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ARTICLE I.

REFORMERS BEFORE THE REFORMATION.

BRETHREN OF THE LIFE IN COMMON; AN ACCOUNT OF THE ORIGIN AND PROGRESS OF THE INSTITUTION, AND ITS INFLUENCE UPON LITERATURE AND RELIGION.¹

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LIKE all institutions of a solid character and of a permanent influence upon society, that of the Brethren of the Life in Common, was called into being by the wants of the age and of the country in which it originated. So helpless was the condition of multitudes of individuals in the middle ages, and so destitute of life the scholastic theology, the religion, or rather the superstitions of the church, that associations for mutual relief, and for spiritual edification among the people were certainly altogether natural, if not absolutely necessary. The communities of the Beguins, Beghards and Lollards, which were the first essays to satisfy those necessities, had originally so many defects, and had, moreover, so far degenerated in their character since their establishment, that they either went to decay of themselves, or were suppressed by authority. And yet both the physical and the moral causes which, in that age of political disorder and of ecclesiastical corruption, had awakened a desire for such fraternities, continued in their unabated strength. Nowhere did the civil disorders, and, at

¹ The substance of this Article is taken from the work of Ullmann entitled *Reformatoren vor der Reformation*, Vol. II. pp. 62—201. The work itself has been reviewed in a former number.

very root of skepticism, and leave not even his own hollow ground beneath the feet of the unbeliever." "We now may know, in their own hand writing, what the earliest post-diluvian men and nations thought and felt and believed, not merely about this life, but about God, about religion, about "miracles, the resurrection and the life to come."²⁹ He refers to the latter half of the seventh line of the inscription, which he reads: "And we proclaimed our belief in miracles, in the resurrection, in the return into the nostrils of the breath of life." But the three points of faith here specified are neither an iota more nor less than the cardinal points of Mohammedan doctrine; and who, not being prepossessed with a certain opinion, would hesitate whether to refer an inscription, found in Arabia, and supposed to contain such a specification of religious belief, to an age subsequent to Mohammed, or to derive from it, on the ground alleged in favor of its primitive antiquity, a "contemporary" evidence "of patriarchal faith, and primeval revelation?"³⁰

For ourselves, we will not venture to express any opinion, as yet, respecting the age of the Himyaritic inscriptions, though we believe that something may be inferred, on this point, from the relation to each other of the Himyaritic and Ethiopic alphabets, even if no date should be discovered in any of the inscriptions.

ARTICLE III.

A SKETCH OF GERMAN PHILOSOPHY.

[On the basis of an Article in the Halle "*Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*," October, 1843, Nos. 182, 183, 184.]

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INTRODUCTION.

[The following Article is rather a paraphrase than a translation of the original. Much matter also from other sources which seemed necessary to the elucidation of some of the positions has been incorporated into it. The paragraphs upon some of the re-

²⁹ S. Hist. Geogr. of Arab. I. Dedic. XI.

³⁰ S. Ibid. ibid. XV.

sults of the Hegelian system, and a general statement of Schelling's new scheme, were condensed from an essay by professor Bachmann of Jena in the "*Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*" of that university for the month of December, 1843. The chief addition, however, is an analysis or summary of Hegel's System from the German *Conversations-Lexikon*," which occupies several pages, and is a free and full paraphrase of the original. A literal rendering, word for word, of a mere abstract of an abstruse German system could only mislead the reader, and give a most unfair view of the system itself.

The present Article does not pretend to be anything more than a very general and cursory view of the subject. The title of the original was "*New Schellingism*," and the body of it will be found to refer to the old and the new schemes of this philosopher. In connection with this it gives a sketch of the leading opinions of the other philosophers, and of the course of philosophical inquiry in Germany. Upon the whole it is perhaps as clear an account as can be found within the same compass. It is chiefly open to objection in its depreciation of Schelling, and the correctness of the author's statement of all of Schelling's views, especially of his later system, would be questioned by the adherents of this remarkable man.

Many are asking, what is German Philosophy? And it is easier to ask the question than to answer it. Some seem to imagine it a mere mass of fantastic conceits—and call it mysticism. But a German smiles when he hears the clear-headed Kant called a mystic. Others seem to think it a certain something whose only possible use is to raise a broad laugh on the faces of all sensible men, women and children—a farrago of words and nonsense. A few it may be are looking to German speculations as the means of giving them a higher and more comprehensive system than they have been able elsewhere to find; of solving some of the questions and problems which are forcing themselves upon their minds. Many, the most, regard it with unmingled aversion and distrust. Perhaps it may be found upon a closer examination of the subject that none of these parties and opinions are wholly correct. It may be that German philosophy and mysticism are two entirely distinct things. It may be that there are some things in the German schemes which are intelligible; that though he may be a bold man who would venture to assert that he understands everything that the Germans have taught, yet that he is still bolder who will undertake to say that it is all or chiefly an

unmeaning collection of mere words. Every one is inclined to laugh at the strange sounds of a foreign language, but this is no evidence that the language does not mean something, that it is strange sounds and nothing else. Those again who expect to see the enigmas of life solved, and the difficulties and contradictions of science explained in the German schools, are assuredly going into the very thick of the conflict, to find peace. German philosophy is as yet militant, is not yet triumphant. In some of its later forms it is undeniably opposed to the whole spirit and faith of Christianity. It can hardly be doubted that the tendencies of many individual philosophers, if not of whole schools, are pantheistic, that they give us a universal idea instead of a personal God; and a system of vague philosophical speculations instead of a divine Redeemer. It cannot be doubted that the fiercest assault which Christianity has ever experienced, both in its history and in its doctrines, is that to which it is now exposed in the country of Luther and the Reformation. Many present the alternative—Christianity or philosophy; as one author has expressed it—“Christ or Spinoza.” Whether it be necessary to accept the alternative or not; what Christian can doubt that it is not Christianity which will be last abandoned? In Germany itself within the few past years the protest against a pantheistic philosophy has waxed loud, and the revival of an intelligent and earnest love of Christianity is most marked and most auspicious.

To say that this philosophy is false and pantheistic is one thing; to say that it is absurd and ridiculous is quite another thing. With all its apparent strangeness, it may be that it has stronger affinities with some theological and philosophical tendencies of the American mind than we at present dream of. It may be that we shall laugh at its supposed absurdities, and so be indifferent to the real dangers with which it threatens us. Revolutionary democratic opinions, and foul-mouthed blasphemy have sprung into being in the midst of a German pantheistic school. A like democracy and a like infidelity amongst ourselves are fast finding out their connections with certain German speculations. Is it then the part of wisdom for those who first present us with a view of these schemes to seek out only their deformities? Perchance others and the opponents of our faith may also read and see that they are colossal and comprehensive; that they give into their hands, ready forged, some of their strongest weapons of attack.]

THE criticism to which Kant subjected the human mind, in all the spheres of its manifestation, not only introduced a new epoch into the history of philosophy, but it put Germany at the head of modern movements in this science, and made philosophy to be the centre of all sciences. The position began to be maintained, that only what could be justified before the bar of speculation, only what could show its derivation from this original fountain of truth, could lay claim to authority or regard. It was boldly assumed that no law of the State, no precept of morality, no prescript of religion, no fact of science, no work of plastic or oratorical art, could any longer be recognized or adopted without philosophical examination.

But does philosophy now maintain this position? In its further progress it has become split up into the most opposite and irreconcilable parties. When it left the sphere of abstractions and came down to what is concrete, when it entered into the departments of religion and of morality, it called into being the sharpest and most implacable antagonisms, as well among theologians, as against philosophy itself. And in addition to this, the other sciences have made such rapid strides, that the systems of philosophy which have hitherto prevailed are ill at ease in the midst of the rich mass of materials and facts that have been collected; to say nothing as to their being able to direct the researches of investigators in these departments. Who would venture with the principles of Kant's philosophy, or of Fichte's, or even of the maturer school of Hegel, to give a complete and exhaustive view of the organism of the State? Who would be so bold as to imagine that with the categories of Schelling alone he could make out a perfect system of Natural Philosophy, which should bind together all the results that have been attained, and unite them in one central point or principle? Even Herbart, whose whole philosophical scheme is much more intimately allied to the sphere of the natural sciences, has not exerted any essential influence upon them. If we add to this, that the course of investigation and research has been gradually turning itself away from metaphysical speculation to less abstract subjects, that in the fields of the former there remain comparatively few gleaners of the ears of corn that have fallen, and that the reapers have gone to the richer harvest which the positive sciences afford; that even within the schools of philosophy there are many who are consciously or unconsciously tending to what may be called a philosophical or

rational empiricism, to a reconciliation between philosophy and the empirical sciences; then it is clear that the position which metaphysical speculation once assumed, even if it did then actually possess it, can no longer be maintained; that its high pretensions must be abandoned.

It was Schelling in the former period of his philosophical course who gave such prominence and authority to speculation. This was his mission. His late call to be professor of philosophy in Berlin, together with the applause and the opposition he has there encountered, has given a new interest to his views. His system may be looked upon as the chief source of the distractions and confusion that now prevail. It is said that he has been called to his present post in order to reconcile the conflicting parties, to overthrow the system of Hegel, to bring about a new era in which philosophy and theology shall be at peace. But it hardly seems possible that the man who has caused the disturbance can quell it; and it certainly seems remarkable that this philosopher, deeply as he may be penetrated by a sense of his own importance, should have taken upon himself this most difficult office. But our doubts rise to the highest grade now that Schelling has not only promised to respond to all the claims and fulfil the expectations of the present age of the world in speculative matters, but also boasts that he is "in possession of a system of philosophy which will carry human consciousness beyond its present boundaries." Although in the whole course of his career he has not been wanting in the most extraordinary promises which have always far exceeded his powers, yet this last one, "*to carry man's consciousness beyond its limits*" is in itself so preposterous, that, to look for the reconciliation of existing difficulties from a science based on such assumptions can only be compared with the attempt, which has at different times been proposed, to restore the disordered finances of a country by the art of making gold. And the whole undertaking assumes an air of still greater improbability, since it is at the same time declared, that Schelling "does not by any means intend to abandon the philosophical discoveries which he made when he was a young man," that he "does not mean to substitute another system of philosophy for his former one, but *to add to it* a new science, a science which has been hitherto considered an impossibility." Does not this condition, under which this new philosophy, which is to carry man's consciousness beyond its present limits, is to come into existence, include the assumption, that our consciousness, in order to be ca-

pable of undergoing this extension, must first of all let itself be confined within the bounds of Schelling's youthful discoveries?

We have had from different sources some accounts of the new system and teachings of Schelling. His lectures were delivered before large audiences. Professors, students and theologians frequented them. Several adepts took copious notes, some of which have been published. From all that can be learned respecting his new position, as much as this is quite evident, that he has not fulfilled his intentions. Notwithstanding the private coteries and the public parades, his aim has not been reached. In respect to the real value of what he has achieved the most opposite views prevail. From his own pen we have not indeed received any work which may be considered as perfectly defining his new position, and be subjected to a critical examination. Such a work has for years been promised, and for years withheld. But there are still sufficient sources of information in the works already published and in the reports of his lectures. And now that the passions, which were aroused, when he first came to his new post have become somewhat allayed, and matters have begun to take a more quiet course, it may be the fitting time to subject the system of Schelling to examination in respect to the present problems of philosophy; and to see how far it may be expected directly or indirectly to assist in their solution.

In order to place ourselves in the right point of view, it will be necessary to direct our attention to the philosophical views prevalent in the two periods, out of which the two systems of Schelling proceeded, and with which they are both intimately connected.

It is now generally conceded that Schelling did not by any means discover a new principle or law in philosophy. He only attempted to adapt a system which had been previously developed, that of Spinoza, to more modern times, to carry it out and shape it in conformity with the wants of a new period. Schelling's youthful discovery or invention is, in its fundamental principle, no way different from Spinozism; the difference concerns only the mode in which the principle is carried out. The doctrine is that all things inhere, are immanent in the alone-existing, all-penetrating, all-containing, all-maintaining *Substance*. That his theory may elevate men to a high degree of enthusiasm has been sufficiently taught in our own experience. But in spite of this, such a theory, so diametrically opposed to all the principles of the modern world, could not have carried away at least the

highly cultivated minds of the times just past, if there had not been some peculiar characteristics and special wants in those times. It will be necessary to look at this period more closely.

Every one knows that the result of the *Critique* of Kant, in its theoretical department, of his criticism of the Pure Reason, was, that things as they exist in nature were virtually robbed of their essence, of all substance or substantiality, as in the system of Spinoza, they were reduced to mere modifications to forms of manifestation. That which lies beneath the form, which is the ground of the manifestation, is not an object of real knowledge. Kant did not by this mean to say, as the subjective idealism of Berkeley asserts, that nature is to be reduced to a mere ghost-like existence; he granted, he maintained, that behind or beneath the manifestations or phenomena there was an essence, a nature. What he denied was, that this essence, this nature was something that could be known, that it was a subject of real knowledge. Therefore he wished that his system should be called, the system of *Critical or Transcendental Idealism*. Such was the result of the theoretical or intellectual part of his philosophy. In his system of moral philosophy, what he calls *Practical Reason*, he comes to an exactly opposite result. In the Practical Reason, or moral consciousness of men, he found a real essence or nature, which could be an object of certain knowledge—a thing per se (*Ding an sich*), as he called it, a something which existed by and for itself, and which we could also absolutely know. This was the categorical imperative, the sense of absolute obligation, the *ought*, of our moral nature, in respect to which no one could have any doubt. Thus his system was made up of two distinct parts, which were sharply distinguished from one another. There was the domain of nature, in which the laws of the understanding prevail; and the domain of freedom where reason holds the sceptre. In the former, the sphere of theoretical knowledge, there is a great gulf between sensible things and what is beyond and above the senses, the supersensuous; "just as if they were two worlds, the first of which had no influence upon the second." In the other sphere, however, there exists practically the absolute necessity of carrying out in the world of sense, and there striving to realize, the ends and aims which are prescribed by the nature of freedom. Consequently—and this is the weighty point to which all speculation must at last have reference—the world of sense stands in regular and lawful connection, in fixed internal union with the supersensuous world, the reflections of our under-

standings with the ideas of our reason, necessity with freedom; and to find out and explain this connection is the end of all knowledge, and the aim of our moral nature. The difficulties that here arise, recur in all the spheres and departments of spiritual life, wherever mind manifests itself. Whoever would understand the progress and conflicts of man in history and art, in philosophy, morals and religion, must look at them from some central point of view; whoever would understand the waves on the surface must look at their causes beneath; whoever would penetrate into the depths of the matter, and become competent to form a thorough acquaintance with it, must be able to grasp these two apparently contradictory elements, to see the struggle between them in all phenomena, and to see that movement and progress depend and are based upon the antagonism between these opposing forces.

In considering this subject, the first point of importance is to endeavor to grasp and comprehend the manifold operations of nature in the principle of their unity, to discern the end or final cause of nature, the purpose for which it exists. In manifold phenomena this is clearly presented in the way of experiment and observation. But since Kant supposed it to be a point entirely proved, that we are not able to have any knowledge of the essential nature of things, what could the whole conception of the final cause of nature, the whole relation between means and ends which there exists, and all the laws of nature, as well the universal as the particular; what could all these be to him other than a mere scheme or theory of man's understanding, a *focus imaginarius* which we had transferred from our own minds into the external world? And so we find that the successor of Kant, Fichte, entirely set aside the notion of the thing per se (the Ding an sich) as having any substantial existence. With Kant only the name had remained. Fichte abolished even that. In nature, in the external world, there remained nothing that was essential. Nothing is essential, has a real, substantial existence excepting what is personal, excepting the *I*, as he expressed himself. Nature thus became a mere stone of stumbling, a mere basis for something else, a something to be presupposed or taken for granted, in order that something else might exist or be shown to exist; but in itself considered it had no independent value or existence. Besides the *I*, there was nothing that was essential. But with such a system would it not at last become necessary to look at and to speak of this *I* as in itself the absolute substance of all things? Philosophy demands the absolute; it cannot rest con-

tented with the relative, the personal, the subjective. And so we find that in the later system of Fichte, the *I*, which formed the central idea of his whole scheme, was declared to be absolute, was understood as the Absolute Substance. Here was the great change from the subjective to the objective, from the personal to the absolute. The advance which Schelling made in philosophy consists now in this, that he substituted another expression for the *I* of Fichte. In reference to their fundamental principles there is only the difference of a word, a name, between Fichte's later system, and Schelling's first theory.¹

The system of Schelling is called the System of Identity, or the Philosophy of the Absolute; it has also received the designation, Philosophy of Nature, because he first and chiefly turned his attention to giving to natural science a more speculative character. He starts with the conception of an *Absolute Substance*, which pervades everything. But we everywhere find antagonisms; the subjective and the objective, the real and the ideal, unity and multiplicity, the infinite and the finite. Schelling asserts that these are not really opposed to one another, that they are to be considered as one, as identical; that they are but the opposite poles of one and the same *Substance*. Hence his system received the name of the System of Identity. In the whole

¹ This remark applies fully only to the first form in which Schelling presented his philosophy. Hegel says that Schelling himself was not aware of the fundamental difference of his own system from that of Fichte, until he (Hegel) pointed it out to him. This statement is made on the authority of Michelet who says that he had it from Hegel himself. There was quite a discussion between Fichte and Schelling as to which of them really first made the transition from the subjective basis of philosophy to the objective. Compare, *Schelling's Exhibition of the True Relation of the Philosophy of Nature to the Improved Doctrine of Fichte*. Also, *Fichte's Life*, by his son. However this question may be decided, there is yet no doubt about the fact that the transition was actually made. Fichte came to the result, that all our knowledge is a merely subjective act, that no one can know or experience anything more than what is passing within the sphere of his own self-consciousness. Whatever is out of this sphere is a subject of knowledge only so far as it comes within this sphere; it is viewed as objective only because it is made objective by ourselves. Schelling says, however, that to *know anything* means the same as to be certain of its actual existence; that by the fact of knowing it we presuppose or take for granted that it actually exists. A knowledge of something which did not exist apart from our knowledge would be only an empty dream, no knowledge at all. That is—knowledge is not all, self-consciousness is not all, there is also that which is independent of knowledge, there is that which actually exists, which exists objectively. There is not only a Subject; there is also an Object.—Comp. Chalybaus *Entwicklung d. Phil* pp. 190—194.

of nature he saw the marks and developments of the one universal *Substance*. Thus he gave new life to nature, and new impulse to the attempt to bring the results of experimental research into harmony with philosophical speculation.

Let any one now imagine what impression must have been made upon all minds in place of the shadowy life which Kant allowed to nature, to see again brought into it the pulsations and movements of an absolute, all-pervading *Substance*. This idea that nature is to be considered as a whole by itself, not as something merely accidental, not a mere aggregate without unity, has always been at the basis of all natural science. The scientific investigator expects to find in nature an order and a system of laws, which are something more than a reflex of the laws of his own soul. Kant could not succeed in overcoming, by his theoretical principles, his own great ideas in respect to the organism of nature in reducing it to a mere figment. In the meantime, F. H. Jacobi had insisted with great energy upon the principle of individual life, and, from this point of view, he had again brought forward the deep and clear conception of Leibnitz. The way being thus prepared, Schelling's system, this new form of Spinozism, which brought back a new life into nature, was greeted at its first appearance with the greatest enthusiasm. This was natural and necessary. Schelling himself has given the best clue to it in the following words, "After all finite forms have been torn in pieces, and in the wide world there remains no common principle or bond by which we may consider men or nature as held together, it is only the conception (or vision) of *Absolute Identity*, considered in the most complete and objective way as embracing all seeming opposites, which can again unite them, and which in its highest application to religious truth will forever unite them."

If the fundamental principle, the central idea, had been thus obtained, yet this was not sufficient; it must still be shown how this principle could be carried through and applied to all departments of the world of matter and of mind; the relation of all separate and individual existences to this fundamental idea was still to be exhibited. Schelling was not adapted to this undertaking, it was beyond his powers. He was wanting in severe logical culture. His unfixed fancy hurried him from one object to another, before he had resolved the questions which he propounded in each successive work that he published; he had not sufficient power of endurance to exhaust the problems. Spinoza had already given to his principle a full and logical development. With masterly consecutiveness and plastic repose he had striven to

bring under it all the phenomena of the universe; but since his times, the position of the world had been changed, there was a new phase in its progress. And if this principle were to receive authority and recognition, it was necessary to bring the results of the empirical sciences into harmony with it, both theoretically and practically. The first thing was to define more clearly the meaning of the *Absolute Substance*, for the use of the new system. Spinoza had defined it as consisting of an infinite number of attributes; only two of them, however, he says, come within the sphere of human knowledge, viz. *Extension* and *Thought*. In these two, and in their modifications, he found the means of explaining the phenomena of the world. Not noticing, or not troubled by, what Spinoza might have meant, when he would not limit the attributes of the *Absolute* to thought and extension, Schelling declared that the *Identity* of these two, (Spinoza also regards them as only different forms of knowing *one* and the *same* thing), constitutes the essence of the *Absolute Substance*. But he changed the names of the attributes. Sometimes he called them the *Subjective* and the *Objective*, sometimes the *Real* and the *Ideal*, and again he used other like meaning expressions. Hence come the different definitions which Schelling gives of the absolute substance; as the *Subject-Object*, as the *Indifference of the Subjective and Objective*, as the *Identity of the Real and the Ideal*, etc. The office and problem of philosophy is the mutual penetration and interaction of the *Ideal* and the *Real*.

In order now to bring the phenomena of the world within his system, to *subsume* everything under this Absolute Substance, he constructed out of its two attributes a balance with two arms; upon the one arm he suspended *Nature*, upon the other *History*. With Spinoza, *Thought* reaches as far as *Extension*, the order of things in the sphere of the *Ideal* is the same as in the sphere of the *Real*. But Schelling on the side of nature gives the supremacy to the *Real*, to the comparative exclusion of the other element; on the side of Spirit he gives the supremacy to the *Ideal*; each side puts itself into equipoise. Such a bringing down of the loftiest and most universal conceptions to the lowest and commonest forms and images, which even the world of matter has to offer, would be sufficient to destroy all hope of a systematic carrying out of the scheme.¹

¹ "All distinction or difference in being (Sein), is produced only by a relative preponderance of the Subjectivity or Objectivity of the parts. Let us represent to ourselves being in general under the figure of a line :

More difficult than this, however, was the problem to find out the law by means of which all these finite and individual existences could be derived from this one Absolute Substance. A deeper penetration into the doctrine of Spinoza might have given him the means of doing it. Spinoza takes for his basis the proposition, *ex necessitate divinae naturae infinita infinitis modis (hoc est, omnia quae sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt), sequi debent*. And from this he makes the conclusion, *deum omnium rerum quae sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt, esse causam efficientem*. And thus to the alone-existing Substance he attributed an energy according to which it produced all things from eternity, *ex solis suae naturae legibus et a nemine coactus*. This vital point in Spinozism which constitutes the true greatness of the system, was overlooked by Schelling; and therefore as long as he philosophized, he could never find an objective principle of movement, a living, vital energy to infuse into his system. He tried the most manifold forms. Now he imitated the method of Fichte in his Doctrine of Science (*Wissenschaftslehre*); now the desultory and grasshopper style of Jacobi, just skipping over the phenomena; again he proceeded after the pattern of Spinoza, striving to get the true form by a parade of mathematical propositions, and modes of proof; then he took the Platonic fashion of a dialogue as a means of saving himself and his system, and after-



let the part *a-C* represent preponderating Subjectivity, the part *C-b* the preponderating Objectivity. The whole line *C* will represent the identity of the Subjective and the Objective; and this letter will also stand for the point of Indifference or the equilibrium of both sides. But now the whole of being (*Sein*) is neither at the point *a* pure Subjectivity, nor at the point *b* pure Objectivity, because no being, no actual existence can be predicated of either of these two conceptions taken by itself; but subjectivity and objectivity are everywhere and in everything exhibited and reacted. Let now this same line be divided into an infinite number of parts; in all the parts between *a-C* there would be relatively more subjectivity than in those between *C-b*. But in every single part of the line, thus divided, we shall at once find again one pole with relative subjectivity, *a* and an opposite with relative objectivity *b*, and between the two another point of indifference *c*, which would again be an expression for a whole—though here a relative whole, while in a former case it was absolute. Thus is represented the possibility or conceivability that the Absolute Substance, or the infinite, has become finite, still retaining its true nature, having the same characteristics. The process of becoming finite consists in a distinguishing of itself from itself, in an inherent activity of the infinite substance within itself, in which it always retains one and the same nature or essence."—Chalybaeus *Hist. Entwicklung* S. 226—227.

wards the aphoristic method; until at last, when none of these means could save him, historical narration and the stamp of authority were resorted to instead of proof and deduction.

Hegel, by a thorough study of the Kantian system and of the ancient philosophers, attained a high degree of logical culture, and was brought to grapple with the great problem of philosophy, as we have above given it. Of the modern systems, previously to Kant, he seems, so far as we may gather from his writings, to have thoroughly studied only that of Spinoza. He very soon saw the defects of Schelling's philosophizing; as is abundantly proved by the scorn and contempt with which he treats him and his followers in the energetic preface to his "*Phenomenology of the Spirit*." In this, his first larger work, he strives with great energy to gain the only position which could realize the promises of Schelling. He says, the Absolute is not to be regarded as a *Substance* but as a *Subject*; not as sunk into repose, but as living and active. It is endued with life, with the power of motion or development; this power he defines as its "*existence for itself*" (*Fürsichseyn*)—it does not merely exist, but it exists for itself, with a power of self-movement or production. This power it is by means of which the differences in things are produced out of the original substance; the living energy of the Absolute consists in this, that it produces from itself and establishes out of itself the differences, the opposing powers and forces, which exist in the universe; while at the same time it exists in them, and is conscious of being by itself, of retaining its own nature and characteristics, of not being lost or destroyed in the midst of all these developments. Thus its life is manifested in, or is, action; the Absolute is *Spirit*—not *Substance*. His system of philosophy consists, now, in the exhibition of this self-movement, self-development of the Absolute. But in order to do this, it is not enough to get up an enthusiasm for an Absolute Substance, as sudden and evanescent as the explosion of a pistol, nor to talk in high-sounding, prophetic language, nor to make use of old formulas, in the midst of which the system moves, as courtiers observe traditional etiquette. The whole power of severe thought must be applied; and the movement or development of the system is not the work of the system-maker alone, it is the natural and necessary development of the Absolute itself. A necessary constituent of the Absolute is this inherent power of self-movement, this is what is meant by and included in, the phrase, that it exists for itself, (*Fürsichseyn*). And all that the philosopher has to do is, as it

were, to stand by and see the process going on, and not to disturb it by any interference of his own notions and theories.

Hegel supposed that he had now found the position, which would enable him to develop the fundamental principle of philosophy into a complete system, and which made it an object of philosophical knowledge. He had found his principle, and he had found a moving power, a *nisus*, within it. But there was still wanting the *law* of its movements, the precise mode in which it was to advance. Schelling's pair of scales would not answer the purpose.

Kant and Fichte had looked much deeper than Schelling into the real nature of knowledge. Kant in the second part of his Criticism of the Pure Reason had given a summary of what he calls the Antinomies of the Reason, of the contradictory conclusions and judgments to which by our reasoning powers we may be compelled to come in respect to certain points of speculation. He enumerates these contradictions in respect to four points, and says that by starting from different data we may, by mere reason, prove exactly opposite things about them. They are in substance as follows: we can prove, that the world has a beginning in time and that it is restricted by space; and also that it has no beginning and no restrictions, but is infinite; that every composite substance in the world is made up of simple parts, and that it does not consist of simple parts; that there is causality of freedom as well as of nature, and that there is no freedom; that an absolutely necessary being must be assumed as the cause of the world, and that it need not be assumed. These contradictions Kant says do not belong to the laws of reason itself; but are owing to a wrong application of them: it is not the province of reason to understand the nature and essence of objects, but it is to be employed by the investigation of phenomena. Hegel, now, looked at these *Antinomies* as the necessary contradiction of the human understanding, when it reflects upon objects, and took the ground that this system of contradictions, of apparent opposition, is not confined to the points which Kant enumerates, but extends to the whole sphere of Philosophy; that opposing powers and agencies are everywhere at work, and are necessary in order to progress and life. But this conflict is not all, there is also a law of mediation. These antagonisms exist, but they are to be annulled. These conflicting and opposed principles are to be resolved into a higher unity. They exist for the understanding, but not for the reason. (The essence of these Antinomies, ex-

pressed in an abstract form, Hegel gives in a peculiar terminology, in the phrases, a thing existing of or by itself, (an sich) a thing existing for itself (für sich). Hegel finds these contradictions everywhere, but he also everywhere attempts to resolve them into a higher unity—to mediate between them. His whole system of logic is constructed with a view to this. Kant had discovered in the *Categories* the law of triplicity, and Fichte had made use of it, as a part of the method of philosophical investigations. In Hegel's system everything proceeds by triplicates. There is first a statement expressed in the positive form, then there follows the negation of the position; and then the two contradictory statements are resolved into a higher unity. And so the system proceeds from stage to stage, positive, negative and the union between the positive and the negative. This union becomes in its turn a positive, a negative is set over against it, and this new contradiction is resolved into another and higher unity. Each stage is higher and more comprehensive than the one which preceded it, since it contains the sum of all that has gone before. And this process is continued until the whole sphere of thought is exhausted—until the absolute has gone through all the stadia of its evolutions.

Hegel did not merely adopt the fundamental principle which Schelling had laid down, but he defined it with greater precision. With Schelling, Identity was an undefined term; Hegel, as we have seen, defined the *nature* of Identity. Schelling gives the fact of the identity of opposites; Hegel shows in what the identity consists. Wherever there is identity, he says, there is also difference. What is identical must develop itself into difference. Identity without difference cannot be even conceived, much less actually exist. By these further definitions of the fundamental principle of philosophy Hegel went beyond Schelling; but his advance was yet greater in his development of the principle into a scientific system, for which Schelling had not the logical culture nor the philosophical calmness. At the same time Hegel acknowledged the services of Kant and Fichte in respect to the *method* of philosophical investigation, and applied this method to the *principle* which Schelling had brought out; so that he neglected nothing which his predecessors had achieved. The principles which Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Spinoza had separately dwelt upon, he combined into one system. And he did this not by a mere external aggregation, but he found the central point in which all their views coincided, and presented them as members of one bo-

dy, as distinct parts of one fundamental conception. From the consciousness of having done this proceeded Hegel's peculiar views in respect to the Philosophy of History, and to the position of his own system in relation to all the antecedent systems. He considered his system as the product of the labor of his predecessors, as the result of all that had gone before. He looked upon the whole progress of philosophy as consecutive, so that all the successive systems formed at last only one great, all-comprehensive system. This was *his* system. He had found the centre of unity for them all. All that had gone before came to its culmination in his scheme. His was the Absolute Philosophy. It contained all that was true in all other systems. All other systems led to his.

In his first work of any extent, the *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, Hegel plants himself upon this position. He there goes through the various grades and stages of the mind from the lowest form of its manifestations up to the highest, from sensation to philosophy. The power of Hegel's mind is clearly seen in it. To its unobtrusive agency is to be ascribed much of the influence which the Hegelian system afterwards attained, when his method of philosophizing had broken through all barriers, and had been more perfectly carried out. But in this work, he is still struggling with his materials, and hence his mode of expression is harsh and awkward; so that in spite of the energy of his thoughts, the peculiarity of his system of philosophy, of his view of nature and mind, was not exhibited in its full clearness. Even his system of *Logic*, in which his principles were exhibited in their fullest development, failed to win the favor and sympathy of the public. It was in his lectures, especially at Berlin, as professor of Philosophy, that he obtained his greatest influence. He applied his system to all branches of knowledge. He lectured upon the Philosophy of Nature, upon Psychology, upon Art, upon Ethics, upon the History of Philosophy, upon the Philosophy of History, upon the Philosophy of Religion, and showed how his system could give a perfect form to all these sciences, could explain them all, and how it alone was able to achieve such a work. And never perhaps did any system of philosophy exert so wide an influence upon so many branches of science in so short a time. The Absolute Philosophy alone, it was said, was able to explain all other sciences; all other sciences were to be remoulded by it. It was able to explain the whole course of history, the whole progress of art, all the phenomena of the mind, all the facts and doctrines of revela-

tion. It was to give a new form to theology. It was the same thing in the sphere of speculation, which the Christian religion was in the sphere of faith.

Since this is a system of such lofty pretensions, since it professes to be able to include all science and art within its comprehensive principles, and to deduce all things from its fundamental conceptions by a necessary law, it may be a matter of some interest to give a concise analysis of his whole scheme, so as to see the mode in which Hegel attempts to accomplish this end.

The following outline is taken from an article in the German Conversations-Lexikon. It is an abridgment of a few of the sections in Hegel's *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. Though divested of some of the technicalities and terminology of the school, yet it has the inherent defect of all condensed statements, that it is stripped of the illustrations and amplifications contained in the original exposition, and of course is not so intelligible as the work itself. The translator has endeavored by a free paraphrase, and by incorporating additional matter from the original work of Hegel to bring the statements into as intelligible a shape as the nature of the English language will allow. He has, in short, endeavored to render it rather *ad sensum* than *ad verbum*. And though it may not all be perfectly intelligible, and though it may be thought wholly false, yet it is hoped that it will not be found to be a mere mass of absurdities, a mere collection of sounding words.

Hegel begins his view of Logic in the Encyclopaedia, by a preliminary discussion of the different positions and relations of thought, of man as a thinking being, to whatever may be the object of his thoughts, to all that is external and objective. This is what the author of the article in the Lexicon means by saying that the Logic, as it is contained in the Encyclopaedia is enriched by some preliminary views of the position of thought in relation to what is objective. Hegel's Logic, as contained in his separate work upon this subject, is not enriched by such a previous discussion.

Hegel divides the whole of philosophy into three parts, viz., Logic, Natural Philosophy and the Philosophy of the Spirit. These three are but different stadia or degrees of manifestation of one and the same idea. (Hegel defines the word *idea* to be what is true in and of itself, the entire correspondence or union between the notion of a thing and the thing as it really exists, between the conception and the object, the thing in its objective

existence.¹ The definition of *idea* and the definition of *truth* are with him one and the same thing. The idea is the same as what is elsewhere called the *Absolute*.) The first part of philosophy, *Logic*, is the science of this Absolute Idea, of what is really true, in its abstract character, as it exists in and for itself. Logic is not with Hegel the mere form of thinking, it is thought itself in all its forms and stages, from the simplest notions up to the most concrete and complex. The second part of his system comprises *Natural Philosophy*. Nature is a manifestation of the same Absolute Idea, but in a different form.² It is the same absolute substance, but existing materially, externally, instead of spiritually. The third part comprises the *Philosophy of Spirit*. This is the highest stage of the development of the Absolute Substance, or the absolute idea. It has here, so to speak, returned back from the material and external shape which it took in nature, and has become spiritual. As it existed in the realm of nature, being material and external, it was deprived of some of its true characteristics, it was in a foreign land, an estranged condition. But in the realm of spirit it re-assumes its true, its permanent, its real characteristics.

1. Hegel's system of *Logic* represents to us thought in its abstract form, the connection of all our ultimate ideas and conceptions with one another, arranged in a systematic manner, developed according to a fixed and strict law. His *Logic* embraces not only what we call logic, but also what we comprehend under metaphysics and ontology. The Absolute Substance or idea with which he starts is viewed throughout the *Logic*, as existing in a merely abstract form.

2. In the system of *Natural Philosophy*, the same Absolute Idea is viewed as existing in another form. The essence of nature consists in this, that it is the Absolute Idea existing in an external form; it has left its state of abstract existence, and become a different thing, become palpable, external, material. A necessary result of its existing in this material form is, that it has the appearance of having no permanent existence, that it is composed

¹ Vide Hegel's *Encyclopædie* § 213.

² Hegel ascribes the creation of nature to the free act, and, as he in one place has said, to the "goodness" of the absolute spirit, but yet in such a way as not to annul the pantheism of his system. Conf. Chalybäus, *Entwicklung der Philosophie von Kant bis Hegel*, p. 302. This work of Chalybäus contains the most intelligible view of German Philosophy that has been published. It was originally delivered as a series of lectures before an intelligent audience in Dresden.

of parts which may be separated from one another. We may say of anything in the world that it may exist, or that it may not; that is, it has no necessary existence. It is essential to the very conception of anything external and material, that it should be susceptible of division into separate parts, which have no necessary nor permanent existence. Hence nature, in its existence (*Daseyn*) does not manifest any freedom; there is nothing that can properly be called freedom in nature; we find indeed necessity and chance in the external world, but no freedom. Nature in itself considered, in its essence, in its idea, is indeed divine; but as it actually exists, it does not correspond with its idea. Since now there are eternal and necessary ideas in nature, and yet nature as it actually exists is ever changing, never fully realizing the ideas which are contained in it, it may be described as an enigma which is never solved, as containing a contradiction for which we have not the explanation. We may indeed admire in it the wisdom of God; but when we look at the matter aright, every mental conception, even the poorest of our imaginations, every sportive and chance mood of mind, every word which is uttered by human lips, does in fact contain more decisive ground of belief in the being of God, than any single object of nature. (And for this reason, because mind in any of its manifestations is higher and nobler than matter; because every word that is uttered by a human voice comes from a free moral agent, but in nature there is no freedom.) And even when man in the use of his freedom, of his power of choice, may go on to commit sin, this very state of sin, since only a free moral agent can come into it, is an infinitely higher one than the regular and orderly course of the stars, or the innocent life which the plants lead. Nature is to be looked upon as a system of successive stages, each one of which proceeds by necessity from the one that went before. But it is not true, as is often stated, that each stage is naturally generated from the one that preceded it, by any power which this previous stage has in and of itself to produce another; but it is generated by the Absolute Idea which passes through one stage to another, and is as it were the basis or soul of nature. All the substances we find in nature in a concrete form are made up of a collection of properties and qualities, which seem to be entirely distinct from one another, and are more or less indifferent to one another. (What inherent connection can be shown to exist between the color and the weight of any object?) And the simple substance or essence, which lies at the basis of these qualities which is the subject to which the properties are attached, seems

also to have no necessary connection with the properties themselves. Any accident or external influence may rob any piece of matter of most of its properties, (may change it from hard to soft, from one color to another, from heavy to light, etc.). Here we see the impotence of nature, as compared with mind or spirit. A spiritual being or substance retains its attributes always, remains true to the statements and definitions we may give respecting it; but it is not so with nature. Its forms and states are ever changing, there is in it no power to determine and shape and keep things in full accordance with the idea that lies at their basis. Genera and species run into one another so that it is hardly possible to define their boundaries.

The Absolute Idea is developed in nature in three forms, which constitute three distinct sciences, the science of Mechanics, the science of Physics, and the science of Organized Bodies. 1. *Mechanics*—this includes space and time, matter and motion. The peculiarity of what belongs to this science is, that all its different parts are distinct from one another, are susceptible of division into infinitely small parts, (e. g. one point of space, or time, or matter is distinct from every other, and space, time, and matter may be considered as infinitely divisible). Another peculiarity of this science is that its objects do not exist in any definite form, there is no unity of form. This unity of form, which exists in nature is, so far as this part of nature is concerned as yet only an ideal, something to be looked for elsewhere than in the science of Mechanics.¹ 2. This unity of form is found in the second part of natural science, viz. in the science of *Physics*. The peculiarity, the defining characteristic of this branch of nature is, that the Absolute Idea is here resolved into single and individual bodies or things. Everything that has a definite form belongs to it, and in this consists its distinction from the previous stage. This science comprises all those material bodies, which have definite properties, and which exist distinct and separate from one another—in short all those things which have an individual existence, all "*individualities*."² These are comprehended under the head of Physics. These individual bodies are arranged in three classes.³ The first class comprises those in which the differences of form have no relation to one another, are independent in respect to each other. These are of three kinds; *a.* the comparatively free physical bodies, the light, the bodies which are opposed to

¹ Conf. Hegel's Encyclopædia, 2d Part, Ed. 1842, § 253.

² *Ibid.* § 272.

³ Conf. Hegel, *ubi supra*, § 273.

or set over against one another, the sun, the planets, the moon, the comets; *b.* the four elements; *c.* the meteorological processes.¹ The second class comprises those in which the individual bodies are in opposition to one another. Under this head are considered, specific gravity, cohesion, sound and caloric.² The third class comprises those in which the individual body, "*the individuality*" has merged in itself all differences of form. Under this class come shape (as distinguished from mere form), the specific properties of bodies, and the chemical processes. 3. The third class of the natural sciences is that of Organized Bodies. The distinguishing characteristic of this sphere of nature is, that in it, while differences of form really exist, they are yet brought into an organized unity, into a unity corresponding with the idea; the organism controls all the separate parts, they are under an organic law.³ All that is organized is not a mere object, but it is a subject also, having in some degree an existence and life of its own, and assimilating foreign things into harmony with its organic structure. To this sphere belong, Geology, Vegetable Nature and Animal Organization.

3. The third part of philosophy is, the Philosophy of Mind or Spirit. The knowledge of Mind or Spirit is the highest and most difficult part of philosophy. The injunction "*Know thyself*" does not signify merely a knowledge of the particular qualities, character, inclinations and weaknesses of the individual, but it refers to the knowledge of what is really true and abiding in man, of what is true in and of itself, of the essential traits of the spirit.⁴

Spirit, mind, has for us as we are placed in the world, or as our minds are developed in the world, nature for its basis; nature comes before spirit. But when we look at spirit in the most general point of view, we see that that must have come before nature, that spirit was first, and then nature. And when we look at nature in its true character, it will be found that it contains a kind of prophecy or anticipation of something more than what is merely material, that is, of what is spiritual; so that we may say, the truth of nature is spirit. The Absolute Idea though first developed in the form of nature, cannot be content with this, but must

¹ Ibid § 274—289.

² Ibid § 290—307.

³ "Every living being," says Cuvier, "forms a whole, a single and compact system, all the parts of which correspond to one another, and by their reciprocal action contribute to and bear upon the same end. No one of these parts can be changed without a change of the others, and therefore every part taken alone points to and gives all the others."

⁴ Conf. Hegel Encycl. § 377.

manifest itself also as spirit. Here is its fullest manifestation. Nature is left behind. Spirit shows itself to be the Absolute Idea, existing *for itself*—not as in nature, existing for something else besides itself. Thus man, so far as he is a spiritual being, brings all other things into relation with himself, he considers himself in some sort as the centre of them, he has a certain independent existence of his own, he is conscious that as a spiritual being he exists *for himself*. This could not be said of anything material, or of any brute. There is yet another characteristic of spirit, that in it object and subject become one, are identical. A spirit is both an object and a subject, and in this, too, it differs from anything material. Nature is something merely objective, spirit is subjective as well as objective. In nature, the notion which lies at its basis assumes only an objective form, in spirit it becomes also subjective. Hence the essence of spirit is, that its acts always take the form of freedom. All that is done by spirit is free. Hence it *can* abstract itself from all that is external, from all that affects it in the external world, from all sense of existence in any one point of space or moment of time. Hence, too, every spirit has the consciousness of being an individual, existing for itself, having rights and powers of its own. In consequence of this another distinguishing trait of spirit is, that it must manifest itself. Since spirit must manifest or reveal itself, it follows that the world or nature must be looked upon as constituted and established by spirit, that it is a manifestation of the Absolute Spirit.

The highest and complete definition of the Absolute is, that it is spirit. To find this definition and to understand its meaning has been the tendency of all civilization and of all philosophy. All religion and science have pressed upon this point; the history of the world can be understood only by this pressure. The word and the notion of spirit were early found. The substance of the Christian religion is that it reveals God as a Spirit. The office of philosophy is to seek to understand what spirit is.¹

There are three stages in the development of spirit, first as subjective spirit, then as objective spirit, and lastly as absolute spirit.

I. *Subjective Spirit*; by this is meant spirit considered in itself, in its internal relations and characteristics; what is generally embraced under the head of Mental Philosophy, the faculties and powers and states of the human mind. There are here three distinct branches, Anthropology, the Phenomenology of Mind, and

¹ Hegel Encycl. § 384.

Psychology. A. *Anthropology*; here the soul of man is viewed in its connection with nature, in its first and lowest stages of development. Under this head are considered the relation between body and soul, the qualities which the soul has in consequence of its connection with the world, the different races of mankind, the different periods of life, sensation, the state of dreaming, animal magnetism,¹ the natural feeling of distinct personal existence, and habit, which has been well called a second nature. (§ 410 Encycl.) B. The second manifestation of the subjective spirit is included in what Hegel calls the *Phenomenology of Mind*. Here the whole doctrine of human consciousness is discussed. This differs from the previous stage in that spirit is here considered as existing for itself, reflecting upon itself. This is a higher state than that in which it is connected with the natural world. The mind is viewed in all the different stages of its consciousness. The three stages given are, consciousness, self-consciousness and reason. (Encycl. § 413—439.) C. *Psychology*—investigates the powers, the general modes in which spirit acts as such. (§ 440.) Spirit is here viewed as determining itself in itself. The acts considered are proper spiritual acts. That which is truly spiritual is the subject and the centre of unity of all the powers and faculties. There are three stages of development, which spirit here makes, which give a threefold division of Psychology: they are what Hegel calls the *theoretical*, the *practical*, and the *free spirit*. a. By *theoretical spirit* is meant nearly the same as by the word intellect: it includes man as an intellectual being, as a being who *knows*; it is the reason, which knows itself to be reason. The division generally made, of man's mind into so-called powers or faculties, is a mere act of our own understandings to which nothing perfectly corresponding can be found in the mind itself. The mind is represented too much as a mere aggregate, without any internal union, as a sort of collection of powers bound together like a piece of mechanism or like the bones of the body. The lowest form in which spirit manifests itself is that of *feeling*, a merely subjective state, in which the personal emotion absorbs the whole mind, and one does not discriminate in respect to the true nature of what has caused the emotion. From feeling as the lowest, the powers of the mind ascend in the following order, in-

¹ Hegel, while he does not deny some of the facts of Animal Magnetism, represents them as belonging to the lower powers of man's soul. He has written energetically and sarcastically against the claims of Magnetism to a higher degree and kind of knowledge.

tuition (*Anschauung*), the power by which we bring things in distinct vision before the mind (*Vorstellung*), recollection, imagination, memory, and lastly thought. Thought, that which should really be called such, is not our mere notion of a thing, but is the thing itself in its essential characteristics. It is the identity of the subjective and the objective. Thought is the substance of everything. Whatever is thought truly exists; and whatever exists, really exists only so far as it is thought. Thought is free, and thought is universal.¹ It manifests itself in three forms, as understanding, as judgment, and as reason. So far as thought is free, or what we think about is free, so far there is in it an element of the will. And this leads us to the second part of Psychology which is, *b.* what is called the *practical spirit*, or in other words, the *will*. The definition of will is, that it is free. It is called the practical spirit, because it has reference to the deeds and duties of man as a moral being. It manifests itself first of all in the feeling of moral obligation, of right and of duty. But it is not mere feeling, mere private, subjective emotion. We must also look at the rational grounds of things. It is nothing less than an absurdity to endeavor to exclude thought and intellect, from our morality and our religion. (§ 469). Evil, sin, which is considered under the head of will, is defined as the contrast between what we are and what we should be. Our duties come under the head of will; here are considered our natural impulses, inclinations and passions, in their true moral character and bearings. The last part of Psychology is, *c. the free spirit*. This is the union of the two former parts of psychology, of the theoretical with the practical, of the intelligence with the will. The true idea of freedom came into the world with Christianity. Whole regions of the world, Africa and the East, have never had this idea, and do not now have it. The Greeks and the Romans, Plato and Aristotle and even the Stoics had it not. But in Christianity it exists in its true character, viz.—that man as such is of an *infinite* value, since he is the object and end of the love of God; his highest and absolute relation is to God as a spirit; this spirit takes up its abode in him, and so brings him to the highest freedom.²

¹ This is one of the positions of the Hegelian philosophy which has met with the most opposition. It assumes that everything can be thought, can be understood; and that what cannot be understood has no real existence. And it comes at last to this—that what a Hegelian understands is true as he understands it; and what he does not understand is not true.

² The whole view given of this part of Hegel's system in the original article

II. *Objective Spirit.* By this is meant that the spirit manifests itself in an outward form, in external relations and organizations. It is not mind in itself considered (as above), but mind in its external manifestations,—it is spirit become objective. It produces a world of its own, in which freedom and necessity are woven together. (Encycl. † 385.) We have seen above that the highest form of the subjective spirit was free will. It is this free will manifesting itself in all the relations of life, which is now to be considered. There are three chief ways in which it shows itself, which respectively compose, A) the system of the rights of man or law, B) the system of subjective or private morality or *morals*, C) the system of public morality which is the union of the other two, the realization of right and law in the world, or *Ethics*. (The English language has no definite terms to express the difference between the German *Moralität* and *Sittlichkeit*; but it may be allowed to make some such distinction between the two words, *morals* and *ethics*). In the science of ethics is exhibited the consummation of the objective spirit. The Absolute Substance, which is the basis of all things, here becomes perfectly free. Its highest manifestation is in what we call the spirit of a people. The full spirit of a people is made up of three elements, family, civil society, and the State. The history of each single State is connected with and runs into the history of the world. The same spirit is here manifested, but in a wider sphere, and is called the spirit of the world, that which is contained in universal history. The spirit of any single people is only one stage in the development of this general spirit of the world; one people can only perform one act in the great drama.

III. *The Absolute Spirit.* This is spirit in its absolute and unlimited manifestations, not restricted by the boundaries of nations or of the world. It is the perfect union between the two preceding stages, between the subjective and objective spirit, as we have before considered them. It is spirit in its absolute truth, where the idea and the reality become one. It is the one universal Substance in a perfectly spiritual form. It is the Absolute Idea known and understood. The three stages of its development are A) Art, B) Revealed Religion, C) Philosophy. Philosophy,

in the *Lexicon* is exceedingly confused. The numbers and divisions are in several cases omitted and in some misplaced. All this is manifest at the first glance by comparing it with Hegel's *Encyclopaedia*. Accordingly here and elsewhere much has been taken from the work of Hegel in order to have the representation as correct as possible.

in the system of Hegel, is the highest state to which the consciousness of man can be brought. It is not merely the union of art and religion, but it is this union elevated to the state of self-conscious thought. The true notion of philosophy is, that it is the Absolute Idea which has become conscious of itself. In nature it exists unconsciously, unthought. In spirit it both exists and is the object of thought. It is the truth which knows itself to be the truth. Philosophy differs from logic in this respect, that logic is made up of abstract conceptions, of universal notions, but existing only as vague and barren generalities. Philosophy has the same ideas, the same universal truths; but in a living form as they have been manifested and revealed in the whole realm of nature, and in all the actual manifestations of spirit. It has the same general truths, but it has tested them and found them to hold good and true in their application to the worlds of matter and of mind. But still both in nature and in spirit only these same universal truths were found, which made up the substance of the logic; and so the whole course of development having been gone through with, we are brought back again to the point from which we started; and the result of philosophy is to bring us back again to the truths of logic. Thus is the circle of science completed; the beginning and the end unite.

The acuteness and iron consistency with which Hegel elaborated into his system all the chief problems of philosophy are worthy of admiration. There has probably never been a system which can be compared with it in comprehensiveness; none which displays so much art and skill in binding together all the separate parts. Many of his transitions from one part to another are made with the greatest skill, but they do not always abide the test of severe examination. Several of his disciples, have changed the order of development in some important particulars, and this is fatal to the claims of his system. (Religious men will find themselves repelled by his depreciation of every form of holding truth excepting the philosophical form. Faith is with him a lower stage of development than philosophy. God as a personal being is lost in the notion of the Universal Substance and the Absolute Idea.) The language of Hegel in exhibiting his views is harsh; the construction of his sentences, as all acknowledge, is hard and not seldom incorrect. He uses many terms in new and unusual significations; and he has been at little pains to define his words. The unintelligibility of his writings has often given occasion to his opponents to cite the pro-

verb, the man that does not think clearly will not write clearly. To this his friends and disciples reply, coldness, hardness and weight are properties of a precious stone.

But while this system endeavored to substantiate its claims to universal reception and authority, by applying its principles and laws to all departments of science ; it was this very application which produced the reaction against it. Its pretensions were not found to be realized. Especially was this the case in the domain of theology. Very few theologians embraced it. Many of those who did so were soon carried far away from the positive doctrines of Christianity. And not only was it found inadequate to solve the great problems of religion, of history and of the human mind ; but there was another circumstance which contributed to stay its course. It called men to severe thought. It sharpened their faculties. It made them more observant of themselves ; it brought forward more distinctly the great subjects of speculation. And so in proportion as these questions were weighed, and as the powers of the mind were sharpened and enlarged, it came to be distinctly felt, that a pantheistic scheme was not only irreconcilable with Christianity, but was unable to satisfy the consciousness of the modern world. The world had outgrown such a system. Much as the Pantheism of Hegel differs from and as a philosophical scheme is superior to the ruder forms of this theory in earlier times ; yet in his whole system there is wanting the appreciation of freedom, sympathy with and understanding of human nature, the personal and ethical elements of modern times. In one word, it is the principle of freedom which is neglected by Hegel, and which will be the means of the overthrow of his system. The philosophical system which shall next succeed must acknowledge that the idea of freedom is at the basis of the existence of the world, that by it all is upheld and carried onward, that the end of religion and of religious culture is to kindle and to feed the flame of true freedom in all minds, that the aim of the State is and must be to make every one of its members a free man, having individuality of character ; that the concrete sciences should be only the organs and instruments of freedom, and that art should be the celebration of its apotheosis. This too is the goal which philosophy is to strive to reach. Everywhere there are intimations of it. With greater or less clearness it is felt and expressed in our whole recent literature, in almost all the works on philosophy, theology and history which are daily issuing from the press. We need only the

watch-word which shall loose the bonds of freedom, and call forth its shape in ever blooming youth.

We have thus endeavored to present an outline of the stadia through which philosophy has passed during the last fifty years. We have seen the part which Schelling had in the formation of its system; and in what way Hegel understood and applied the principle which lay at the basis of Schelling's scheme. We have also stated that the view of nature and of spirit which is contained in this principle is unable to satisfy the wants of present times, and that all which philosophy has hitherto achieved is only the porch to the temple of moral freedom which must yet be erected.

How stands it now with Schelling's reappearance upon the stage, in his new appointment as professor at Berlin? We will first look at the circumstances under which he comes, and then see whether the principles of his present philosophy will be likely to satisfy the demands of the age.

The school of Hegel, whose chief centre was at Berlin, have long been of the opinion that the essential principles of philosophy have been already discovered and elucidated, and that all that remains is to apply them to all other departments of science. They supposed that the foundations of their supremacy over the whole realm of mind had been laid; that their system was destined to rule the world. They had become over-confident in consequence of the favor shown them by the Prussian Ministry of State. Now they see themselves suddenly assailed in the very heart of their own land, by a man whom they believed that they had long since overcome. Their very existence is threatened. The enemy within the walls of the metropolis proclaims, as in a manifesto, the last and great catastrophe of philosophy, by which its fate is to be forever decided. The highest authority in the State now extends to him its sympathy and protection as once it did to Hegel. It needs Hegel's school no longer, its work is done, it is to be set aside, to be cut out like a cancer. Therefore this school is embittered. It fights for life or death. It attacks the State. It fears a reaction, a restitution of principles it imagined to have been long since exploded. The minister of State, von Altenstein, unquestionably made a bold misstep when he gave such encouragement to the school of Hegel. This can only be explained on the supposition that he looked only at the glittering and deceptive side of the scheme, at its strict and apparently most scientific method, by which minds were aroused to self-examination and severe thought; at its pretensions to being a most Chris-

tian philosophy, to elevating Christianity from the sphere of mere notions and opinions into the sphere of what it called the triune idea; at its exhibition of the State, and particularly of the Prussian State, as perfectly conformed to the highest ethical conceptions and to the divine will. According to Hegel's principle "*what is actual is also rational*," whatever is, is reasonable, and the Prussian State being actual, was called the perfection of reason. The great defects of the system were veiled. The government did not see that the fruit of this tree of knowledge was deadly. It was waked up from its deception only when the poison began to penetrate into the organism of the State, when teachers of religion came who had no religion, and who concealed from their congregations their real sentiments; when officers of State were produced who were very well acquainted with Hegel's logic, but wholly unacquainted with State matters and averse to all the details of business; and especially when there came young politicians who applied the new philosophy to the State in a somewhat different fashion, who said "that whatever was actual was also reasonable," and if a republic should only actually exist, it would of course be reasonable. And in fact in Hegel's scheme the monarch in a constitutional State is nothing more than the dot over the letter *i*: and the young liberals thought that the dot might as well be left out, *z*. Hegel had clothed his ideas in a hard and abstruse form so that few could follow him. He was not unaware of the revolutionary tendencies of his system; but he had reverence for positive institutions. He would not rob men of everything. But some of the logical results of his system became apparent when the "*German Annals*" (*Deutsche Jahrbücher*) at Halle became the organ of some of the perverse and enthusiastic disciples of this school, in which they spoke out without reserve all that they had in their hearts. They did not conceal their design of undermining all that at present was established, so that a *young and new Germany* might be formed on the ruins. L. Feuerbach and Bruno Bauer were the boldest in avowing this tendency in religious matters. They proclaimed open war against Christianity and religion. "Christianity is to *them* only a figure of speech. Religion is contrary to the true nature of man; its mother is the night. The existence of God is a chimera." Societies were formed which repudiated Christianity and religion. Emancipated humanity was to find its joys in sensual lust; it was no longer to be frightened by the ghost of a government or by the dark future. All this reminds us of a declaration of Count Mira-

bean: "Nothing has been done for the revolution, so long as France is not unchristianized." Theology was transformed into Anthropology. The Universities were attacked, for here authority still prevailed. The Prussian government was spared so long as it remained a quiet spectator. But as soon as it began to oppose their revolutionary and blasphemous sentiments, their weapons were turned against it. They accused it of suppressing freedom of mind, of love for a dead orthodoxy, of pietism, of despotism. And in all these accusations Schelling has freely shared, because he was avowedly called to Berlin as the opponent of the Hegelian scheme, which had borne such bitter fruits. (It ought in justice to be stated that it is only a small faction of the Hegelian school which has run to these extremes;¹ and that Hegel himself never would have countenanced them. Whether his system logically leads to these results is a different question. Some of his most logical followers deny that it does. There are conservatives both in church and State who are also Hegelians.)

According to the specimens we have hitherto had, it is the intention of Schelling, in what he now calls the *Positive Philosophy*, not only to give a Philosophy of Revelation, of the Trinity, of the Fall and of Redemption, but also a Somatology and a doctrine of Aeons in the way of the Gnostics, and that too without giving up his system of Absolute Identity and his Natural Philosophy. He intends then not merely to unite what is incompatible, realize what has been held to be impossible, but to carry back philosophy far behind the Reformation to the fantastic doctrines of the Gnostics and the dark labyrinth of scholastic dialectics. In the metropolis of German philosophy the fate of German philosophy is to be decided, and by *him*. It is not then a mere question of the position of philosophy in respect to the Prussian State, but it embraces matters that concern the whole German fatherland, the destiny of philosophy itself, for which there is no legislative metropolis, since often according to the testimony of history great things have proceeded from small cities. In this point of view the opposition which has been raised against Schelling from various quarters is a cheering sign. It has indeed chiefly proceeded from the school of Hegel, and this party seems to know no alternative than, Schelling or Hegel; as though where Schelling is wrong, Hegel must be right, and no third term were conceivable.

Are the principles of Schelling's present system adapted to

¹ Vide *Bibl. Sacra and Theol. Rev.* Vol. I. pp. 211, 212.

satisfy the demands of the age? His very first lecture in Berlin, in spite of the great promises which it made, sufficiently told us what was to be expected from the new science which was "to carry human consciousness beyond its present boundaries." No one who was well acquainted with the previous progress of philosophy, could for a moment cherish the hope that Schelling was fitted to realize the promises he so profusely made. To do this he must have been born anew, and gone through a new culture, and then he would not have clung so tenaciously to the discoveries of his youth. He adheres to these. Upon his pair of scales he makes again the division into positive and negative philosophy. Of the latter, the negative philosophy, he has already given the outlines in the noted preface to the German translation of Cousin's Philosophical Fragments. In this preface he broke the silence of many years, and spoke with contempt of Hegel's system and pretensions. Commenting upon the mode in which Hegel declares that he has gone beyond and annulled the theory of Spinoza, Schelling says that he had long since done the same. Spinoza maintains, he asserts, that all things proceed from the nature of the Absolute Substance (this Absolute Substance is that which it is absolutely impossible not to think of,¹) with a necessity as inevitable, as from the nature of the triangle it follows that its angles are together equal to two right-angles. We see here that he does not yet understand the real principle of movement in the system of Spinoza, on which account he had before compared it with the statue of Pygmalion which became living only when the fire of love quickened it. His own philosophy, he adds, "in its infinite subject-object includes a principle of necessary progress or movement. And it proceeds thus. The Absolute Subject from the necessity of its nature becomes Object, but from every objective state it issues victorious and returns back again into a higher state, or (using the word in its mathematical sense) a higher power of subjectivity, until after exhausting its whole possibility of becoming objective, it remains the Infinite Subject, victorious over all. This Subject which at last remains is wholly different from

¹ The phraseology of Schelling in respect to this is peculiar. The Absolute Substance is "das nicht Nicht-zu-denkende," literally, is that which "cannot not-be-thought," which we are absolutely obliged to think of, if we think at all. That is, there is something which is the ground of all our special thoughts, without which all our notions and ideas have no basis or connection, which is absolutely essential to thinking. If one should try not to think, he would still think of this—it cannot not-be-thought.

the first merely intellectual Subject, since it has ascended from every state of objectivity, to a higher an intenser subjectivity, and at the same time has drawn into itself, has made its own all that actually exists." Here is the one arm of the lever, and it forms his negative philosophy. The other arm, the positive philosophy, that is, the construction of history according to his views, is to go through a similar process of the same elements or powers, only in another sense. The outlines of this positive philosophy we already have in the published works of Schelling, especially in his System of Transcendental Idealism, his Lectures upon Academic Studies, his work on Philosophy and Religion, and in the essay upon Human Freedom, to which his book against Jacobi, the "Denkmal," may be taken as a supplement. We think then that we are warranted in saying that Schelling has not only not given a new science which transcends all previous systems and "the present bounds of human thought," but that he has not even gone beyond the position of his earlier system.

The utmost which he could, in such a conjuncture, be expected to accomplish was to have given a logical exhibition of his own philosophy. But apart from the consideration, that he does not possess the logical culture and the philosophical calmness which such a task would have demanded, he would have been obliged in order to accomplish this object to go through with that re-casting of his whole scheme, which Hegel had already effected, and to have conceded the merits and consistency of the Hegelian system. For the latter is only the philosophy of Schelling and Spinoza carried out to its logical results; it is the elaboration and development of all that lay concealed in the fundamental principle of this school. It has done more than this; by carrying the principle to its last results it has at the same time laid the foundation for its overthrow. It has given us the principle in a double shape, in its abstract form in the system of logic, and in its concrete form in its application to all the other departments of science. Its inadequacy to solve the problems which the other sciences present gives us the assurance that it must be superseded by another and better system.

Schelling, then, with his new discoveries has at any rate come *post festum*: for the progress of the human mind has already carried it beyond the boundaries of the principle which he looks upon as essential, and as the means of enlarging the domain of thought. In his new researches and studies he may have attained to a broader and deeper insight into the principles

of his own philosophy; those who were educated in the times in which he first came upon the stage, when his renown was in its fullest bloom; and those who are still to be made acquainted with the speculative questions and problems which have been agitated during the last fifty years, may find some enjoyment and satisfaction in the new theories of Schelling. But the problems of the present age cannot be solved, the interest of present times cannot be permanently attracted, by the new shape in which his system is to appear. Yet even for the present age his reëpearance upon the stage will not be fruitless; for the history of the past teaches us what the future demands, what the present ought to accomplish. Our gaze must be directed to the guidance of the unseen hand in history, if we would find the path and the means of our future spiritual progress. The history of the last fifty years—and Schelling's reëpearance will again turn our attention to them—contains the materials out of which the present age is to construct its peculiar system of philosophy. Kant laid the corner-stone, his successors have brought together the quarried blocks of marble. Hail to the men of German science who shall rear the temple of Freedom!

ARTICLE IV.

THE NATURE OF OUR LORD'S RESURRECTION-BODY.

By E. Robinson, Prof. in Union Theol. Seminary, New York.

THE inquiry respecting the nature of our Lord's resurrection-body has at the present day an interest, not only in itself considered, but also from its near relation to several other questions just now before the public mind. The raising up of Jesus is every where spoken of as the "first fruits" of the resurrection from the dead,—as the earnest and pledge and pattern of the future resurrection of the saints.¹ If then we can ascertain the character and circumstances of this great fact in our Lord's history, it may be expected to afford us some aid in obtaining a more clear and defi-

¹ 1 Cor. 15: 12—23. Col. 1: 18.—Rom. 6: 5, 8. 1 Cor. 6: 14. 2 Cor. 4: 14. Phil. 3: 10, 11. 1 Pet. 1: 21.