. The form of a vase, into which a piece of clay is moulded, is not one of the essential properties of clay. The clay has all of its necessary properties, even if it should never be moulded at all by the potter. So, too, a human nature has all the human properties, even though it should never be individualized by generation. It is capable of becoming a person, though as yet it is not one. It is not a brute nature, because it has spiritual, rational, and voluntary elements in its substance. It is not inorganic nature, because it is vital substance. This truth is clearly stated by Turretin, in his account of Christ's human nature, *Institutio* XIII., vi. 18: "Although the human nature of Christ is a spiritual and intelligent substance, and perfect in respect to the existence and properties of such a substance, yet it is not at first [statim] a person, because it has not that peculiar incommunicable property which constitutes a subsistence as distinguished from a substance [or a person as distinguished from a nature]—just as soul (anima), taken by itself, is a particular intelligent substance, yet not a person, because it is an incomplete part of a greater whole. It requires to be united with a body before there can be an individual man. It does not derogate from the reality and perfection of Christ's human nature to say that before it was assumed into union with the Logos it was destitute of personality, because we measure the reality and dignity of a human nature by the essential properties of this nature, and not by the characteristic of individuality subsequently added to it. These essential properties belong to it by *creation*, but the individual form is superinduced after creation by *generation*. The definition of substance or nature, consequently, differs from the definition of subsistence or person. Personality is not an integral and essential part of a nature, but is, as it were, the terminus to which it tends; and Christ's human nature acquired a more exalted and perfect personality by subsisting in the Logos than it would had it acquired personality by ordinary generation."

If these two points are kept in view, namely, that the divine and human natures in Christ's person are united, but not transmuted, and that the human nature is assumed into union in its unindividualized state, there need be no logical difficulty in the construction of Christ's single personality. The fathers at Chalcedon did this, and so did leading schoolmen like Aquinas. The Reformed theologians did the same; while the Lutheran divines very soon showed a tendency toward the ancient Monophysitism—a tendency which in some of the later speculations has gone to even a greater extreme than those of Apollinaris and Eutyches, and to which this volume of Dr. Bruce furnishes an excellent corrective. W. G. T. SHEDD.

DIE EPIPHANIE IM LEBEN DES HERRN, von F. L. STEINMEYER. Berlin, 1880: Verlag von Wiegandt und Grieben. [B. Westermann & Co., N. Y.]

What is the idea or true notion of the Epiphany? This is the question which Prof. Steinmeyer properly raises at the very outstart. Is it, primarily, the manifestation of Christ to the world? Or is it the divine manifestation in Christ and to Christ; and, then, the manifestation of Christ to the world?

The distinction is important. If the former constitutes the idea, then the Epiphany may be external and phenomenal, and may be confined to a day, or, at most, to single occasions in the life of Christ. Then a commemorative festival, if intro-