

Coleridge, and the moral tendency of his writings ~ 1844

1844  
635

19477.635



HARVARD  
COLLEGE  
LIBRARY

*Prof. Park*

*With the respects of  
W. White*

COLERIDGE,

AND THE

MORAL TENDENCY OF HIS WRITINGS.

By \_\_\_\_\_

Logic is the art of talking unintelligibly on things of which we are ignorant.—MELAN.

NEW-YORK:  
LEAVITT, TROW & CO.,  
194 BROADWAY.  
1844.

COLERIDGE,

AND THE

MORAL TENDENCY OF HIS WRITINGS.

By William Mitchell

Logic is the art of talking unintelligibly on things of which we are ignorant.—MENAGE.

---

NEW-YORK:  
LEAVITT, TROW & CO.,  
194 BROADWAY.  
1844.

# CONTENTS.

---

	PAGE
ADVERTISEMENT, . . . . .	5
PREFACE, . . . . .	9
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTICE, . . . . .	11

## PART I.

### PHILOSOPHY.

General view, . . . . .	17
Classification of the mental powers, . . . . .	27
Understanding, . . . . .	27
Reason, . . . . .	28
Conscience, . . . . .	28
Consciousness, . . . . .	29
Will, . . . . .	30
Ideas, . . . . .	33
Moral tendency of the system, . . . . .	37 ✓

## PART II.

### THEOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Of God and the Trinity, . . . . .	41
Inspiration of the Scriptures, . . . . .	45 ✓
Integrity of the Canon, . . . . .	55 ✓
Miracles, . . . . .	56 ✓
Romanism, . . . . .	62
Virgin Mary, . . . . .	63
Eucharist, . . . . .	66
Transubstantiation, . . . . .	67
Power of the Church, . . . . .	69 ✓
Angels, good, . . . . .	71
Angels, evil, . . . . .	75
The atonement, . . . . .	79
The resurrection, . . . . .	82
Baptism and original sin, . . . . .	88
Contempt of common philosophy, . . . . .	99

## CONTENTS.

## PART III.

## CHRISTIAN CHARACTER.

	PAGE
General view, . . . . .	101
Denial of the faith, . . . . .	104
Indifference to Christian missions, . . . . .	105
French decade, . . . . .	109
Humility of the saints despised, . . . . .	110
Richard Baxter, . . . . .	110
Jeremy Taylor, . . . . .	110
Henry More, . . . . .	110
John Bunyan, . . . . .	111
St. Theresa, . . . . .	111
Religion, . . . . .	114 ✓
Confession of faith, . . . . .	114 ✓
Conclusion, . . . . .	116 ✓

---

ERRATA.—Page 90, 13th line from top, for *philanthropist* read *paianthropist*. Page 95, 6th line from bottom, for *synastosis* read *synartosis*. Page 109, 4th line from bottom, for *amicas* read *amica*.

## ADVERTISEMENT.

It begins at length to be seen, that the theological mists of Coleridgism have been spreading themselves among us, not without effect. Our divinity professors seem to have thought that they are too much like the comet's hair to have much influence of any kind; but have they not in this instance forgotten that the appropriate title of Satan, as the author of evil, is the prince of the *power of the air*? Minute and invisible causes are often the most powerful. Changes have been occurring during the last ten or fifteen years, to which it is now very manifest these transcendental tenuities have been, in no small measure, causal. Unitarians have become pantheists. Calvinists have exchanged Calvin and Edwards for modern divines of Germany. Satisfaction for sin has been discarded, and the doctrine of at-one-ment substituted for that of the atonement. Preaching, in certain cases, has passed from plain to dreamy and mystical, from shallow to incomprehensible, from commonplace to great seeming profundity. Friends of our religious revivals have become distrustful, if not contemptuous, towards them. Friends of missions have acquired a supersensuous indifference, if not disgust, towards them and almost every other cause of active benevolence. Puritans have adopted the religion of

19477.635



HARVARD  
COLLEGE  
LIBRARY





*Prof. Park*

*With the respects of  
W. Miller*

<sup>B</sup>COLERIDGE,

AND THE

MORAL TENDENCY OF HIS WRITINGS.

By \_\_\_\_\_

Logic is the art of talking unintelligibly on things of which we are ignorant.—MRS. WASH.

NEW-YORK:  
LEAVITT, TROW & CO.,  
194 BROADWAY.

1844.

philosopher and divine is cautious in the disclosure of his sentiments, acting somewhat upon the saying of Talleyrand, that "the great object of speech is to conceal the thought." His principles are scattered, in mystic paragraphs, through many volumes, and what the Editor says in the Preface to the *Literary Remains* might be prefixed to the whole of his philosophical speculations. "The materials were fragmentary in the extreme—Sybilline leaves; notes of the lecturer, memoranda of the investigator, outpourings of the solitary and self-communing student." In truth, Coleridge was too indolent to evolve and give his principles a systematic arrangement. Like a certain bird which lays its eggs in a nest ready made, and hatches its brood by proxy, he deposited his doctrines in extracts from the great divines of a past age, and constrained them to nestle and own the alien progeny. This is conspicuous in the *Literary Remains*, and in the *Aids to Reflection*, the proper title of which should be, "Leighton's *Aids to Evangelical Piety*, corrupted and perverted by Coleridge." But the reader can form his own opinion of the man and his writings from the following works, consisting chiefly of selections from the various accessible publications of Coleridge: his *Poems*, *Literaria Biographia*, *The Friend*, *Literary Remains*, *Aids to Reflection*, and *Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit*.

## BIOGRAPHICAL NOTICE.

WORDS are thoughts in type; and biography is an expositor of the language in which a writer exhibits his character. The reader must have some knowledge of the life of Coleridge to be prepared for his pure-reason phraseology. In maturer years, he called himself an "affectionate visionary;" and in his early youth are visible the predominant traits which made him a fragmentary author, and conducted him at last to a quiescent state in the mysteries of transcendentalism, so kindred to his spirit. The Memoirs of Coleridge by Gillman, I have not been able to obtain. The following biographical sketch is derived from incidental notices of himself; from an article by Tuckerman in the Southern Literary Magazine; and from the brief Memoir prefixed to the volume containing his Poems, Literary Biography, and the Friend. These writers are highly laudatory in commending the excellences of Coleridge, and the faults therefore, which they admit may be regarded as too prominent to be passed by unnoticed.

"No writer of the age," says the Memoir, "was more the theme of panegyric by his friends, and of censure by his enemies, than Coleridge. It has been the custom of the former to injure him by extravagant praise, and of the latter to pour upon his head much unmerited abuse. His natural character, however, was indolent; he was far more ambitious of excelling in conversation, and of pouring out his wild philosophical theories—of discoursing about

Fix'd fate, free-will, foreknowledge absolute—

the mysteries of Kant, and the dreams of metaphysical vanity, than 'in building the lofty rhyme.'

"Samuel Taylor Coleridge was born at Ottery Saint Mary, a town of Devonshire, in 1773. His father, the Rev. John Coleridge, was vicar there, having been previously a schoolmaster at South Molton. Coleridge was educated at Christ's Hospital school, London. The smallness of his father's living and large family rendered the strictest economy necessary. At this excellent seminary he was soon discovered to be a boy of talent, eccentric, but acute. According to his own statement the master, the Rev. J. Bowyer, was a severe disciplinarian after the inane practice of English grammar-school modes, but was fond of encouraging genius, even in the lads he flagellated most unmercifully. He taught

with assiduity, and directed the taste of youth to the beauties of the better classical authors, and to comparisons of one with another. In our English compositions, says Coleridge, (at least for the last three years of our school education,) he showed no mercy to phrase, image, or metaphor, unsupported by a sound sense, or where the same sense might have been conveyed with equal force and dignity in plainer words. Lute, harp, and lyre; muse, muses, and inspirations; Pegasus, Parnassus, and Hippocrene, were all an abomination to him. In fancy, I can almost hear him now exclaiming—'Harp? harp? lyre? pen and ink, boy, you mean! muse, boy, muse? your nurse's daughter, you mean! Pierian spring? O ay! the cloister pump, I suppose.'" It would have been well for himself, and better for the world, had Coleridge so far profited by this severe discipline as to abandon "phrase, image, and metaphor, unsupported by a sound sense," and also the mystical metaphysics which cannot be expressed in intelligible language. A present from a school-fellow of Bowles's Sonnets had such an effect, that "while a boy of seventeen he was drawn away from Theological controversy and wild metaphysics to the charms of poetry." This was however only a temporary withdrawal from the wild metaphysics, his darling theme.

"When eighteen years of age, Coleridge removed to Jesus College, Cambridge. It does not appear that he obtained or even struggled for academic honors. From excess of animal spirits he was rather a noisy youth, whose general conduct was better than that of many of his fellow-collegians, and as good as most: his follies were more remarkable only as being those of a more remarkable personage; and if he could be accused of a vice, it must be sought for in the little attention he was inclined to pay to the dictates of sobriety.

"In the month of November, 1793, while laboring under a paroxysm of despair, brought on by the combined effects of pecuniary difficulties and love of a young lady, sister of a school-fellow, he set off for London with a party of collegians, and passed a short time there in joyous conviviality. On his return to Cambridge, he remained but a few days, and then abandoned it forever. He again directed his steps towards the metropolis, and there, after indulging somewhat freely in the pleasures of the bottle, and wandering about the various streets and squares in a state of mind nearly approaching to frenzy, he finished by enlisting in the 15th dragoons, under the name of Clumber Vacht. Here he continued some time, the wonder of his comrades and a subject of mystery and curiosity to his officers. His friends at length found him out, and procured his discharge." This bottle-roving-propensity seems to have followed Coleridge even after his marriage, for in Vol. II. *Literary Remains*, p. 412, he has left this record of himself—"I dined and punched at Lamb's, March 10th, 1804." He makes no secret of his carousals, for, without signs of compunction, he thus writes in his first letter from

Germany.\* "On Sunday morning, Sept. 16, 1798, the Hamburg Paquet set sail from Yarmouth, and I, for the first time in my life, beheld my native land retiring from me. At the moment of its disappearance—in all the kirks, churches, chapels, and meeting-houses, in which the greater number, I hope, of my countrymen were at that time assembled, I will dare question whether there was one more ardent prayer offered up to heaven than that which I then proffered for my country." The sincerity of this prayer, so pious in the judgment of the supplicant, is rendered more than doubtful by his manner of keeping the Sabbath. Having spent much of the day in frivolous conversation with a couple of Danes, fellow-passengers, he was prevailed on "to join their party and drink with them." It was deep drinking, by his own showing: "Certes, we were not of the Stoic school. For we drank and talked and sung, till we talked and sung altogether; and then we rose and danced on the deck a set of dances, which, in *one* sense of the word at least, were very intelligibly and appropriately entitled *reels*. The passengers who lay in the cabin below, in all the agonies of sea sickness, must have found our bacchanalian merriment

————— a tune  
Harsh and of dissonant mood for their complaint."

It seems not to have occurred to our theological philosopher that such bacchanalian merriment, and on the Sabbath too, must have been extremely offensive to Him who is of purer eyes than to behold iniquity. He never evinced any fixed and sound moral principles, a counterpoise to the extravagance of his natural temperament. Finding his element in the adventurous and the marvellous, he was exposed alike to excess of conviviality, and to erratic speculations in morals.

"At a very premature age, even before my fifteenth year, I had bewildered myself in metaphysics, and in theological controversy. Nothing else pleased me. History and particular facts lost all interest in my mind. In my friendless wanderings on our *leave days*, (for I was an orphan, and had scarce any connexions in London,) highly was I delighted if any passenger, especially if he were drest in black, would enter into conversation with me. For I soon found the means of directing it to my favorite subjects

Of Providence, foreknowledge, will, and fate,  
Fixed fate, free-will, foreknowledge absolute,  
And found no end in wandering mazes lost.

Metaphysics and psychology have long been my hobby-horse." (*Literary Biography*, p. 238, 254.) In keeping with this delineation of his own

\* *Biographia Literaria*, Philadelphia edition, p. 336.

character, Coleridge, "on leaving the University, was full of enthusiasm in the cause of freedom, and occupied with the idea of the regeneration of mankind. He found ardent coadjutors in the same enthusiastic undertaking in Robert Lovell and Robert Southey, the present courtly laureate. This youthful triumvirate proposed schemes for regenerating the world, even before their educations were completed; and dreamed of happy lives in aboriginal forests, republics on the Mississippi, and a newly-dreamed philanthropy." The experiment of this promising scheme was tried at Bristol, which "has been frequently styled the Bœotia of the west of England." Coleridge published two pamphlets, one called "Conciones ad populum, or Addresses to the people;" and the other "A Protest against certain bills (then pending) for suppressing seditious meetings." These efforts excited "considerable applause," but few were the converts.

"The charm of the political regeneration of nations, though thus warped for a moment, was not broken. Coleridge, Lovell, and Southey, finding the old world would not be reformed after their mode, determined to try and found a new one, in which all was to be liberty and happiness. The deep woods of America were to be the site of this new golden reign. There all the evils of European society were to be remedied, property was to be in common, and every man a legislator. The name of 'Pantisocracy' was bestowed upon the favored scheme, while yet it existed only in imagination. Unborn ages of human happiness presented themselves before the triad of philosophical founders of Utopian empires, while they were dreaming of human perfectibility. In the midst of these plans of vast import, the three philosophers fell in love with three sisters of Bristol, named Fricker, (one of them, afterwards Mrs. Lovell, an actress of the Bristol theatre, another a mantuamaker, and the third kept a day-school,) and all their visions of immortal freedom faded into thin air. They married, and occupied themselves with the increase of the corrupt race of the old world, instead of peopling the new. Thus, unhappily for America and mankind, failed the scheme of the Pantisocracy, on which at one time so much of human happiness and political regeneration was by its founders believed to depend." Southey became "the enemy of political and religious freedom, the advocate of arbitrary measures in church and state;" and Coleridge sobered down his Utopian notions into "something like a disavowal of having held them." After his marriage to Miss Sarah Fricker, he resided for a time at Nether Stowery, in Somersetshire, and while there "he was in the habit of preaching every Sunday at the Unitarian Chapel in Taunton, and was greatly respected by the better class of his neighbors." He officiated as a lay-preacher, and depended on his literary labors to procure a subsistence for his family. In 1798, by the patronage of a friend, he visited Germany, and attended lectures at the universities. He became "master of most of the early German writers, or rather of the state of early German literature. He dived deeply into the mystical stream of Teutonic philosophy. There the predilections of

his earlier years no doubt came upon him in aid of his researches into a labyrinth which no human clew will ever unravel, or which, were one found capable of so doing, would reveal a mighty nothing. Long, he says, while meditating in England, had his heart been with Paul and John, and his head with Spinoza. He then became convinced of the doctrine of St. Paul, and from an anti-trinitarian became a believer in the Trinity, and in Christianity as commonly received; or, to use his own words, found a 're-conversion.'" It was, however, a conversion from Unitarianism to Immanuel Kantism, a renovation of no practical value, for the two systems, by different routes, meet in the same deism. We may safely apply to the critical philosophy of the great German what a writer says of metaphysics in general: "Metaphysics are most unprofitable things; as political economists say, their labors are of the most 'unproductive class' in the community of thinkers." On his return from Germany, Coleridge went to reside at Keswick, in Cumberland. He had greatly enlarged his stock of knowledge, but neither his poetry, philosophy, nor theology could afford him the means of subsistence. "His style and manner of writing, the learning and depth of his disquisitions forever came into play, and rendered him unintelligible, or, what is equally fatal, unreadable to the mass." Falling short in all the labors of his pen, Coleridge "set off for Malta," and became Secretary to the Governor. This office, for which he was indifferently qualified, he retained but a very short time. In fact, he was too unstable and aerial to excel in any of his multifarious pursuits. "He was at different times," says Tuckerman, "a zealous Unitarian, and a High Churchman—a political lecturer—a metaphysical essayist—a preacher—a translator—a traveller—a foreign secretary—a philosopher—an editor—a poet. We cannot wonder that his productions, particularly those that profess to be elaborate, should in a measure partake of the variableness of his mood. His works, like his life, are fragmentary. He is too frequently prolix, labors upon topics of secondary interest, and excites only to disappoint expectation. By many sensible readers, his metaphysical views are pronounced unintelligible, and by some German scholars declared arrant plagiarisms." And yet, with all his faults, the Metropolitan says: "As a poet, Coleridge was unquestionably *great*; as a moralist, a theologian, and a philosopher of the very highest class, he was utterly *inapproachable*." In the sense of *unintelligible* only can this last epithet be true, and the eulogy, as a whole, is extravagant. His powers of conversation may have been unrivalled, and it seems to have suited his ambition to hold captive a listening circle. "The gift of *discourse*," says an enthusiastic admirer, "Coleridge has in perfection. While he is discoursing, the world loses all its *common-places*, and you and your wife imagine yourselves Adam and Eve listening to the affable archangel Raphael in the garden of Eden. Whether you understand two consecutive sentences, we shall not stop too curiously to inquire; but you do something better—you feel the whole, just like any other divine music." The latter years of Coleridge were spent in "a domestication" with

his friend and patron, Mr. Gillman, Surgeon of Highgate Grove. Coleridge died on the 25th of July, 1834, having previously written his own characteristic epitaph, as follows :

“ Stop, Christian passer-by ! stop, child of God !  
 And read with gentle breast. Beneath this sod  
 A poet lies, or that which once seemed he—  
 Oh, lift a thought in prayer for S. T. C. !  
 That he who, many a year, with toil of breath,  
 Found death in life, may here find life in death ;  
 Mercy for praise—to be forgiven for fame,  
 He asked and hoped through Christ. Do thou the same.”

His biographer says, “ This is perfection—worthy of the author ;” but we think it savors more of Romanism than of evangelical piety. We cannot “ lift a thought in prayer for S. T. C.,” not believing in prayers for the dead ; nor would we judge in reference to his state in the other world. But the fear cannot be suppressed that he died a *practical* Unitarian, and was in *theory* only a Trinitarian. The evidences of his piety, in my view, are somewhat doubtful, when I consider the gross errors of his faith, the laxness of his moral principles, and the instances of profaneness occasionally in his poems, and more frequently in his *Literary Remains*.\* Selections of great power and beauty, and true excellence, may be made from his works ; but as a whole, either as philosopher or theologian, he is, for young men, an extremely unsafe guide. Coleridge seems to have read every accessible writer on philosophy and theology, good and bad, from Plato down to Robinson Crusoe ; and to have gathered from them all materials for his patchwork system. Luther, Jeremy Taylor, Leighton, More, Swedenborg, Jacob Behman, Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, all furnish a scrap for the counterpane—all Coleridgians by compulsion in the main. In fact, I know no modern author to whom may be more fitly applied Toplady’s description of a certain divine in his day :

Aliquis in omnibus, nullus in singulis.

Mr. W., by a very singular mixture of Manichæism, Pelagianism, Popery, Socinianism, Ranterism, and Atheism, has, I believe, now got to his ultimatum. Probably he would go further if he could ; but I really think he has no farther to go. Happy settlement, after forty years infinity of shiftings and flittings hither and thither !

Thus weather-cocks, which for a while  
 Have turned with every blast,  
 Grown old, and destitute of oil,  
 Rust to a point, and fix at last.

\* See Poems, pp. 27, 28, 201. Lit. Remains, pp. 39, 54, vol. iv. ; p. 95, vol. iii. ; p. 349, vol. i.



## PART I.

### PHILOSOPHY OF COLERIDGE.

THE reader is premonished that Coleridge belongs to the transcendental or mystic school. His son-in-law, Henry Nelson Coleridge, Esq., the Editor of his *Literary Remains*, prepares us for high metaphysical flights, by informing us that, "in perusing the following pages the reader will, in a few instances, meet with disquisitions of a transcendental character, which as a general rule have been avoided: the truth is, that they were found so indissolubly intertwined with the more popular matter which preceded and followed as to make separation impracticable."\* We are thankful for this acknowledgment, and that the more transcendental disquisitions have been left unpublished. Notwithstanding the expurgation, the remaining philosophy lies, for the most part, beyond the legitimate province of reason, and would not suffer in comparison with the cycles, epicycles, and crystalline spheres of the Ptolemaic system—its essential elements being either an indemonstrable hypothesis, or resting on the basis of a sublime nonentity. In the following extracts, Coleridge explains the elementary principles, and states the origin of his philosophy. "After I had successively studied in the schools of Locke, Berkeley, Leibnitz, and Hartley, and could find in neither of them an abiding place for my reason, I began

\* The *Literary Remains* of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Collected and edited by Henry Nelson Coleridge, Esq., M. A. London. William Pickering. 1836.

to ask myself, Is a system of philosophy, as different from mere history and historic classification, possible? If possible, what are its necessary conditions? I was for a while disposed to answer the first question in the negative, and to admit that the sole practicable employment for the human mind was to observe, to collect, and to classify." Finding soon "that human nature itself fought up against this wilful resignation of the intellect," and that the common-sense philosophy, "cleared of all inconsistencies, was not less impracticable than contra-natural," Coleridge proceeds to describe the true science of metaphysics. "The term Philosophy defines itself as an affectionate seeking after the truth; but Truth is the correlative of Being. This again is no way conceivable, but by assuming as a postulate, that both are, ab initio, identical and co-inherent; that intelligence and being are reciprocally each other's substrate." I presumed that this was a possible conception, (i. e. that involved no logical inconsonance,) from the length of time during which the scholastic definition of the *Supreme Being*, as *actus purissimus sine ulla potentialitate*—most pure act without any potentiality—was received in the schools of Theology both by the Pontifical and the Reformed divines. The early study of Plato and Plotinus, with the commentaries and the *THEOLOGICA PLATONICA* of the illustrious Florentine; of Proclus and Gemistus Pletho; and at a later period of the 'De immenso et innumerabili,' and the 'De la causa, principio et uno,' of the philosopher of Nola (Bruno), who could boast of a Sir Philip Sydney and Fulke Greville among his patrons, and whom the idolaters of Rome burnt as an atheist in the year 1660; had all contributed to prepare my mind for the reception and welcoming of the *cogito quia sum, et sum quia cogito* (I think because I am, and I am because I think); a philosophy of seeming hardihood, but certainly the most ancient, and therefore presumptively the most natural. Why need I be afraid? say, rather, How dare I be ashamed of the Teutonic theosophist, Jacob Behmen?" It is admitted by Coleridge in the following paragraphs from his *Literary Biography* that the system of the shoemaker Behmen, containing "many and gross delusions, is capable of being convert-

ed into an irreligious *Pantheism*. The ethics of *SPINOZA* may, or may not, be an instance. But at no time," says he, "could I believe, that *in itself*, and *essentially*, it is incompatible with religion, natural or revealed; and now I am most thoroughly persuaded of the contrary. The writings of the illustrious sage of *Konigsberg*, the founder of the Critical Philosophy, more than any other work, at once invigorated and disciplined my understanding. The originality, the depth, and the compression of the thoughts; the novelty and subtlety, yet solidity and importance, of the distinctions; the adamant chain of the logic; and I will venture to add, (paradox as it will appear to those who have taken their notion of Emanuel Kant, from Reviewers and Frenchmen,) the *clearness* and *evidence* of the 'CRITIQUE OF THE PURE REASON;' of the 'JUDGMENT;' of the 'METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY;' and of his 'RELIGION WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF PURE REASON,' took possession of me as with a giant's hand. After fifteen years' familiarity with them, I still read these and all his other productions with undiminished delight and increasing admiration. The few passages that remained obscure to me, after due efforts of thought, (as the chapter on *original apperception*,) and the apparent contradictions which occur, I soon found were hints and insinuations referring to ideas, which Kant either did not think it prudent to avow, or which he considered as consistently *left behind* in a pure analysis, not of human nature in toto, but of the speculative intellect alone. In Schelling's 'Natur-Philosophie,' and the 'SYSTEM DES TRANSCENDENTALEN IDEALISMUS,' I first found a genial coincidence with much that I had toiled out for myself, and a powerful assistance in what I had yet to do. The coincidence of Schelling's system with certain general ideas of *Behmen*, he declares to have been *mere* coincidence; while *my* obligations have been more direct. *He* needs give to *Behmen* only feelings of sympathy; while *I* owe him a debt of gratitude. God forbid that I should be suspected of a wish to enter into a rivalry with Schelling for the honors so unequivocally his right, not only as a great and original genius, but as the *founder* of the philosophy of nature, and as the most successful *improver* of the

Dynamic system,\* which, begun by Bruno, was re-introduced (in a more philosophical form and freed from all its impurities and visionary accompaniments) by Kant ; in whom it was the native and necessary growth of his own system."

The ideal, and some other principles of his philosophy, Coleridge derived from Plato, whom he revered extremely. Travelling to procure subscribers for a periodical called "The Watchman," he preached in the great towns "as a hireless volunteer, in a blue coat and white waistcoat, that not a rag of the woman of Babylon might be seen on me. For I was at that time, and long after, though a Trinitarian (i. e. ad normam Platonis, after the law of Plato) in philosophy, yet a zealous Unitarian in religion ; more accurately, I was a *prilanthropist*, one of those who believe our Lord to have been the real son of Joseph, and who lay the main stress on the resurrection rather than on the crucifixion. O ! never can I remember those days with either shame or regret. For I was most sincere, most disinterested !" Puzzled with the obscurity of the divine Plato, so called, Coleridge concludes the difficulty to lie in his own want of penetration. "I have been re-perusing, with the best energies of my mind, the *Timæus* of Plato. Whatever I comprehend, impresses me with a reverential sense of the author's genius ; but there is a considerable portion of the work to which I can attach no consistent meaning." But, he adds, in view of the great men united "in honoring the name of Plato with epithets that almost transcend humanity, I feel that a contemptuous verdict on my part might argue want of modesty, but would hardly be received by the judicious, as evidence of superior penetration.

\* The Dynamic Philosophy, Coleridge describes thus, in his eulogy of Mr. Saumarez :—"He established not only the existence of final causes, but their necessity and efficiency in every system that merits the name of philosophical ; and substituting life and progressive power for the contradictory *inert force*, has a right to be known and remembered as the first instaurator of the Dynamic Philosophy in England." This is the life, or power philosophy, and "polar logic" of Bruno—life and power in all things ; even matter is only "spirit coagulated," as Coleridge elsewhere intimates.

Therefore, utterly baffled in all my attempts to understand the ignorance of Plato, I CONCLUDE MYSELF IGNORANT OF HIS UNDERSTANDING." In connexion with this modest confession, we may properly add the definition which Coleridge gives of transcendentalism—of the Dynamic philosophy—and may also learn that very few are capable of being true philosophers.

It is neither possible or (nor) necessary for all men to be PHILOSOPHERS. There is a *philosophic* (and inasmuch as it is actualized by an effort of freedom, an *artificial*) *consciousness*, which lies beneath, or (as it were) *behind* the spontaneous consciousness natural to all reflecting beings. As the elder Romans distinguished their northern provinces into Cis-Alpine and Trans-Alpine, so we may divide all the objects of human knowledge into those on this side, and those on the other side of the spontaneous consciousness; *citra et trans conscientiam communem*. The latter is exclusively the domain of PURE philosophy, which is, therefore, properly entitled *transcendental*, in order to discriminate it at once, both from mere reflection and *re*-presentation, on the one hand, and on the other from those lawless flights of speculation, which, abandoned by *all* distinct consciousness, &c., are justly condemned as *transcendent*.

It is, according to my conviction, i. e. the Dynamic Philosophy scientifically arranged, no other than the system of Pythagoras and Plato revived and purified from impure mixtures.

Philosophy cannot be intelligible to all, even of the most learned and cultivated classes. A system, the first principle of which is to render the mind intuitive of the *spiritual*\* in man, (i. e. of that which lies *on the other side* of our natural consciousness,) must needs have a great obscurity for those who have never disciplined and strengthened this ulterior consciousness. It must, in truth, be a land of darkness, a perfect *Ante-Goshen*, for men to whom the noblest treasures of their being are reported only through the imperfect translation of lifeless and sightless notions, &c.

They, and they only, can acquire the philosophic imagination, the sacred power of self-intuition, who within themselves can interpret and understand the symbol, that the wings of the air-sylph are forming within the skin of the caterpillar: those only who feel in their own spirits the same instinct which impels the chrysalis of the horned fly to leave room in its involucre for antennæ yet to come. They know and feel that the *potential* works in them, even as the *actual* works on them!

The above extracts are quoted from Coleridge himself, Literary Biography, Chs. IX. X. XII. One citation more in this

\* Once for all, it may be remarked, that Coleridgians dwell much on the *spiritual* in man, their pet phrase. They are the most spiritual, and yet the least spiritual, in the evangelical meaning of the term.

connexion is appropriate from the *Literary Remains*, Vol. III., p. 33, and also the *Table Talk*, p. 95. "Every man capable of philosophy at all (and there are not many such) is a born Platonist, or a born Aristotelian. I believe that Aristotle never could get to understand what Plato meant by an idea. Aristotle was and still is the sovereign lord of the understanding, the faculty judging by the senses." It did not detract from the honor of the pupil, that he could never comprehend what his broad-shouldered master meant by an *idea*, for great men in all subsequent ages have labored under the same difficulty. Even if Coleridge understood the word in the Platonic sense, he never could explain the meaning. "An IDEAL," he says, "in the highest sense of that word, cannot be conveyed but by a *symbol*; and except in geometry, all symbols of necessity involve an apparent contradiction—*φανήσασθαι Συμβολισμῶν*: and for those who could not pierce through this symbolical husk, his writings, i. e. of Kant, were not intended. When Kant, therefore, was importuned to settle the disputes of his commentators himself, by declaring what he meant, how could he decline the honors of martyrdom with less offence than by simply replying, 'I meant what I said: and at the age of near fourscore, I have something else, and more important to do, than to write a commentary on my own works.'" *Literary Biography*, Ch. IX.

From this general view of the philosophy of Coleridge, the reader will perceive that its essential elements are borrowed from Plato, Behmen, Bruno, Schelling, Kant, and others of the mystic school. He labors, indeed, ingeniously and hard in his *Literary Biography*, Ch. IX., to prevent the charge, as he says, of "ungenerous concealment or intentional plagiarism;" but he is not acquitted by the bench of philosophers. From the original sources, then, whence it was derived, we can best ascertain the character of the philosophy of Coleridge. His *idealism* comes from the school of Plato, as also his philosophical Trinity, and his shadowy notions of material objects. Plato taught that there is one God—eternal, immutable, immaterial—endowed with perfect natural and moral attributes. This Being formed the universe from matter pre-existing in a chaotic state: that there is in mat-

ter a necessary but blind and stubborn force, resisting the Supreme Artificer, and preventing the full execution of his designs, which opposing forces cause the mixture of good and evil in the material world ; that the soul of man emanated from God through the intervention of the soul of the world, (*anima mundi*), which itself was debased by material admixture ; and that the human soul derives moral evil, by original constitution, from its relation to matter ; that God, when he formed the universe, separated from the soul of the world inferior souls, equal in number to the stars, and assigned to each its proper celestial abode ; that these souls sent down to the earth were imprisoned in mortal bodies, and hence the depravity and misery of human nature ; that the soul is immortal, and by disengaging itself from all animal passions, and rising above sensible objects to the contemplation of the world of intelligence, it may be prepared to return to its original habitation. The system of Plato makes the perfection of morality consist in conformity to the will of God, and the highest good in the contemplation and knowledge of the Supreme Being. Plato admitted a sort of Trinity, of three *hypostases*, in the divine Being. The first he considers as self-existent, calling him, by way of eminence, *TO ON*, the Being, or *TO EN*, the One. The only attribute which he acknowledged in this person was goodness, and he therefore frequently names him *TO AGATHON*, the Good. The second he considered as *νοῦς*, the mind, or *logos*, the Wisdom or Reason of the former ; and the *δεμιουργος*, maker of the world. The third he always speaks of as *ψυχη*, the soul of the world. He taught that the second is a necessary emanation from the first, and the third from the second, or from both. Plato also regarded all objects of sense as shadowy and uncertain, whence was derived Berkeley's World without Matter, and from this Hume's World without Souls. He taught his disciples, by intuition, to examine the essences of things—advanced the doctrine of eternal *ideas*, the images, types, or patterns, in the mind of all sensible objects, preceding visual forms. As Akenside describes it, "The Great Spirit, within his own deep essence, viewed the forms, the forms eternal, of created things." God having in his mind the patterns of created things, transferred the *ideas*—i. e.,

the images—to the reason of man ; and hence in our own intellect we must look for the true knowledge of the world without. Coleridge is much indebted to the great pagan philosopher for his ideas, his notions of matter, and his doctrine of the sort of Trinity, “ ad normam Platonis ;” but the words of Plato are turned much aside from their original meaning.

Giordano Bruno, burned as an Atheist, is also an important contributor to the Coleridgean philosophy. Bruno, who suffered a martyr to his philosophy, described, in a Latin poem, the bigotry of the age and his own fate, about to be sacrificed for his principles. What these principles are Coleridge himself informs us. “ The conclusion,” i. e., of the poem, by the Nolan philosopher, says he, “ alludes to a charge of impenetrable obscurity, in which Bruno shares one and the same fate with Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and in truth with every great discoverer and benefactor of the human race, excepting only when the discoveries have been capable of being rendered palpable to the outward senses, and have therefore come under the cognizance of ‘ our sober judicious critics,’ the men of ‘ sound common sense ;’ that is, of those snails in intellect who wear their eyes at the tips of their feelers, and cannot even see unless they at the same time touch. When these finger-philosophers affirm that Plato, Bruno, &c., must have been ‘ out of their senses,’ the just and proper retort is, ‘ Gentlemen ! it is still worse with you ! you have lost your reason !’ Bruno, in his ‘ *Bestia Triumphans*,’ (*Triumfata*, the Beast Triumphant,) had exposed ‘ all the theologies and theogonies conceived for the mere purpose of solving problems in the material universe, &c.’ ” And says Coleridge, “ The principal and most important truth taught in this allegory is, that in the concerns of morality all pretended knowledge of the will of heaven which is not revealed to man through his conscience—that all commands which do not consist in the unconditional obedience of the will to the pure reason without tampering with consequences (which are in God’s power, not in ours)—in short, that all motives of hope and fear from invisible powers which are not immediately derived from, and absolutely coincident with, the reverence due to the supreme reason of the universe, are all



alike dangerous superstitions. Herein Bruno speaks not only as a philosopher, but as an enlightened Christian—the evangelists and apostles every where representing their moral precepts not as doctrines then first revealed, but as truths implanted in the hearts of men, which their vices only could have obscured.” *Literary Remains*, Vol. I. p. 308.

To this may be properly added the remarks of Coleridge on “Sense and Common Sense,” p. 310. “I have noticed,” says he, “two main evils in philosophizing: the first is the absurdity of demanding proof for the very facts which constitute the nature of him who demands it—a proof for those primary and unceasing revelations of self-consciousness which every possible proof must presuppose; reasoning, for instance, *pro* and *con*, concerning the existence of the power of reasoning. Other truths may be ascertained, but these are certainty itself, (all at least which we mean by the word,) and are the measure of every thing else which we deem certain.” One extract more will suffice for the philosophy of Bruno, and for the impenetrable obscurity of his commentator, Coleridge.

EVERY POWER IN NATURE AND IN SPIRIT *must evolve an opposite, as the sole means and conditions of its manifestation*; AND ALL OPPOSITION IS A TENDENCY TO RE-UNION. This is the universal law of polarity or essential Dualism, first promulgated by Heraclitus, two thousand years afterwards re-published, and made the foundation both of logic, of physics, and of metaphysics, by Giordano Bruno. The principle may be thus expressed. The *identity* of thesis and antithesis is the substance of all *being*; their opposition the condition of all *existence*, or being manifested; and every thing or phenomenon is the exponent of a synthesis as long as the opposite energies are retained in that synthesis. Thus water is neither oxygen nor hydrogen, nor yet is it a commixture of both; but the synthesis or indifference of the two; and as (so) long as the copula endures by which it becomes water, or rather which alone *is* water, it is not less a *simple* body than either of the imaginary elements improperly called its ingredients or components. It is the object of the mechanical atomistic philosophy to confound synthesis with *synastesis*, or rather with mere juxtaposition of corpuscles separated by invisible inter-spaces. I find it difficult to determine whether this theory contradicts the reason or the senses most, for it is alike inconceivable and unimaginable.” *The Friend*, p. 77.

The famous mystic, Jacob Behman, to whom Coleridge says

he owed so much gratitude, was a shoemaker, and an unlearned man, born near Górlitz, in Upper Lusatia. His first Treatise, entitled *Aurora*, was seized and detained by the senate of Górlitz. The next work was called *The Three Principles*, a continuation and completion of what he attempted to do in the *Aurora*. The contents of the two Treatises are:—1. How all things came from a working will (the *actus purissimus* of Coleridge) of the holy triune incomprehensible God, manifesting himself as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, through an outward perceptible working triune power of fire, light, and spirit, in the kingdom of heaven. 2. How and what angels and men were in their creation; that they are in and from God, his real offspring; that their life began in and from this divine fire, which is the Father of light, generating a birth of light in their souls; from both which proceeds the Holy Spirit, or breath of divine love in the triune creature, as it does in the triune Creator." More of the same sort might be cited, but this will suffice to show the disordered brain of the poor shoemaker philosopher.

Schelling, so highly esteemed by Coleridge, and from whom he borrowed so largely, is of the rational school, and his philosophy so nearly resembles that of Kant that he needs no further notice. He is a transcendental Idealist—an eminent defender of a branch of philosophy incomprehensible and indemonstrable.

Kant is the great man of the Pure Reason School, and to him Coleridge is more especially indebted, as "the giant hand" that came upon him and fixed his vacillating principles. The founder of a new sect, Emanuel Kant, was born in 1774, at Königsberg, in Prussia. He was a man of talent, a deep thinker, a famous metaphysician, but fond of abstraction, and his writings are impenetrably obscure. His *Critical Philosophy*, bringing religion "within the bounds of pure reason," is subversive of the Scriptures, and of the necessity of a divine revelation. He made the distinction between the *understanding* and the *reason*; and divided into three the sources of knowledge, viz.—sense, understanding, and reason. The faculty of sense is limited to the material phenomena of nature. The understanding judges according to sense—a higher and an active faculty, which gives

laws to nature, but which the brutes possess in common with man. The reason is a sublime faculty, competent to all necessary knowledge, having for its objects *ideas* existing out of, and independent of, time and space. "His religious system," says Robinson, (Bib. Repos. 1831,) "is little better than Deism in disguise." Dugald Stewart, a competent judge, says of Kant: "As to his works, I must fairly acknowledge that, although I have frequently attempted to read them in the Latin edition, printed at Leipsic, I have always been forced to abandon the undertaking in despair; partly from the scholastic barbarism of the style, and partly *from my utter inability to unriddle the author's meaning*. Whenever I have happened to obtain a momentary glimpse of light, I have derived it, not from Kant himself, but from my previous acquaintance with those opinions of Leibnitz, Berkeley, Hume, Reid, and others, which he had endeavored to appropriate to himself, under the deep disguise of a new phraseology." Phil. Essays, p. 98.

This historical view of the philosophy of Coleridge, serves to elucidate his classification of the mental powers, viz.:

The imitative power, voluntary and automatic; the imagination, or shaping and modifying power; the fancy, or the aggregative and associative power; the understanding, or the regulative, substantiating, and realizing power; the speculative reason, *vis theoretica et scientifica*, or the power by which we produce, or aim to produce, unity, necessity, and a universality in all our knowledge by means of principles, *a priori*; the will, or practical reason, (*willkühr*;) and (distinct both from the moral will and the choice) the sensation of volition, which I have found reason to include under the head of double touch. Lit. Remains, vol. 1., p. 326.

This classification simplified, and so far as it requires notice, consists of "truth powers" or powers realizing *ideas*, the understanding, the reason,\* the will, to which may be added the conscience, and consciousness. These are all, in the Critical Philosophy, godlike powers, out of the ordinary sense of the word. The *understanding* is the faculty that "judges according to sense." Its materials for operation are the impressions

\* The practical reason comprehends the will, the conscience, the moral being, &c. Aids to Reflection, p. 181.

made through the organs of sense ; and it " combines these multifarious impressions into individual notions, and by reducing these notions to rules, according to the analogy of all its former notices, constitutes experience," and gives laws to nature. The *reason*, independent of time, space, and sense, with ideas for its objects, reduces the " notions and rules " prepared in the laboratory of the understanding " to ABSOLUTE PRINCIPLES and necessary LAWS." The Friend, Vol. I., Essay V.

We have a further insight into the transcendent powers of the reason, in the following passages.

Reason is the tri-unity, as it were, of the spiritual eye, light, and object. Lit. Remains, Vol. III., p. 88.

Faith, that is, fidelity—the fealty of the finite will and understanding to the reason, *the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world*, as one with and representative of the absolute will, and to the ideas or truths of the pure reason, the supersensuous truths, which in relation to the finite will, and as meant to determine the will, are moral laws, the voice and dictates of the conscience. Ibid. p. 121.

Faith is the apotheosis (the deification?) of the reason in man, the complement of reason, the will in the form of the reason. Ibid. p. 147.

The right and true speculation, said Luther, is this, Believe in Christ ; do what thou oughtest to do in thy vocation, &c. This is the only practice in divinity. Coleridge makes the following comment on this passage :

Still, however, we may in a sound and good sense say, that reason is the ray, the projected disk or image, from the Sun of Righteousness, an echo from the Eternal Word, the light that lighteth every man, &c. Lit. Remains, Vol. IV., p. 5.

Universal reason is the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world. Ibid. p. 189.

The conscience is another all-sufficient faculty in the Coleridge philosophy ; a mysterious, indefinable power, but which nearly supersedes the office of the Holy Spirit. All the moral and intellectual attributes, indeed, excepting "the evil ground" in the will, seem to retain their original purity, with nothing more than a slight occultation from what was formerly called natural depravity. Conscience, like the pure reason, is never defiled, never " seared as with a hot iron," but a divinity in man ; it contains within itself, even for the heathen, proof of the existence

and attributes of God, and through it alone is revealed to man the divine will. The following paragraphs furnish all obtainable insight into the great mystery of the conscience.

A pure conscience, that inward something, that *θεος οικτιος* (domestic god) which, being absolute *unique*, no man can *describe*, because every man is bound to *know*, and even in the eye of the law is held to be a *person* no longer than he may be supposed to know it—the conscience, I say, bears the same relation to God, as (that) an accurate time-piece bears to the sun. The time-piece merely indicates the relative path of the sun, yet we can regulate our plans and proceedings by it with the same confidence as if it was itself the efficient cause of light, heat, and the revolving seasons; on the self-evident axiom that, in whatever sense two things (for instance, A, and C, D, E,) are both equal to a third thing, B, they are in the same sense equal to each other. The Friend, Essay IV.

The reader will obtain some further insight into the mystery of conscience from the theological philosophy. Is it not, however, a necessary sequence from this comparison of conscience with the time-piece, that neither a written revelation nor the teachings of the Spirit are necessary to a knowledge of religious duty? By the time-piece we can regulate our plans and proceedings with the same confidence as if it were the efficient cause of light, heat, and the seasons. So the conscience, holding a relation to God like that of the time-piece to the sun, must be sufficient in itself to give us a true knowledge of God, and to guide us aright in every duty! This comparison is not guarded by even a shade of qualification. Nothing is intimated about the natural perversity and blindness of the conscience—nothing is said of the necessity of light from revelation, or of the sanctifying and enlightening influence of the Holy Spirit. The necessary inference is, that conscience is all-sufficient; and this is one of the obvious and ruinous principles of the neological philosophy imported from Germany, and done into English by Coleridge.

*Self-consciousness* is another wonder-working, indefinable something. Our philosopher requires, as a means of understanding "his fundamental facts," the "voluntary production in our own minds of those states of consciousness to which he has referred us." The Friend, Essay II.

But we must take a seat in his philosophical balloon to reach these fundamental-fact-states of consciousness. For he kindly forewarns us that "it is neither possible nor necessary for all men, nor for many, to be philosophers." This consciousness of voluntary production is Trans-Alpine, and lies "on the other side of the spontaneous consciousness." "There is," says he, "as already cited, a *philosophic* (and inasmuch as it is actualized by an effort of freedom, an *artificial*) *consciousness*, which lies beneath, or (as it were) *behind* the spontaneous consciousness natural to all reflecting beings. A system, the first principle of which it is to render the mind intuitive of the *spiritual* in man, (i. e. of that which lies *on the other side* of our natural consciousness,) must needs have a great obscurity for those who have never disciplined and strengthened this ulterior consciousness." We have neither leisure nor capacity to climb the Alps to examine a consciousness so artificial and ulterior, and prefer to remain below in the Ante-Goshen darkness. The conjecture, however, may be hazarded, that such a consciousness as Coleridge affirms, and such intuition of the spiritual in man, can exist only in the imagination. It is neither an American, nor an English, but a purely German or neological consciousness. Soberly speaking, no man ever was, or in this life ever can be, conscious of a consciousness so indefinable and mystical. But there is so much greater danger to the young. They are prone to yield their understanding to "an artificial system-monger," whose "fundamental facts" lie hidden in the fathomless depths of the mind or of nonentity, but which nevertheless are set forth with dogmatic confidence and a pompous phraseology. We cannot understand Swedenborgianism, a kindred system, till we are caught up into its hallucinations. Neither can we understand the hilarity of intoxication without actual experiment; but who will take leave of his sober senses at such a cost to purchase knowledge? I proceed to consider the place occupied by the *Will*, in the system of Coleridge. It has a self-determining power. This is one of the tenets of Arminianism, and it is generally true that they who advocate this doctrine are unscriptural in their views of human depravity, and of the doctrines of grace



essential to a right faith. The freedom of the will, in his philosophy, Mr. Coleridge states and argues in the following paragraphs :

A free will, having its law within itself and its motive in the law—and thus bound to originate its own acts, not only without, but even against, alien stimulants. *Aids to Reflection*, p. 125.

I maintain, that a will conceived separately from intelligence is a non-entity, and a mere phantom of abstraction ; and that a will, the state of which does in no sense originate in its own act, is an absolute contradiction. It might be an instinct, an impulse, or plastic power and if accompanied with consciousness, a desire ; but a will it could not be. *Ibid.* p. 158.

By the phrase “in Christ,” I understand all the supernatural aids vouchsafed and conditionally promised in the Christian dispensation ; and among them the spirit of truth, &c. But aids, observe :—therefore not by the will of man alone ; but neither without the will. The doctrine of modern Calvinism, as laid down by Jonathan Edwards and the late Dr. Williams, which represents a will absolutely passive, clay in the hands of the potter, destroys all will, takes away its essence and definition, as effectually as in saying, This circle is a square—I should deny the figure to be a circle at all. It was in strict consistency, therefore, that these writers supported the Necessitarian scheme, and made the relation of cause and effect the law of the universe, subjecting to its mechanism the moral world, no less than the physical. It follows that all is nature. *Ibid.* p. 169.

Whatever is comprised in the chain and mechanism of cause and effect, of course necessitated, and having its necessity in some other thing, antecedent or concurrent—this is said to be natural ; and the aggregate and system of all such things is NATURE. It is therefore a contradiction in terms to include in this the free will, of which the verbal definition is—that which originates an act or state of being. In this sense, therefore, which is the sense of St. Paul, and indeed of the New Testament throughout, spiritual and supernatural are synonymous. *Ibid.* p. 108.

The will is ultimately self-determined, or it is no longer a will under the law of perfect freedom, but a nature under the mechanism of cause and effect. *Ibid.* p. 261.

There is some truth and some error in the doctrine thus confidently asserted. If the phrase “in Christ” means only the supernatural aids of the Christian dispensation, all men under the light of the gospel are Christians, for to all are “the supernatural aids vouchsafed and conditionally promised in the Christian dispensation.” But the apostle meant no such thing, and this is only one of a thousand instances in which Scripture is

perverted and evacuated of its meaning by philosophy, falsely so called. The freedom of the will, as stated by Edwards, is also grossly misrepresented. He was no necessitarian, in the sense imputed to him by Coleridge. The distinction between physical and moral causes is confounded. But there is an essential difference in the two kinds of mechanism. Edwards admitted the freedom of the will, and yet maintained that it is acted upon, determined by some moral influence or cause out of itself and still free in its volitions according to "the greatest apparent good." Freedom of will is essential to responsibility; and in a qualified sense the will is self-determined. Admit, as Coleridge affirms, that it is "the essential attribute of a will, and contained in the very idea, that whatever determines the will acquires this power from a previous determination of the will," and still it may be true that the will is determined by an influence out of itself, and freely consents or submits to the controlling power, choosing the greatest apparent or real good. Coleridge himself cites an instance, as pertinent an illustration of the freedom of the will in the Treatise of Edwards, as it is in his own philosophy of a self-determining power. I lay in bed, says he, one morning, reviewing the arguments pro and con, and debating the question whether to rise or not. At length I resolved after counting a certain number to spring out of bed—and did so. This is the substance of his story, and this is the proof of a self-determining power in the will. But in this instance was not the will constrained by shame, remorse, or a sense of duty to the particular determination? Was it not subject to the law of moral cause and effect? He himself admits something like this, not very consistently with his theory, for he says that "the supersensuous truths, which, in relation to the finite will, and as meant to determine the will, are moral laws, the voice and dictates of the conscience." Now, if the will is determined by moral laws, or by the dictates of conscience, how can it be strictly self-determined? Is not the will, as Coleridge objects to Edwards, "absolutely passive, clay in the hands of the potter?" Truth will occasionally thrust itself into systems of error. What, after all, do the advocates of a self-determining power demand, more



than is granted by Edwards and similar writers? Do they mean that the will, though acted upon, and submitting to foreign influence, yields by its own consent, and is therefore free in its volitions? What man of sense denies this? Do they mean that the finite will is absolutely free, removed wholly out of the universal sphere of moral cause and effect, and influenced solely, as if a deity, by its own supreme sovereignty? This is too absurd, even for speculative philosophy. I would not even attempt to prove that the Infinite Will is free in such a sense, that is, influenced by no considerations out of itself. Have the other faculties or attributes no control over the mind? Is the will subject to no moral laws? The will is free in its determinations, and yet it is subject, in a proper sense, to the great moral mechanism, essential to the glory and blessedness of the kingdom of God. The Treatise of Edwards on the Will, in its fundamental principles, will stand impregnable when such philosophers as Coleridge are forgotten. But the doctrine of a self-determining power has this end in view, to do away the deep depravity of human nature, and the bondage of the will to this depravity, as taught in the Scriptures. This accomplished, we have another gospel more acceptable to the carnal man.

The next and last topic of review in the philosophy of Coleridge is his doctrine of *ideas*. This, too, is a remarkably occult subject, although the word *idea*, in its common import, is quite intelligible. It signifies a thing seen, or visible object; a form, model, mental image, appearance, (*idea avrov*.) Matt. xxviii. 3; also notion, opinion, purpose, thought. But none of these definitions reach the system of idealism, which "makes every thing to consist in ideas, and denies the existence of material bodies." The ideas of Mr. Coleridge differ somewhat from those of Plato, but his shoulders are broad enough to bear the additional load of improvement. The Platonico-Coleridgian ideas are thus defined by himself:

By ideas, I mean intuitions not sensuous—in themselves necessarily both inexpressible and inconceivable. Lit. Remains, Vol. IV. p. 394.

Idea co-existing with νόμος, becomes νόμος, law, type. Idea in its oppo-

sition, and of course its correspondence to νομος, begets in itself an *analogon* to product; and this is self-consciousness.

According to Plato, ideas are constitutive likewise, and one in essence with the power and life of nature; εἰς λόγῳ ζωῆ ην, &c., in him was life, and the life was the light of men.

Both νομος and idea (or νους) are the verbum (the word); but, as in the former it is *verbum fiat*, 'the word of the Lord;' in the latter it must be the *verbum fiet*, or 'the word of the Lord in the mouth of the prophet.' Lit. Remains, Vol. II. pp. 346, 348, 354.

The Christian religion is a plain, an easy, a perspicuous truth. Donne. A religion of ideas, spiritual truths, or truth powers—not of notions and conceptions, the manufacture of the understanding—is therefore plain and easy, that is, immediate. Comment on Donne by Coleridge. Lit. Remains, Vol. III. p. 120.

We have in the above paragraphs a description of ideas, notwithstanding that they are "intuitions in themselves necessarily both inexpressible and inconceivable." Our philosopher, writing in fragments, and these scattered in miscellaneous confusion, sometimes forgot what he said last. But, with all the explanation, the *nomos*, *idea*, *nous*, and *verbum*, are very obscure to us; and still more so is the algebraic solution of an idea in the Aids to Reflection, p. 184. We have, however, a perceptible glimpse of the Pantheism to which this philosophy tends, and in which at last it will find its quiescent state. Ideas are one in essence with the power and life of nature; or with the Word, the Christ of John, for εἰς λόγῳ ζωῆ ην, says Coleridge, in the Word was life, and the life was the light of men. It will more fully appear as we advance into the Gospel philosophized, that the universe is a huge animal, "whose body nature is, and God the soul." One paragraph more will furnish us with a direct definition of an *idea*, that "inexpressible and inconceivable" thing. "A distinguished power, self-affirmed, and seen in its unity with the Eternal Essence, is, according to Plato, an *idea*." The Friend, Sect. II. Essay IX.

This definition of an idea, making darkness more dark, with all that is said about supersensuous faculties, provokes a complacent laugh as we hear the master and his beardless disciples (for few men of sober age are caught in such a web of mysticism) chafe at our ignorance of his impenetrable system of ethics, and

our incapacity to understand it; but really such philosophy, despite of our utmost charity, seems to us to be a compound, in Alligation Alternate, of nothingness, mist, and a few grains of truth; and the more we ask for light, the more are we involved in obscurity. Explanations and definitions in the Coleridgian system only remind us of the philosopher Bardolph's effort to define, for Justice Shallow, the word *accommodated*: "Accommodated, that is, when a man is, as they say, accommodated; or when a man is—being—whereby—he may be thought to be accommodated; which is an excellent thing." I must not leave this philosophy without noticing more fully the conscience and the will. All we can know of the mental powers is learned from reflection, attention, and consciousness. The wonderful attributes constituting the mind, and their character, are known to us; but the personal *I*, to which these attributes belong, is a hidden mystery on which intuition and the strengthening of "ulterior consciousness" can throw no light. The famous *γνωσι σεαυτον*, which Coleridge pushes to a perilous extreme, can extend only to the legitimate limits of consciousness, and the deductions of reason enlightened by the Spirit and the Word of God. Of eternal essences, and of ideas in unity with the Eternal Essence, we *can* know nothing. The *conscience* is by no means what it is represented to be in the system of Coleridge. He asserts that it contains in itself nearly or quite the entire evidence of the Divine character and attributes. "I believe," he says, "that the notion of God is essential to the human mind; that it is called forth into distinct consciousness principally by the conscience, and auxiliarily by the manifest adaptation of means to ends in the outward creation. It is therefore evident to my reason that the existence of God is absolutely and necessarily insusceptible of a scientific demonstration, and that Scripture has so represented it; for it commands us to believe in one God." The Scriptures, however, refer us to the works of creation for proof of the Divine existence and his natural attributes. What stronger demonstration could Scripture give us? Paul, inspired authority, says that the heathen have proof of the "eternal power and Godhead," not from the conscience, but from "the things that are made."

(Rom. i. 20.) The existence of God must therefore be susceptible of proof from his works. The apostle says, further, that the province of conscience is to *accuse* and *excuse*. As a judge it passes sentence upon our *deeds*; *following*, not *preceding* our responsible action. It is not qualified to settle beforehand questions of duty, to weigh testimony, and collect data for the forming of a right judgment; this belongs to the reasoning powers. What Coleridge in one of his beautiful figures of speech, in which he excels most writers, says of *experience*, applies aptly to the conscience. "Human experience, like the stern-lights of a ship at sea, illumines only the path which we have passed over." Conscience is the stern-light; it is not hung in the bow of the ship, for there reason places her lantern. The Coleridgian view of the conscience is therefore erroneous, both as it regards its province and its mysterious ability. But the great error in this aerial system consists in the quasi-deification of human reason. It seems to be identical with the Supreme Reason; and Coleridge, echoed by his disciples, asserts, over and over, that reason is the life and light of men—the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world. Are the Logos, the Reason, and Christ the same? What is the "*νοῦς*, or pure reason in man?" what is meant by "the pre-existence, in order of thought, of the *νοῦς* as spiritual, both to the objects of sense and to their products, formed as it were by the precipitation, or—if I may dare adopt the bold language of Leibnitz—by a coagulation of spirit?" Lit. Remains, Vol. II. pp. 336, 337. We do not understand such a *νοῦς* as this, nor objects of sense precipitated, or matter as merely spirit condensed! The term *understanding* includes all the intellectual powers in common philosophy. If any choose to separate the reason from the other faculties we will not object, provided the two halves do not exceed the whole. There seems to be, however, no great benefit arising from the distinction between the *reason* and the *understanding*, nor do we admit the assumed fact, that the brutes have no reason. This is not, nor can it be, proved. The broad distinction between man and brute is the *conscience*. But Coleridge makes a vital and all-important distinction between reason and understanding, as the only ground

of difference between man and beast. For thus he argues against Donne, who had cited the passage—No man cometh to Christ unless the Father lead him: “The corrupt will,” says Coleridge, “cannot, without preventient as well as auxiliary grace, be unively subordinated to the reason; and again, without this union of the moral will, the reason itself is latent. Nevertheless, I see no advantage in not saying the will, or in substituting the term ‘faith’ for it. But the sad non-distinction of the reason and the understanding throughout Donne, and the confusion of ideas and conceptions under the same term, painfully inturbidates his theology. Till this distinction of the *νοῦς* (reason) and the *φρόνημα σαρκός* (understanding) be seen, nothing is seen aright. If you know not the diversity of reason from the understanding, you know not reason; and reason alone is knowledge.” Lit. Remains, Vol. III. p. 147. It is a sin against Paul to make him mean, by the “mind of the flesh,” and “mind of the spirit,” nothing more than reason and understanding. It is a shameless perversion of Scripture. But the *reason*—the *pure reason*—is above Scripture; for, says our theologian, (long after his conversion from Unitarianism,) in reply to Sherlock, on the passage, All judgment is committed to the Son—“At this moment I have no intuition, no intellectual diagram, of this commission of all judgment to the Son, and therefore a multitude of plausible objections present themselves which I cannot solve, nor do I expect to solve them till by faith I see the thing itself.” Lit. Remains, Vol. IV. p. 217. It is very apparent now that the philosophy of “RELIGION WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF PURE REASON” supersedes the necessity of Revelation, subverts the gospel, and is *Deism* in disguise. It is the German *rationalism* reducing the truths and doctrines of Scripture to the standard of human reason; and it might be called *naturalism* or *pantheism* prospectively.



## PART II.

### THEOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY.

IN the estimation of Coleridge the great value of his philosophy consists in its elucidation of the Scriptures, and the true principles of theological science. This system, so far as fragments can be systematic, professes to be the philosophy of theology; but it is only the accommodation of the Scriptures to a peculiar and delusive philosophy. He aimed to deduce from one cause and principle, and refer to the same, the "universality of knowledge," the "*De la causa, principio et uno*," of the philosopher of Nola; a theory mischievous alike in moral, as in physical therapeutics. If reason is so competent to oneness and universality of knowledge, and the mind has within itself types of all things, revelation is necessary only in the humbler office of shedding a clearer light on previously known truths; — "the Evangelists and Apostles every where representing their moral precepts not as doctrines then first revealed, but as truths implanted in the hearts of men, which their vices only could have obscured." Even the hidden fact of the Trinity, says Coleridge, "would have been a necessary idea of my speculative reason, deduced from the necessary postulate of an intelligent Creator." The gospel metamorphosed by such philosophy, becomes quite another gospel, and the unlearned apostles make an awkward figure in the stole of the academy. The Editor of the Literary Remains of Coleridge, Pref. Vol. III. p. 10, says, "He distinguished so strongly between that internal faith which lies at

the base of, and supports, the whole moral and religious being of man, and the belief as historically true, of several incidents found or supposed to be found in the text of the Scriptures, that he habitually exercised a liberty of criticism with respect to the latter which will probably seem objectionable to many of his readers in this country (England). His friends have always known this to be the fact; and he vindicated this so openly that it would be folly to attempt to conceal it." This liberty of criticism, exercised upon the doctrines and interpretation of Scripture, is exhibited to the full extent in the four volumes of *Literary Remains*. The second volume consists chiefly of criticisms on Shakspeare, of whom our divine says, "Shakspeare may sometimes be gross, but I boldly say that he is always moral and modest." A few things more only need be noticed in this volume.

The criticisms on the great poet of nature are for the most part just, and written in surpassing beauty of style. This was the proper field for Coleridge, and elsewhere he was not at home. Of the morality and modesty of Shakspeare, his readers will form their own judgment. It is not, however, the best text-book for practical theology. We find also in this volume of *Literary Remains*, p. 398, a specimen of Romanism, on "prayer for the dead," in "Notes on Sir Thomas Brown's *Religio Medici*." "Our Church," says Coleridge, "with her characteristic Christian prudence, does not enjoin prayer for the dead, but neither does she prohibit it." The following is a sample of philosophical exposition:—"Thus expound Exod. xxxiii. 10, Thou canst not see my face and live. By the 'face' of God, Moses meant the *idea νοητικον*, which God declared incompatible with human life, it implying *επαφη του νοητικου*, or contact with the pure spirit." P. 406. But more wonderful still is the labor expended on the foolish pagan fable of the Prometheus. Our philosopher, addressing a learned audience, has wrought up this piece of mythology to such a height of mystery, that even he himself is lost in the clouds. The more he explains and illustrates, the more is confusion worse confounded. We can gather from the production only an attempt to find in the Prometheus the nucleus of the Platonic philosophy, and a fellowship of the fable with the Scrip-

ture doctrine of the divine Logos, or the Word. Dismissing now the second volume of the Literary Remains, we shall find in the other three, and elsewhere, an ample illustration of the principles of the so-called theological philosophy. The following quotations give the reader a Coleridgean view of

## GOD, AND THE TRINITY.

God is the eternal self-affirmant, the I Am in that I am; and the key of this mystery is given to us in the pure idea of the will, as the alone *causa sui*.—Lit. Remains, Vol. III. p. 142.

Being is the name of God, and of God only. Donne.

Rather, I should say, 'the eternal antecedent of being; *I that shall be in that I will to be*;\* the absolute will; the ground of being; the self-affirming *actus purissimus*. Coleridge, *ibid.* p. 115.

God had said, my name is *I Am*; yet in truth it is, my name is, *I shall be*. Donne.

Nay—I am that only one who is self-originant, whose will must be contemplated as antecedent in idea to, or deeper than, his own co-eternal being. Coleridge, *ibid.* p. 118.

St. Paul to the Colossians, speaking of Christ as the creative mind of his Father, before all worlds, *begotten before all things created*. *Ibid.* p. 252.

The Father only has origin in himself. Lit. Remains, Vol. IV. p. 237.

In a note "on the permission of evil," p. 73, Vol. III., of the Literary Remains, we find some affinity of creed with the extravagance of the cobbler, Jacob Behmen. In this connexion it may also be added, that Coleridge thought of writing a book, entitled, "Vindication of great Men unjustly branded;" and the prominent names in such a work, he says, would have been "Giordano Bruno, Jacob Behmen, Benedict Spinoza, and Emanuel Swedenborg." *Ibid.* p. 422. The Behmen doctrine of the Deity, improved by Leibnitz, is given in the subjoined extract from Coleridge, and such philosophy I should call *German silver* theology.

The Leibnitzian distinction of the Eternal Reason or nature of God, το Θειον, (the *νοϋς και αναγκη* reason and necessity of Timæus Locrus,) from the will or personal attributes of God—(θεληται και βουλησις—αγαθου πατρος αγαθον βουλημα)—planted the germ of the only possible solution,

\* The Hebrew admits of no such meaning. Exod. iii. 14.



or rather perhaps in words less exceptionable and more likely to be endured in the schools of modern Theology, brought forward the truth involved in Behmen's too bold distinction of God and the ground of God;—who yet in this is to be excused, not only for his good aim, and his ignorance of scholastic terms, but likewise because the Fathers expressed themselves no less crudely in the other extreme, &c. At least Behmen constantly makes self-existence a positive act, so as that by an eternal *περιχωρησις* or mysterious intercirculation God wills himself out of the ground (*το θειον—το εν και παρ*, the divinity—the one and all—*indifferentia absoluta realitatis infinita et infinita potentialitatis*, the absolute indifference of infinite reality and of infinite potentiality); and again, by his will, as God existing, gives being to the ground *αυτογενης αυτοφνης—υιος αυτου*, self-begotten, self-produced, son of himself. *Deus ipse sui origo est—ex seipso procreatus ipse se fecit*—God is the origin of himself—procreated from himself, he made himself. Synesius, Jerome, Hilary, Lactantius, and others, involve the same conception. Vol. III. p. 73.

Dr. Johnson said of Dryden, that he “delighted to tread upon the brink of meaning, where light and darkness begin to mingle; to approach the precipice of absurdity, and hover over the abyss of *unideal* vacancy.” Coleridge delighted to tread further, and to throw himself into the abyss of *absolute* vacancy. What greater possible absurdity than to speak of the eternal antecedent of being; and to call God the self-affirmant, the self-affirming most pure act, self-originant, the origin and creator and son of himself; and to make Paul speak to the Colossians of Christ as the creative mind of his Father! And then to plunge into the chaos of distinction between God and the ground of God, and God willing himself out of the ground the One and All, or pantheism, into the ground of self-creation! Even charity herself might ask, ‘Was the man drunk or crazy?’ But what are his views of the Trinity? These appear in his formula of faith, dated 1830, about four years before his death;

#### FORMULA FIDEI DE SANCTISSIMA TRINITATE.

##### THE IDENTITY.

The absolute subjectivity, whose only attribute is the Good; whose only definition is—that which is essentially causative of all possible true being; the ground; the absolute will; the adorable *προπρωτον*, which, whatever is assumed as the first, must be presumed as its antecedent;

, without an article, and yet not as an adjective. See John i. 18, *Θεον ουδεις εωρακε*, &c. No man hath seen God, &c., as differenced from *ibid.* 1, *και Θεος ην ο λογος*, and the Word was God.

But that which is essentially causative of all being, must be causative of its own—*causa sui*, *αυτοπατωρ*. Thence

#### THE IPSEITY.

The eternally self-affirmant, self-affirmed; the "I AM in that I AM," or the "I shall be that I will to be;" the Father, the relatively subjective, whose attribute is, the Holy One; whose definition is, the essential finific in the form of the infinite; *dat sibi fines*.

But the absolute will, the absolute good, in the eternal act of self-affirmation, the Good as the Holy One, co-eternally begets

#### THE ALTERITY.

The supreme being; *ὁ οὐτως ων*; the supreme reason, the Jehovah; the Son; the Word; whose attribute is, the True (the truth, the light, the *fiat*); and whose definition is, the *pleroma* of being whose essential poles are unity and distinctivity; or the essential infinite in the form of the finite: lastly, the relatively objective, *deitas objectiva* in relation to the I Am as the *deitas subjectiva*; the divine objectivity.

N. B. The distinctivities in the *pleroma* are the eternal ideas, the substantial truths; each considered in itself, an infinite in the form of the finite; but all considered as one with the unity, the eternal Son, they are the energies of the finific; *παρτα δι' αυτου*, &c. John i. vs. 3 and 16. But with the relatively subjective and the relatively objective, the great idea needs only for its completion a co-eternal which is both, that is, relatively objective to the subjective, relatively subjective to the objective. Hence

#### THE COMMUNITY.

The eternal life which is love, the Spirit relatively to the Father, the Spirit of Holiness, the Holy Spirit; relatively to the Son, the Spirit of truth, whose attribute is wisdom; *sancta sophia*; the Good in the reality of the True, in the form of actual life.

Holy, holy, *ιλασθητι μοι*.

Here endeth the first lesson in this astounding formula of faith; and the prayer at the close, Be propitious to me, was suitable after such a bold intrusion into the unrevealed and unrevealable mystery of the Godhead. It is utterly impossible to convict such a theologian either of heresy or of orthodoxy: for if the words of the above formula have any meaning, it would require a Daniel to interpret the writing. What a mercy that the

Scriptures were written by unlearned men. Had they been penned by *philosophers*, who could have been made wise by them unto salvation? A few extracts, placed in juxtaposition with the formula of faith, will give the reader all the light which Coleridge has cast upon the mystery of the Trinity by his theological philosophy.

In which essential unity of God, a Trinity Personal nevertheless subsisteth, after a manner far exceeding the possibility of man's conceit. Hooker, b. i. 2, p. 250.

If 'conceit' here means conception, the remark is most true; for the Trinity is an idea, and no idea can be rendered by a conception. An idea is essentially inconceivable. But if it be meant that the Trinity is otherwise inconceivable than as the divine eternity, and every attribute of God is, then neither the commonness of the language here used, nor the high authority of the user can deter me from denouncing it as untrue and dangerous. So far is it from being true, that, on the contrary, the Trinity is the only form in which an idea of God is possible, unless indeed it be a Spinosistic or World-God.—Coleridge, Notes on Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity. Lit. Remains, Vol. III. p. 31.

Field, "On the Church," says, there are some things *explicite*, some things *implicite credenda*; that is, there are some things that must be particularly and expressly known and believed, as that the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost God, and yet there are not three Gods, but one God, &c.

Merciful heaven! Eternal misery, and the unmitigable wrath of God, and the inextinguishable fire of hell amid devils, parricides, and haters of God and all goodness—this is the verdict which a Protestant divine passes against the man, who, though seriously believing the whole Nicene Creed, and every doctrine and precept taught in the New Testament, and living accordingly, should yet have convinced himself that the first chapters of St. Matthew and St. Luke were not parts of the original gospels.—Coleridge, Note on Field, Lit. Remains, Vol. III. p. 69.

The distinctive title of the Father as the Supreme Will is the Good; that of the only begotten Word, as the Supreme Reason (*o ων*), is the True; and the Spirit proceeding from the Good through the True, is the Wisdom. Wisdom is the pure will, realizing itself intelligently as the good manifesting itself as the truth, and realized in the act. Wisdom, life, love, beauty, and the beauty of holiness, are all synonyma (equivalent names) of the Holy Spirit.—6th December, 1831. Ibid. p. 127.

The Holy Spirit is only an *attribute*, not a *person*, according to the above statement, and yet these were the views of Cole-

ridge about three years before his decease. He speaks still more explicitly of the Holy Spirit, in answer to Sherlock: "St. Paul tells us," says Sherlock, 1 Cor. ii. 10, "that the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God. So that the Holy Spirit knows all that is in God." Coleridge rejects this sound exposition, and says, "St. Paul is speaking of the holy spirit of which true spiritual Christians are partakers, and by which or in which those Christians are enabled to search all things, even the deep things of God. No person is here spoken of, but reference is made to the philosophic principle (!!) that can only act immediately, that is interpenetratively, as two globules of quicksilver, and co-adunatively! Lit. Remains, Vol. IV. p. 197. Whitaker cites, as proof of the Trinity, the benediction of the Apostles, which Coleridge, p. 307, of the same volume, calls only "a pious wish;" and he says, also, that Christ was visually present to Stephen; his invocation, therefore, was not perforce an act of religious adoration, an acknowledgment of Christ's deity! In view of the above cited paragraphs, what is the value of Coleridge's conversion from Unitarianism, thus stated by himself, Vol. IV. p. 223,—"During the sixteen months of my aberration from the Catholic faith, I presumed that the tenets of the divinity of Christ and redemption, and the like, were irrational, and that what was contradictory to reason could not have been revealed by the Supreme Reason. As soon as I discovered that these doctrines were not only consistent with reason, but themselves very reason, I returned at once to the literal interpretation of the Scriptures and to the Faith." Can it be gravely pretended now, that this theological philosopher was not a *bona fide* Socinian? And yet he is lauded by his disciples as an orthodox man, and a great champion of the Trinity. He who is credulous enough to believe this, would do well to read again the story of Virgil's wooden horse. "Not with such defenders," &c. We turn now to the

#### INSPIRATION OF THE SCRIPTURES.

His views of the authority of Scripture, and of the right principles of interpretation, Mr. Coleridge has stated in the last of

his publications, entitled, "Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit," or "Letters on the Inspiration of the Scriptures." "These Letters," says the Editor, Mr. Henry Nelson Coleridge, a son-in-law, "were left by Mr. Coleridge, in MS., at his death. The reader will find in them a key to most of the Biblical criticism scattered throughout the author's own writings, and an affectionate, pious, and, as the editor humbly believes, a profoundly wise attempt to place the study of the written Word on its only sure foundation—a deep sense of God's holiness and truth, and a consequent reverence for that Light—the image of himself—which he has kindled in every one of his creatures." The substance of this volume the author thus gives: "Seven Letters to a Friend, concerning the bounds between the right and the superstitious use of the Sacred Canon; in which the writer submissively discloses his own private judgment on the following questions:—

I. Is it necessary, or expedient, to insist on the belief of the divine origin and authority of all and every part of the Canonical Books as the condition, or first principle of Christian faith?

II. Or, may not the due appreciation of the Scriptures, taken collectively, be more safely relied on as the result and consequence of the belief in Christ?" &c. In this small volume, Mr. Coleridge has argued several points unnecessarily, and we do not dissent from his judgment in these particulars. He does not admit to the full extent the verbal and literal inspiration of the Scriptures, i. e. that the very words and letters contained in the Bible were given by the dictation of the Holy Spirit—nor that every passage in the volume, or received "Canonical Books," is truly inspired. No sane man will contend for this: for the peculiar and appropriate style of each writer shows that partially, at least, the penmen, guided and kept from error, clothed the thoughts of the Spirit in their own words. How otherwise can we rationally account for the diversity of style which appears, each writer exhibiting the characteristics of his own temperament, talents, and learning? Nor do we hold that every passage in the Scriptures is from the Spirit of God. Paul quotes passages from heathen poets, for instance, Acts xvii. 28, and Titus i. 12. We do not suppose that these pagan writers were inspired, although

their sayings are incorporated with the sacred writings. And we allow Mr. Coleridge his position, that all the words in the book of Job were not given by inspiration of God, and that neither Job nor his friends spake by the Spirit in all they said, for they uttered things untrue and wicked, for which God in the sequel reproveth them. We do not hold that the passage, Gen. iii. 4, 'Ye shall not surely die,' is divinely inspired. It is the lying word of the serpent; and is recorded in Scripture as the saying of the father of lies. But admitting this, that the *words* and *letters* of Scripture were not all given by divine inspiration; and that certain passages were uttered by uninspired men, and by Satan; were not the sacred writers moved and permitted by the Holy Spirit to record what is contained in the Scriptures? and do they not contain a true statement of facts and doctrines, and sanctioned as such, by the Spirit of Truth? In short, may we not rely upon the sacred volume as "a sure word of prophecy, a light shining in a dark place," and enduring forever? Were not the "holy men of old," who spoke and wrote the living oracles, so moved, and guided, and preserved from error, by "the Holy Ghost" that we may rely upon the Word as divine and infallibly true? This is all we ask, and in this sense "all Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness; that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works." 2 Tim. iii. 16, 17. We should not dissent so much from Mr. Coleridge, in a general view, did he not lay down principles which, followed out in their results, must subvert the divine authority of the Scriptures. He advocates the doctrine that no writer of the Scriptures is to be accredited as inspired, in the plenary and received sense of the term, except so far as he refers what he reveals to a direct communication from God. Says he, "Have I not declared—do I not begin by declaring—that whatever is referred by the Sacred Penman to a direct communication from God, and wherever it is recorded that the subject of the history had asserted himself to have received this or that command, this or that information or assurance, from a superhuman intelligence, or where the writer in his own person, and in the

character of an historian, relates that the *Word of the Lord* came unto priest, prophet, chieftain, or other individual—have I not declared that I receive the same with full belief, and admit its inappellable authority?" Letter III. p. 46. But is nothing to be received as inspired, unless the writer explicitly prefixes to it a *Thus saith the Lord*? On this principle the Scriptures, especially the New Testament, would be reduced to a very small compass. Is there no internal evidence in the writing, nothing in the miracles wrought by the writer which furnishes proof of divine authority and "direct communication from God?" The theology of Coleridge must have been sadly "imbrangled" by his philosophy, thus to destroy the common faith. He was in weakness and pain, approaching the close of his eventful life, when, by reading the "Confessions of a Fair Saint" in Carlisle's translation of *Wilhelm Meister*, or the "Confessions of a Beautiful Soul," as he would rather translate the German, "my thoughts," he says, were thrown "inward on my own religious experience, and gave the immediate occasion to the Confessions of one, who is neither fair nor saintly, but who—groaning under a deep sense of infirmity and manifold imperfection—feels the want, the necessity of religious support." He sought not this support in Christ by simple trust and obedience, but still he says, "Faith subsists in the *synthesis* of the Reason and the individual will." Most melancholy it is to see a man of the mental powers of Coleridge spending his dying breath in loosening the authority of the Word of God, the only lamp to our feet. "The time of the formation and closing of the canon unknown;—the electors and compilers unknown, or recorded by known fabulists;—and (more perplexing still) the belief of the Jewish Church—the belief, I mean, common to the Jews of Palestine and their more cultivated brethren in Alexandria (no reprehension of which is to be found in the New Testament)—concerning the nature and import of the *θεοπνευσια* (inspiration) attributed to the previous remains of their Temple Library." Letter II. p. 35. "Every sentence found in a canonical book, rightly interpreted, contains the *dictum* of an infallible Mind;—but what the right interpretation is,—or whether the very words now extant are corrupt or

genuine—must be determined by the industry and understanding of fallible, and alas ! more or less prejudiced theologians.” Letter IV. p. 76. “Be only, my Friend ! as orthodox a believer as you would have abundant reason to be, though from some accident of birth, country, or education, the precious boon of the Bible, with its additional evidence, had up to this moment been concealed from you ; and then read its contents with only the same piety which you freely accord on other occasions to the writings of men, considered the best and wisest of their several ages ! What you find therein coincident with your pre-established convictions, you will of course recognize as the Revealed Word,” &c. Letter IV. p. 84. An eminent writer says, that “one of the most striking instances of prejudice and inconsistency in a philosophic mind, is to be found in the views entertained by Mr. Coleridge in regard to the Word of God ; views which would, if driven closely, be as a ploughshare of ruin to the Christian system, or else would land the believer in a pseudo-Romanism, with an infallible Church, possessing an inspiration denied to the Scriptures, but without which, in themselves, let the inspiration of the Church be what it might, the Scriptures would be of no avail. I refer to the publication of the ‘Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit,’ the least intellectual and the most unphilosophical of all his productions. The true subjective evidence of the Word of God, internal in the Scriptures, and subjective in us, is opposed to three false schemes : the scheme which assumes the Church as the infallible and only interpreter ; the scheme in philosophy which would reduce the evidences of Christianity to mere miracles and historical testimony ; and the scheme which supposes in man a natural spiritual faith, the product of his unregenerate state. The system of Mr. Coleridge, if system it can be called, to which that great and learned man never gave form and unity, lies open to severe remark, in reference to all he has said on the doctrine of atonement. Disposing of almost the entire language of the Scriptures on this subject as metaphysical, he has, in effect, resolved the atonement into a mere business of regeneration—a mere arrangement of means and ends for our personal sanctification. We may, with great probability, suppose that this



was the result of Mr. Coleridge's early religious errors; one consequence of the cold and deadly baptism of his soul in the Unitarian scheme, though he afterwards shuddered at its recollection, was an inability or unwillingness to contemplate the higher ends of the atonement, and its higher nature, as revealed in the Scriptures."\* There is lamentably conclusive evidence that Mr. Coleridge never got out of the cold and deadly baptism of Unitarianism, till he *died* out. We are thankful, nevertheless, for even this testimony against his errors from Mr. Cheever, who has been claimed as a Coleridgeite. He seems not to have seen the "views of the Word," which he reprehends, carried out and practically applied in the *Literary Remains*. There the "ploughshare of ruin" is boldly driven through "the Christian system," and the believer is actually "landed in a pseudo-Romanism." The "Confessions" of Coleridge being his last work, and containing no qualification or disavowal of the principles of interpretation applied to the Scriptures in his previous publications, and, moreover, his Editor informing us that these Letters on Inspiration are the "key to the Biblical criticism scattered through his other works," we have full assurance that the principles laid down in the "Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit, in Seven Letters on the Inspiration of the Scriptures," are truly developed and applied by the author in his *Literary Remains*. We turn, then, to these volumes for the most astounding Biblical criticism and its results. A more perfect illustration is rarely found, of the Apostle's "profane and vain babblings, and oppositions of science, falsely so called." (1 Tim. vi. 20, 21.) The grossness of the errors, scattered up and down in detached paragraphs, is not fully seen till we reduce the chaos to order. In the following extracts, the reader will have a connected view of the Biblical criticism, and philosophical theology of Coleridge.

#### NOTES ON THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER.

Now that Christ died for our sins—11th Sunday after Trinity. But the meaning of *υπερ των αμαρτιων* (for our sins) is that Christ died through the sins, and for the sinners. He died through our sins, and we

\* Cheever's Discourse at Burlington, 1843; pp. 28, 52.

live through his righteousness. Comment by Coleridge. Lit. Remains, Vol. III. p. 12.

Thou madest him little lower than the angels. Prayer Book. Power + idea = angel. Idea — power = man or Prometheus. Coleridge. *Ibid.* p. 13.

My mind praying this verse, Ps. lxxi. 16, in our Prayer Book version is turned to the right appreciation of the Scriptures, and in what sense the Bible may be called the Word of God, and how, and under what conditions the unity of the Spirit is translucent through the letter, which read as the letter merely, is the word of this and that pious, but fallible and imperfect man. Alas, for the superstition where the words themselves are made to be the Spirit! O might I live to utter all my meditations on this most concerning point! Lit. Remains, Vol. IV. p. 6.

The last citation is from "Notes on Luther's Table Talk;" and in this connection, may be added a passage from Jeremy Taylor, touching the Liturgy, which it seems was inspired. The emendation of the Scripture cited above, How that Christ died through our sins, is *ominous*. But the plain and pious Christian will still believe that Christ died *for* our sins; made a *propitiation* for sin. As for the Algebraic statement, that power added to *idea* equals an *angel*, and power subtracted from *idea* equals *man*, or the pagan Prometheus, it is a problem which the reader must solve for himself—if he can. We untranscendentalists are incompetent to meddle with so high a branch of spiritual mathematics: nor can we pray the 16th verse of Psalm lxxi. in the Coleridgean spirit. But we have not so great fears of what Mr. Coleridge so often in his works calls "bibliolatry," or as we should say bible-idolatry, nor are we prepared to admit that even the *words* of Scripture are the words of "pious, but fallible and imperfect men." Mr. Coleridge lived to utter quite enough of *such* "meditations on this most concerning point." But to the Liturgy, compiled under Edward VI., of which he speaks as follows:

The argument therefore, (i. e. of Taylor) should be inverted;—not that the Church (A, B, C, D, F, L, &c.) compiled it; *ergo*, it is unobjectionable, but (and truly we may say it) it is so unobjectionable, so far transcending all we were entitled to expect from a few men in that state of information, and such difficulties that we are justified in concluding that the compilers were under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. But the same order holds good even with regard to the Scriptures. We cannot

rightly affirm they were inspired, and therefore they must be believed; but they are worthy of belief, because excellent in so universal a sense, &c. Lit. Remains, Vol. III. p. 230.

The Liturgy and the Scriptures on a par as to inspiration! In this view of the matter, we cease to wonder at the changes rung so long and incessantly on the "admirable, excellent, and most excellent, Liturgy." We were not aware that it is inspired! On page 254 of this same Volume III. strong doubts are expressed about "the absolute plenary inspiration and infallibility of the Apostles and Evangelists." And at page 257 we find this singular, but positive assertion: "The rite of circumcision, I say, was binding on all the descendants of Abraham, through Isaac, for all time, even to the end of the world." This notion will be explained, when we come to the subject of baptism. And we shall find several more specimens of Puseyism of the first water. We need ask no more, why certain disciples of a certain philosopher are so charitable toward Episcopacy. One more example of Biblical criticism we furnish out of the volume just referred to, which is also repeated, in substance, in the Aids to Reflection, and in Vol. IV. p. 4, of the Lit. Remains. "The word *religion*," says our philosopher, "for *θρησκεία* in St. James i. 27, ought now to be altered to ceremony or ritual. The whole version has, by change of language, become a dangerous mistranslation, and furnishes a favorite text to our moral preachers, Church Socinians, and other christened pagans now so rife amongst us. What was the substance of the ceremonial law is but the ceremonial part of the Christian religion, but it is its solemn ceremonial law, and though not the same, yet one with it and inseparable, even as form and substance." p. 62. The word translated religion signifies indeed outward ceremony, as well as spiritual devotion. But the apostle defines his own meaning of the term, by calling religion, (*θρησκεία*) in its pure, spiritual nature, the visiting of the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and keeping unspotted from the world. What this practical piety has to do with the *ceremony*, or *ritual* of religion, it is difficult to see. But with some theologians and preachers, the *forms* of godliness are more important than its *power*. But

to proceed with the doctrine of inspiration. The following extracts are from "Notes on Jeremy Taylor's Sermon on the Power of the Keys." Taylor advocates the common view that the apostles had the power to bind and loose penitents and delinquents. Coleridge thinks that what Christ says of the Church refers wholly to the Jewish synagogue or Church then established, and that the binding and loosing has reference to the miraculous power of healing diseases committed to the apostles. "And I am not afraid," he adds, "to avow the conviction that the first three Gospels are not the books of the New Testament in which we should expect to find the peculiar doctrines of the Christian faith explicitly delivered." In proof of inspiration, Taylor cites the words of Christ, The Spirit of truth shall bring all things to your remembrance. (John xiv. 26.) Coleridge denounces this as "the enslaving Old Bailey fashion of defending, or, as we may well call it, apologizing for Christianity, introduced by Grotius." He questions whether "a miraculous remembering" was necessary to the credibility of the narrators, and whether "the gift had any reference to the inspiration of the Gospels." And, says he, "God forbid that I should become the advocate of mechanical infusions and possessions, superseding the reason and responsible will." *Lit. Remains*, Vol. III. pp. 211, 226. One more extract from Taylor, with the extended comment upon it, will give the reader more fully Mr. Coleridge's view of Inspiration.

And yet because the Holy Ghost renewed their memory, improved their understanding, supplied to some their want of human learning, and so assisted them that they should not commit an error in fact or opinion, neither in the narrative, nor dogmatical parts, therefore they wrote by the Spirit. Taylor, Sermon XXXII. And where is the proof?—and to what purpose unless a distinct and plain diagnostic were given of the divinities and humanities which Taylor himself expressly admits in the text of the Scriptures? And even then, what would it avail unless the interpreters and translators, not to speak of copyists, in the first and second centuries, were likewise assisted by inspiration? As to the larger part of the prophetic books, and the whole of the Apocalypse, we must receive them as inspired truths, or reject them as simple inventions or enthusiastic delusions. But in what other book of Scripture does the writer assign his own work to a miraculous dictation, or infusion? Surely the contrary is implied in St. Luke's preface. Does the hypothesis rest on one possi-

ble construction of a single passage in St. Paul, 2 Tim. iii. 16? And that construction resting materially on a *και* (*θειοπνευστος και ωφελιμος*) not found in the oldest MSS., when the context would rather lead us to understand the words as parallel with the other assertion of the Apostle, that all good works are given from God,—that is, *every divinely inspired writing is profitable*, &c. Coleridge, *Ib.* pp. 228, 229.

These last cited intelligible and very significant paragraphs should be followed by a few more quotations of similar character. It is quite evident that, in the theology of our soi-disant professor, the faculties of Reason, Conscience, and the Will, are so exalted that the inspiration of the Scriptures was not necessary. "Talk not," says he, "of bad conscience; it is like bad sense, that is, no sense; and we all know that we may wilfully lie till we involuntarily believe the lie as truth; but *causa causæ est causa vera causati*." And again: "The co-ordinate authority of the Word, the Spirit, and the Church, I believe to be the true Catholic doctrine." *Lit. Remains*, Vol. III. pp. 362, 366. This is nearer the true *Roman Catholic* doctrine, for Coleridge does not allow that the Word and the Spirit have a co-ordinate or coequal authority with the Church. Another comment now on Jeremy Taylor:

We have no reason to rely upon any tradition for any part of our faith, any more than we could do upon Scripture, if one book or chapter of it should be detected to be imposture. Taylor.

What says Jeremy Taylor then to the story of the woman taken in adultery (John viii. 3-11), which Chrysostom disdains to comment on? If true, how could it be omitted in so many, and these the most authentic copies? And if this for fear of scandal, why not others? And who does not know that falsehood may be effected as well by omissions as by interpolations? But if false—then—but Taylor draws the consequence himself. Coleridge.

Are the passages in St. Peter's epistles respecting the circumstances of the last day and the final conflagration, and even St. Paul's, to be regarded as apocalyptic, and a part of the revelation by Christ, or are they, like the dogma of a personal Satan, accommodations of the current popular creed which they continued to believe? Coleridge. *Ibid.* pp. 374, 378.

Pretended demonstrations, from Grotius to Paley, are mischievous underminings of the Faith, pleadings fitter for an Old Bailey thieves' counsellor than for a Christian divine. The true evidence of the Bible is

the Bible. Coleridge, Notes on Luther's Table Talk. Vol. IV. p. 5, Lit. Remains.

Luther had argued for the internal evidence of the Scriptures against traditions, and contended valiantly for the gospel in opposition to Papists. But such commendation as our writer of Notes gives him, could not be very cordial to the Reformer. "O that the dear man Luther had but told us here what he meant by the term gospel! That St. Paul had seen even St. Luke's, is but a conjectural interpretation of a single text, doubly equivocal; namely, that the Luke mentioned was the same with the Evangelist Luke; and that the *evangelium* signified a book," &c. Objecting still further that the apostles could not mean "the now called four gospels, but the contents of those books as far as veracious," &c. Coleridge thus concludes: "I, therefore, feel myself impelled to infer that by the gospel Paul intended the eternal truths known ideally from the beginning, and historically realized in the manifestation of the Word in Christ Jesus; and that he used the ideal immutable truth as the canon and criterion of the oral traditions." Lit. Remains, Vol. IV. pp. 8, 9. What must be the effect on the minds of theological students, if they credit such doctrines concerning the authority of God's Word? What must be the consequences to the churches of their future ministrations? O ye fathers, who love the truth as it is in Jesus, hear ye not a well known voice, Blow ye the trumpet in Zion, and sound an alarm in my holy mountain? I cannot dismiss this vital question of Inspiration, without adducing a little more testimony. "God's Word a Lord of all Lords," said Luther. "Yea," responds Coleridge—"if we were previously assured that all and every part of the Old and New Testament is the voice of the divine Word. But except by the Spirit, whence are we to ascertain this? Not from the books themselves; for not one of them makes the pretension for itself, and the two or three texts which seem to assert it refer only to the Law and the Prophets, and nowhere enumerates the books that were given by inspiration." Again, the difficulties in 2 Pet. iii. 10 might be avoided by "the easy and nowise improbable supposition that

---

Peter, no great scholar or grammarian, dictated the substance, the matter, and left the diction and style to his *amanuensis*, who had been an auditor of St. Paul." Lit. Remains, Vol. IV. pp. 46, 410. But worse, if possible, still, is the following citation :

Had Edward Irving argued temperately and learnedly, the controversy must have forced the momentous question on our clergy: Are Christians bound to believe whatever an Apostle believed—and in the same way and sense? I think St. Paul himself lived to doubt the solidity of his own literal interpretation of our Lord's words, &c. The unhappy effect which his (may I not say) incautious language respecting Christ's return produced on the Thessalonians, led him to reflect on the subject, and he instantly, in the second epistle to them, qualified the doctrine, and never afterwards resumed it; but on the contrary, in the first epistle to the Corinthians, ch. xv., substitutes the doctrine of immortality in a celestial state, and a spiritual body. On the nature of our Lord's future epiphany or phenomenal person, I am not ashamed to acknowledge that my views approach very nearly to those of Emanuel Swedenborg. *Ibid.* pp. 14, 18.

Can it be uncharitable now to regard the man who philosophizes in this style, and who doubts the genuineness of Matthew's Gospel entire, from the simple fact that Christ omits the mention of Zechariah, as having predicted his entrance into Jerusalem on the colt—*Ibid.* p. 14—is it uncharitable to consider him as little better than a baptized infidel? I shall next, in working a system out of the chaos, present Mr. Coleridge's views of the *integrity of the sacred canon, and of miracles.*

The Church had received from Christ, says Hooker, (*Ecclesiast. Polity*, p. 243,) a promise that such as have believed in Christ, these signs and tokens should follow them, 'To cast out devils, to speak with tongues,' &c. Mark xvi.

The man who verily and sincerely believes the narrative in St. John's Gospel of the feeding of five thousand persons with a few loaves and small fishes, and of the raising of Lazarus in the plain and literal sense, cannot be reasonably suspected of rejecting or doubting any narrative concerning Christ and his apostles simply as miraculous. I trust, therefore, that no disbelief, or prejudice against miraculous events and powers will be attributed to me, as the ground or cause of my strong persuasion that the latter verses of the last chapter of St. Mark's Gospel were an additament of a later age, for which St. Luke's Acts of the Apostles misunderstood

supplied the hints. Coleridge, Note on Hooker. Lit. Remains, Vol. III. p. 47.

Baxter refutes the claim of modern apostles by calling for their miracles, *tongues*, spirit of revelation, and infallibility. Coleridge thus comments on this paragraph :

This is a two-edged argument which Baxter and Taylor imported from Grotius, and which proves the miracles of the first two centuries to be much on a par with the miracles wrought by the apostles. I venture to assert most unequivocally, that the New Testament contains not the least proof of the *linguipotence* (power of tongues) of the apostles, but the clearest proofs of the contrary, &c.\* Notes on Baxter's Life of Himself. Lit. Remains, Vol. IV. p. 108.

Donne, observing that the miracles of Christ and his preaching prevailed not against the common unbelief, says, Therefore we have a clearer, that is a nearer right than the written Gospel, that is, the Church. Coleridge adds :

True; yet he who should now venture to assert this truth, or even contend for a co-ordinateness of the church and the written Word, must bear to be thought a semi-Papist, an ultra high-Churchman. Still the truth is the truth. Lit. Remains, Vol. III. p. 116.

If they killed Lazarus, had not Christ done enough to let them see that he could raise him again? Donne.

Malice, above all, party malice, is indeed a blind passion, but one can scarcely conceive the chief priests such dolts as to think that Christ could raise Lazarus again. Their malice blinded them as to the nature of the incident; made them suppose a conspiracy between Jesus and the family of Lazarus, a mock burial, in short; and this may be one, though it is not, I think, the principal reason for this greatest miracle being omitted in the other Gospels. Coleridge, Note on Donne. Ibid. p. 133.

Mr. Coleridge seems not to admit the common and very rational conclusion that, the four apostles writing the same history of Christ, certain incidents omitted by one apostle were supplied by another; and one writer omitted now and then an event because his brother apostle had recorded it. This variation is proof of honesty, that the writers had neither concert nor collusion. Yet more than once he turns this omission against the inspiration of the entire Gospels. A very singular and ominous reason he gives for the not recording of a miracle. And the Pharisees such *dolts*, as to think Christ capable of raising the

\* See also The Friend, Section II., Essay II. and XII. pp. 590, 527.



dead! Are all dolts who believe this? But we proceed with our citations. The following is a comment of Coleridge on Henry More's Theological Works:

We may draw from this passage (1 Thess. iv. 16, 17) the strongest support of the fact of the ascension of Christ, or at least of St. Paul's (and of course of the first generation of Christians') belief of it. For had they not believed in his ascent, whence could they have derived the idea of his descent—his bodily, personal descent? The only scruple is, that all these circumstances were parts of the Jewish *cabala* or idea of the Messiah by the spiritualists, before the Christian era, and therefore taken for granted with respect to Jesus as soon as he was admitted to be the Messiah. With his *semi*-Cartesian, *semi*-Platonic, *semi*-Christian notions, Henry More makes a sad jumble in his assertion of chronochorhistorical Christianity. Ibid. p. 163.

As the woman Mary did bring forth the son who bruised the serpent's head which brought sin into the world by the woman Eve, so the Virgin Mary was the occasion of grace as the Virgin Eve was the cause of damnation. Bishop Hacket, Sermon on Luke ii. 7.

A Rabbinical fable or gloss on Gen. iii. 1. Hacket is offensively fond of these worse than silly vanities. The fault of the bishop is, that he believed the story in Genesis, and that by the disobedience of Eve all were made sinners. Coleridge, Notes on the Life of Bishop Hacket. Ibid. p. 192.

A few citations more will present in their full light Mr. Coleridge's views of miracles, and of the integrity of the Scripture Canon. Bishop Hacket is reprehended for teaching that by "the disobedience of Eve all were made sinners;" for which fault the apostle Paul also comes under reproof. (Rom. v. 19.) And Jeremy Taylor betrays his ignorance of philosophy by speaking "of some causes of error in the exercise of reason, which are inculcate in themselves." To this Coleridge replies, "It is a lamentable misuse of the term reason, thus to call by that name the mere faculty of guessing and babbling. The making reason a faculty, instead of a light, and using the term as a mere synonyme of the understanding, and the consequent ignorance of the true nature of ideas, and that none but ideas are objects of faith, are the grounds of all Jeremy Taylor's important errors." Lit. Remains, Vol. III. p. 272. Again, on page 278, says our theological philosopher, of the miraculous death of Ananias and Sapphira, and the blindness of Elymas, "There are for me great

difficulties in this incident, especially when it is compared with our Lord's reply to the apostle's proposal to call down fire from heaven. *The Son of Man is not come to destroy,*" &c.—1 John v. 7, he calls, after the Unitarian system, "an intruded gloss." In his Notes on Skelton, he says, "The exact accordance of the miracles related with the ideal of a true miracle in the reason, does indeed furnish an argument for the probable truth of the relation." And again, on Acts x. 38, he thinks "that Peter could not have introduced to such an audience, a truth so mysterious." Says Skelton, "Christianity proved by miracles." Coleridge replies, "I cannot see, and never could, the purpose or *cui bono* of this reasoning." Same objection on pages 275, 276, of Vol. IV., and also a metaphorical atonement. On pages 294, 295, *ibid.*, Jonathan Edwards and Andrew Fuller are roughly handled by our so-called paragon of modesty and humility, the one for his Treatise on the Will, the other for believing the doctrine of election. The last quotations are from Lit. Remains, Vol. IV. pp. 253, 261, 269, 271. A few specimens from Notes on Waterland. "As soon as the miraculous gifts," says Waterland, "or gift of discerning spirits ceased." Coleridge replies, "No one point in the New Testament perplexes me so much as these (so-called) miraculous gifts." *Ibid.* p. 273. He supposes the silence of John about the Corinthian heresy to furnish "an almost overwhelming argument against the Apostolicity of the *Christopedia*,\* both that prefixed to Luke, and that concorporated with Matthew." *Ibid.* p. 250. "I will go further," says our biblical critic, "and confess my belief that the (so-called) Ebionites, and whose gospel commenced with the baptism by John, were orthodox apostolical Christians, who received Christ as their Lord, that is, as Jehovah *manifested in flesh.*" *Ibid.* p. 254. The Ebionites, says Waterland, rejected three of the gospels, receiving only Matthew curtailed, and rejected Paul's writings, reproaching him as an apostate. Yet Coleridge believes that they were orthodox and apostolical Christians. He seems to have forgotten that he said,

\* The birth and childhood of Christ.

in Vol. III. p. 258, "No such man as Ebion, as I can see, ever existed." But here he admits the veritable posterity of Ebion, and over the back of Martin Luther, the *optime meritis* Reformer, gently lays his lash upon the Church for an article of heterodoxy, as he thinks, introduced by these same Ebionites. "Helvidus," said Luther, "alleged the mother of Christ was not a virgin, so that, according to his wicked allegation, Christ was born in original sin." Whereupon Coleridge exclaims, "O what a tangle of impure whimsies has this notion of an immaculate conception, an Ebionite tradition as I think, brought into the Christian Church! I have sometimes suspected that the apostle John had a particular view to this point in the first half of the first chapter of his Gospel. Not that I suppose that our present Matthew then in existence, or that if John had seen the Gospel according to Luke, the *Christopedia* had been already prefixed to it. But the rumor might have been whispered about, and as the purport was to give a psilanthropic (merely human) explanation and solution of the phrases, Son of God, and Son of Man—so St. John met it by the true solution, namely, the eternal Filiation of the Word." Vol. IV. p. 13. The reader will need no comment on the "tangle of impure whimsies in this notion of an immaculate conception." We are glad, however, to find that the Catholic *Sainthood* prefixed to the simple names of the apostles, Peter, John, Matthew, Paul, as they called each other, does not in *every* instance disfigure their names. They knew little of the superb titles of Right Reverend Fathers in God, and Lords Spiritual, worn by their successors, and would have stared much at such a prefix. But even the orthodox now-and-then-omission of *Saint* by our author, makes nothing against his Romanism. "For the Fathers," says Luther, "were but men, and to speak the truth, their reputes and authorities did undervalue and suppress the books and writings of the sacred apostles of Christ." To this fact, Coleridge answers, "But in inspiration the early Christians, as far as I can judge, made no generic difference, let Lardner say what he will. Can he disprove that it was declared heretical by the Church in the second century, to believe the written words of a

dead apostle in opposition to the words of a living Bishop, seeing that the same spirit\* which guided the apostles dwells in and guides the Bishops of the Church?" Lit. Remains, Vol. IV. p. 49. A public crier hawking such wares as this, would probably say, 'Here is your fine Puseyism.' The words of a *living* Bishop equally inspired as the written words of a *dead* apostle! And this sentiment stands on the same page with a German *Der Teufel*—which translated is The Devil! an exclamation point, called forth by Luther's honest orthodoxy. Again says Luther, of the history of the prophet Jonas—"If it stood not in the Bible, I should take it for a lie." The good man is enlightened by our divine: "It is quite wonderful that Luther, who could see so plainly that the book of Judith was an allegorical poem, should have been blind to the book of Jonas being an apologue, in which Jonah means the Israelitish nation." Ibid. p. 50. Any way to avoid a miracle. But once more. With the best reason, Luther supposes the great Prophet foretold by Moses to be Christ. But says his annotator, Coleridge, "If I could be persuaded that this passage (Deut. xviii. 15—19) primarily referred to Christ, and that Christ, not Joshua and his successors, was the prophet here promised, I must either become a Unitarian psilanthropist, (i. e. mere-man-thropist) and join Priestly and Belsham—or abandon to the Jews their own Messiah as yet to come, and cling to the religion of John and Paul without further reference to Moses than to Lycurgus, Solon, and Numa: all of whom in their different spheres no less prepared the way for the coming of the Lord, *the desire of* all nations." Ibid. p. 22. The man who entertained such views of God's Word and Prophets, was a regular member of the Episcopal Church. High-churchmen with such latitude of sentiment, make an easy but not very consistent boast of their unity and freedom from the schisms and divisions which prevail, as they say, among Dissenters. In the iron shoe of the Prayer Book, and Liturgy, unity in the *forms* of worship only can be secured, or pretended. But it is such a *unity* as Leighton speaks of—that of frost, which congeals sticks, stones, and rubbish, into a

\* The philosophical Germans use a small *s* where we, speaking of the Deity, should employ a capital *S*—Spirit.

mass, and holds them in fellowship, till there comes a thaw. It is a weighty problem for men of high-church principles to solve: Why do you thrive best in a season of spiritual declension in other and surrounding churches; and why are your ranks thinned when evangelical piety most prevails in them? But we will not charge Mr. Coleridge with Puseyite doctrines, without more decisive proof than has yet been presented. A few extracts will exhibit his views of

#### ROMANISM.

Mr. Coleridge says, in his "Notes on Sir Thomas Brown's *Religio Medici*, Lecture XIV.," that "strong feeling and an active intellect conjoined, lead almost necessarily, in the first stage of philosophizing, to Spinosism. Sir T. Brown was a Spinosist without knowing it. If I have not quite all the faith that the author of the *Religio Medici* possessed, I have all the inclination to it; it gives me pleasure to believe. I have never read a book in which I felt greater similarity to my own make of mind—active in inquiry, and yet with an appetite to believe—in short an affectionate visionary." *Lit. Remains*, Vol. I. pp. 241, 242. This Sir Thomas Brown, with many other errors, believed in "prayer for the dead." Coleridge, intimating assent to this article of the Papist faith, says, to repeat a quotation which I have before given to the reader, "Our Church, with her characteristic Christian prudence, does not enjoin prayer for the dead, but neither does she prohibit it." He intimates clearly his approval of this practice, in his own epitaph, and in his "Lines on a Friend, who died of a frenzy fever induced by calumnious reports."

Rest, injured shade! the poor man's grateful prayer  
On heavenward wing thy wounded soul shall bear;  
As oft at twilight gloom thy grave I pass,  
And sit me down upon its recent grass.

Is not this a virtual admission of the propriety and efficacy of prayer for departed souls? But in answer to Field on "the saints praying for us," Coleridge says, "To have placed this

question in its true light, so as to have allowed the full force to the Scriptures, asserting the communion of saints and the efficacy of their intercession without undue concessions to the *hierolatry* of the Romish Church, would have implied an acquaintance with the science of transcendental analysis, and an insight into the philosophy of ideas, not to be expected in Field, and which was then only dawning in the mind of Lord Bacon. The proper reply to Brerely would be this: The communion and intercession of saints is an idea, and must be kept such." Lit. Remains, Vol. III. p. 81. We turn now to the Virgin Mary, the so-called Eucharist, the power of the Church, and Luther's choke-pear, *consubstantiation*. To begin with the Virgin Mother. Mr. Coleridge, like a true Catholic, makes her a goddess. From the "Translation of a passage in Ottfried's Metrical Paraphrase of the Gospels,"\* we have the following:

HYMN TO THE VIRGIN.

There lives not on this ring of earth,  
A mortal that can sing her praise.  
Mighty mother, virgin pure,  
In the darkness and the night,  
For us she bore the heavenly Lord.—1810.

"Most interesting it is," says the comment appended to the Hymn by Coleridge, "to consider the effect, when the feelings are wrought above the natural pitch by the belief of something mysterious, while all the images are purely natural; then it is that religion and poetry strike deepest." Lit. Remains, Vol. I. p. 204. But although Mr. Coleridge thinks the praise due to this "Mighty mother, virgin pure," above all mortal power, like the heathen poets he treats irreverently the divinity of his own creation. Field argues against the heresies of Jovinian—"The first, that Mary ceased to be a virgin when she had borne Christ; the second, that all sins are equal." "Neither this, nor that," replies Coleridge, "is worthy the name of opinion; it is mere unscriptural, nay, anti-scriptural gossiping: for example, as to

\* See Lit. Biography, Chap. X. p. 278.

Mary's private history after the conception and birth of Christ, we neither know, nor care about it." Ibid. p. 75. As for this unwise, needless, unprofitable, and endless dispute about the "always virgin," not to speak of the natural brethren of Christ, the question is for ever settled by reference to a single passage; Matthew i. 25. The Scriptures give Mary no higher eulogy than this: "Thou art highly favored, the Lord is with thee: blessed art thou among women." Luke i. 28. The inspired writers nowhere intimate that she is an object of worship more than Anna, and other holy women, nor do they ascribe to her other than human attributes. More than this can be found only in fabulous legends. But again, says Coleridge, on the alleged virginity of Mary, "Can such points appertain to our faith as Christians, which any parent would decline speaking of before a family, and which if the question propounded by another in the presence of my daughter, aye, or even of my, no less in mind and imagination, innocent wife, I should resent as an indecency?" Ibid. p. 103. Modesty is an excellent grace, but not to be arrayed against the necessary utterance of truth. If it be not uncivil, we would just ask how this "innocent wife," came to be present with her husband only in imagination? We have heard a separation "whispered about," but if the rumor be correct, whether this happened on *poetical*, or *theological* grounds, we are not informed. In this connection may be properly added the comments of our divine on a sermon of Donne, Isa. vii. 14, "Behold a virgin," &c.

The fear of giving offence to good men should make us slow and cautious, in making up the mind finally on a religious question. But there may arrive a time of such perfect clearness of view respecting the particular point, as to supersede all fear of man by the higher duty of declaring the whole truth as it is in Jesus. Therefore having now overpowered six-sevenths of the ordinary period allotted to human life; resting my whole and sole hope of salvation and immortality on the divinity of Christ, and the redemption by his cross and passion, and holding the doctrine of the Triune God as the very ground and foundation of the Gospel faith—I feel myself enforced by conscience to declare and avow, that in my deliberate judgment the *Christopedia* prefixed to the third Gospel and concorporated with the first, but according to my belief in its present form the latest of the four, was unknown to, or not recognized by

the apostles Paul and John; and that instead of supporting the doctrine of the Trinity and the Filial Godhead of the Incarnate Word as set forth by John i. 1, and by Paul, it, if not altogether irreconcilable with this faith, doth yet greatly weaken and bedim its evidence; and that by the too palpable contradictions between the narrative in the first Gospel and that in the third, it has been a fruitful magazine of doubts respecting the historical character of the Gospels themselves. But were it asked of me, Do you therefore believe our Lord to have been the Son of Mary by Joseph? I reply; it is a point of religion with me to have no belief one way or the other. I am in this way, like St. Paul, more than content not to know Christ himself *κατα σαρκος* (after the flesh). It is enough for me to know that the Son of God became flesh, John i. 14, Gal. iv. 4; and more than this, it appears to me, was unknown to the apostles, or if known, not taught by them as appertaining to a saving faith in Christ. Lit. Remains,\* Vol. III. p. 101. October, 1831.

From the date subjoined, the above sentiments were expressed and recorded for posterity, by Mr. Coleridge, about three years before his death. It was after his conversion from Unitarianism, or to use his own word, "re-conversion." The "sixteen months of his aberration," he considers as only a lapse from the faith, when he returned to his former faith, in the schools of Germany. See Literary Biography, chapter x., for a full account of this "gracious Providence," for which he says, "I can never be sufficiently grateful." He has used the exact word, "re-conversion," i. e., a return to his former state, for no account or evidence appears of his ever having been converted, that is, born again, in the evangelical sense of the term. It would be curious to learn how he attained to "such perfect clearness of view," as to be "enforced by his conscience," to reject Isaiah vii. 14, and the *Christopedia*, as he calls it, of the first and third gospels. He labors with extreme assiduity to make the true gospels begin with the Logos of John, or the Platonic Logos, and rid himself of the miraculous birth of Christ. And yet, in the estimation of his admirers, this is the holy man, the humble and orthodox Christian, the champion of the Trinity, and defender of the Faith! Very like Paul, truly, in not wishing to know Christ *after the flesh*—having no belief one way or the other about the

\* See p. 100 for a comparative anatomy and zoological exposition of Rom. viii. 21.



origin of his human nature. Was ever an apostle more misunderstood or abused? With the Prayer Book, we can heartily say, From such piety, and such defenders of the Faith, "Good Lord deliver us." He has enough to say of faith, but it is always the mysterious "adunation of the will and the reason." Christ never comes distinctly in, as the Object of faith; and his chapter on Faith, in his Literary Remains, is so enveloped in darkness, that an unlearned man, yes, and a learned man too, would die in his sins *twice* before he could understand such a treatise *once*.

We come now to the *Eucharist*, the popish name for the Lord's Supper. The word *ευχαριστια*, is always thanksgiving, and thankfulness. Never in a single instance, as may be seen from Schmidt's Greek Concordance, does the New Testament call the Lord's Supper a *eucharist*. But this only in passing. Now for Mr. Coleridge's views of the "sacrament of the eucharist," contained in "Notes on the Book of Common Prayer," and elsewhere in his annotations. He is advising a young student in theology, and his counsels run as follows:

#### THE EUCHARIST.

After this course of study (i. e. the gospel of John) you may then take up and peruse sentence by sentence the communion service, the best of all comments on the Scriptures appertaining to this mystery. And this is the preparation which will prove, with God's grace, the surest preventive of, or antidote against, the freezing poison, the lethargizing hemlock of the doctrine of the Sacramentaries, according to whom the Eucharist is a mere practical metaphor, in which things are employed, instead of articulated sounds, for the exclusive purpose of recalling to our minds the historical fact of our Lord's crucifixion; in short—(the profaneness is with them, not with me)—just the same as when Protestants drink a glass of wine to the glorious memory of William III. Lit. Remains, Vol. III. pp. 8, 9.

I will detain neither the reader nor myself with a comment on the injustice and wickedness of the above paragraphs, but will only say, what I have felt all along in the perusal of these text-books of theology, that they contain the greatest amount of profane ribaldry and of "damnable heresies," that I ever met with,

in any professedly Christian writer, within the same space. Let us go on. The Prayer Book, Companion for the Altar, requires, as a fit preparation for the "holy eucharist," the "seeing and hating our sins." Coleridge answers, "But what if a man seeing his sin, earnestly desire to hate it? Shall he not at the altar offer up at once his desire, and the yet lingering sin, and seek for strength? Is not this sacrament medicine as well as food?" Again, he dissents from the Rubric, which saith of the man in extreme sickness, "He doth eat and drink the Body and Blood of our Saviour Christ profitably to his soul's health, although he do not receive the sacrament with his mouth." Says he, "incautiously expressed, and scarcely to be reconciled with the Church's own definition of a sacrament." Ibid. p. 11. We have generally supposed that "the Church" defined a sacrament to be "the outward and *visible* sign of an *inward* grace." But the reader can the better understand the contempt thrown on the Sacramentaries—i. e., those who regard the Lord's Supper, not as a *mystery*, but a simple and precious *means of grace*, observed by faith in the recipient; and can see that Coleridge makes it a saving ordinance—if he will "read, mark, and inwardly digest," a few more paragraphs. Field, "On the Church, its jurisdiction and powers," says, "The Bishops assembled in a General Council may interpret the Scriptures, and by their authority suppress all them that shall gainsay such interpretations, and subject every man that shall disobey such determinations, as they consent upon, to excommunication and censures of like nature." Coleridge nods assent to this assumed power of Bishops, but adds more of the essence of Romanism. "This would be satisfactory," quoth he, "if only Field had cleared the point of the communion in the Lord's Supper; whether taken *spiritually*, though in consequence of excommunication, not *ritually*, it yet sufficeth to salvation." Lit. Remains, Vol. III. p. 90.

We proceed now to the doctrine of

#### CONSUBSTANTIATION.

Luther finds in Coleridge an apologist for his error, as do also the Papists for the kindred figment of *transubstantiation*. A fig-

ment I regard both doctrines, for Scripture in its common-sense interpretation, intimates neither that the body of Christ is corporeally present with the elements of bread and wine, nor that these elements are transformed into the real body and blood of Christ. The reader may have some difficulty in "enucleating" the sense of Mr. Coleridge's language, but for this he must task his own intellectual powers. He argues as follows :

I do not think the attack on Transubstantiation the most successful point of the orthodox Protestant controversialists. The question is, what is meant in Scripture, as in John vi., by Christ's body and blood. Surely not the visible, tangible, accidental body, that is, a cycle of images and sensations in the imagination of the beholders; but his supersensual body, the *noumenon*\* of his human nature, which was united to his divine nature. In this sense I understand the Lutheran ubiquity. If by "substance" in the enunciation of the article, be meant *id quod vere est*, (that which truly is—I translate for the unlearned reader,) then it is possible to give a philosophically intelligible sense to Luther's doctrine of consubstantiation; at least to a doctrine that might bear the same name: at all events, the mystery is not greater than, if it be not rather the same as, the assumption of the human by the divine nature. If *per impossibile* (through impossibility) human nature could make itself sinless and perfect, it would become or pass into God; and if God should abstract from human nature all imperfection, it might without impropriety be affirmed, even as Scripture doth affirm, that God assumed or took up into himself the human nature. Lit. Remains, Vol. III. p. 78.

We have here some kind of *stantiation*, but whether it is *trans*, or *con*, it would be hazardous to say. It looks rather like the good old Platonic doctrine—the soul a part of God, taken up at last and lost in the *το πᾶν* Deity. But let us look first at some kindred and illustrative paragraphs. "Freedom of will," says Field, "is proper to God only; and in this sense Calvin and Luther rightly deny that the will of any creature is, or ever was free." Says Coleridge, "I add, except as in God, and God in us. Now, the latter alone is will; for it alone is *ens super ens*, (being above being.) And here lies the mystery, which I dare

\* Mr. Coleridge has expounded this hard word. *Noumenon*, "or thing in itself." Chap. IX. p. 266. Lit. Biography. Phenomenal—"object of the outward senses." Lit. Remains, Vol. III. p. 30.

not openly and promiscuously reveal.—A creaturely will cannot be free; but the will in a rational creature may cease to be creaturely, and the creature, *αποστασις*,\* finally cease in consequence; and this neither Luther nor Calvin seem to have seen.—It is not given, nor is it wanting, to all men to have an insight into the mystery of the human will and its mode of inherence on the will, which is God, as the ineffable *causa sui*.” Ibid. pp. 84, 85.—Who need ask again, What is transcendentalism? Mr. Coleridge, ever floating about, all things in general and nothing in particular, accuses Donne of grievous error in the use of the word “nature,” and inquires of all the modern theological giants, What is “body?” What is the “gospel?” “All ideas,” says he, “or spiritual truths are supernatural.” Ibid. p. 122. The good and great Archbishop Leighton, too, is in fault, for he believed “angels and glorified souls to be unchangeable by nature.” But his annotator says, “If angels be other than spirits made perfect, or as Leighton writes, ‘glorified souls,’ the unalterable by nature seems to me rashly asserted.” Again, Leighton says, of the creation of the world, “how much more consistent is it to believe that this was done in time, than to imagine it was from eternity.” Not so, thinks Coleridge, for, says he, “It is inconceivable how any thing can be created in time, and production is incompatible with interspace.” Lit. Remains, Vol. IV. pp. 178, 181. How many furlongs is this from Plato’s eternal matter? But the Apostle Paul is also a Platonist, for “Plato glorified by St. Paul,” Leighton is *made* to say in his Commentary on the first Epistle of Peter. Ibid. p. 165. Of this theological philosophy we can only say, Alas! it is too high for us, we cannot attain unto it! We pass on to the power of

#### THE CHURCH.

The reader has been already made acquainted with Mr. Coleridge’s views of the high authority of the Church, from its inspired Liturgy, its co-ordinateness with the Word of God, the spirit of the apostles dwelling in, and guiding the Bishops, &c. I shall

\* Apostasia, Mr. C. calls *chaos spirituale*, spiritual chaos. Letters on Inspiration, I.

present in addition a few extracts from his *Notes on Baxter's Life of Himself*, showing his contempt of Dissenters, and his belief that the Episcopal Church (the Catholic excepted) is the true and only Church. In the first volume of his *Literary Remains*, p. 255, "Notes on Junius," he throws out an unchristian sneer in this comparison: "Like a Presbyterian's prayer, you may substitute almost every where the third for the second person without injury." This same spirit appears in the following quotations:

Baxter urged the indifference of church ceremonies, a vital question, truly, with high-churchmen.\* This provoked from our theologian a testy and somewhat profane response: "Nothing can be more pitifully weak than the conduct of the Presbyterian party.—If they admitted the authority lawful, and the ceremonies only, in their mind, inexpedient, good God! can self-will more plainly put on the cracked mask of tender conscience than by refusal of obedience? What intolerable presumption, to disqualify as ungodly and reduce to null the majority of the country, who preferred the Liturgy, in order to force the long-winded vanities of bustling God-orators on those who would fain hear prayers, not spouting." *Lit. Remains*, Vol. IV. p. 109. Again, Baxter pleads for "the authority of the pastoral office, and credible piety in those who come to the Lord's Supper." "But," replies Coleridge, "suppose only such men pastors as are now most improperly, whether as boast or as sneer, called Evangelical, what an insufferable tyranny would this introduce? Who would not rather live in Algiers?" That the minister be not bound to read the Liturgy himself, if another, by whomsoever, be procured to do it, &c. Baxter. Wonderful that so good and wise a man as Baxter should not have seen that in this the Church would have given up the best, perhaps the only efficient preservative of her faith. But for our blessed and truly Apostolic and Scriptural Liturgy, our churches' pews would long ago have been filled by Arians and Socinians, as too many of their desks already are. Coleridge, *Lit. Remains*. *Ibid.* pp. 113, 136.

It is more wonderful that Mr. Coleridge should not have perceived that he was the last man to "cast the first stone" at Dissenters. How much better was he than a Socinian? And has the "blessed and truly apostolic Liturgy" kept the Church of England from errors of faith? Such boasting is indeed "pitifully

\* My fixed principle is: that a Christianity without a Church exercising spiritual authority, is vanity and dissolution. *Aids*, p. 272.

weak." But we have long been accustomed to hear it, and will leave the truth in this matter to speak for itself. What does Mr. Coleridge think of *angels*, both *good* and *evil*? First, of the *holy* angels :

But now that we may lift up our eyes (as it were) from the footstool to the throne of God, and leaving these natural, consider a little the state of heavenly and divine creatures: touching angels which are immaterial and intellectual. Hooker on the Angels.

All this disquisition on the angels confirms my remark, that our admirable Hooker was a giant of the race Aristotle *versus* Plato. Hooker was truly judicious—the consummate *synthesis* of understanding and sense. An ample and most ordonnant conceptionist, to the tranquil empyrean of ideas he had not ascended. Of the passages cited from Scripture, how few would bear a strict scrutiny; being either, 1, divine appearances, Jehovah in human form; or 2, the imagery of visions, and all symbolic; or 3, names of honor given to prophets, apostles, or bishops; or lastly, mere accommodations to popular notions. Coleridge's Lit. Remains, Vol. III. pp. 31, 32.

Since their fall, their practices have been clean contrary unto these before mentioned. For, being dispersed, some in the air, some on the earth, some in the water, some among the minerals, dens, caves, &c., they have by all means labored to effect a universal rebellion against the laws, and, as far as in them lieth, utter destruction to the works of God. Hooker.

Childish! but the childishness of the age, without which neither Hooker nor Luther could have acted on their contemporaries with the intense and beneficent energy with which they (God be praised) did act. Coleridge, *ibid.* p. 34.

Thus much, therefore, may suffice for angels; the next unto whom in degree are men. Hooker.

St. Augustine well remarks that only three distinct *genera* of living beings are conceivable: 1. The infinite rational; 2. The finite rational; 3. The finite irrational; that is, God, man, brute animal. *Ergo*, angels can only be men with wings on their shoulders. Were our bodies transparent to our souls, we should be angels. Coleridge, *ibid.* p. 35.

We pause here a moment to inquire whether Augustine authorizes the inference drawn from his language. Young says, "Angels are men, in lighter garments clad; and men are angels." Different species, but of the same genus. Men and angels belong to the same class of the "finite rational;" and Augustine might, for aught we can see, have meant only this. But our bold

philosopher has, with one touch of his wand, made angels, fallen and unfallen, to vanish utterly away. No "prince of the power of the air," neither angel, nor devil—spectres and phantoms all! Denying, also, as we shall see, virtually the resurrection, he belongs rather to the Sadducees than to the school of Christ. Having banished angels, good and evil, from existence, he need not have followed up the subject with such persevering industry, scolding at every old divine who uses the word angel in its generally received sense. Donne is not mystic enough, and on page 99, receives his modicum of censure. To show the peevishness of the man, let me add here his comment on "judicious" Hooker's use of the word *nature*. "So that nature, even in this life," says Hooker, "doth plainly show and call for a more divine perfection than either of these two that have been mentioned." Coleridge replies, "When I meet with an ambiguous or multivocal word, without its meaning being shown and fixed, I stand on my guard against a sophism. I dislike this term 'nature,' in this place. If it mean the *light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world*, it is an inapt term; for reason is supernatural. That all these cognitions, (i. e. of things revealed,) together with the fealty or faithfulness in the will whereby the mind of the flesh is brought under captivity to the mind of the spirit, (the sensuous understanding to the reason,) are supernatural, I not only freely grant, but fervently contend. But why the very perfection of reason, namely, those ideas or truth powers, in which both the spiritual light and the spiritual life are co-inherent and one, should be called supernatural, I do not see."\* Ibid. pp. 36, 37. When will Coleridgites call, not *reason*, but *Christ*, the True Light that lighteth every man? And when will they cease to confound Paul's carnal and spiritual mind with the "sensuous understanding and reason" of their false philosophy? And when

\* Mr. Coleridge gives a definition of *nature* in the last, or H. N. Coleridge's edition of the Aids to Reflection, Note p. 108: "Whatever is comprised in the mechanism of cause and effect—this is said to be natural—and the aggregate and system of all such things is *Nature*." Also Lit. Biog. chap. xii., "The sum of all that is merely *objective*, we will henceforth call *Nature*." p. 289.

will they make Christian faith, instead of "the fealty of the will to the reason," a trust in Christ that "works by love and purifies the heart?" If "the sum of all that is merely *objective* is nature, and the sum of all that is *subjective*, we may comprehend in *self* or *intelligence*," (Lit. Biog. chap. xii. p. 279,) we are at a loss to know whether the "finite rational" is created, or a mere emanation, like a sunbeam. What, in the Coleridgian sense, may this *supernatural* be, that lies beyond all "mechanism of cause and effect?" We proceed with the angels:

The angels are winds. Notes on Oxlee, Psa. 104. Coleridge.

Try as long as you will, you can never make an angel any thing but a man with wings on his shoulders. Coleridge, Notes, do., Lit. Remains, Vol. IV. pp. 311, 316.

But our bodies shall revive out of that dust into which they were dissolved, and live for ever in the resurrection of the righteous. Bishop Hackett, Sermon, Luke ii. 9. And lo, the angel, &c. I never could satisfy myself as to the continuance and catholicity of this strange Egyptian tenet in the very face of St. Paul's *Thou fool! not that*, &c. I have at times almost been tempted to conjecture that Paul taught a different doctrine from the Palestine disciples on this point, and that the Church preferred the sensuous and therefore more popular belief of the Evangelists, *κατα σαρκα* (after the flesh), to the more intelligible faith of the scriptural sage of the other Athens; for so Tarsus was called. All this superstitious trash about angels, which the Jews learned from Persian legends, asserted as confidently as if Hackett had translated it word for word from the four Gospels. Salmassius, if I mistake not, supposes the original word to have been bachelors, young unmarried men. Others interpret angels as meaning the bishops and elders of the church. More probably it was a proverbial expression, derived from the cherubim in the temple: something as the country folks used to say to children, Take care, the Fairies will hear you!—After much search and much thought on the subject of angels, as a diverse kind of finite beings, I find no sufficing reason to hold it for a revealed doctrine, and if not revealed it is assuredly no truth of philosophy, which, as I have elsewhere remarked, can conceive but three kinds: 1, the infinite reason; 2, the finite rational; and 3, the finite irrational; that is, God, man, and beast. What indeed, for the vulgar, is or can an archangel be, but a man with wings, better or worse than the wingless species, according as the feathers are white or black. Coleridge, Notes on Hackett. Lit. Remains, Vol. III. pp. 176, 177.

Mr. Coleridge very evidently imported from Germany a full credence in the neological doctrine of demoniac possessions. He



would hardly be permitted to swear to an important point by the "holy Evangels," if he can so readily dispose of the Scripture doctrine of angelic beings, turning their very existence into St. Nicholas, and "Fairie" talk for children! The word angel is used in numerous senses, and has no primary meaning from which the secondary are derived! No angels distinct from men! Or if an angel does exist, he differs from a man only by the appendage of "wings and feathers." Why did he not by the same argument turn atheist? The words Lord and God are applied to rulers, masters, bishops: therefore there is no other Lord or God. His peculiar philosophy might demonstrate this latter absurdity as easily and as veritably as that there are no celestial beings, immortal and spiritual, called angels. But there is nothing new under the sun, not even in philosophy. Some few generations before Mr. Coleridge appeared, the famous Archbishop of Cambray, in his "Demonstration of the Existence and Attributes of God," coinciding nearly with Father Malbranche, says, "That we know the finite only by the ideas of the infinite." Sect. 51, 63. "That the superior reason in man is God himself, acting in him." Sect. 55, 60. "That the idea of unity cannot be taken from creatures, but from God only."\* Sect. 61, 62. We proceed to the *fallen angels*. No Universalist has labored more faithfully or ingeniously than Mr. Coleridge, to sweep clear from "a local habitation and a name" these evil spirits, with Satan their prince. His sentiments, arguments, or reveries, are contained in criticisms on most of the old English divines, and several extracts will be necessary to present this article of his faith in the proper light. I shall commence, however, with his Lectures, and his strictures on a layman, our own poet Hillhouse. The following paragraphs, opening the case, are from Lecture XII. Dreams—Apparitions—Alchymists—Personality of the Evil Being—Bodily Identity.

In a note written in a copy of Hadad by Hillhouse, Mr. Coleridge condemns what he calls "the ridiculous and frigid machinery borrowed from the popular superstitions of the Greeks, (though

\* Dr. Watts, Improvement of the Mind, p. 82.

probably of Egyptian origin,) and accommodated clumsily enough to the purer monotheism of the Mosaic law." "Mr. Hillhouse," says he, in reference to fallen spirits, "will find it no easy matter to support this assertion of his by the passages of Scripture here referred to, consistently with any sane interpretation of their import and purpose."

#### I. THE FALLEN SPIRITS.

This is the mythological form, or if you will, the symbolical representation of a profound idea necessary as the *præ-suppositum* of the Christian scheme, or a postulate of reason indispensable, if we would render the existence of a world of finites compatible with the assumption of a super-mundane God, not one with the world. In short, this idea is the condition under which alone the reason of man can retain the doctrine of an infinite and absolute Being, and yet keep clear of Pantheism as exhibited by Benedict Spinosa.

#### II. THE EGYPTIAN MAGICIANS.

The whole narrative is probably a relic of the old diplomatic *lingua-arcana*, or state-symbolique, in which the prediction of events is expressed as the immediate causing of them. Thus the prophet is said to destroy the city, the destruction of which he predicts. The word which our version renders by "enchantments," signifies "flames, or burnings," by which it is probable that the Egyptians were able to deceive the spectators, and substitute serpents for staves. And with regard to the possessions in the Gospels, bear in mind first of all, that spirits are not necessarily *Ps* (ich-heiten, or self-consciousnesses), and that the most ludicrous absurdities would follow from taking them as such in the Gospel instances; and secondly, that the Evangelist who has recorded the most of these incidents, himself speaks of one of these possessed persons as a lunatic, *σληνιαζεται*, Matt. xvii. 15, 18, while St. John names them not at all, but seems to include them under the description of diseased or deranged persons. That madness may result from spiritual causes, and not only or principally from physical ailments, may readily be admitted. Is not our will itself a spiritual power? Is it not the spirit of the man? The mind of a rational and responsible being (that is, of a free agent) is a spirit, though it does not follow that all spirits are minds. Who shall dare determine what spiritual influences may not arise out of the collected evil wills of wicked men? Even the bestial life, sinless in animals and their nature, may, when awakened in the man, and by his own act admitted into his will, become a spiritual influence. He receives a nature into his will, which by this very act becomes a corrupt will, and *vice versa*, this will becomes his nature, and thus a corrupt nature. This may be

conceded ; and this is all that the recorded words of our Saviour absolutely require in order to receive an appropriate sense ; but this is altogether different from making spirits to be devils, and devils self-conscious individuals. Lit. Remains, Vol. I. p. 211.

This is a new way of exorcising Satan ; but we think still that personal beings, called in Scripture devils, do really exist, and did, in the age of the apostles, possess men. We do not understand, for it is too "supersensuous," the "profound idea necessary as the præ-suppositum of the Christian scheme," but our faith is not shaken by such logic as Bruyere calls "the art of talking unintelligibly about that of which nobody knows any thing." We pass on. From "Notes, March, 1824, written in a copy of Select Discourses, by John Smith, of Queen's College, Cambridge, 1660, On the Christian's Conflicts and Conquests," we have the following extract and comments :

By the devil we are to understand that apostate spirit which fell from God, and is always designing to haul down others from God also. The old dragon (mentioned in the Revelation) with his tail drew down the third part of the stars of heaven, and cast them to the earth. Smith. How much it is to be regretted that so enlightened and able a divine as Smith had not philosophically and scripturally enucleated this so difficult, yet so important question—respecting the personal existence of the evil principle ; that is, whether as *το θειον* (the divinity) of paganism is *ο θεος* (the God) in Christianity, so the *το πορευον* (the evil) is to be *ο πορευος* (the evil one, or the devil)—and whether this is an express doctrine of Christ, and not merely a Jewish dogma left undisturbed, to fade away under the increasing light of the gospel, instead of assuming the former, and confirming the position by a verse from a poetic tissue of visual symbols—a verse alien from the subject, and by which the apocalypt enigmatized the Neronian persecution, and the apostacy through fear occasioned by it in a large number of converts. Coleridge, *ibid.* p. 214.

It is more "to be regretted" that Coleridge did not "enucleate" himself from such errors : but he claims Smith even as coinciding with him in belief. He had said, by "the devil being continually with us, I mean not only some apostate spirit as one particular being, but that spirit of apostacy which is lodged in all men's natures." Taking courage from this, Mr. Coleridge asks, "May I not venture to suspect that this was Smith's own

belief and judgment? and that his conversion of the satan, that is *circulator*, or minister of police, (what our Sterne calls the accusing angel,) in the prologue to Job, into the devil, was a mere condescension to the prevailing prejudice? Here, however, he speaks like himself, and like a true religious philosopher, who felt that the personality of evil spirits is a trifling question compared with the personality of the evil principle. This is indeed most momentous." Lit. Remains, Vol. I. p. 214.

A few citations more will suffice :

In one thing only are we permitted and bound to assert a diversity, namely, in God and *Hades*, the good and the evil will. This awful mystery, this truth, at once certain and incomprehensible, is at the bottom of all religion, and to exhibit this truth free from the dark phantom of the Manicheans, or the co-eternal and co-ordinate principles of good and evil, is the glory of the Christian religion. But this mysterious dividity of the good and evil will, the will of the spirit and the will of the flesh, must not be carried beyond the terms 'good' and 'evil.' There can be but one good will—the spirit in all; and even so all evil wills are one will, the devil or evil spirit. Lit. Remains, Vol. III. p. 108.

We pass by, without comment, this "awful mystery," or *fog*, and proceed to Hackett's "Sermon on the Temptation." The temptation of Christ is a source of great perplexity to our theologico-philosopher. But as it is in Matthew, Mark, and Luke, he fears to reject it. "Disdaining," as he says, to "confute the whims and nugacities of Hackett," he admits that the passage of Christ's temptation must have had some meaning—but what? Casting about, he thinks that Christ "struggled with the evil principle" in three forms of temptation. "These, perhaps—but I am lost in doubt," says he. No wonder, for having denied the existence of the tempter, and Christ had within him neither evil principle nor evil will. Ibid. p. 179. On pages 181, 182, textual divines are admonished of the great error of overlooking "dates, occasion, object;" and of theological wonders there is "none stranger than the general agreement of orthodox divines to forget to ask themselves what they precisely meant by the term 'body.' Our Lord's and St. Paul's meaning is evident enough, that is, the *personality*." Body, as defined by Mr. C., seems to

be a thing in perpetual flux, and which has not much relation to personal identity. In this wise he comments on Martin Luther. "An angel," said Luther, "is a spiritual creature created by God without a body, for the service of Christendom, especially in the office of the Church." Coleridge asks, "What did Luther mean by a body? For to me the word seemeth capable of two senses, universal and special: first, a form, indicating to A, B, C, &c., the existence and finiteness of some one or other being *demonstrative*, as *hic*, (he,) and disjunctive, as *hic et non ille*, and in this sense God only can be without body; secondly, that which is not merely *hic distinctive*, but *divisive*; yea, a product divisible from the producent, as a snake from its skin, a precipitate and death of living power; and in this sense the body is proper to mortality, and to be denied of spirits made perfect," &c. Lit. Remains, Vol. IV. p. 50. We give the reader a few citations more on the subject of fallen angels, from Comments on Luther's Table Talk:

The devils are in woods, in waters, in wildernesses, &c. Luther.

"The angel's like a flea,  
The devil is a bore;"  
No matter for that! quoth S. T. C.  
I love him the better, therefore.

Yes! heroic swan; I love thee even when thou gabblest like a goose; for thy geese helped to save the capitol. Coleridge, Lit. Remains, Vol. IV. pp. 52, 53.

There are colored words and figures, whereby the devil is signified and showed. Luther on the Behemoth.

A slight mistake of Brother Martin. The *Behemoth* of Job is beyond a doubt neither whale nor devil, but, I think, the hippopotamus; who is indeed as ugly as the devil, and will occasionally play the devil among the rice grounds; but though in this respect a devil of a fellow, yet on the whole he is too honest a monster to be a fellow of devils. Coleridge, *ibid.* p. 54.

More and more I understand the immense difference between the Faith-article of the devil (*τον πονηρου*)\* and the superstitious fancy of devils, &c. Coleridge, *ibid.* p. 57.

He that will dispute with the devil, &c. Luther.

\* The original, Matt. vi. 13, is ambiguous. Evil or the evil one. Mr. C. holds to the former sense.

Coleridge suggests three queries, which he would have had Luther answer :

I. Abstractedly from, and independently of, all sensible substances, and the bodies, wills, faculties, and affections of men, has the devil, or would the devil have a personal self-subsistence? Does he, or can he exist as a conscious individual agent or person? Should the answer to this query be in the negative, then—

II. Do there exist the finite and personal beings, whether with composite and decomposable bodies, &c., so eminently wicked, or wicked and mischievous in so peculiar a kind, as to constitute a distinct *genus* of beings under the name of devils?

III. Is this second *hypothesis* compatible with the acts and functions attributed to the devil in Scripture? *Ibid.* pp. 22, 26.

Comments on this passage of divinity are unnecessary. We advance to more errors pertaining to the vital doctrine of the *Atonement*. This is called the great Redemptive act, and synonymous with regeneration. The explicit language of the Scriptures is “evaporated into metaphors.” See *Aids to Reflection*, pp. 290–298. Our philosopher dissents from all the great standard theological writers of the Reformation, and while he “reverses the almost measureless superiority of the sermons of the divines who labored in the first seven, the first two centuries of the Reformation from Luther to Leighton, over the prudential morals and apologizing theology of the unfanatical clergy since the Reformation in 1688 ;” yet, says he, “I cannot but regret, especially while listening to a Hooker, that they withheld all light from the truths contained in the words ‘satan,’ ‘the serpent,’ ‘the evil spirit,’ and this last plurally.” He dislikes also in Hooker, the word ‘purchased,’ for certain reasons. We shall see.

As we have received, so we teach, that besides the bare and naked work, wherein Christ, without any other associate, finished all the parts of our redemption, and *purchased* salvation himself alone; for conveyance of this eminent blessing unto us many things are required, as to be known and chosen of God *before* the foundation of the world; *in* the world to be called, justified, sanctified; *after* we have left the world to be received into glory; Christ in every of these hath somewhat which he worketh alone, &c. Hooker, *Dis. of Justification, Works, &c.* I dislike only the word ‘purchased;’—not that it is not scriptural, but because a metaphor, well and wisely used in the enforcement and varied elucidation of a truth,

is not therefore properly employed in its exact enunciation.—I am persuaded that the practice of the Romish Church tendeth to make vain the doctrine of salvation by faith in Christ alone; but judging by her most eminent divines, I can find nothing dissonant from the truth in her express decisions on this article. Perhaps it would be safer to say, Christ alone saves us, working in us by the faith which includes hope and love. Coleridge, *Lit. Remains*, Vol. III. pp. 49, 52.

This appropriation of a metaphor, (i. e. the word debt, used by Field,) namely, forgiveness of sin and abolition of guilt through the redemptive power of Christ's love, and of his perfect obedience during his voluntary assumption of humanity, expressed on account of the sameness of the consequences in both cases, by the payment of a debt for another, which debt the payer had not himself incurred—the appropriation of this, I say, by transferring the sameness from the consequents to the antecedents, is one point of orthodoxy (so called, I mean) in which I still remain at issue. St. Paul illustrates the consequences of the act of redemption by four different metaphors drawn from things most familiar to those for whom it was to be illustrated, namely, sin-offerings, or sacrificial expiation; reconciliation; ransom from slavery; satisfaction of a just creditor by vicarious payment of the debt. These all refer to the *consequences* of redemption. Now St. John without any metaphor, declares the mode by and in which it is effected; for he identifies it with a fact, not with a consequence, and a fact, too, not better understood in the one case than in the other, namely, by *generation* and *birth*. There remains, therefore, only the redemptive act itself, and this is transcendent, ineffable, and *a fortiori*, therefore inexplicable. Like the act of primal apostacy, it is in its own nature a mystery, known only through faith in the Spirit. Coleridge, *ibid.* p. 65.

Mr. Coleridge has prepared the way to come out boldly with his sentiments, which possibly may shock the reader. The following citations are from "Notes on Donne, LXXX. Sermons, folio, 1660."

What could God pay for me? What could God suffer? God himself could not; and therefore God hath taken a body that could. Donne.

God forgive me—or those who first set abroad this strange *μεταβασις εις αλλογενοσ*, (shifting of the subject,) this debtor and creditor scheme of expounding the mystery of Redemption, or both! But I never can read the words 'God himself could not, and therefore took a body that could,' without being reminded of the monkey that took the cat's paw to take the chestnuts out of the fire, and claimed the merit of puss's sufferings. I am sure, however, that the ludicrous images, under which this gloss of the Calvinists embodies itself to my fancy, never disturb my recollections of the adorable mystery itself. It is clear that a body, remaining a body, can only suffer as a body; for no faith can enable us to be-

lieve that the same thing can be at once A, and not A. Now that the body of our Lord was not transelemented or transnated by the *pleroma* indwelling, we are positively assured by the Scripture. Therefore it would follow from this most unscriptural doctrine, that the divine justice had satisfaction made to it by the suffering of a body which had been brought into existence for this special purpose, in view of the debt of eternal misery, due from, and leviable on, the bodies and souls of all mankind! It is to this gross perversion of the sublime idea of the Redemption by the Cross, that we must attribute the rejection of the doctrine of redemption by the Unitarian, and of the Gospel *in toto* by the more consequent deist. It seems plain to me, that in this and sundry other passages of St. Paul, the *Father* means the total triune God. Coleridge, *Lit. Remains*, Vol. III. pp. 94, 95.

What had Christ done? Nay, what had he believed? Had he either faith or works before that union of both natures? Donne and Augustine.

Dr. Donne and St. Augustine said this without offence; but I much question whether this same would be endured now. That it is, however, in the spirit of Paul and the Gospel, I doubt not to affirm, and that this great truth is observed, by what in my judgment is the post-Apostolic *Christopedia*, I am inclined to think. Coleridge, *ibid.* p. 97.

Two brief citations more, and we leave this doctrine of the atonement. I have transcribed the above paragraphs verbatim, ("the profaneness is with" him, "not with me," as he says of the Sacramentarians,) and the Christian must be grieved and astonished at such language on the most awful of subjects. Mr. C. has flatly denied and ridiculed the atonement in the (as we believe) evangelical meaning of the term. He proves clearly in his dialogue between Matthew, James, and his mother, (*Aids to Reflection*, p. 294,) what nobody questions, that the vicarious obedience of *Christ* does not release the *sinner* from obedience. But his arguments against the atonement do not deserve a serious refutation. To proceed—

God's justice required blood. Donne.

It is affecting to see the struggles of so great a mind to preserve its inborn fealty to the reason, under the servitude to an accepted article of belief, which was, alas! confounded with the high obligations of faith;—faith, the co-adunation of the finite individual will with the universal reason, by the submission of the former to the latter. To reconcile redemption by the material blood of Jesus with the mind of the Spirit, he seeks to spiritualize the material blood itself in all men. Coleridge.



All Christians must confess, that there is no other name given under heaven whereby men can be saved, but only the name of Christ. Sherlock.

Now this is a most awful question, on which depends whether Christ was more than Socrates; for to bring God down from heaven to proclaim the ten commandments is too ridiculous. Coleridge. *Lit. Remains*, Vol. III. p. 98. Vol. IV. p. 193.

With philosophers who trifle with the character of God, and deny the Lord that bought them, we cannot reason. Let us go on to the

#### RESURRECTION.

On this doctrine, and on the 'nature' of 'body,' Mr. Coleridge's views seem to be *original*, and very *sui generis*. He speaks for himself. In Lecture XII., note on a passage in the *Life of Henry Earl of Morland*, 20th June, 1827, we have the germ of the speculation, which subverts the Scripture doctrine of the resurrection:

The defect of this, and all similar theories that I am acquainted with, or rather let me say the desideratum, is the neglect of a previous definition of the term "body." What do you mean by it? The immediate grounds of a man's size, visibility, tangibility, &c. But these are in a continual flux, even as a column of smoke. The material particles of carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, hydrogen, lime, phosphorus, sulphur, soda, iron, that constitute the ponderable organism in May, 1827, at the moment of Pollio's death in his 70th year, have no better claim to be called his "body," than the numerical particles of the same names that constituted the ponderable mass in May, 1787, in Pollio's prime of manhood, in his 30th year;—the latter no less than the former go into the grave, that is, suffer dissolution, the one in a series, the other simultaneously. The result to the particles is precisely the same in both; and of both therefore we must say with holy Paul,—*Thou fool!* that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body that shall be, &c. Neither this nor that is the body that abideth. Abideth, I say; for that which riseth again must have remained in an inert state. It is not dead, but sleepeth;—that is, it is not dissolved any more than the exterior or phenomenal organism appears to us dissolved when it lieth in apparent inactivity during our sleep. Sound reasoning this, to the best of my judgment, as (so) far as it goes. But how are we to explain the reaction of this fluxional body on the animal? In each moment the particles, by the informing force of the living principle, constitute an organ not only of motion and sense, but of consciousness. The organ plays on the organist. How is this conceivable?

The solution requires a depth, a stillness, and subtlety of spirit, not only for its discovery, but even for the understanding of it when discovered, and in the most appropriate words enunciated. I can merely give a hint. The particles themselves must have an interior and gravitative being, and the multiteity must be a removable or at least a suspensible accident." Lit. Remains, Vol. I. p. 215.

It is not given to all men, says Mr. Coleridge, to be philosophers. To us it is not given, with all the "depth, stillness, and subtlety of spirit" that we can command, to comprehend the substance of his argument. We see not why, in such a flux of particles, a *scar* does not flow away. In its place, we shall inquire whether "holy Paul" is not misunderstood, and what he designed as an *illustration* is not exalted to the rank of the *doctrine* itself under consideration. Let us forbear, and hear Mr. Coleridge through. He comments on Donne's Sermon, 1 Cor. xv. 26.

Nothing in Scripture, nothing in reason, commands or authorizes us to assume or suppose any bodiless creature. It is the incommunicable attribute of God. But all bodies are not flesh, nor need we suppose that all bodies are corruptible. *There are bodies celestial.* In the three following paragraphs of this sermon, we trace wild fantastic positions, grounded on the arbitrary notion of man as a mixture of heterogeneous components, which Descartes shortly afterwards carried into its extremes. On this doctrine the man is a mere phenomenal result, a sort of brandy-sop or toddy punch. It is a doctrine unsanctioned by, and indeed inconsistent with the Scriptures. It is not true that body plus soul makes man. Man is not the *syntheton* or composition of body and soul, as the two component units. No; *man* is the unit, the *prothesis*, and body and soul are the two poles, the positive and negative, the *thesis* and *antithesis* of the man, even as attraction and repulsion are the poles in and by which one and the same magnet manifests itself. Ibid. p. 129.

Quite a bold position this! But where is the proof? Where the Scripture? The soul of man departed, *not* bodiless! One body it has left *behind*—what is that other body? Will the soul have *two* bodies after the resurrection? Or have we here an outright denial of the Scripture doctrine of the resurrection? Who gave Mr. Coleridge this information? And *man* lies between the *two poles*, soul and body! This is spun, web and woof, out of

the garret of his own cranium—mere “trash,” and no philosophy at all. But what next? Donne speaks of the clod of red earth, of which man was made. “A sort of pun,” says the philosopher, “on the Hebrew word Adam, or red earth, common in Donne’s age, but unworthy of Donne, who was worthy to have seen deeper into the Scriptural sense of the ‘ground,’ the Hades, the multeity,” (the nonsense!) “the man *absque numero, et infra numerum*, that which is below, as God is that which transcends intellect.” Ibid. p. 148.

So when it is said, *Flesh and blood shall not inherit the kingdom of God*, that is, corruption shall not inherit; and in the resurrection our bodies are said to be spiritual, that is, not in substance, but in effect and operation. Taylor. This is, in the first place, a wilful interpretation, and secondly, it is absurd; for what sort of flesh and blood would incorruptible flesh and blood be? As well might we speak of marble flesh and blood. But as in Taylor’s mind, as seen throughout, the logician was predominant over the philosopher, and the fancy out-bustled the pure intuitive imagination. In the sense of St. Paul, as of Plato, and all other dynamic philosophers, flesh and blood is *ipso facto* corruption, that is, the spirit of life in the mid or balancing state, between fixation and reviviscence. *Who shall deliver me from the body of this death*, is a Hebraism for ‘this death which the body is.’ For matter itself is but *spiritus in coagulo* (spirit in a coagulated state) and organized matter the *coagulum* (spirit condensed) in the act of being restored; it is then repotentiating. Stop its self-destruction as matter, and you stop its self-reproduction as a vital organ. Coleridge. Lit. Remains, Vol. III. p. 339.

In my judgment, Jeremy Taylor has given neither a “wilful,” nor “absurd,” but a right “interpretation” of Scripture. The resurrection body is “spiritual, not in substance, but in effect and operation.” One sense of the word *spiritual* is, not gross, but refined, purified. Is man after the resurrection to have two spirits, all spirit and no body, or is his body corruptible to be refined, immortalized, glorified, and fitted for the pure spirit, and thus a spiritual body? In this latter sense, I have long interpreted the apostle. Flesh and blood *corruptible* shall not, but made *incorruptible* it shall, inherit the kingdom of God. The incorruptible is called spiritual. Mr. Coleridge, with his usual positiveness and effrontery, denounces this as a wilful and absurd exposition. But his own “intruded gloss,” ‘this death which the body is,’ making

the death of the apostle *bodily* merely, and not *spiritual*, is surely "a predominance of the logician," or rather of the *illogical* over the *philosophical*, and an out-bustling of the imagination. As for his "marble flesh and blood," and the question, "What sort of flesh and blood would incorruptible flesh and blood be?" I answer, That of Adam before his fall, and that of Christ after his resurrection. Is there any absurdity in supposing the present natural body to be made incorruptible and immortal? But this figment of *matter* being only *spirit coagulated*, and vice versa! It may be *dynamic*, and *Platonic*; but it is commended to our credence neither by common sense, nor by logic, nor by Scripture. We proceed. Taylor answers the question, whether, by Christ's body in the Sacrament, is meant "that body, that flesh, that was born of the Virgin Mary, that was crucified, dead and buried." I reply, says he, "that I know none else that he had or hath: there is but one body of Christ, natural and glorified." To which Coleridge responds, "This may be true, or at least intelligible of Christ's humanity, or personal identity as *νοητον τι*, (something immaterial,) but applied to the phenomenal flesh and blood it is nonsense. For, if every atom of the human frame be changed by succession in eleven or twelve years, the body born of the Virgin could not be the body crucified, much less the body crucified be the body glorified, spiritual, and incorruptible." *Ibid.* p. 341. Mr. Coleridge makes nothing of, or does away *bodily* identity. And what *his personal* identity is, or what he means by the "supersensuous," above fleshly, immaterial, or spiritual body of Christ, he neither has told us, nor can tell. But he boldly denies that the body of Christ, born, crucified, risen, and glorified, is, in any sense, the same body. This is worse than "nonsense." What must be the effect on his credulous disciples, of such more than irreverent trifling with the great mystery of the Incarnation? A few citations more:

Christ's natural body is changed into a spiritual body, and therefore cannot now be in the Sacrament after a natural manner, because it is so nowhere, and therefore not there: *It is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body.* Taylor.

But, mercy on me! was this said of the resurgent body of Jesus? a

spiritual body of which Jesus said, it was not a spirit. If tangible by Thomas's fingers, why not by his teeth, that is manducable?" Coleridge. Lit. Remains, Vol. III. p. 351.

This, to say the least of it, is most shocking divinity. And again, we have the same "nugacity" in Notes on Irving's Ben Ezra.

Resurrection is always and exclusively resurrection in the body;—not indeed a rising of the corpus *φανταστικον*, that is, the few ounces of carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, hydrogen, phosphate of lime, the *copula* of which, that gave the form, no longer exists—and of which Paul exclaims, Thou fool! not this, &c.—but the corpus *υποστατικον η γουμενον*. Lit. Remains, Vol. IV. p. 406.

I will affront and afflict the pious reader with only one paragraph more.

When the spirit by sanctification is fitted for an incorruptible body, then shall it be raised into a world of incorruption, and a celestial body shall burgeon forth thereto the germ of which had been implanted by the redeeming and creative Word in this world. Ibid. p. 167.

The true Coleridgian doctrine of the 'body' and the 'resurrection' has at last *burgeoned* forth, or shot out in its "knot or button," the gardener definition of burgeon. And who can hesitate to class the advocate of this doctrine with Sadducees? He denies the existence of angels, and virtually the resurrection. No scripture informs us that at death a celestial body shall invest the soul, and the natural body shall never be raised. The apostle says, *It* is sown a natural body, *it* is raised a spiritual body. The *It* is raised—the same identical body, or there is no resurrection of the dead. The bodies of the saints arose at the resurrection of Christ, the pledge and proof of the general resurrection. And the graves were opened; and many bodies of the saints which slept arose, and came out of the graves after his resurrection, and went into the holy city, and appeared unto many. (Matt. xxvii. 52, 53.) These were not Mr. Coleridge's manufactured celestial bodies, but the same veritable bodies that were laid in the sepulchres. And they, very probably, were known by the living. Lazarus came up in the same body. Moses and Elijah,

and Enoch were translated ; their natural bodies fitted at once for the celestial state. And in the last day, when the living shall be "changed in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye," will not the same earthly bodies be changed, the mortal putting on immortality, and the corruptible incorruption, and yet preserving the bodily identity? Was not the body of Christ identically the same *after as before* his resurrection, and will not the "vile bodies" of the saints be changed into the likeness of Christ's "glorious body?" Does not the Resurrection and the Life himself say that all that are in their graves shall hear his voice and come forth? The same bodies shall rise ; for is there any thing impossible with God? Mr. Coleridge's "burgeon" doctrine is not only at point blank opposition to Scripture, but it robs us of all our hallowed associations and cherished hopes of meeting departed friends in their *recognized*, though *glorified* bodily forms. So says Bishop Mant :—

I count the hope no day-dream of the mind,  
No vision fair of transitory hue.

\* \* \* \* \*

Such hope to nature's sympathies is true ;  
And such, we deem, the holy word to view  
Unfolds, an antidote for grief designed,  
One drop from comfort's well.

As for 1 Cor. xv. 35–38, passages on which alone this new semi-Sadducean doctrine of the resurrection is made to rest, I humbly conceive, since great men are not always wise, that the meaning and argument of the apostle are misunderstood. Not the body in its grossness and corruption is to be raised, as the Sadducees viewed the matter, but a purified, and immortal, and spirit-serving body. The objector is rebuked for doubting the power of God. See ye not the dead grain quickened, and shooting up a living harvest of similar grain? But this illustration cannot mean that a new body shall *grow* out of the deceased and dissolved human body, which *itself* is never to be seen again. An *illustration* is put in the place of the *doctrine* of Paul. He pretends not to clear up the *mystery* of the resurrection, but only

to show its *possibility*, and *truth*, and the purified, glorious *form* of the risen or celestial body. We shall still confidently believe that God will *raise* the dead; and that he hath power to destroy both *soul* and *body* in hell. The last doctrine of Mr. Coleridge to be examined is that of *baptism* connected with *original sin*.

#### INFANT BAPTISM AND ORIGINAL SIN.

Christ might ungirt himself, and give more *scope* and liberty to his *passions* than any other man; both because he had no original sin within to drive him, &c. Donne.

How then is he said to have *condemned sin in the flesh*? Without guilt, without actual sin, assuredly he was; but *εγενετο σαρκι*, 'he was made flesh,' and what can we mean by original sin relatively to the flesh, but that man is born with an animal life and a material organism that renders him temptible to evil, and which tends to dispose the life of the will to contradict the light of the reason? Coleridge. Lit. Remains, Vol. III. p. 134.

Origen plainly enough overthrows the phantom of hereditary guilt; and as to guilt from a corruption of nature, it is just such guilt as the carnivorous appetites of a weaned lion, or the instinct of a brood of ducklings to run to water. Origen calls it neither hereditary nor original, but universal sin. Coleridge. Ibid. p. 312.

For it is certain and evident that regeneration or new birth is here enjoined to all, as of absolute and indispensable necessity. Taylor. Yet Taylor himself has denied it over and over again, in his Tracts on original sin; and how is it in harmony with the words of Christ, *Of such is the kingdom of heaven*? Are we not regenerated back to a state of spiritual infancy? Yet for such Antipædo-baptists as hold the dogma of original guilt it is doubtless a fair argument. Coleridge. Ibid. p. 284.

Censuring Taylor's view of original sin, as involving us in the consequences and punishment of Adam's sin, Coleridge asks, "Is not this the result infused into the milk *not mingled* (pure milk) of St. Peter; spotting the immaculate begotten, souring and curdling the innocence without sin or malice?" Ibid. p. 330.

Mr. Coleridge, a Baptist in *theory*, but any thing in *practice*, ridicules the idea that infants need baptism on account of any thing sinful in them; for, says he, p. 287, "Baptism was the Jewish custom, and natural to those countries; but with us it would be a more significant rite if applied as penance for excess of zeal and acts of bigotry, especially as sprinkling." Jeremy Taylor, supposing children capable of receiving some of the gifts

of the Spirit, argues the propriety of infant baptism, from the instance of the children crying Hosanna to the Son of David. To which, and also to the doctrine of the corrupt inherited nature of infants, Coleridge answers as follows :

By the same argument I could defend the sprinkling of mules and asses with holy water, as is done yearly at Rome on St. Anthony's day, I believe. For they are capable of health and sickness, of restiveness and of good temper, and these are all emanations from their Creator. Lit. Remains, Vol. III. p. 288.

The Bishop flutters about and about, but never fairly answers the question, What does Baptism do? The Baptist says, It attests forgiveness of sins, as the reward of faith and repentance. This is intelligible: All that Taylor can make out is, that Baptism effects a potentiality in a potentiality, or a chalking of chalk to make chalk white. Ibid. p. 290.

Our modern latitudinarians will find it difficult to suppose, that any thing could have been said in the defence of Pelagianism equally absurd with the facts and arguments which have been adduced in favor of original sin, (sin being taken as guilt; that is, observes a Socinian wit, the crime of being born, &c.) Lit. Remains, Vol. I. p. 321.

Mr. Coleridge is careful to qualify his words, "sin taken as *guilt*." If I remember, the fathers meant by guilt, as applied to infants, in the question of original sin, exposure to punishment, forfeiture of original righteousness, &c. And the phrase *obnoxius culpa*, often signifies *liable to blame*. In good usage, *obnoxius*, the old theological word, means only 'liable to,' not offensive or guilty in the sense of actual sin. And in this sense, I understand the fathers to hold that infants are guilty of the original, or first and parent sin of Adam; that is, are involved in its consequences, born in original corruption, and liable to actual sin and punishment. But they do not say, I think, that infants are *accountable for* Adam's sin, or for "the crime of being born." They, at least some of them, expressed their belief that *death* settles the account with infants, as to Adam's transgression, and the corruption derived from him by natural descent. But they held that infants being depraved *by nature*, need the atonement, and regeneration; and standing in relation, through believing parents, to the covenant made with Abraham—a covenant including Christ and his disciples—are proper subjects of baptism.



This we suppose to be nearly the doctrine of original sin, as maintained by the evangelical churches, past and present. But Mr. Coleridge denies "the phantom of hereditary guilt;" makes "guilt from a corruption of nature, just such guilt as the carnivorous appetites of a weaned lion, or the instinct of a brood of ducklings to run to water;" says, "that man is born with an animal life and a material organism that renders him *temptible* to evil," which is all that we can mean by "original sin relatively to the flesh;" and inquires if adults "are not regenerated back to a state of spiritual infancy?" Finally, to baptize infants on the supposition that they are depraved, is only "a chalking of chalk to make chalk white." This is an explicit denial of the doctrine of natural depravity, as derived by descent from Adam; a disowning of original sin in any and every sense of the word; for infants and "ducklings" are on a par as to corruption of nature! As to any necessity of *regeneration*, there is no difference between infants, "*the immaculate begotten*," and "a weaned lion." What need have infants, dying such, of salvation by Christ? No need at all—no more than Mr. Coleridge's duckling brood, and lion, if we dared to speak out in his "boldlier" way. He directly denies original sin, and depravity by nature. And thus he sets himself in battle array against the Word of God. For as by one man's *disobedience* many were made sinners, so by the *obedience* of one shall many be made righteous. (Rom. v. 19.) Having denied that sin came upon us by Adam, he ought, in consistency, to reject the other line of the parallel, i. e. salvation by Christ. And so, reader, he does, for he believes not much either in *original* or in *actual* sin. Universal *reason*, the "light within" is the *Christ*; and *faith* is only the subjection of the reason to the will. "Faith seems to me," says he, "the coadunation of the individual will with the reason, enforcing adherence alike of thought, act, and affection to the Universal Will." Lit. Remains, Vol. III. p. 136. Again, "Without or in contravention to the reason\* (that is, the *spiritual* mind of St. Paul, and *the light*

\* Mr. C. calls the reason "*νοῦς*, that is, intuitive reason, the source of idea and absolute truths, and the principle of the necessary and the universal in our affirmations and conclusions?" P. 241.

*that lighteth every man* of John,) this understanding (*φρονημα σαρκος*, or carnal mind) becomes the sophistic principle, the wily tempter to evil by counterfeit good, the pander and advocate of the passions and appetites." Aids to Reflection, last Edition, Note, p. 241. But what does Mr. Coleridge substitute for the Pauline doctrine of original sin? He calls it *originant*; "Not the origin of evil, not the chronology of sin, or the chronicles of the original sinner; but sin originant, underived from without, and no passive link in the adamantine chain of effects, each of which is in its turn an instrument of causation, but no one of them a cause; not with sin inflicted, which would be a calamity; not with sin (that is, an evil tendency) implanted, for which let the planter be responsible; but I begin with original sin." As defined by Mr. C., "A sin is an evil which has its ground or origin in the agent, and not in the compulsion of circumstances." The amount is, dismissing Adam, that man originates sin in himself, and there is nothing sinful, nothing naturally, or morally corrupt in him, till he becomes a sinner by his own "original or originant" act. Aids to Reflection, pp. 240, 245. We are born pure from sin! So they wrap it up. But were the author of these paragraphs living, we would direct his attention to certain Articles of faith, which he thought *inspired*, and ask with how much mental reservation he subscribed to them, when he became a member of "the Church." There are XXXIX articles, which would require each and all quite a "latitudinarian" exposition to accommodate the theological philosophy of our "Lay Preacher." We pass by the article "Of Predestination and Election," and cite Art. IX. "Of Original or Birth Sin."

"Original sin standeth not in the following of Adam (as the *Pelagians* do vainly talk); but it is the fault and corruption of the nature of every man that naturally is engendered of the offspring of *Adam*, whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil, so that the flesh lusteth always contrary to the Spirit; and therefore, in every person born into this world, it deserveth God's wrath and damnation. And this infection of nature doth remain, yea in them that are regenerated; whereby the lust of the flesh, called in Greek *φρονημα σαρκος*, which some do expound the *Wisdom*, some

the Affection, some the Desire of the Flesh, is not subject to the Law of God." The mind of the flesh, or carnal mind, is here something different from the "understanding," and we are surprised to find Mr. Coleridge so at odds with his own profession, that the scripture interpreted by the Church is to be received, and that non-jurors, opposing the united wisdom of "the Bishops in Council," may be fined, imprisoned, or excommunicated. It is not for us, however, to reconcile such matters. A few extracts more on *circumcision* as connected with *infant baptism*, are important. The reader has been already apprised that the rite of circumcision, by a "self-affirming act" of Coleridge, is still binding on the Jews, through Isaac, to the end of the world; but it has nothing to do with baptism.

There is no doubt that the primary purpose of circumcision was to peculiarize the Jews by an indelible visible sign; and it was as necessary that Jewish infants should be known to be Jews as Jewish men. Coleridge. Lit. Remains, Vol. III. p. 281.

It is too plain to be denied, that the belief of the strict necessity of Infant Baptism and the absolute universality of the practice did not commence till the dogma of original guilt had begun to despotize in the Church. While that remained uncertain and sporadic, Infant Baptism was so too; some did it, many did not. But as soon as original sin, in the sense of actual guilt, became the popular creed, then all did it. Ibid. p. 291.

Baptism supposed both repentance and a promise: babes are not capable of either, and therefore not of baptism. For the physical element was surely only the sign and seal of a promise, by a counter promise and covenant. The rite of circumcision is wholly inapplicable; for there a covenant was between Abraham and God, not between God and the infant. 'Do so and so to all your male children, and I will favor them. Mark them before the world as a peculiar and separate race, and I will then consider them as my chosen people.' But baptism is personal, and the baptized a subject, not an object; not a thing but a person. Ibid. p. 283. The same lumber we find in the Aids, p. 320. "Circumcision was no Sacrament at all; but the means and mark of national distinction."

In these sentences there are errors in abundance, supported with confident assertions, but a great scarcity of proof. An infant is a *thing*, an *object*, not a *person*! Prove the assertion, and we admit the conclusion, that infants are no more *subjects* of baptism than a church *bell* that is baptized by the Catholics. The Editor of Coleridge confesses that he knows not what "spiritual efficacy

he ascribed to infant baptism, but he was," says he, "certainly an advocate for the practice." Yes, and a very inconsistent advocate, a man at least of easy faith. How, with such views as he has expressed, could he write a "Sonnet on his own baptismal Birthday," (Poetry, p. 151,) i. e. baptismal-regeneration-day? And how could he stand godfather to Adam Steinmitz K——, and say, in his letter to his "dear godchild," that "the Father of mercies, by his only begotten Son, has redeemed you from the evil ground, and willed you to be born out of darkness, but into light?" &c. Lit. Remains, Vol. III. p. 480. A most notable contradiction of profession and practice. This *baptismally* born child, Adam S. K., must have had a very hypocritical spiritual grand-papa. But let us look back upon some of the bold assertions in reference to circumcision. Its "primary purpose" was *not* merely a "national mark," or "to peculiarize the Jews by an indelible visible sign." Circumcision is not *outward*, says the apostle—not a mark merely of national distinction. For he is not a Jew which is one outwardly, neither is that circumcision which is outward in the flesh: but he is a Jew which is one *inwardly*, and circumcision is of the *heart*, in the *spirit*, and not in the *letter*; whose praise is not of men, but of God. What advantage then hath the Jew? or what profit is there of circumcision? Much every way, chiefly because that unto them were committed the oracles of God. Rom. ii. 28, 29: iii. 1, 2. Moses so understood the rite, just as Paul did, an outward sign, implying and requiring inward grace and obedience. Only the Lord had a delight in thy fathers to love them, and he chose their seed after them, even you, above all people, as it is this day. Circumcise, therefore, the foreskin of your heart, and be no more stiff-necked. (Deut. x. 15, 16.) And the Lord thy God will circumcise thine *heart*, and the heart of thy *seed*, to love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, that thou mayest live. (Deut. xxx. 6.) Jeremiah uses the same language. (Ch. iv. 4.) The rejected in Israel were "uncircumcised in heart." Circumcision was *spiritual*, made without hands. (Coloss. ii. 11.) The apostle also implies that, in truth, circumcision is the keeping of the commandments. (1 Cor. vii. 19.) The circumcised in

heart were the true Christian Church. For we are the circumcision which worship God in the Spirit, and rejoice in Christ Jesus, and have no confidence in the flesh. (Phil. iii. 3.) What is the epistle to the Galatians, but demonstration clear that Christ after the flesh, and the Christian Church with all its blessings, and the heirs of promise, were included in the covenant with Abraham, and sealed to believers and to their seed, by the rite of circumcision, and afterwards by the substituted seal of baptism? Now we, brethren, as Isaac was, are the children of promise. (Gal. iv. 28.) A change of the seal, by the rightful authority, does not invalidate a covenant. That made with Abraham is everlasting. Abolish that covenant, and the Christian Church must fall with it. Deny the spiritual meaning of circumcision, and you deny the spiritual meaning of baptism. They both signify essentially the same thing, and are both seals of one and the same covenant. The same objections against infant baptism, lie against infant circumcision, for one is just as applicable to infants as the other. Mr. Coleridge put himself in a very singular position when he stood godfather to a child, and afterwards wrote a letter to the lad to convince him that he had been baptismally regenerated, "born out of darkness into light," by a mere empty and utterly inappropriate ceremony. What must this young Adam think of the Literary Remains of his *Sponsor*? What value will he set upon infant baptism? But Mr. Coleridge says that baptism implies a covenant and a promise, and therefore cannot be fit for infants. On the part of the *parent*, the only Scriptural sponsor, infant baptism *does* imply a covenant and a promise, just as infant circumcision did. Infants are as *capable* in the one case as the other, and in neither are they "*things*," or "*objects*," but subjects. But God, it is said, made a covenant with Abraham, not with the infant. Is this so evident that it required no proof, only a round assertion? Moses speaks otherwise: the uncircumcised child, in the person of his father, has broken the covenant. And the uncircumcised man-child, whose flesh of his foreskin is not circumcised, that soul shall be cut off from his people; *he* hath broken my covenant. (Gen. xvii. 14.) *It*, that is, circumcision, shall be a token of the *covenant* between me and you. (Gen. xvii.

11.) This is not a mere "national mark." God said, also, I will circumcise the heart of thy *seed*—will be a God to thee and to thy seed after thee. And he received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the righteousness of the faith which he had, being yet uncircumcised. (Rom. iv. 11.) The application to infants of this rite was no more appropriate than the application of baptism now is. We derive the Christian Church from *Abraham*, not from *Levi*. For, argues the apostle, the priesthood being changed, there is made of necessity a change also of the *law*. For he of whom these things are spoken, pertaineth to another tribe, of which no man gave attendance at the altar. For it is evident that our Lord sprang out of Juda; of which tribe Moses spake nothing concerning priesthood. (Heb. vii. 12–14.) The Levitical economy came in between Abraham and Christ, and left its three orders and cumbrous worship dead in the wilderness, between Ur of the Chaldees and Calvary. The Church of Abraham is the Church of Christ; and the everlasting covenant remains with its *token*, sign, and seal, in the new rite of baptism. We do not think it "too plain to be denied," that infant baptism became universal only "with the dogma of original guilt." We rather believe that the practice came from circumcision and the sanction of the apostles. This is the testimony of historical *silence*, and stronger than any historical *fact* Mr. Coleridge can show. This is not the place to demonstrate the Scriptural propriety and privilege of infant baptism. But the practice will stand some time yet, untouched by such arguments as we have reviewed. Errors and bold assertions, anti-Scriptural and truthless, are freely poured forth, but nothing of sober reasoning. In Mr. Coleridge's own phraseology, we call it "guessing and babbling." A few more paragraphs must here be cited, on account of their general bearing on the last topic.

I often suspect that Taylor, in *abditis fidei secretis*, inclined to the belief that there is no other immortality but heaven, and that hell is a *poena damni negativa, haud privativa* (negative punishment). I own myself strongly inclined to it; but so many texts against it. Lit. Remains, Vol. III. p. 317. I am persuaded that, in some form or other, Taylor believed in a Purgatory. Ibid. p. 320.

For my part, I believe this only as certain, that nature alone cannot

bring them to heaven, and that Adam left us in a state in which we could not hope for it. Taylor. This is likewise my belief, and that men must have had a Christ, even if Adam had continued in Paradise—if, indeed, the history of Adam be not a *mythos* (fable): as indeed but for passages in St. Paul we should most of us believe; the serpent speaking; the names of the trees, and so on, &c. Coleridge, *Ibid.* p. 319.

Jeremy Taylor will not be called a Pelagian. Why? Because, without grace superadded by Christ, no man could be saved: that is, all men must go to hell, and this not for any sin, but from a calamity, the consequences of another man's sin, of which they were even ignorant. God would not condemn them, the sons of Adam, for sin, but only inflicted on them an evil, the necessary effect of which was, that they should all troop to the devil! And this is Jeremy Taylor's defence of God's justice! The truth is, Taylor was a Pelagian, believed that without Christ thousands, Jews and heathens, lived wisely and holily, and went to heaven. But this he did not dare say out, probably not even to himself; and hence it is that he flounders backward and forward, now upping and now downing. Coleridge, *Ibid.* p. 327. Also see, *The Friend*, p. 501.

If there be a *jus dominandi* over rational and free agents, then why blame Calvin? for all attributes then are merged in blind power, and God and fate are the same:

Ζεὺς καὶ Μοῖρα καὶ ἡεροφορεὶς Ἐπίρρυς

Strange Trinity! God, Necessity, and the Devil. *Lit. Remains*, Vol. III. p. 331.

How man would have needed a Christ if Adam had not sinned, we are not informed. The reader will comment for himself on the last paragraphs cited. But a remark on what follows is necessary: "Jeremy Taylor," says Coleridge, "additionally puzzled himself with Adam, instead of working into the fact within himself." *Ibid.* p. 333. This is the *generic* Adam, the name for *man* in general; and we must not look out of ourselves for the origin of sin! Mr. Coleridge speaks of the phrase "in Christ," by which he understands the means of grace, including the Spirit, vouchsafed to us in the gospel; of the "superadded grace by Christ;" of the "supplementary aids of grace;" and thinks there are "many converted persons;" but the inquiry how many, and precisely what conversion is, is unimportant. Some of his views, carried out to their legitimate results, would diminish guilt in proportion to depravity, and make salvation a matter of *debt* rather than of *grace*. His philosophy, especially as applied

to theology, is extremely injurious in its influence on the minds of the young. It captivates the imagination, and sets the reason afloat in a chaos of speculation—nothing tangible and fixed, while first truths are shaken from their foundation. What is ‘body,’ what is ‘nature,’ what is the ‘gospel?’ he asks, but answers not either clearly or safely. In his estimation, his own philosophy only is worthy of credit. It is vital to Christianity, and the true ground of morals; and this must needs produce an open contempt for all other philosophy. This has appeared all along in his works, but we have reserved a few specimens for direct reference. He cites Field on the Church, “for a masterly confutation of the Paleyo-Grotian evidences of the gospel.” Lit. Remains, Vol. III., p. 59. “O, compare,” says he, “this manhood of our church divinity, (i. e. in the age of Donne,) with the feeble dotage of the Paleyan school, the ‘natural theology,’ or watch-making scheme, that knows nothing of the maker but what can be proved out of the watch, the unknown nominative case of the verb impersonal *fit—et natura est*, the ‘it,’ in short, in ‘it rains,’ ‘it snows,’ ‘it is cold,’ and the like.” Ibid. p. 142. Of Jeremy Taylor, Coleridge thinks, (ibid. 292,) that from many passages in his works, his “private opinions were favorable to Socinianism.” This is good evidence that he himself was strongly biassed Unitarian-ward, but not so conclusive against the Bishop. His views of the weakness of Jeremy Taylor and Henry More, in relying on the external evidences of Christianity, are thus stated:

Taylor neither saw nor admitted any *priori* necessity of the Incarnation from the nature of man, and which being felt by man in his own nature, is the greatest of proofs for the admission of it, and the strongest predisposing cause of the admission of all proof positive. Not having this, he was to seek *ab extra* for proofs in facts, in historical evidence, in the world of sense. The same causes produce the same effects. Hence Grotius, Taylor, and Baxter, (then, as appears in his life, in a state of uneasy doubt,) were the first three writers of evidences of the Christian religion, such as have been since followed up by hundreds—nine-tenths of them Socinians, and which, taking head and tail, I call the Grotio-Paleyan way. Coleridge, Ibid. p. 299. More was in want of the logical treatment of the intellect—deficient “in respect to the intellectual part of man, which was commenced by Lord Bacon in his *Novum Organum*, and



brought to a systematic completion by Immanuel Kant, in his *Kritik der reinen, &c.* (Critic of the Pure Reason.)” In common with other divines of his day, More was ignorant of *natural science*. “Their physiography scant in fact, and stuffed out with fables: their physiology imbrangled with an inapplicable logic, &c.—yet if Christianity is to be the religion of the world, if Christ be that Logos or Word that was in the beginning, by whom all things became, (our philosopher dislikes the word *made*;) if it was the same Christ who said, *Let there be Light*; who in and by the creation commenced that great redemptive process, the history of life which begins in its detachment from nature, and is to end in its union with God; if this be true, so true must it be that the book of nature, and the book of revelation, with the whole history of man as the intermediate link, must be the integral and coherent parts of one great work,” &c.—*Ibid.* p. 157.

We cannot perceive the evidence of that peculiar modesty, humility, and piety, which the admirers of Coleridge claim for him. On the contrary, he seems to us to have been a man of great vanity and self-sufficiency. How, otherwise, could he treat as he has such giants in literature and intellect? In his *Notes on Select Discourses of John Smith, 1660*, he says that “Cudworth, Dr. Jackson, (Chaplain of Charles I.,) Henry More, John Smith, and others, were called, and believed themselves to be Platonists, but were more truly Plotinists. What they wanted was a transcendental, dæsthetic logic and noetic. Lord Herbert\* was at the entrance of, nay, already some paces within, the shaft and adit of the mine, but he turned abruptly back, and the honor of establishing a complete *προπαιδεια* of philosophy was reserved for Immanuel Kant, a century or more afterwards.” *Lit. Remains*, Vol. III. p. 416.

While the ancient worthies are thus contemned by our philosopher, with the same breath he extols them, to throw deeper into the shade, by contrast, modern divines. Noticing one of Luther’s bursts of eloquence, he exclaims, “A delicious paragraph! How our fine preachers would turn up their Tom-tit beaks, and flirt with their tails at it!” “O for a Luther in the present age! Why Charles, (Lamb, the brother poet with whom he ‘punched,’) with the very handcuffs of his prejudices, he

\*Lord Herbert was a very eminent Deist.

would knock out the brains, (nay, that is impossible, but,) he would split the skulls of our *Cristo-Galli*, translate the word as you like, French Christians or coxcombs." Lit. Remains, Vol. IV. pp. 10, 37. These very smart paragraphs were written to be printed, and printed to be read. We would not withhold from Mr. Coleridge any measure of his fame. But we regard his great "redemptive process," stated in the above critique upon Taylor, as no better than a Deistical salvation. And why, but to deify reason, does he reject miracles and the external evidences of Christianity? True it is, that tongues are for a sign not to them that believe, but to them that believe not. (1. Cor. 14, 22.) The spiritual man, having experimental knowledge and the witness of the Spirit in himself, needs not other evidence of the truth of the gospel. But unbelievers need "the tongues," and miracles, and outward evidences for their conviction. Was not Sir Isaac Newton, at first a clamorous infidel, silenced and brought to the faith by a candid examination of the evidences of Christianity? Is not this true of other infidels? Both Grotius and Paley have left noble works on the Evidences of Christianity, and the ridicule cast upon them will only confirm their value in the judgment of all the candid, whose verdict is not forestalled by a ruinous philosophy. The disciples of Coleridge, inhaling the infectious spirit of the master, show an open contempt for sound common sense philosophy and its advocates; or, as Coleridge says, for those "finger philosophers,"—those "snails in intellect, who wear their eyes at the tips of their feelers, and cannot even see, unless they at the same time touch." Such example, in one enthroned so high, in their view; such commanding influence, must be greatly injurious to the young, and is greatly to be deprecated. "We would recommend," says an eminent writer, "to any young man, whose brains have been a little touched with this philosophy, to commit to memory, or (to use a better phrase) get by heart the words of the first verse of the cxxxi. psalm: '*Lord, my heart is not haughty, nor my eyes lofty, NEITHER DO I EXERCISE MYSELF IN GREAT MATTERS, OR IN THINGS TOO HIGH FOR ME.*'"

## PART III.

### CHRISTIAN CHARACTER.

WE allow Mr. Coleridge his full measure of fame as a scholar, a poet, a man of extensive knowledge, of unrivalled powers in conversation, and a master of the sublime and beautiful in style. He seems never at a loss for the most appropriate word in the expression of his thoughts, or the choicest imagery. "To no other man," says a great artist and poet, "do I owe so much *intellectually*, as to Mr. Coleridge, with whom I became acquainted in Rome, and who has honored me with his friendship for more than five-and-twenty years. He used to call Rome the *silent* city; but I never could think of it as such, while with him; for, meet him when or where I would, the fountain of his mind was never dry, but like the far-reaching aqueducts that once supplied this mistress of the world, its living stream seemed specially to flow for every classic ruin over which we wandered. And when I recall some of our walks under the pines of the Villa Borghese, I am almost tempted to dream that I had once listened to PLATO in the groves of the Academy."\* This and similar testimony may be admitted, but it touches not the question of Christian character. And this question we must ask, and answer—for, in the faith of the increasing many, Mr. Coleridge is not only the prince of modern philosophers and theologians, but is, withal, a man eminent in humility and the Christian spirit. "If it be true, indeed," says a eulogist of commanding

\* Washington Allston. Griswold's Poets and Poetry of America.

talents, and of much greater moral worth than the subject of his adulation, "that a really great mind can be worthily commended only by those who adequately both appreciate and *comprehend* its greatness, there are few who should undertake to estimate, and set forth in appropriate terms, the intellectual power and moral worth of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. As the author showed himself, both living and dying, to be eminently, in his speculative views, a philosopher, and in spirit a Christian, there will be found in his writings a philosophy that is religious, and a religion that is philosophical. Neither he nor the public would be benefited by such commendations as I could bestow. The few among us who have read his works with the attention which they deserve, are at no loss what rank to assign him among the writers of the present age; to those who have not, any language which I might use would appear hyperbolical and extravagant. The character and influence of his principles as a philosopher, a moralist, and a Christian, and of the writings by which he is enforcing them, do not ultimately depend upon the estimation in which they may now be held; and to posterity he may safely entrust those 'productive ideas,' and 'living words;'—those

—— truths that wake,  
To perish never,

the possession of which will be for their benefit, and connected with which, in the language of the Son of Sirach,—*His own memorial shall not depart away, and his name shall live from generation to generation.*" (Pref. and Prelim. Essay to the Aids to Reflection, American edition, 1840.)

The eulogist and the eulogized have both passed beyond the reach of human censure or applause. But although the former of these great men was of untarnished character, of uncommon moral excellence, and a personal friend, these considerations must not prevent me from investigating the truth in the premises. *Amicus Plato, amicus Socrates, sed magis amicus veritas.* "Few lines which dying he could wish to blot:" and these few lines of misguided commendation bestowed so unguardedly upon Coleridge, most sincerely do *I wish* the eulogist had blotted out from the

eye of the present and future generations. "I regret that these words dropped from your Lordship," said a nobleman to Pitt, "for whatever falls from you, falls from such an eminence as to make an indelible impression." The serious reader will perceive now the importance of endeavoring to solve the problem, Was Samuel Taylor Coleridge, with all his greatness and moral worth, a *Christian*, or *spiritually acquainted with the truth as it is in Jesus*? We are constrained to take the negative, for sundry reasons. (1.) We find *no evidence of regeneration, except baptismal*. Mr. Coleridge attaches a regenerating power, and a saving efficacy to baptism; or at least supposes the regenerative influence of the Spirit present with the rite of baptism duly administered. The proof of this is seen in his letter to his god-child, Adam Steinmitz K.—, which has been cited. He makes also his own *baptismal* synonymous with his *spiritual* birth-day. Among his poems is found a sonnet thus entitled: "MY BAPTISMAL BIRTH-DAY. *Lines composed on a sick-bed, under severe bodily suffering, on my Spiritual birth-day, October 28th.*"

The heir of Heaven, henceforth I dread not Death.  
 In Christ I live, in Christ I draw the breath  
 Of the true Life. Let Sea, and Earth, and Sky  
 Wage war against me: on my front I show  
 Their Mighty Master's seal.

What Christian, born and taught of God, ever *so* relied on baptism, especially infant baptism, making it an amulet in suffering, and in the prospect of death? And yet, the reader has seen that, in his other writings, Mr. C. makes nothing of infant baptism but a mere mark of national distinction. He never speaks of Christ in the faith-language of the true, Spirit-enlightened believer. And if he knew any other *new birth*, why does he speak of his baptismal and spiritual birth-day as one and the same? It will be said, in reply, that at a later period he was truly converted. But of this no conclusive evidence appears. Coleridge himself, the best authority, speaks of his "sixteen months' aberration from the Catholic faith," and of his return, which he calls "a *re-conversion*," implying no change except a restoration

to his former character and faith; and his state previous to the "aberration" was not very Christian-like. His "moral worth," by his own showing, was never of the highest value. And he records some of his worst errors of faith near the close of his life. He departed July 25th, 1834; and in October, 1831, with mind matured, and "such perfect clearness of view," and "having now overpassed six-sevenths of the ordinary period allotted to human life," he feels himself "enforced by conscience" to reject as a later and merely human addition, the *Christopedia*, as he terms it, of the gospels; and to make it "a point of religion to have no belief one way or the other," on the momentous question whether or not Christ was "the Son of Mary by Joseph." Can such mature and conscientious convictions be reconciled with Christian character? *Credat Judaeus Apella, non ego!* But we have more light upon the value of the "re-conversion." In a poem to Charles Lamb, with whom he was intimate, and who, in passing, we may remark, was not a very fit companion for saints, Coleridge had written these lines:

He knows, (the Spirit that in secret sees,)  
Of whose omniscient and all-spreading love  
A right to *implore* were impotence of mind.

Referring afterward to these impious lines, Mr. Coleridge recants "the sentiment," the only sentiment he seems ever publicly to have recanted, except the errors embraced in his sixteen months' aberration. "I utterly recant," says he, "the sentiment contained in the lines above, it being written in Scripture, Ask, and it shall be given you, and my human reason, moreover, being convinced of the propriety of offering *petitions*, as well as thanksgivings to Deity. S. T. C., 1797." *Lit. Remains*, Vol. I. p. 37. But a little further on, p. 44, under the date 1796, he says, "In my calmer moments, I have the firmest faith that all things work together for good. But, alas! it seems a long and a dark process." But,

Were it not better hope a nobler doom,  
Proud to believe, that with more active powers  
On rapid, many-colored wing,  
We through one bright perpetual spring

Shall hover round the fruits and flowers,  
Screened by those clouds, and cherished by those showers?

The recantation of such sentiments, and the penitence for having uttered them, seems to us not very sincere. Faith is humble, not "*proud* to believe." And why does he omit the very important clause in the Scripture cited, i. e., *to those who love God*. There is no satisfactory evidence that Mr. Coleridge was ever born again. (2.) No evidence of this appears *from his Christian experience*. In advance of his age, Baxter had the true missionary spirit. He says :

My soul is much more afflicted with the thoughts of the miserable world, and more drawn out in desire of their conversion than heretofore ; there is nothing in the world that lieth so heavy upon my heart, as the thought of the miserable nations of the earth. Baxter. Life of himself.

I dare not condemn myself for the languid or dormant state of my feelings respecting the Mahomedan and other heathen nations ; yet know not in what degree to condemn. The less culpable grounds of this languor are, first, my utter ignorance of God's purposes with respect to the Heathens ; and second, the strong conviction I have that the conversion of a single province of Christendom to true practical Christianity, would do more toward the conversion of Heathendom, than an army of Missionaries. Lit. Remains, Vol. IV. p. 95.

Every vicious habit being radicated in the will, and being a strong love, inclination, and adhesion to sin, unless the natural being of this love be taken off, the enmity against God remains. Jeremy Taylor.

But the most important question is, as to those vicious habits in which there is no love to sin, but only a dread and recoiling from intolerable pain, as in the case of the miserable drunkard ! I trust that these epileptic agonies are rather the punishments than the augmenters of his guilt. The annihilation of the wicked is a fearful thought, yet it would solve many difficulties, both in natural religion and in Scripture. And Taylor, in his Arminian dread of Calvinism, is always too shy of this "*grace of God ;*" he never denies, yet never admits it any separate operancy *per se*. Coleridge. Lit. Remains, Vol. III. p. 303.

Strange grace of God ! Strange theology, this—the annihilation of the wicked. But Unitarians deny the existence of a personal devil, and annihilate the wicked to avoid future punishment.

O, what a miserable, despairing wretch should I become, if I believed

the doctrines of Bishop Jeremy Taylor in his *Treatise on Repentance*, or those I heard preached by Dr. ———; if I gave up the faith that the life of Christ would precipitate the remaining dregs of sin in the crisis of death, and that I should rise in purer capacity of Christ, &c. Coleridge. *Lit. Remains*, vol. iv. p. 30.

The one great and binding ground of the belief of God and a hereafter, is the law of conscience; but as the aptitudes, and beauty, and grandeur of the world are a sweet and beneficent inducement to this belief, a constant fuel to our faith, so here we seek these arguments, not as dissatisfied with the one main ground, not as *of little faith*, but because believing it to be, it is natural we should expect to find traces of it, and as a noble way of employing, and developing, and enlarging the faculties of the soul, and this, not by way of motive, but of assimilation, producing virtue. Coleridge, *Lit. Remains*, Vol. I. p. 373. *Death, and Grounds of Belief in a Future State*. 2nd April, 1811.

Conscience, again, is all things to man, as to a knowledge of the objects of faith. And we must not talk of a conscience, weak, blinded, depraved, *bad*. "A bad conscience is like bad sense, that is, no sense at all." The "remaining dregs of sin precipitated by the life of Christ, in the crisis of death!" But Socialism, or Fourierism, has a place in the "theological philosophy." So it appears from the translation of a *morceau* from a German writer, entitled, *Hope in Humanity*. "Although the misery on the earth is great indeed, yet the foundation of it rests after deduction of the partly bearable, partly removable, and partly imaginary evil of the natural world, entirely and alone in the moral dealings of men." Such is the translation, and Mr. Coleridge, too animated to be reverent, exclaims, "O, my God! What a great, inspiriting, heroic thought! Were only a hundred men to combine even my clearness of conviction of this with a Clarkson and Bell's perseverance, what might not be done! How awful does not hope become! What a nurse, yea, mother of all other, the fairest virtues! Suppose the state of a rich man perfectly *Adam Smithed*, yet with a naturally good heart;—then suppose him suddenly convinced, vitally convinced, of the truth of the blessed system of hope and confidence in reason and humanity." *Lit. Remains*, Vol. I. p. 349.

What has become of human depravity, too deep, too strong, to be eradicated by "the blessed system" of hope, reason, and



humanity? Where is the gospel remedy for sin, and the conversion of lost men? Let the reader review the above extracts, and say, if a man of such religious experience and hope ever knew the grace of the glorious gospel in the renovation of his own heart.

And if such was the master, let the disciple Beware lest any man spoil you through *philosophy*, and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ; for in him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily. Coloss. ii. 8. (3.) The errors of *doctrine* advocated by Coleridge are so gross, that we cannot regard him as a Christian. Whosoever transgresseth, and abideth not in the doctrine of Christ, hath not God. (2 John, 9.) Tried by this high authority, Mr. Coleridge cannot stand within the pale of the church spiritual. And using one of his own words, his faith was so *omnified*, so visionary, so diffused over a multitude of doctrines, none of them more than half credited—his conscience was so restless—his heart so vacant of a resting-place, and he wandered so like the unhoused dove over the abyss of waters, that we are suspicious that he himself doubted his own Christian character, and greatly feared that the “dregs of sin” might not “be precipitated in the crisis of death.” How could he have a stable hope? If we were to affirm that he was not sound in a single doctrine or article of faith essential to the gospel, we should not fear to stand trial in any impartial ecclesiastical court. His extreme unsoundness in doctrine is conclusive against his piety; for, As many as led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God. And the Spirit is the Spirit of truth. A few additional references to *errors of doctrine* are given, for further confirmation of the position we have taken, as to the moral worth and piety of Mr. Coleridge. He asserts that in Milton, “the fallen angels are human passions, invested with a dramatic reality.” He admires the *Paradise Regained*, but adds, “I cannot, however, but wish that the answer of Jesus to Satan, in the 4th book, (v. 285,) Think not but I know these things, &c., had breathed the spirit of Hayley’s noble quotation, rather than the narrow bigotry of Gregory the Great. The passage, indeed, is excellent, and is

partially true; but partial truth is the worst mode of conveying falsehood." Lit. Remains, Vol. I. p. 176.

If the reader will turn to the passages cited from Milton, he will find a very impartial history of heathen sages, and not a "narrow bigotry," but a Scriptural account of fallen man. The difficulty is, that Milton taught "the dogma of a personal Satan," and was too evangelical for a neological Christian philosopher. But in a worse strain, he censures and burlesques De Foe for his orthodoxy:

I considered—that as I could not foresee what the ends of divine wisdom might be in all this, so I was not to dispute his sovereignty, who, as I was his creature, had an undoubted right by creation to govern and dispose of me absolutely as he thought fit, &c. Robinson Crusoe.

I could never understand this reasoning, grounded on a complete misapprehension of St. Paul's image of the potter, Rom. ix. ; or rather, I do fully understand the absurdity of it. The susceptibility of pain and pleasure, of good and evil, constitutes a right (a right to what?) in every creature endowed therewith in relation to every rational and moral being—a *fortiori*, therefore, to the Supreme Reason, to the absolutely Good Being. Remember Davenant's verses:

Doth it our reason's mutinies appease  
To say, the potter may his own clay mould  
To every use, and in what shape he please? &c.

I entered into a long discourse with him about the devil, the original of him, his rebellion against God, his enmity to man, the reason of it, his setting himself up in the dark parts of the world to be worshipped instead of God, &c. Crusoe.

I presume that Milton's Paradise Lost must have been bound up with one of Crusoe's Bibles, otherwise I should be puzzled to know where he found all this history of the old gentleman. Not a word of it in the Bible itself, I am quite sure. But to be serious. De Foe did not reflect that all these difficulties are attached to a mere fiction, or at the best an allegory, supported by a few popular phrases and figures of speech, used incidentally or dramatically by the Evangelists—and the existence of a personal, intelligent evil being, the counterpart and antagonist of God, is in direct contradiction to the most express declarations of Holy Writ. *Shall there be evil in a city, and the Lord hath not done it?* Amos iii. 6. *I make peace, and create evil.* Isa. xlv. 7. Coleridge, Lit. Remains, Vol. I. p. 194.

The comments of Coleridge on De Foe's orthodoxy, confirmed by the lines from Davenant, are a good argument against fate, or power in the mere abstract, exerted upon moral and sentient beings; but in calling Crusoe's doctrine of the divine sovereignty *absurd*, he shows that he did not believe in the doctrine taught by Paul, in Rom. ch. ix. This setting Scripture in array against Scripture, making the Bible contradict itself, by reference to two irrelevant passages, needs no comment. Can a man of such sentiments be accounted a Christian? Mr. Coleridge nowhere leaves a written word, not even in his last hours, against these errors—no syllable of recantation. His editors pretend to no disavowal on his part. Such, then, was his faith—such his “re-conversion.” We pass on to his views of the Sabbath. The reader has seen how he spent one day of holy rest, setting sail for Germany, as stated in the Biographical Notice. In one of his poems, written in Germany, he has a new way of keeping the Sabbath.

'Tis sweet to him who all the week  
Through city-crowds must push his way,  
To stroll alone through fields and woods,  
And hallow thus the Sabbath day.

But his views are more fully expressed, in his observations on the “French Decade. Omniana, 1812.”

This folly and sin of abolishing the Sabbath, is condemned by Coleridge not only “as a senseless outrage on an ancient observance—as tending to weaken the bond of brotherhood between France and the other members of Christendom—but as dishonest in robbing the laborer of restorative and humanizing repose, &c.”—all prudential reasons, but nothing about the divine authority of the Sabbath. But he cannot assent to the judgment of Lutherans, Protestants, and members of the Church of England, who “inveigh against this charge as a blasphemous contempt of the fourth commandment.” Says he, “I pause, and before I can assent to the verdict of condemnation, I must prepare my mind to include in the same sentence, at least as far as theory goes, the names of several among the most revered reformers of Christianity.” These martyrs, he adds, “without referring to Luther, were Master Frith, and Master Tindal, the one suffering in the year 1533, and the other in 1536.” Frith says, as quoted by Coleridge, “Our forefathers, which were in the beginning of the church, did abrogate the Sabbath, to the intent that

men might have an example of Christian liberty. Howbeit, because it was necessary that a day should be reserved in which the people should come together to hear the word of God, they ordained instead of the Sabbath, which was Saturday, the next following, which is Sunday. And although they might have kept the Saturday with the Jew as a thing indifferent, yet they did much better." Thus far Master Frith, who, rightly understood, is probably not so far from the truth, as it would seem from his language. But he is a poor witness in favor of the French Decade, Master Tindal is more to the purpose, for which he is introduced. "As for the Sabbath," says Master Tindal, "we be lords of the Sabbath, and may yet change it to Monday, or any other day, as we see need; or we may make every tenth day holy day only, if we see cause why. Neither was there any cause to change it from the Saturday, save only to put a difference between us and the Jews; neither need we any holy day at all, if the people might be taught without it." So deposeth Master Tindal. "This great man believed," says Coleridge, "that if Christians should ever become Christians indeed, there would every day be so many hours taken from the labor for the perishable body, to the service of the souls and the understandings of mankind, both masters and servants, as to supersede the necessity of a particular day. At present our Sunday must be considered as so much holy land, reserved from the sea of oppression and vain luxury, and embanked against the fury of their billows." *Lit. Remains*, Vol. I. p. 283.

The commendation bestowed on the errors of the above named martyrs—the slight condemnation of the French Decade, and implied apology for it—and the absence of all allusion to the divine origin and obligation of the Christian Sabbath, sufficiently exhibit the loose views of Coleridge respecting the sacredness of the day. As was his faith, such must have been his practice; for no man is better than his creed. But (4.) The piety of Mr. Coleridge is most of all doubtful, from his *despising the humility of the Saints*. This testimony he will himself furnish:

In the dedication of one of his sermons, More calls himself "the most unworthy of all God's servants."

How an express avowal of unworthiness, comparatively superlative, can consist with that Job-like integrity and sincerity of profession, especially required in a solemn address to Him to whom all hearts are open, this I do not understand in the case of such men as Henry More, Jeremy Taylor, Richard Baxter were, and, by comparison, at least, with the multitude of evil doers, must have believed themselves to be. Coleridge. *Lit. Remains*, Vol. III. p. 157.

Mr. Coleridge gives a most exalted character to the Nun *St. Theresa*; calls her "a poor, afflicted, spotless innocent." Yet she is tempted and distressed on account of remaining sin, and so abased as to say, "True it is that I am both the most weak and the most wicked of any living." To this our philosopher, moralist, and Christian, thus replies: "What is the meaning of these words that so often occur in the works of great saints? Do they believe them literally? or is it a specific suspension of the comparing power and the memory, vouchsafed to them as a gift of grace—a gift of telling a lie without breach of veracity—a gift of humility indemnifying pride." *Lit. Remains*, Vol. IV. pp. 66, 67.

One of the clearest evidences of piety, is a sense of indwelling sin, and an earnest desire to be free from its bondage. The holiest men in all ages of the world, have spoken of themselves in the strongest terms of self-abasement, and this in proportion to their nearness of access to God. I have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear; but now mine eye seeth thee. Wherefore I abhor myself, and repent in dust and ashes. (*Job* xlii. 5, 6.) The unregenerate and unsanctified are ignorant of the ground of this humility; and they despise as visionary or insincere the self-abasement of the godly. But we have never known the truly pious to do so unseemly a thing. It implies, in the most unequivocal manner, that the soul is destitute of a saving knowledge of itself and of God. With all that he says and boasts of the *γνωσι σεαυτου*, there is much reason to fear that Mr. Coleridge did not *know himself* truly in the sight of God. How could he ask, "Are we not regenerated back to a state of spiritual infancy?" We must also cite a few pertinent passages, from "Notes on the Pilgrim's Progress."

But the wickedness of the tinker has been greatly overcharged; it is taking the language of self-accusation too literally, to pronounce of John Bunyan that he was at any time depraved. The worst of what he was in his worst days, is to be expressed in a single word—he had been a blackguard, &c. Southey.

Coleridge thus endorses the sentiments of his brother poet, high-churchman, and quondam coadjutor in the "Pantisocracy." "All this narrative, with the reflections on the facts, is admirable, and worthy of Robert Southey; full of good sense and kind feeling—the wisdom of love." *Lit. Remains*, Vol. III. p. 394.

R. Edwards, Preface to the *Life of Bunyan*, says, "The early part of

his life was an open course of wickedness." Coleridge adds, "Southey, in the *Life* prefixed to his edition of the *Pilgrim's Progress*, has, in a manner worthy of his head and heart, reduced this oft repeated charge to its proper value. Bunyan was never, in our received sense of the word, wicked. He was chaste, sober, honest; but he was a bitter black-guard; that is, damned his own and his neighbor's eyes on slight or no occasion, and was fond of a row. In this our excellent Laureate has performed an important service to morality. For the transmutation of actual reprobates into saints is doubtless possible; but, like the many recorded facts of corporeal chemistry, it is not supported by modern experiments." *Ibid.* p. 398.

The allegory of Christ behind the wall, counteracting the malice of Satan, Coleridge says is beautiful; but, says he, "I cannot but think it would have been still more appropriate, if the water-pourer had been a Mr. Legality, a prudentialist offering his calculation of consequences as the moral antidote to guilt and crime; and if the oil-instillator, out of sight and from within, had represented the corrupt nature of man, that is, the spiritual will corrupted by taking up a nature into itself." *Ibid.* p. 403.

This imagery would have been more appropriate, if the "water-pourer had been a Mr. Legality," for then the devil would have lost his *personality*. And if "the oil-instillator had represented the spiritual will corrupted," Christ, "with the oil of his grace," would have been excluded from the place assigned him in the gospel as the only Saviour of men! It is well that neither the "courtly Laureate," Robert Southey, nor the philosopher, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, wrote *The Pilgrim's Progress*. Both of these learned men were lamentably ignorant of human depravity as seen in the light and power of divine truth upon the conscience. Bunyan *never a wicked man!* We rely on his own better testimony, in his "Grace Abounding," and on the rebuke given him by the poor woman, for his dreadful profaneness, and corrupt life. Bunyan is corrected again by our annotator, for making Christian's bundle fall off at the cross. "Alas!" says Coleridge, "how many Protestants make a mental idol of the cross, scarcely less injurious to the true faith in the Son of God, than the wooden crosses and crucifixes of the Romanists!—and this because they have not been taught that Jesus was both the Christ, and the great symbol of Christ." *Ibid.* p. 404. Com-

ment on John v. 20, 21. Mr. Coleridge, alas! was liable to no idolatry of the cross or of Him crucified. But again, says he, "The dissenting Calvinists fell into mournful errors respecting absolute election, and discriminative, yet reasonless grace;—fearful this divorcement of the Holy Will, the one only Absolute Good, that eternally affirming itself as the I Am, eternally generateth the Word, the Absolute Being, the Supreme Reason, the Being of all Truth, the Truth of all Being;—fearful the divorcement from the reason; fearful the doctrine which maketh God a power of darkness instead of the God of light, the Father of the light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world." Ibid. p. 411. "Metaphysics are those truths of the pure reason which always transcend, and not seldom appear to contradict the understanding, or (in the words of the great apostle) spiritual verities, which can only be spiritually discerned—and this is the true meaning of metaphysics, *μετα τα φυσικα.*" Ibid. p. 403. "All things in which the temporal is concerned may be reduced to a Pentad, namely: prothesis, thesis, antithesis, mesothesis, and synthesis. So here—

	Prothesis, The Word = Christ.	
Thesis, The Scripture.	Mesothesis, The Spirit.	Antithesis, The Church.
	Synthesis, The Preacher."	Ibid. p. 396.

The DESTINY OF NATIONS, A VISION, (Poems, p. 17,) is the Philosophy.

But properties are God; the naked mars  
 (If mars there be, fantastic Guess or Ghost,)  
 Acts only by its inactivity.  
 Here we pause humbly. Others boldier think  
 That as one body seems the aggregate  
 Of Atoms numberless, each organized;  
 So, by a strange and dim similitude,  
 Infinite myriads of self-conscious minds  
 Are one all-conscious Spirit, which informs  
 With absolute ubiquity of thought  
 (His one eternal, self-affirming Act!)  
 All his involved Monads.

The reader has now a full view of the "matter-is-coagulated-spirit"-philosophy of Mr. Coleridge, and the evidence by which to form a judgment respecting him, as a philosopher, a moralist, and a Christian. We append, to avoid all unfairness, his "Religion," and "Confession of Faith."

#### RELIGION.

Among the great truths are these:

I. That religion has no speculative dogmas; that all is practical, all appealing to the will, and therefore all imperative. *I am the Lord thy God: Thou shalt have none other gods before me.*

II. That, therefore, miracles are not the proofs, but the necessary results of revelation. They are not the key of the arch, and roof of evidence, though they may be a compacting stone in it, which gives while it receives strength. *Lit. Remains, Vol. I. p. 374.*

#### EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY.

I should conclude that, if we suppose a man to have convinced himself that not only the doctrines of Christianity, which may be conceived independently of history or time, as the Trinity, spiritual influences, &c., are coincident with the truths which his reason, thus strengthened, has evolved from its own resources, but that the historical dogmas, namely, of the incarnation of the creative Logos, and his becoming a personal agent, are themselves founded in philosophical necessity; then it seems irrational that such a man should reject the belief of the actual appearance of a religion strictly correspondent therewith," &c. *Ibid. p. 388.*

CONFESSIO FIDEL. Nov. 3, 1816. *Ibid. pp. 389-394.*

#### I.

I. I believe that I am a free-agent, inasmuch as, and so far as, I have a will, which renders me justly responsible for my actions, omissive as well as commissive. Likewise, that I possess reason, or a law of right and wrong, which, uniting with my sense of moral responsibility, constitutes the voice of conscience.

II. Hence it becomes my absolute duty to believe, and I do believe, that there is a God, that is, a Being, in whom supreme reason and a most holy will are one with an infinite power; and that all holy will is coincident with the will of God, and therefore secure in its ultimate consequences by his Omnipotence;—having, if such similitude be not unlawful, such a relation to the goodness of the Almighty as a perfect time-piece will have to the sun.



## COROLLARY.

The wonderful works of God in the sensible world are a perpetual discourse, reminding me of his existence, and shadowing out to me his perfections. But as all language presupposes in the intelligent hearer or reader those primary notions which it symbolizes, as well as the power of making those combinations of these primary notions which it represents and excites us to combine—even so I believe that the notion of God is essential to the human mind; that it is called forth into distinct consciousness principally by the conscience, and auxiliarily by the manifest adaptation of means to ends in the outward creation. It is therefore evident to my reason, that the existence of God is absolutely and necessarily inusceptible of a scientific demonstration, and that Scripture has so represented it. For it commands us to believe in one God. *I am the Lord thy God, &c.\** Now all commandment necessarily relates to the will; whereas all scientific demonstration is independent of the will, and is apodictic or demonstrative only as far as it is compulsory on the mind, *volentem, nolentem* (willing or unwilling).

III. My conscience forbids me to propose to myself the pains and pleasures of this life as the primary motive or ultimate end of my actions; on the contrary, it makes me perceive an utter disproportionateness and heterogeneity between the acts of the spirit, as virtue and vice, and the things of the sense, such as earthly rewards and punishments must be. Its hopes and fears therefore refer me to a different and spiritual state of being: and I believe in the life to come, not through arguments acquired by my understanding or discursive faculty, but chiefly and effectively because so to believe is my duty, and in obedience to the commands of my conscience.

Here ends the first table of my creed, which would have been my creed, had I been born with Adam; and which therefore constitutes what may in this sense be called natural religion, that is, the religion of all finite beings. The second table contains the creed of revealed religion, my belief as a Christian.

## II.

IV. I believe and hold it as the fundamental article of Christianity, that I am a fallen creature; that I am of myself capable of moral evil, but not of myself capable of moral good, and that an evil ground existed in my will, previously to any given act or assignable moment of time, in my consciousness. I am born a child of wrath. This fearful mystery I pretend not to understand, I cannot even conceive the possibility of it—but I know that it is so. My conscience, the sole fountain of certainty, commands me to believe it, and would itself be a contradiction were it not so—and what is real must be possible.

\* The Scriptures refer us to the works of God for proof of his existence and attributes.

V. I receive with full and grateful faith, the assurance of revelation, that the Word, which is from all eternity with God, and is God, assumed our human nature in order to redeem me and all mankind from this our carnate corruption. My reason convinces me, that no other mode of redemption is conceivable, and as did Socrates, would have yearned after the Redeemer, though it would not dare expect so wonderful an act of divine love, except only as an effort of my mind to conceive to the utmost of the infinite greatness of that love.

VI. I believe that this assumption of humanity by the Son of God, was revealed and realized to us by the Word made flesh, and manifested to us in Christ Jesus; and that his miraculous birth, his agony, his crucifixion, death, resurrection, and ascension, were all both symbols of our redemption (*φαινομενατων τουμενων*) and necessary parts of the awful process.

VII. I believe in the descent and sending of the Holy Spirit, by whose free grace obtained for me by the merits of my Redeemer, I can alone be sanctified and restored from my natural inheritance of sin and condemnation, be a child of God, and an inheritor of the kingdom of God.

COROLLARY.

The Trinity of persons in the Unity of the Godhead, would have been a necessary idea of my speculative reason, deduced from the necessary postulate of an intelligent Creator, whose ideas being anterior to the things, must be more actual than those things, even as those things are more actual than our images derived from them, &c.

This Confession of Faith, taken by itself is not so objectionable, but it must be modified by the writer's philosophical and theological system. The Confession bears date, Nov. 1816. Compare this with the sentiments recorded October, 1831, in relation to the *Christopedia*, and with some other doctrines later than the *Confessio Fidei*. We may say of Mr. Coleridge, *crescit eundo*; he grew worse the farther he went. We cannot have confidence in orthodox *words*, unless we know that they are used in an orthodox *sense*. But we must take our leave of Mr. Coleridge and his works. It will probably be objected, by the admirers of the great philosopher, that the errors so freely exposed belong to his "aberration from the Catholic faith," to his unregenerate state, and that he afterwards became pious and sound in doctrine. The evidence of this conversion, or re-conversion, has been examined, and we do not find that the "holy man," was ever more than *baptismally* regenerated. It may also be objected

that his doctrines, philosophical and theological, are misunderstood, and his language *perverted*. But is it *possible* to misunderstand the elements of his theology, or can any magic of hermeneutics reconcile his language with truth and Scripture? It may be further alleged that the Literary Remains, in which are contained so many of the heresies animadverted upon, are only fragments, never designed for publication, and collected after the decease of the writer, for the purpose of book-making. It is sufficient to answer, that the editor of these volumes is a son-in-law of Mr. Coleridge; that they correspond in principle, as seen by reference, with the works edited by Mr. C. himself; and, moreover, he lays no injunction of privacy; and in his late, and as it appears, his last work, *The Confessions*, he pens not a syllable to disapprove of his former sentiments. Why did he not, like primitive converts, burn these books? (Acts xix. 19.) They must now stand, till time shall bury them, as his system of chaotic faith, stamped with his own seal. We are amazed out of measure that reflecting and good men can patronize such philosophy, much more such theology. Most of all are we confounded that a son of the Puritans, a great, good man, should have prefixed to the *Aids to Reflection*, so late as 1839, the following paragraphs: "It is to be hoped, indeed, from the increasing demand for them, that we shall soon be furnished with a uniform edition of all the author's prose writings, when he will be found by *all* who wish to understand his views, his own best commentator." God forbid! Are such works to be commended to the young, without a grain of caution? In what age do we live? It is to be hoped, and charity bids us believe, that the good man who, by his commanding influence, recommends in the lump, *such* publications, could not have known the worst of the case—could not have examined *all* the *prose writings* of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Admit that a cabinet of the richest gems might be gathered from the intellectual mine he has opened; yet who can safely enter "the shaft and adit" of the mine? Were a medicine compounded of the most salutary ingredients, could we recommend it, if *arsenic* so predominated in the mixture as to endanger the life of the recipient? We have opened the gilded pill—have discharged a

most momentous duty to the churches, and whether censured for dragging to light the errors of a great man, or approved for the truth's sake, shall quietly leave the result with Him who is the Way, the Truth, and the Life. An appropriate close we find in Mr. Withington's *Present State of Metaphysics*: "One note of warning we wish to sound before we close. Nothing can be more fatal to the usefulness of a minister, than to infect his head with this turbid philosophy, if he has the least intention of bringing it out in his public performances. It would be the mildew of piety. For, to say nothing of those mixed feelings, half principle and half sentimentalism, (or to speak more accurately, one third mystery, one third truth, and one third nothingism,) feelings derived, he says, from the depths of nature, and from communion with those great minds formed on the principles of nature, (whatever this means,) to say nothing on this point, how is it to be expected, that our plain congregations should trace their indefinite shadows, formed by the midnight moon, and having no tendency to sanctify the heart when they are traced? The philosophy of Coleridge is a poor commodity to present to a New England audience, especially when it is to displace the doctrines of Edwards, and modify the epistles of Paul. The dairy-women on the banks of the Champlain will hardly understand it. The organ of the 'supersensuous' will hardly discover the objects of faith; nor will the 'distinguishing power, self-affirmed,' supply the place of the power of the Holy Spirit. It would be a poor exchange to give up an English understanding for a German's reason; or to barter away all the glories of creation for things which confessedly exist only out of time and space. Coleridge is dead,—peace to his memory: and may his" (philosophical and theological) "works soon follow him."



3 2044 058 291 709

THE BORROWER WILL BE CHARGED THE COST OF OVERDUE NOTIFICATION IF THIS BOOK IS NOT RETURNED TO THE LIBRARY ON OR BEFORE THE LAST DATE STAMPED BELOW.

BOOK DUE WID  
6703330  
APR 18 1980

WIDENER  
CANCELLED  
SEP 17 2003  
APR 10 1981  
CANCELLED

WIDENER  
BOOK DUE  
SEP 7 2003  
JAN 2 1981  
CANCELLED

WIDENER  
WIDENER  
SEP 15 2003  
FEB 10 2003  
CANCELLED

WIDENER  
BOOK DUE  
SEP 7 2003  
756941  
CANCELLED

APR 1 JUL 1978 1978  
4/12/78



