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I.

THE INFLUENCE OF PAGANISM ON POST- APOSTOLIC CHRISTIANITY.

EVERY reader of early Christian literature, unless wholly prejudiced by his dogmatic views of Christianity, must recognize the inferiority, as exponents of Christian thought, of the literary productions known to have come from the post-apostolic age, to those which form our New Testament. This inferiority is not merely of literary power but of grasp on Christian ideas. When we turn from the New Testament to Clement of Rome or Ignatius, to the unknown author of the so-called Epistle of Barnabas or to Justin Martyr, we pass manifestly from the teaching of masters whose hold on Christian truth is firm and whose view of it is pure and clear to the teaching of disciples whose hold trembles and whose view is partial and dim. In post-apostolic literature the New Testament doctrines are often reproduced in a fragmentary way. They are mixed with other ideas foreign to apostolic Christianity. The latter is unintentionally distorted and misrepresented. The points of view from which the New Testament authors presented their religion had been, it would appear, frequently lost by their successors, so that apostolic phrases were not seldom repeated with changed meanings.

This is quite a different phenomenon from that of the various types of doctrine found in the New Testament itself. It is true that Paul's conception of faith was not identical with that of James nor his presentation of it with that of the Epistle to the Hebrews. We would have had a very incomplete idea of Christ's ministry if the fourth Gospel had not supplemented the synoptic narrative. The New Testament writers had, in short, their individual points of view and doctrinal characteristics. Their mental peculiarities and their

II.

THE IMPECCABILITY OF CHRIST.

THE doctrine of Christ's person is not complete without considering the subject of his impeccability. That he was sinless is generally acknowledged. But that he was impeccable is frequently overlooked, and in some instances denied. The character of Jesus has called forth many monographs of late, in which the sinless perfection of his character is delineated and eulogized, but in which little or nothing is said of his impeccability. The treatise of Ullmann, for example, is profound and thoughtful upon Christ's sinlessness, but deficient on the latter point.

The holiness of the God-man is more than sinlessness. The last Adam differs from the first in this respect. He was characterized not only by the *posse non peccare*, but the *non posse peccare*. He was not only able to overcome temptation, but was unable to be overcome by it.

An impeccable will is one that is so mighty in its self-determination to good, that it cannot be conquered by any temptation to evil, however great. A will may be determined to good and able to subdue temptation, and yet not be so omnipotent in its holy energy that it cannot be subdued. The angels who fell could have repelled temptation with that degree of power given them by creation, and so might Adam. But in neither case was it infallibly certain that they would repel it. Though they were holy, they were not impeccable. Their will could be overcome because it was not almighty, and their perseverance was left to themselves and not made sure by extraordinary grace. The case of Jesus Christ, the second Adam, was different, in that he was not only able to resist temptation, but it was infallibly certain that he would resist it. The holy energy of his will was not only sufficiently strong to conquer evil, but was so additionally strong that it could not be conquered by it.

The proof of Christ's impeccability rests upon two grounds : The Scripture representations and the peculiar constitution of his person.

1. Revelation describes the Redeemer of man as immutable. "Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, and to-day, and forever" (Heb.

xiii. 8). This immutability belongs to all the qualities of his person. His holiness is one of the most important of these. If the God-man, like Adam, had had a holiness that was mutable and might be lost, it would be improper to speak of him in terms that are applicable only to the unchangeable holiness of God. He would not be holy, harmless, and undefiled, "yesterday, to-day, and forever."

Again, a mutable holiness would be incompatible with other divine attributes ascribed to the God-man. (a) The possibility of being overcome by temptation is inconsistent with the omnipotence of Christ. It implies that a finite power can overcome an infinite one. All temptation to sin must proceed from a created being, either man or angel. Temptation proper, in distinction from God's paternal trial, must always be finite. God tempts no man in the strict sense of the term (James i. 13). But if a finite temptation is met by an infinite power of resistance, the result must be the failure of the temptation, and not the defeat of the tempted person. (b) The success of temptation depends, in part, upon deceiving the person tempted. "Adam was not deceived, but the woman being deceived was in the transgression" (1 Tim. ii. 14). A finite intelligence may be deceived, but an infinite intelligence cannot be. Therefore, the omniscience which characterizes the God-man made his apostasy from God impossible. (c) A mutable holiness is irreconcilable with the fact that the God-man is the author of holiness. He is "the author and finisher of our faith" (Heb. xii. 2). The "last Adam is a quickening spirit" (1 Cor. xv. 45). This means that, unlike the "first Adam," he is the fountain of spiritual and holy life for others; and this implies the unchangeable nature of his own holiness. In Rom. i. 4 the divine nature of our Lord is described as "a spirit of holiness." The genitive here is not equivalent to an adjective, but denotes that the noun which it limits is a source of the quality spoken of.

In accordance with these representations of Scripture respecting the person of Christ, the symbols and theologians have generally affirmed his impeccability. Augustine and Anselm attribute this characteristic to him (Neander, "History," IV. 495, 496).

2. The truth and self-consistence of the doctrine of Christ's impeccability appear also from a consideration of the constitution of his person. Christ's person is constituted of two natures: one divine and the other human. The divine nature is both intemptable and impeccable. "God cannot be tempted with evil" (James i. 13). "It is impossible for God to lie" (Heb. vi. 18). The human nature, on the contrary, is both temptable and peccable. When these two natures are *united* in one theanthropic person, as they are

in the incarnation, the divine determines and controls the human, not the human the divine. The amount of energy, therefore, which the total complex person possesses to resist temptation must be measured not by the human nature, but by the divine; and the amount of energy to resist temptation determines the peccability or impeccability of the person. Jesus Christ, consequently, is as mighty to overcome sin and Satan as his mightiest nature is. His strength to prevent a lapse from holiness is to be estimated by his divinity, not by his humanity, because the former and not the latter is the base of his personality, and dominates the whole complex person.

Consequently, what might be done by the human nature if *alone* and by itself cannot be done by it in this *union* with omnipotent holiness. An iron wire by itself can be bent and broken in a man's hand; but when the wire is welded into an iron bar, it can no longer be so bent and broken. And yet, iron, whether in a bar or in a wire, is a ductile and flexible metal; and human nature, whether in a God-man or a mere man, is a temptable and fallible nature. A mere man can be overcome by temptation, but a God-man cannot be. When, therefore, it is asked if the person named Jesus Christ, and constituted of two natures, was peccable, the answer must be in the negative. For in this case the divine nature comes into the account. As this is confessedly omnipotent, it imparts to the person Jesus Christ this divine characteristic. The omnipotence of the Logos preserves the finite human nature from falling, however great may be the stress of temptation to which this finite nature is exposed. Consequently, Christ, while having a peccable *nature* in his constitution, was an impeccable *person*. Impeccability characterizes the God-man as a totality, while peccability is a property of his humanity.

But it may be objected that the properties of either nature may be attributed to the person of the God-man, and that therefore both peccability and impeccability may be attributed to him. We say that Jesus Christ is both finite and infinite, passible and impassible, impotent and omnipotent, ignorant and omniscient; why may we not also say that he is both peccable and impeccable? If the union in one person of the two natures allows of the attribution of contrary characteristics to the one God-man in these other instances, why not also in this instance?

Because, in this latter instance, the divine nature cannot *innocently* and *righteously* leave the human nature to its own finiteness without any support from the divine, as it can in the other instances. When the Logos goes into union with a human nature, so as to constitute

a single person with it, he becomes responsible for all that this person does through the instrumentality of this nature. The glory or the shame, the merit or the blame, as the case may be, is attributable to this one person of the God-man. If, therefore, the Logos should make no resistance to the temptation with which Satan assailed the human nature in the wilderness, and should permit the humanity to yield to it and commit sin, he would be implicated in the apostasy and sin. The guilt would not be confined to the human nature. It would attach to the whole theanthropic person. And since the Logos is the root and base of the person, it would attach to him in an eminent manner. Should Jesus Christ sin, incarnate God would sin.

In reference, therefore, to such a characteristic as *sin*, the divine nature may not desert the human nature and leave it to itself. In reference to all other characteristics it may. The divine nature may leave the human nature alone, so that there shall be ignorance of the day of judgment, so that there shall be physical weakness and pain, so that there shall be mental limitation and sorrow, so that there shall be desertion by God and the pangs of death. There is no sin or guilt in any of these. These characteristics may all attach to the total person of the God-man without any aspersion upon his infinite purity and holiness. They do, indeed, imply the humiliation of the Logos, but not his culpability. Suffering is humiliation, but not degradation or wickedness. The Logos could consent to suffer in a human nature, but not to sin in a human nature. The God-man was commissioned to suffer (John x. 18), but was not commissioned to sin.

Consequently, all the innocent limitations and defects of the finite may be attributed to Jesus Christ, but not its culpable limitations and defects. The God-man may be weak, or sorrowful, or hungry, or weary ; he may be crucified, dead, and buried, but he may not be sinful and guilty. For this reason, the divine nature constantly supports the human nature under all the temptations to sin that are presented to it. It never deserts it in this case. It empowers it with an energy of resistance that renders it triumphant over the subtlest and strongest solicitations to transgress the law of God. It deserts the humanity so that it may suffer for the atonement of sin, but it never deserts the humanity so that it may fall into sin itself. When Christ cried, "My God, why hast thou forsaken me?" the desertion of the finite by the infinite nature occurred in order that there might be suffering, not that there might be sin. The divine nature, at the very moment of this agony and passion, was sustaining the human nature so that it should not sinfully yield to what

was the most powerful temptation ever addressed to a human nature—namely, the temptation to flee from and escape the immense atoning agony which the God-man had covenanted with the Father to undergo. This is implied in Christ's words, "If it be possible, let this cup pass; nevertheless, not my will but thine be done. The cup that my Father giveth me, shall I not drink it?"

Again, the impeccability of Christ is proved by the relation of the two wills in his person to each other. Each nature, in order to be complete, entire, and wanting nothing, has its own will; but the finite will never antagonizes the infinite will, but obeys it invariably and perfectly. If this should for an instant cease to be the case, there would be a conflict in the self-consciousness of Jesus Christ similar to that in the self-consciousness of his apostle Paul. He, too, would say, "The good that I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do. It is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me?" (Rom. vii. 19, 20, 24). But there is no such utterance as this from the lips of the God-man. On the contrary, there is the calm inquiry of Christ: "Which of you convinceth me of sin?" (John viii. 46); and the confident affirmation of his apostle, "In him was no sin" (1 John iii. 5). There is an utter absence of personal confession of sin, in any form whatever, either in the conversation or the prayers of Jesus Christ. There is no sense of indwelling sin. He could not describe his religious experience as his apostle does and his people do: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit; and the spirit against the flesh" (Gal. v. 17).

It is objected to the doctrine of Christ's impeccability that it is inconsistent with his temptability. A person who cannot sin, it is said, cannot be tempted to sin. This is not correct, any more than it would be correct to say that because an army cannot be conquered it cannot be attacked. Temptability depends upon the constitutional *susceptibility*, while impeccability depends upon the *will*. So far as his natural susceptibility, both physical and mental, was concerned, Jesus Christ was open to all forms of human temptation excepting those that spring out of lust or corruption of nature. But his peccability, or the possibility of being overcome by these temptations, would depend upon the amount of voluntary resistance which he was able to bring to bear against them. Those temptations were very strong, but if the self-determination of his holy will was stronger than they, then they could not induce him to sin, and he would be impeccable. And yet, plainly, he would be temptable.

That an impeccable being can be tempted is proved by the instance of the elect angels. Having "kept their first estate," they

are now impeccable not by their own inherent power, but by the power of God bestowed upon them. But they might be tempted still, though we have reason to believe that they are not. Temptability is one of the necessary limitations of the finite spirit. No creature is beyond the possibility of temptation, though he may, by grace, be beyond the possibility of yielding to temptation. The only being who cannot be tempted is God, *ὁ γὰρ θεὸς ἀπείραστος* (James i. 13). And this, from the nature of an Infinite Being. Ambition of some sort is the motive at the bottom of all temptation. When the creature is tempted, it is suggested to him to endeavor to "be as gods." He is incited to strive for a higher place in the grade of being than he now occupies. But this, of course, cannot apply to the Supreme Being. He is already God over all and blessed forever. He, therefore, is absolutely intemptable.

Again, redeemed men in heaven are impeccable through the grace and power of Christ their head. Yet they are still temptable, though not exposed to temptation. Redemption, while it secures from the possibility of a second apostasy, does not alter the finite nature of man. He is still a temptable creature.

And, in like manner, Christ the God-man was temptable, though impeccable. But his impeccability, unlike that of the elect angels and redeemed men, is due not to grace but to the omnipotent and immutable holiness of the Logos in his person. One of the reasons mentioned in Scripture (Heb. ii. 14-18) for the assumption of a human nature into union with the second person of the Trinity is, that this person might be tempted. The Logos previous to the incarnation could not be tempted. The human nature was the avenue to temptation; but the divine nature so empowered and actuated the human, the divine will so strengthened the human will, that no conceivable stress of temptation could overcome Jesus Christ and bring about the apostasy of the second Adam.

The temptability of Christ through his human nature may be illustrated by the temptability of a man through his sensuous nature. A man's body is the avenue of sensual solicitation to his soul. A certain class of human temptations are wholly physical. They could not present themselves through the mental or immaterial part of man. Take away the body, and the man could not be assailed by this class of temptations. These, it is true, do not constitute the whole of human temptations. Fallen man is tempted through his soul as well as through his body. But we can distinguish between the two inlets of temptation. Now, as the mind of man, which may be called his higher nature, is approached by temptation through his body, which is his lower nature, so the divinity of Christ, which is

his higher nature, was approached by temptation through his humanity, which is his lower nature. The God-man was temptable through his human nature, not through his divine ; and he was impeccable because of his divine nature, not because of his human.

Temptability and peccability may be in inverse proportion to each other, and this proves that the two things are entirely distinct and diverse. There may be a great temptation with little possibility of its succeeding, owing to the great strength of character and the great voluntary resistance that is made. Here there is great temptability and little peccability. A very strong temptation is required to overcome a very virtuous person. The God-fearing man must be plied with far more sollicitation than the irreligious man, in order to bring about a fall into sin. Some saintly men repel a species and stress of sollicitation which, if it were applied to some vicious men, would cause them to sin immediately. To such apply the lines of Watts :

“ Nor can a bold temptation draw
His steady soul aside.”

The patriarch Joseph was as strongly tempted as ever Charles II. was, but there was less possibility of yielding to temptation—that is, less peccability. A godly poor man with a suffering family whom he tenderly loves may be as strongly tempted to steal or embezzle, for the sake of his family, as an ungodly poor man in a similar case, but the peccability of the former is less than that of the latter. And for the reason that has been mentioned—namely, that the temptability is in the susceptibility, but the peccability is in the will. And while the susceptibility, or sensibility to the sollicitation, may be the same in the two men, the wills of the two men have become very different from each other. The will of the one has been renewed and endowed with a divine energy of resistance, while the other possesses only the power of a self-enslaved faculty.

Upon the same principle, there may be the very greatest degree of temptation where there is no possibility at all of its succeeding ; there may be the highest temptability and absolute impeccability. Such we suppose to have been the case of our Lord, the God-man. He had a perfectly pure human nature, which was exceedingly sensitive, because of this purity, to all innocent desires and cravings. No human being ever felt the gnawings of hunger as he experienced them after the forty days' fast, during which time he was miraculously kept alive, “ and was *afterward* an hungered ” (Matt. iv. 2 ; Luke iv. 2). No human being ever felt a deeper sorrow under bereavement than he felt at the death of Lazarus, when the God-man wept. No human soul was ever filled with such an awful agony of

pain as that which expressed itself in the words, "My God, why hast thou forsaken me?" and which had previously forced the globules of blood through the pores of the flesh. "The Lord Jesus endured most grievous torments immediately in his soul, and most painful sufferings in his body" ("Westminster Confession," viii. 4). It is to this extreme sensibility, and susceptibility, and temptability that our Lord alludes when he says (Luke xxii. 28, 29), "Ye are they which have continued with me in my temptations. And I appoint unto you a kingdom, as my Father hath appointed unto me; that ye may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom, and sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel." And when he says (Matt. xxvi. 41) with the deepest emphasis, because of the experience he had just passed through and of the experience which he knew he was yet to have, "Watch and pray, that ye enter not into temptation; the spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak." And when, in reference to this whole subject, he both permits and commands tempted man to pray, "Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil."

The fact is, that as there may be the most violent attack upon a strategic point where there is an invincible power of resistance, so there may be the most extreme and powerful of temptations addressed to a person in whom there is absolute impeccability. A holy God-man, who can meet Satan's solicitation with an almighty energy of opposition, will be assailed by a fiercer trial than an irresolute, sinful man would experience. A far heavier ordnance will be brought to bear upon Gibraltar than upon a packet-boat. Christ was exposed to a severer test and trial than the first Adam was. And this for the very reason that his resistance was so steady and so mighty. Had he showed signs of yielding, or had he succumbed in the outset, the stress of the temptation would have been far less than it actually was. Had the first temptation in the wilderness succeeded, it would not have been followed by the second and third. But the more the God-man baffled the tempter, the more the tempter returned to the charge and intensified his attack.

Neither let it be supposed that our Lord's temptations were slight, because they were sinless. An innocent temptation may be greater in its force than a sinful one. Christ was solicited by sinless temptation more strongly than any man ever was by sinful temptation. No drunkard or sensualist was ever allured by vicious appetite so fiercely as Christ was by innocent appetite, when after the forty days "he was an hungred." For the stress of the appetite was supernaturally heightened in this instance. A natural appetite may be stronger and more difficult to control than an unnatural and

vicious one. The craving of the glutton for artificial sauces and highly seasoned food is not so intense as the hunger of the traveller in the desert who is on the brink of starvation. The thirst of the inebriate, great as it is, is not so dreadful and overpowering as that of an English soldier in the Black Hole of Calcutta or of a negro slave in the middle passage.

Furthermore, the innocent temptations of Christ were made more stringent and powerful by reason of the steady resistance which he offered to them. Temptations that are accompanied with struggle and opposition against them are fiercer than those that are not so accompanied. A good man, in this way, often feels the distress of temptation far more than the bad man. The latter yields supinely, and, making no opposition, does not experience the anguish of a struggle. The former is greatly wearied and strained by his temptation, though he is not conquered by it. Christ "resisted unto blood, striving against sin, and offered up prayers and supplications with strong crying and tears unto him that was able to save him from death." But his people "have not so resisted" (Heb. xii. 4 ; v. 7).

At this point it is necessary to notice the difference between the temptability of Christ and that of a fallen man ; for while there is a resemblance, there is also a dissimilarity between them. Christ's temptations were all of them *sinless*, but very many of the temptations of a fallen man are *sinful*—that is, they are the hankering and solicitation of forbidden and wicked desire. The desire to steal, to commit adultery, to murder, is sinful, and whoever is tempted by it to the act of theft, or adultery, or murder is sinfully tempted. St. James (i. 14) refers to this species of temptation when he says that "a man is tempted when he is drawn away by his own lust and enticed." The *ἐπιθυμία* here spoken of is the same which St. Paul mentions in Rom. vii. 7 as the equivalent of *ἀμαρτία*. It is also the same thing that is forbidden in the tenth commandment—"Thou shalt not lust"—which Luther renders : "Du sollst nicht böse Begierden haben." St. James (i. 2, 3) bids the believer to "count it all joy when he falls into divers [innocent] temptations" by the will and providence of God, "knowing this, that the trial of his faith worketh patience," but he does not bid him to count it all joy when he is "tempted and drawn away by his own lust."

A man, for illustration, is sinfully tempted when he is solicited to perform a certain outward act—say, to preach a sermon—by the craving of pride or ambition. This craving or inward lust after human applause is itself sin (John v. 44 ; xii. 43 ; Rom. i. 25), and to be tempted by it is to be sinfully tempted. It is idolatry, or creature worship, in the heart. Even if he does not perform the outward act

to which his pride or ambition tempted and urged him, he must repent of his wicked lust or pride of heart, and obtain forgiveness for it. This is taught in Acts viii. 21, 22, "Thy heart is not right in the sight of God. Repent therefore of this thy wickedness [of heart], and pray God, if peradventure the thought (ἐπινοία, purpose) of thine heart may be forgiven thee." Simon Magus's particular lust was avarice; it was wickedness (κακία), and needed the exercise of mercy. Had it been an innocent and sinless desire, he might have continued to have it, and needed not to repent of it.

When, again, a man is solicited by the lust of gluttony to perform the external act of intemperate eating of food for the sake of the sensual pleasure of eating, he is not innocently but sinfully tempted. This is wholly different from the solicitation of the natural and innocent appetite for food, such as a famishing sailor on a wreck experiences, such as our Lord felt when, having "fasted forty days and nights, he was afterward an hungered." The craving of gluttony is vicious, and whoever is tempted by it is sinfully tempted. Gluttony is not merely and only physical appetite, but contains also a mental and voluntary element. It *thinks* of eating as enjoyment, and *calculates* for this. Hunger pure and simple, on the contrary, is physical merely, not mental and voluntary. Gluttony is a part of original sin; it is the corruption of human nature as respects the body.

Now, our Lord was not tempted by the sinful lusts of pride, ambition, envy, malice, hatred, anger, jealousy, avarice, gluttony, voluptuousness, drunkenness—in short, by evil desire or "concupiscence" of any kind. He never felt the hankering of pride and vain-glory, so common to man, but was always in his inmost spirit meek and lowly. The appeal of Satan in the last of the three temptations to a supposed ambition in Christ was met with the avowal, "Get thee hence, Satan." Christ had no sinful lust of any sort. This is taught in Christ's own words: "The prince of this world cometh, and hath nothing in me" (John xiv. 20). It is also taught in Heb. iv. 15, "We have a high-priest who was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin." This text teaches that the temptations of Christ were "without sin" in their *source* and *nature*, and not merely, as the passage is sometimes explained, that they were "without sin" in their *result*. The meaning is not that our Lord was tempted in every respect exactly as fallen man is—by inward lust, as well as by other temptations—only he did not outwardly yield to any temptation; but that he was tempted in every way that man is, excepting by that class of temptations that are sinful because originating in evil and forbidden desire. This is evident, because in the original χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας qualifies πεπειρασμένον. Christ was

"tempted without sin, or sinlessly, in all points like as we are." Had the writer omitted *χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας*, the text would read: "Tempted in all points (*κατὰ πάντα*) like as we are." In adding this, he modifies *κατὰ πάντα*, so that it reads, "all points, sin excepted." When the "Westminster Larger Catechism," 37, affirms that "Christ was born of the Virgin Mary, yet without sin," the meaning is not that "he was born of the Virgin Mary, yet did not commit sin," but that "he was born sinless of the Virgin Mary." *

Temptations from evil desire have a different moral quality from those presented through innocent desire. The former are *δι' ἁμαρτίας*, or *ἐξ ἁμαρτίας*, not *χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας*. A temptation from pride, envy, or malice is plainly different in its nature from the temptation from hunger experienced by our Lord in the wilderness; or from the desire to be acknowledged as the Messiah; or from the dread of suffering felt by him in the garden of Gethsemane. "When a temptation comes from *without*," says Owen ("Indwelling Sin," vi.), "it is unto the soul an indifferent thing, neither good nor evil, unless it be consented to. But the very proposal from *within*, it being the soul's own act, is its sin. Christ had more temptations from Satan and the world than had any of the sons of men; and yet in all of them he had to do with that which came from without. But let a temptation be proposed to a *man*, and immediately he hath not only to do with the temptation as outwardly proposed, but also with his own heart about it." Again, he remarks ("Holy Spirit," II. iii.): "Although Christ took on him those infirmities which belong unto our human nature as such, and are inseparable from it until it be glorified, yet he took none of our particular infirmities which cleave unto our persons, occasioned either by the vices of our constitutions or irregularity in the case of our bodies. Those natural passions of our minds which are capable of being the means of affliction and trouble, as grief, sorrow, and the like, he took upon him; and also those infirmities of nature which are troublesome to the body, as hunger, thirst, weariness, and pain. Yea, the purity of his holy constitution made him more highly sensible of these things than any of the children of men. But as to our bodily diseases and distempers, which personally adhere unto us upon the disorder and vice of our constitutions, he was absolutely free from them."

* The preposition *χωρὶς* denotes entire separation (*χωρίζειν*). The author of this epistle frequently employs it. Heb. vii. 21, "Those priests were made without an oath" (*χωρὶς ὀρκωμοσίας*). Their consecration was oathless. Heb. ix. 18, "The first testament was not dedicated without blood" (*χωρὶς αἱματος*). The dedication was not bloodless. Heb. ix. 22, "There is no remission without shedding of blood" (*χωρὶς αἱματεκχυσίας*). Remission is not bloodless. So, too, any temptation that is *χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας* is sinless—wholly separate and apart from sin, either internal or external.

If Christ, like fallen man, were subject to that class of forbidden appetences and selfish desires mentioned in Gal. v. 19, 21—namely, “idolatry, hatred, emulation, envyings, murder, wrath, uncleanness, drunkenness, and such like,” the dignity and perfection of his character would be gone, and he could not be looked up to with the reverence that he is. The words of the dead kings to the fallen king of Babylon would apply: “Art thou also become weak, as we? art thou become like unto us?” (Isa. xiv. 10.)

The reasons why Christ was tempted are the following :

1. The suffering involved in his temptation was a part of his humiliation and satisfaction for sin. A tempted being is, in so far, a sufferer. Hence, we have reason to believe that no temptation is experienced in the heavenly world. 2. In submitting to temptation Christ sets an example to his disciples, of constancy in obedience and resistance to evil. Believers are bidden to “look unto Jesus, who for the joy that was set before him endured the cross, despising the shame,” and to “consider him that endured such contradiction of sinners against himself, lest they be wearied and faint in their minds” (Heb. xii. 2, 3).

The fact that Christ was almighty and victorious in his resistance does not unfit him to be an example for imitation to a weak and sorely tempted believer. Because our Lord overcame his temptations, it does not follow that his conflict and success was an easy one for him. His victory cost him tears and blood. “His visage was so marred more than any man” (Isa. lii. 14). In the struggle he cried, “O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me !” (Matt. xxvi. 39). Because an army is victorious, it by no means follows that the victory was a cheap one. “One more such victory will ruin me,” said Pyrrhus after the battle of Asculum. The physical agony of the martyr is not diminished in the least by the strength imparted to him by God to endure it. The fire is as hot and the pain as great in his case as in that of an unbeliever. Divine grace does not operate like chloroform and deaden pain. Otherwise martyrdom is no more martyrdom. The bereavement of a believer by the death of a beloved object is none the less sore and heavy because of the grace which helps him to bear it. The promise is, “Cast thy burden on the Lord, and he shall sustain *thee*”—not the burden. Such facts as these show that victory over a temptation does not imply that the temptation was a slight one ; that because Christ could not be overcome by temptation, therefore his temptation must have been less severe than that of his people.

On the contrary, Christ’s human nature, while it was supported and strengthened by the divine, was *for this very reason* subjected to a severer strain than an ordinary human nature. Suppose that an

additional engine should be put into a vessel that is adapted to carry only one, and that a safe passage is guaranteed to it. When it comes into port after boring through three thousand miles of billows, it will show marks of the strain such as an ordinary ship under ordinary pressure will not. "*Gemuit sub pondere cymba*" ("*Æneid*," vi. 413). The traditions of the Church and the representations of the old painters, founded upon the Scripture statements, present Christ's humanity as weighed down and worn by the awful burden of that heavy cross which the finite nature supported by the infinite was compelled to bear, and which without that support it could not have endured. For "it was requisite that the mediator should be God, that he might sustain and keep the human nature from sinking under the infinite wrath of God and the power of death" ("*Westminster Larger Catechism*," 36).

3. By this almighty and victorious resistance of temptation Christ evinced his power to succor those that are tempted and to carry them through all temptation. He showed that he is Lord and conqueror of Satan and his kingdom. "Having spoiled principalities and powers, he made a shew of them openly, triumphing over them" (Col. ii. 15). "The kings of the earth set themselves against the Lord's anointed. He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh; the Lord shall have them in derision" (Ps. ii. 2, 4). "He must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet" (1 Cor. xv. 25). "It became him, for whom are all things, to make the captain of their salvation perfect through sufferings" (Heb. ii. 10). The perfection spoken of here is not sanctification from sin, but a suitable preparation for his mediatorial office by trial and grief, whereby he is able to sympathize with them that are tempted. Hence, *τελιῶσαι*, not *ἀγιάζειν*, is the word employed.

The Redeemer of sinful man must be truly human, not weakly human; unfallen man, not fallen; the ideal man, not the actual; temptable, not peccable.

First, he must be truly human in being assailable by temptation, and thereby able to sympathize with every tempted man. In order to sympathize with a person, it is not necessary to have had exactly the same affliction that he has. It is only necessary to have been afflicted. A different kind of affliction may make a man all the more sympathetic. Because Christ was sinlessly tempted, he feels a deeper and more tender sympathy with sinfully tempted man than he would had he been lustfully and viciously tempted. And this for three reasons: (a) Lustful desire deadens the sensibility and blunts the tenderness and delicacy of the nature. (b) There is much selfishness in the so-called sympathy of vice with vice; of one drunkard with another. Misery loves company. But the sympathy

of a benevolent, temperate man for a drunkard is disinterested. (c) The strength and reality of sympathy are seen in the amount of self-sacrifice that one is willing to make for the miserable, rather than in the mere fact that one has felt precisely the same misery himself. Tested by this, Christ has infinitely more sympathy for man than any man has had or can have. "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends" (John xv. 13). One man may know very vividly from personal experience how another man feels, and yet not be willing to undergo any suffering for him, for the purpose of delivering him from suffering. Drunkards have a common feeling of misery, but they do not make sacrifices for one another. On the contrary, they "bite and devour one another" (Gal. v. 15). Satan well knows from personal experience what remorse is and how his fellow-angels suffer from remorse, but he has no disposition to help them at his own expense.

Secondly, the Redeemer of man must not be weakly human and peccably human, because he must be "mighty to save, travelling in the greatness of his strength" (Isa. lxiii. 1). He must have power to overcome all temptation when it assails himself personally, in order that he may be "able to succor them that are tempted" (Heb. ii. 18). Fallen and helpless man cannot trust himself to one who is himself liable to fall from God. The second Adam must be mightier to repel temptation than the first Adam. And certainly if good and evil were so proportioned to each other in Christ that they trembled in the balance, as they sometimes do in his disciples, no fallen man could go to him with confidence of victory over evil. After the cry, "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" there would not be the exulting shout, "I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord." If Christ could meet all the temptations that approached him through his innocent and sinless human nature, from the wiles of Satan, and from suffering positively inflicted by eternal justice upon the sinners' voluntary substitute; if Christ could meet this vast amount of temptation with only a feeble finite will not re-enforced and strengthened by an infinite will, he would not be "mighty to save," nor would he "travel in the greatness of his strength." The Monophysite error which makes Christ to be nothing but God, is not so great and discouraging as the Socinian, which makes him to be nothing but man. For it would be possible for a helpless sinner, fainting in the conflict with sin and death, to trust in a merely infinite person, but not in a merely finite one.

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