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THE RELATIONS  
OF  
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY;

An Address

BEFORE THE

PORTER RHETORICAL SOCIETY OF ANDOVER  
THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY,

AT ITS ANNIVERSARY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1849.

BY

PROFESSOR HENRY B. SMITH,

AMHERST COLLEGE, MASS.

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## ADDRESS.\*

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GENTLEMEN—

We meet as believers, as students, perhaps as teachers of the Christian faith. We are rationally convinced that in Christianity is the highest truth, and that in the orthodox system, which has formed the substance of Christianity through its advancing and victorious centuries, we have the best human exposition of the Divine revelation. In proportion, then, to our love for this system, and to our love of all truth, will be the depth of our interest in the assaults made on our faith, whether by depraved passions or by elevated intellects.

No man who loves the Christian faith as it ought to be loved, no man who is alive to the spirit of the times in which he lives, as every man ought to be alive, can have failed to feel, to see, or to forebode the coming of a conflict between the mightiest powers that sway the destiny of man. There may, indeed, be those to whom, through grace, it is given, in the ripeness of an impregnable conviction, or in what Milton calls the "undeflowered and unblemishable" simplicity of a guileless and unquestioning faith, to live in unruffled serenity; ever to see the guiding star, and never to feel the insurgent billows. Blessed are they in the repose of their faith; intolerant of the spirit of the hour, because conscious of having the truth which is eternal. But most of us, if not ourselves assailed by doubts or if through Divine love delivered from their thralldom, cannot fail to see the ravages they are making upon others, and minds, too, of noble as well as of ignoble mould and temper.

\* The form of the spoken address is retained in this paper, because a change in this respect would demand a change in the whole structure and arrangement of the discussion. The tone of the piece was necessarily kept rather popular than scientific. The exigencies of the occasion must be the author's plea for the slight notice given to many important points, which must needs be introduced, though they could not be formally debated.

We see the orthodox system, and Christianity itself, superseded by ethical, by social, and by metaphysical systems—we see it losing not only its traditionary, but also its intellectual hold, over many a sincere mind. Its sacred language is converted to profane and philosophic use. Its venerable symbols, the lawful heritage of the church, won by ages of conflict, are made to yield a new sense. Social reforms are made the media of indirect, when not of open attack. Each new science puts in its claim to modify some part of the sacred record. Our American propensity to submit all opinions to new examination, and all institutions to new experiment, favours such tendencies. The current English philosophy, when it does not pass Christianity wholly by, pays it but a distant reverence; the French philosophy is at the best vague in its admiration. The German speculations threaten its annihilation. Many who do not definitely doubt, are still half conscious of

That first slight swerving of the heart,  
Which words are powerless to express.

Christianity is to them no longer the sun which rules the day, revealing all things in their true light, and guiding man through the waking hours of his hard and varied toil; but like the paler moon it comes, when at all, in borrowed brightness, clothing all objects in an uncertain light, admired by the more susceptible, and having for its chief office to guard the hours of our repose. As the ardent and versatile Lamennais has represented it, before the intellect and science of the age, our faith is now arraigned, as was once its regal Founder before the representative of the mightiest power of ancient times; and it is met on all sides by the question—Art thou a king? And how shall it show that it can really respond, I am the king of truth; in me is the highest truth, the wise philosophy?

The subject to which we are thus led, the relations of faith and philosophy, is one which lies at the heart of all the questions of our times, and forms their sum and strength, their “pith and puissance.” Let me then ask your sympathy in the boldness, if not your approbation of the wisdom of the attempt to unfold the characteristics and the true relations of faith and philosophy. Let me hope that our faith receive no detriment,

even if your reason receive no instruction; and if the hand fail of its steadiness, still believe that the heart was right.

It is proposed to conduct the discussion by first describing the characteristics of faith and philosophy; then, by showing their opposition; next, by inquiring whether they are really exclusive of each other; and if this should seem not to be the case, by stating, in conclusion, what we conceive to be their relative position, and the rightful claims of each.

I. Faith, in its widest usage, designates a conviction in the reality of things unseen and eternal; in a more religious sense, it is trust in God and God's Word; in a more specific and theological meaning, it embraces the articles of belief drawn out into a definite system; in its most specific and evangelical sense, it denotes that full reliance upon Christ, by which we become partakers of the salvation which he alone has purchased for the human race.

In all these senses, excepting the first, it has certain marked traits by which it is distinguished from philosophy. It rests upon authority, upon good, upon the highest authority, but still upon authority—confirmed indeed by experience, but it is the authority, and not the experience, which is ultimate and supreme. That authority is divine and decisive; it is the very Word of God recorded in the Scriptures. As face answers to face in a glass, so does faith to the Bible, which it receives both in history and in doctrine; and it is not so anxious to harmonise the parts as to imbibe the whole. It connects all things directly with the providence of God; to this it is ever submissive. It is content with miracles, and it accepts mysteries; it says, God alone is wise; here we see as through a glass, darkly; there we shall know as we are known. With the scholastic it has sometimes been willing to say, "I believe, because it is impossible;" or, with Lord Bacon, "By how much any divine mystery is revolting and incredible, so much the more honour do I render to God in believing it; and so much the nobler is the victory of our faith." In such self-forgetful trust it finds, too, a deep delight, as well as a sure support. In Scripture and in prayer, there are rivers of pleasure, fountains

which never fail, peace unutterable. Unregenerate is the heart that has never known such moods; unsanctified the soul that does not ever sink to its rest upon them. All doubt is merged in this exulting confidence; it flits only over its surface, as the breeze sweeps the luxuriant field of grain; nay, it may but serve to quicken faith with a sublimer energy, to add volume and exhilaration to its deep-felt joy. And as doubt does not enfeeble, so danger does not awe it; for Omnipotence is with it. In death also it may delight, for it will then be delivered from sin, its only real enemy; it will be wholly sanctified, its only real good; and through eternity it will ever behold the face of Him, with whom every fibre of the soul's inmost life is intertwined.

Such is faith; it is called a life, and it is worthy of the name of life, it is so full and satisfying. The man who has it would as soon doubt whether his body were animated by the life of nature, when he is conscious of the movements of its muscles in their most strenuous efforts, and of the full delights of nervous sensation, as he would doubt whether his soul were a partaker of spiritual life, when its powers are expanded to their utmost intensity of action and of blessedness, by the gracious truths which centre in the person of our Lord.

Turn we now to philosophy. This is the product of human thought, acting upon the data given by the world without or the world within, and eliciting from these data principles, laws, and system. It is not the whole of human knowledge, but a special mode of that knowledge, the knowing things rationally; the knowing them in their ideas, their causes, their successions, and their ends. Common experience gives us things in their isolation and independence; philosophy in their similarity, harmony, and unity. It starts with facts, but with them abides not; it seeks for law, for all law, for the laws of matter, of mind, and of the universe. It demands necessary truth, eternal and immutable laws; by these it judges all things, and a severe logic is the instrument by which the test is applied. It does not like exceptions, it is intolerant of mysteries, it abhors contradictions. It strives to account for things, for all things. It seeks a harmonious whole. It may begin with wonder, as both Plato and Aristotle taught; but it ends in system, as both



Plato and Aristotle have exemplified. And in proportion to the comprehensiveness, consistency, and exactitude of the system, is the aspiration of the philosophic intellect satisfied. What faith is to the believer, that, as has been said, his system is apt to become to the philosopher. He exults in it with a keen intellectual delight. The laws of nature become to him the elder oracles, which have a voice to him that questions them, though silent to all others; which are ever profound, and ever present. In the calm and sure order, the unwearied and inflexible processes, the successive developments of nature and of the race, in the unseen yet irresistible laws of being and of motion, many a philosopher finds all his ideal realised; he calls this system of things infinite and divine; loving law, he forgets the source of its energy; resting in his system, he thinks not of God.

So diverse are faith and philosophy. The one is a simple act of a trust; the other a reflective process; the one rests in facts and persons, the other in law and system. The former says, I must believe in order to know; the latter, I must know in order to believe; and then it not seldom adds, there is no need of believing. This says, It is so, using the language of authority; that asks, How is it so? using the language of inquiry. Revelation is the boast of faith, reason of philosophy. The latter in second causes forgets the first, the former would even abolish the second, that it might magnify the great First Cause. Philosophy ignores Providence so long as it can find a law; to the eye of faith, even miracles are a welcome evidence of the personal energy of God, breaking in with wise design, upon the too fixed order of a sinful world. The former would rather confess ignorance than belief; the latter, though ignorant, ever trusts. Prayer is the delight of the one, the enigma of the other. In reading the passage: "He that hath the Son, hath life;" philosophy asks, Who is the Son? what is his relation to the Father? is it inherent, or in the manifestation alone? what is this life? is it figurative or essential? while faith welcomes the inspired words with glad assent, they are the very words it needs, its heart is attuned to their gracious import. The one knows no love too great for Jesus, the other is willing to make him a partaker even of human sinfulness, that it may be

exalted above the necessity of trusting in him. And, to sum up all in a word, faith sees God everywhere, especially in the Scriptures, while philosophy, so long as it can find law and system, asks not for God. Law is the word of the one, God of the other; and these are their two extremes.

II. Such being their contrasted characteristics, it is hardly possible but that they should sometimes take the attitude of extreme opposition.

Faith, then, jealous for the honour of her God, and feeling that her all is at stake, approaches philosophy with the mien of one inspired by a divine impulse, and says:—

I have nourished and brought you up, and you have rebelled against me! From the old traditions of the race you received those primal truths which you now claim as the birth-right of human reason. Greece had them from the Orient, where they were cradled—Germany from the gospel it has renounced. You have always been an ingrate, denying your very parentage; you have always been a rebel, defiant of authority; you have always been a sceptic, doubting the best accredited facts. Aiming after unity, you are facile to deny the obstinate facts; seeking for universality, you call partial knowledge universal; the real unity and universality are found only in God, whom you banish from your systems. Of all heresy and division you with depravity have been the fruitful parent; from the times of the Gnostics to the times of the Germans, you have vexed the church by irreverent questions, which no man is able to answer. Strong only in undermining, you have never been able to make a system which could survive the “shock of time, the insults of the elements,” the providence of God, and the might of his church. Your towers have been as Babel on the plain of Shinar, and the act of building has been ever followed by the confusion of tongues. From pagan lands, unillumined, you came in the name of Aristotle, and brought subtle sophistries, and, in the name of Plato, ideal reveries, and substituted these for the simplicity of the gospel. Into the depths of materialism you have seduced the heaven-born soul; to the heights of idealism you have carried man, borne on visionary pinions; and in

the depths you have found only a sepulchre, and from the heights discerned only an unfilled and trackless void. In the pride of reason, you forget the reality of sin. You weave around man a labyrinthine web, and leave him there without a clue, to die without a hope. Nature you rob of its vital energy; instead of a kind Providence, you give us only an un pitying law; instead of a Redeemer, an abstract system, which has neither life nor love. Under your iron, icy reign, crushed are the heart's best affections, unsatisfied its deepest wants; gone, for ever gone, its most needed consolations. All the glorious forms with which grace environed us, you have touched with your magic wand, and they have shrivelled, like the leaf before the frost; you leave us only this poor shifting world; you leave us to despair.

For us, then, there is no possibility even of a truce. It is war and only war: it is faith or philosophy; a disjunctive proposition, a vital dilemma. And you, born of groping reason, must submit to my celestial rights.

Challenged by such an adversary, philosophy, ever ready to respond, takes up the word, and, as is her wont, begins in a more modest, and ends in a more confident tone:

“ He that made us with such large discourse,  
Looking before and after, gave us not  
That capability and god-like reason  
To rust in us unused.”

In your unwise zeal, you charge all philosophy with the extravagancies of the few, forgetful of the services of the many. In the flush of a new system, I may have been your opponent; maturer thoughts have usually made me your ally. Without my aid how could man know, without my weapons how defend, even a revelation. When yourself attacked, you use me in your defence, if you do not rely upon bare assertion or unwise determination. Without me you are a mystic or a fanatic. In the early church I aided in expelling superstitions; I sharpened your weapons, and burnished your armour. The precision of your theological terms is owing to my logic; your accredited formulas of doctrine could never have been built up without my hard toil. Those systems of theology which have been your

boast and your defence are among the ripest products of philosophic culture. When the apostle speaks of the "opposition of science, falsely so called," does he not imply that there is a science, truly to be so called? And that same God who gave to man the illumination of his Spirit, did he not also give the light of reason, and give reason first, and reason always, and reason unto all: and, even if it be granted, that the highest joys of the heart are found only in submission to his revealed will, yet it must also be conceded that the chief delight of reason is in philosophy.

Thus would philosophy speak in the language of apology; but it has other words when it accepts the formula—faith or philosophy. And there are four chief tendencies of our times in which its deliberate and conscious opposition to faith is manifest.

The first is that in which all certainty is found in the facts and laws of the material world. The laws and analogies of nature are forced to explain the laws of mind and of morals. Ethics and metaphysics are subordinated to what is dogmatically called positive science. To conform to natural laws, and not to transgress them, is esteemed the great end. Law has no sanctions excepting the direct consequences of obedience or transgression. The harmony of man with nature is the great ideal, is the perfect state. There is no law reaching beyond this life. This world is the boundary of all real human hope and of all well-founded human fear. All else is doubtful.

The second form utters its oracles in a higher mood; it recognises justice and love and the brotherhood of the race as great ends. It would relieve the wretched; give man his rights; introduce a new social state. It is animated by humane principles, and seeks great moral, though worldly ends. These it believes in; these it judges to be effective and sufficient. It has faith, but a faith which centres in humanity, and not in a personal God or an incarnate Redeemer. It seeks a kingdom: but it is a kingdom which is to be of this world, though it is not yet in the world. Its heaven, the only one which is certain, is to be realised on earth.

There is a third tendency more religious in its language, and which may be and is combined with these others, though as a

tendency it is distinct. God, it says, is to be loved and served; he can be loved. But, it is argued, if I have that love which is the very essence of all religion, what need I more? How can it aid or mar this love to believe in a Bible, a Trinity, an external atonement, and such long confessions of doctrine? The state of the heart is all. You call the Bible inspired, so am I; you call it a revelation, I have one within, more constant and persuasive. Such a mind contemplates the grand and distinctive realities of the Christian faith, as we gaze upon the sculptured gods of a Grecian temple; we may be lost in wonder and enraptured by their beauty, but they have for the soul no divine reality, as object of faith and love; they are memorials of an antiquated superstition; we have thought and felt above and beyond them, we cannot find our whole selves in them.

The fourth form of philosophic unbelief is the pantheistic; and this combines in itself elements from all the others. Here philosophy, as though conscious of its full power, asserts its absolute supremacy. By the assumed universality of its principles, the undeniable comprehensiveness of its aims, the rigour of its logic, and the steadiness of its philosophical processes; by its high ideal character; by its claim to be the result of the concentrated thought of the race, and to contain in itself all that is essential in the Christian faith, and to give the law and the explanation to all other sciences, this system seizes with an almost demoniacal power upon minds that would laugh to scorn the dreamy fantasies of the East, that see the rottenness of bare materialism, and that feel something of the inherent might of Christianity. Never did a philosophical system take such an attitude towards the Christian faith; it does not make it a superstition, as did atheism; it does not neglect it, as does our popular philosophy; it does not scout its mysteries, as does an irrational common-sense; nor does it attenuate it into a mere ethical system: but it grants it to be the highest possible form of man's religious nature, it strives to transform its grandest truths into philosophical principles; it says that only one thing is higher, and that is pantheism. It claims to have transmuted Christianity into philosophy, and to stand above it, triumphant, dominant, exultant. And thus it is the most daring, subtle,

consistent, destructive, and energetic philosophy which ever reared its front against the Christian faith. It has the merit of recognising the grandeur of Christianity; it has the audacity to boast that itself is more sublime. It professes to have systematised all thought; to have possession of the aboriginal substance and the perfect law of its development; to be able to unfold all our ideas in their right connections, and to explain nature, mind, art, history, all other philosophies, and also Christianity. All this, it says, is but the unfolding of its own inner life. It weaves its subtle dialectics around everything, that thus it may drag all into its terrific vortex. It has a word for almost every man, excepting for the Christian established in his faith. By the very extravagance of its pretensions it seduces many; by its harmony with the life of sense it attracts those who love the world; and by its ideal character it sways such as would fain be lifted above the illusions of sense and the visions of imagination, and the contradictions of the understanding, into a region of rarer air where reason sways a universal sceptre. Its system includes all things. God is all things; or rather all is God; he that knows this system knows and has God. And it claims that it thus gives a higher idea of Deity than when he is limited by a definite personality; assuming, without any philosophical ground, that personality is in its very nature finite, and cannot be connected with infinite attributes. It professes to give man a system which shall make him wise; and it is with the oldest temptation, Ye shall be as gods.

Thus does philosophy, in its most daring mood, accept the alternative, philosophy or faith; and gives us the choice between Christ and Spinoza. And this is the great alternative of our times.

III. Leaving these two powers, for the present, in this attitude of opposition, we next inquire whether they can be rationally held to be utterly exclusive of each other.

It is said, for example, in faith is the only certainty; all philosophy is dangerous; the natural tendency of scientific research is against revelation; man is so depraved, that though a true philosophy were a great good, it is irrational to expect it.

And it is undeniable that much modern speculation, both physical and metaphysical, is opposed to revelation; and that

all systems and principles which would explain nature without a God, and man's destiny without Christianity, so far as they logically lead to these results, are an unmixed evil, and ought to be exposed and opposed.

But how opposed? Philosophically, or otherwise? He who will answer this question fairly will take the only correct ground. It is, we will say, an objection to the personality of God. How shall we meet it? Shall we simply assert that we believe in the Divine personality; that the Bible speaks of God as a personal agent? Or shall we not rather strive to show, on the strictest philosophical grounds, that the idea of a personal God is the most rational; that without it we cannot really explain the origin or the order of the universe; and that it is a mere assumption to assert, that personality is in its very nature finite—since it is the finiteness of man's attributes, and that alone which gives the finiteness to his personality. But if we do this, we are entering upon a philosophical discussion. And would it not be unfortunate to have taken at the outset a position against all philosophy, which would only serve to throw doubt over our own argument? Is there not ground for a calm distinction between philosophy and false philosophy? We may deny the possibility of a perfect system; we may show that faith is necessary; yet, is it not unwise to doubt, or to seem to doubt, or to say anything that would imply that we ever thought of seeming to doubt, that we might attain entire certainty on some points, and those, too, the most important which man can discuss? Is not any other position suicidal?

And therefore do we maintain that our ground should be, that faith and philosophy are not inherently opposed, but inherently at one; and that this should be our pervading sentiment, influencing our theology, our philosophy, our preaching, our every-day discussions; and that this is a position of prime necessity, now more than ever.

For, if this be not so, the bitterest sneers of a Hume were all true; fortified is the balanced satire of a Gibbon. He who lately wrote in a widely-circulated Review, "that almost all sects have agreed to divorce religion from reasoning, and to exalt faith by contemning philosophy, and that they thus have left

all works of divinity in the hands of one class of writers and of one class of readers," might maintain his vituperation by our own confessions. Can that which is the dexterous and sinister policy of our enemies be a prudent position for ourselves?

If this be not so, then we give over the whole field of modern scientific research, both in nature and in mind, entire and unguarded, to be the grand arena, the pride, the honour, and the power of infidelity. We virtually say, that to its benefit shall enure the fruit and glory of the sciences. And thus many minds, not faithless, yet not believing, who know that science has gained and garnered up some solid truth, are only repelled from a candid examination of the truths of our faith.

If this be not so, then, further, it is difficult to see the wisdom of that constitution of our being by which we are made cognizant of rational truth, as well as susceptible to the authority of religion.

If this be not so, then do we, in virtue of this constitution, deliver over the human mind to perpetual uncertainty, to an intestine war. And such a war is not like the conflict between sin and holiness, for sin is that which ought not to be, and in overcoming it, man is restored to himself as well as to his God; but, in the other case, prime elements of man's essential nature are set at variance, the foes are they of his own household; and they are contending not upon points of inferior moment, but upon the most vital interests of man. And so we are in danger of leaving it to be inferred with the schoolman, that one may hold to a truth with all the energy of faith, which is opposed by all the arguments of reason. We shall oscillate like the German who declared, "philosophy plunges me into the arms of faith, and faith sends me back into the arms of philosophy; my spirit is a ball playing between these two extremes." If the soul for a moment be delighted with the enrapturing visions of faith, the next thought will be, these gorgeous palaces may be dissolved, and leave only a wreck behind. And thus the mind will be more ready to infer that all things are uncertain, than that faith alone is sure; it is better prepared for scepticism than for trust, if it cannot hold, as an unassailable conviction, that reason and faith may be reconciled.



But this position is not only inconsistent with the rightful claims of reason, it is also repugnant to the real necessities and nature of faith. While it makes us traitors to the one, it only dishonours the other. A faith which we do not believe in the very depths of our hearts to be rational, to contain in itself the sum and substance of all philosophy, is a faith which no thinking man can rationally hold; and if he holds it irrationally, it cannot long maintain its sway. "Faith may precede intellect," as Augustine says, but it involves intellect. It has its grounds, reasons, and relations. "It appears to me a negligence," are the words of Anselm, "if after we are confirmed in the faith we do not study to understand what we believe." If a Christian man does not really hold that his system of faith has a firmer basis, a nobler end, a more puissant energy, that it solves more vital problems, and is adapted to man's nature in a fuller sense than any other system, that it is the highest reason as well as the only redemption, and the highest reason because the only redemption, he virtually confesses that a greater than Christ is here. We rob faith of one of its strongest persuasions, if we do not claim that it is perfectly rational.

Faith, too, has its extremes and perils; and philosophy is needed as a counteracting element. It may degenerate into formality, or be sublimated into mysticism, or glow with fanatical fire. As faith without works is dead, being alone, so faith without knowledge may be superstitious, being unchecked. The divine Spirit alone can indeed save from this and every error, into which man's blind and passionate nature is prone to fall; but does He not often do it, by raising the calm voice of reason, the limitations of reflection, and the power of system against the erratic impulses of an unregulated belief. Knowledge without faith is indeed cold: but faith without knowledge is often blind. It may become the servant of passion, and speak the language of bigotry, if it have not reason for its handmaid. Faith may be likened to the element of heat, whose central source is above, and whose subtle agency pervades all the parts of this wondrous whole—the generator of life, without which all that grows would decay, and all that lives would die; while reason, like the other element of water, stands at the two ex-

tremes, to guard the life which only heat can generate. When the heat becomes excessive, water evaporates, and in this very process envelopes, innocuous, the fiery particles, which else would consume every living thing, and so it guards life at this extreme; and when winter comes, water congeals, and, in its very congelation, sends out its latent warmth to animate the forms that otherwise would perish, and so it guards life at this extreme also. And even thus, it seems to me, that we may say of human reason, that it has a twofold office in the guardianship of faith; from the extreme of formality it may quicken it into a new life by the stimulus of argument, and by unfolding the symmetry and sublimity of the creed which is repeated with cold lips; and, in the other extreme of unhallowed glow, it may guard it, not only by the restraints of prudence, but also by the pervading and calm influence of a profound and clear exhibition of all the parts and checks of the Christian system.

We may add, that an intimate persuasion of the inherent unanimity of faith and reason has been a prominent trait of the grandest intellects of the Christian church. Philosophy they have repelled by philosophy. Such was Augustine, when he refuted the vain pretension that man could regenerate himself, not on grounds of Scripture alone, but from the depths of the human consciousness. Such was Anselm of Canterbury, when, at the hour of the sacred vigils, there was revealed to him his sublime speculation upon the being of God: or when, with holy zeal, he wrote upon that high argument, why did God become incarnate? and first on rational grounds, showed the necessity of an atonement. Such too was that holy French recluse, that sublime ascetic, who felt, as hardly did another of his age, the intense conflict between faith and reason, because he had both in their fulness, and who, in immortal fragments, has left us a sketch of a philosophical apology for Christianity, which has never been completed, because Pascal has had no successor. The wisest of English Christians, while he elaborated with patient thought, through many years, his unsurpassed vindication of Christianity, on the ground of the analogies of nature, was ever animated by the conviction, that there must be harmony in all the works of God, that in their origin, their principles, and their

aims, nature and Christianity are in unison ; and that this can be rationally evinced. And him—the mighty man of our New-England theologic host, when, with capacious intellect and whole-souled love, he meditated, in the fairest village on the banks of our noblest river and in his remoter missionary retreat, upon those two great problems, which have given their distinctive character to all our subsequent theological discussions, upon the Nature of True Virtue, and the Freedom of the Human Will, what impulse moved him, if not the necessity of bringing the subtlest researches of human reason into harmony with the truths which lie at the basis of all piety. Without philosophy how could he have attempted the reconciliation of Divine sovereignty with the consciousness of freedom : without deep speculative insight how could he have discerned, as no one did before him, the radical identity of virtue and religion. Intellect and faith acted together in him, distinct yet as consentaneous as are the principle of life and the organic structure in our animal economy.

Thus, on various grounds, we have contended that it is no sound sense to say that faith and philosophy are foes. On the highest grounds it is false ; on the lowest, it is bad policy. It is unwise to do it even in the heat of discussion, even when opposing a fatal error, even to gain an urgent end. For we should be obliged to recant before the first rational man we encountered in calm debate.

Nor do we forget either man's depravity, or the dangers of philosophy. Man is depraved—alas! that we should say it—man is depraved ; human passions are the source and defence of many a false system : but I am afraid to allow to depravity the fearful advantage of claiming for itself full possession of our intellectual natures, as well as of the wish and the will ; for the evidence of depravity is increased when we show that it is against a man's own reason ; and we lose one of our most potent means of assailing it when we grant that reason is its bulwark and not its foe.

And philosophy, too, is dangerous ; all philosophy is dangerous. But the simple, sober fact in the case is this, that there are some dangers which can be avoided only by being incurred,

and by pressing right through the danger to the victory. And there is one peril that, in our times, is more imminent, and that is, the opposing so dangerous an enemy as is false philosophy, by the only weapons to which it is invulnerable.

Our philosophical infidels are calm men, men of nerve; their infidelity is not fed by their passions alone, nor is it vented only in execrations. They are men of thought and system. They do not feel the force of a bare assertion; they yield to no popular clamour; they fear no ecclesiastical denunciation. They are scrutinising, and profoundly conscious of holding principles which deliberately exclude the realities of the Christian faith. They accept the philosophic horn of the dilemma, philosophy or faith, until they can see that the formula should read faith and philosophy.

IV. And it is with this formula that we make our transition to the fourth part of this discussion: and that is, an attempt to exhibit the real relations and the rightful claims of faith and philosophy. To say that both have rights, and that we should attempt to reconcile them, is only to gain a clear field for the most important portion of our work, the adjustment of their respective claims, of their relative supremacy. And if the limits of the occasion make it necessary to omit much of great importance, they may perhaps allow a statement of the points most needing consideration.

And it may be well at the outset to disown some vague attempts at reconciliation which only smother the difficulties. Thus to faith is assigned one whole sphere, God and the Bible; to philosophy another and a distinct department, nature and the human mind; but philosophy has an intense interest in God and the Bible, and faith cannot do without man and providence. Neither the dispute nor adjustment is territorial.

Nor can we any better say, that revelation gives us all our ideas of God; and that philosophy must accept them, without anything further. For this either takes revelation in so broad a sense, that a philosophical infidelity might be based upon it; or else it puts man in a position in which we cannot see how a revelation could possibly be made to him in an intelligible manner. A revelation takes for granted that he to whom it is

made has some knowledge of God, though it may enlarge and purify that knowledge.

In point of fact, faith and philosophy are employed about the same great subjects, God, man, providence, and human destiny.

1. But though employed about the same great subjects, we say that they are employed about them in a different way; and that the difference in the mode results from a difference inherent in the nature of philosophy and faith. And this is the first aspect in which their relations are to be considered.

What then, we ask, is philosophy? what does it seek? what are its limits? And we answer as before, philosophy is a mode of human knowledge, not the whole of that knowledge, but a mode of it; the knowing things rationally; the knowing them in their causes, their relations, and their ends; the knowing them in the harmony and completeness of a system. It being only such a mode of knowledge, the materials, the substance, the facts must, from the nature of the case, exist before the philosophy, and be taken for granted by the philosophy, and be the limit and the test of the philosophy itself. These exist independently of philosophy, and their reality is, of course, to be attested on independent grounds. The facts of the material or of the intelligible world are the prime materials of all philosophical systems, and without them no system can be constructed. There is one thing, then, against which speculation is fruitless, and that is the majesty of fact, of all facts of the outward or inward world properly attested. Philosophy may explain and systematise realities; may show their rational grounds and connections; but it is not within its province to annul an item of history, any phenomena of nature, or any facts of consciousness. If it endeavour to falsify any reality, duly attested by sense, by internal consciousness, or by valid testimony, it is committing high treason against the majesty of fact. It may seek the rational grounds of all that is, but in doing this it assumes that what is, is; and so far as any system is inconsistent with what is, so far it is false; and so far as it cannot rationally explain what is, so far it is incomplete. And of all philosophy, Scotch or German, ideal or empirical, the indepen-

dent realities of nature, of mind, and of history are not only the substance and the strength, but also the abiding test; taken for granted as such in all discussions.

If this be so, we ask next, What is faith, what does it claim to be, in what does it rest? Faith, internally, is a state of trust; but it is always trust in something external. Its real character can only be determined by stating its objects. And the Christian's faith reposes, as we before said, upon a revelation, an historical revelation, a revelation historically attested, attested by miracle and by prophecy; a revelation recorded in a volume which claims to be inspired. It is not primarily a system of doctrines, nor a confession, nor a speculation; but it is a grand historical economy, a manifestation of God and his purposes, an annunciation of supernatural truth by natural agencies, by prophets and teachers, and, last of all, by Jesus Christ; a manifestation forming a part of human history, connected and progressive through thousands of years. And all this series of revelations comes to us in the Scriptures, which gives us both the facts and the Divine interpretation of them. Christianity thus claims to be a real revelation of God, made in the best form in which we can conceive a revelation to be made, and made for the highest ends for which a revelation can be made, made to give the highest and most needed knowledge, made to redeem mankind. And this whole historic revelation bears with steady and concentrated aim upon one person, himself an historical personage, himself a man, in whom it is declared that heaven and earth are reconciled, that the great problems of human destiny are solved. And thus the Christian religion presents itself as adapted to man's highest wants in an exclusive sense, and with redeeming efficacy. This is the first aspect of the Christian economy; and here is the primary basis of faith.

But this is not all; for faith claims an internal evidence, as well as an historical basis. Man is a believer, made to trust. The infirmities of his finite, and the necessities of his sinful condition, make faith necessary to the attainment of the great ends of his being. And the Christian finds in his own heart a profound experience, which fills and satisfies his soul, and

which is entirely responsive to the substance of the Divine revelation, as recorded in the word of God. And here is another series of facts, reaching through thousands of years, embracing men of every clime and degree, the sage and the simple, the civilized and barbarian, the young and the mature, the living and the dying, who all, with one consent, testify that in this revelation they have found their solace and support, that it is the source of the highest activity and blessedness of all their powers. And in the experience of believers also, all converges around the same Divine Person, who is the centre and the crown of the historic revelation.

Nor is this all. That revelation, historically so grand in its origin, and confirmed by human experience, has also entered into and controlled the whole course of human history and of human thought, since the coming of Jesus of Nazareth. And here is another series of facts. History is the grand test of truth; it does not lie, for it is the ever unfolding providence of God. It is more authoritative than mere speculation, for it gives us the highest reality. And in history the Christian system has existed as a real and permanent power; it has been the centre of man's noblest thoughts and strongest feelings, in his most cultivated state, for eighteen hundred years; it has controlled the destinies and led the march of the nations; from its bitter contests it has ever emerged with added lustre, as though endowed with immortal energy. It is superior to defeat. Its power is now more intense and diffused than ever before. And thus is Christianity not only an historic revelation, and an internal experience, but also an organic, diffusive, plastic, and triumphant force in human history; and in this history, as in the revelation, and as in the experience, the centre around which all revolves is the person of Jesus Christ.

Nor yet is this all. This revelation has another aspect, which has already been hinted at, but which requires a fuller statement. If man were entirely satisfied with the course of nature—with being born, living, and dying: if he had no sense of sin, if he had never sinned; he would not be ever asking those sublime questions, to which nature is deaf and reason is dumb. But he knows something of God, of law, of death, and

of eternity, and he would fain know more; for here are inquiries in comparison with which all the secrets of nature are not only insignificant but patent to our gaze. Now, it is the grand claim of the Christian revelation that it answers these vital questions, that it solves all the great moral problems of human destiny. For each enigma, so dark to reason, it has a definite and an authoritative response; for all the great moral problems of our destiny it offers a solution; and the solutions are given in the person and work of Christ; they all meet in the same radiant centre, in whom the revelation converges, in whom the believer finds his blessedness, and to whom all subsequent history has brought its loyal tribute.

This, then, is the primary aspect in which the Christian faith is to be viewed: as an historical reality, confirmed by experience, influencing history, and professing to solve the greatest questions of our destiny, and all centering in Jesus Christ, a personal object of faith and love, the very manifestation of God here upon the earth.

This being so, what is the attitude which philosophy, from its very nature, if we have correctly described it, must take towards the Christian faith? Philosophy can annul no fact; it must bow to all realities properly attested. It may strive to undermine the basis of faith by historical criticism; to prove that the experience of believers is contrary to right reason; to show that history may be otherwise interpreted than as centering in Christ; and that there are other and better solutions of the problems of our destiny than those which Christianity offers; it may strive to expel Christ from the human heart and from human history. Should it succeed in throwing doubt upon the evidences, there remains the experience; should it make the experience seem a delirium, there remains the history; should it cast suspicion on the history, there still remains the broad ground that to all the great problems of our destiny, philosophy cannot furnish a better decision than that which faith bears on her lips, one more consonant with man's best hopes, more elevating to his whole nature, more rational in itself. So that until philosophy can overthrow the pillars of our revelation, and prove our inmost life to be all a delusion; until it can



find some other centre of convergence and divergence for the whole history of our race than the city of Jerusalem, and the middle cross on Calvary; until it can resolve the questions of our fate with a higher argument than Christianity presents: it is obliged to leave to faith all the vantage ground, all the supremacy, which an historic and experienced reality may confer.

And here, under God, is the hiding-place of the strength of faith. Its is the majesty of a revealed economy; the profoundest experience of the human heart is with it; the might of history testifies unto it; it, and it alone, gives the key which unlocks the mysteries of our moral being. These are the things which make it stronger than any excogitated system. Thus it is intertwined, as no mere speculation can be, with education, with the family, with human institutions, with the organic structure of society, with the deepest wants of the human heart, with its most permanent convictions. And thus is the Christian revelation, considered as a grand, historic, experienced economy, centering in one person, distinct from all other pretended revelations; and here do we find our warrant for drawing the distinction broad and clear. As soon as a revelation is resolved, as by some recent writers, into intuitions, so soon does faith lose its strongest means of defence against the assaults of philosophy.

Human reason may indeed inquire whether the voice which speaks be delusive or divine; it may test the truth of revelation on historical grounds; it may ask whether its doctrines be in harmony with, or contradictory to moral truth, to our essential ideas and necessary convictions; it may inquire whether the problems it proposes to solve be real or only imaginary; but having answered such preliminary inquiries, it has no shadow of a right to go to this revelation, and dictate to it what it shall tell us of God's nature, or what shall be the method of the revelation or of the redemption, any more than it has a right to go to that other reality, nature, and prescribe its laws and limit its elements. In both cases man is to study and to learn. Viewless as the life of nature, Christianity, like that life, is a diffusive, penetrating, and shaping agency; it moves majestically according to its divine laws, and knows not the control of human reason. It is simple as is light to the eye of the child, it is pro-

found as is light to the eye of the sage, it is blessed as is light to all, it is darkness only to those who see not the light.

2. The statements we have thus far made upon the relative claims of faith and philosophy rest on the assumption that both parties admit the existence of a personal God, and the possibility of a revelation. The relation of the two is entirely different, when philosophy would undermine these cardinal points on which revelation rests. And here is where philosophy can be met only by philosophy. It is as unphilosophical for faith to be dogmatic here, as it is for philosophy to be dogmatic in the face of a recognised reality. If we cannot construct the foundations and the outworks of the Christian system, on impregnable grounds; if we cannot show the possibility of miracles, and of a revelation; if we cannot prove, absolutely prove the existence of a wise, intelligent, personal, and providential Ruler of all things, then we are merged in infidelity, or given over to an unfounded faith. If we cannot settle these points on the field of open discussion, we cannot settle them at all.

The way of meeting sceptical positions on these questions is not by saying that they are repugnant to faith, but by showing that they are opposed to sound reason; is not by saying that they are German and transcendental, but by being very bold and yet more wise, and claiming that they are not only German but radically unsound; not only transcendental, but essentially unphilosophical. And if one cannot conscientiously say this, he had better say nothing at all about it.

The wise method is to expose the principle which lies at the heart of all this modern infidelity, and to show that the principle is really unphilosophical and incomplete. And that principle may perhaps be said to be, that we have given a rational account of things when we have reduced them to abstract ideas, or great principles; to laws, whether physical or ideal; that physical causes, antecedents, and consequents, are the great end of philosophic inquiries; in short, that law and system are sufficient to account for the energy, the order, and the ends of the universe. This is the prime falsehood coiled in the heart of all these infidel schemes; this is the point to be met; and against it we must show that this principle does not answer the most

important questions; that it gives only order and system, and does not explain the origin even of that; that it only answers the question, What are the constituents, and what the succession of things; that it does not answer the question, Whence are they? nor the question, How came they so to be? nor yet the question, What is their final cause? And these are as important and as philosophical questions as are those which concern abstract law and fixed succession.

When, for example, an enthusiastic naturalist, who knows something of nature and little of logic, thinks that by means of the fire-mist and an assumed law, he can show how all things are developed out of the mist, up to man and down to his system, and all without a God,—shall we deny that there are order and development, and a vast unfolding series in creation; or, shall we not rather say, conceding the order and development so far as they are verified, that the more the order, and the vaster the development, the greater is the need of an intelligent cause and an omnipotent energy? When modern explorers in history find reason and law and progress in its course, if we deny the reason and the progress, how can we vindicate Providence on any historical grounds: if we accept them, how may we not use them to show, even to the objector, that history has a guiding hand? And even when the pantheist brings forward his boasted system, and asserts that he has got the primal substance and the universal law, by which all things may be developed, and attempts to exhibit their relations and connections and ends; whether is it wiser to say that reason is proud, that we cannot see relations and make systems, or, granting the reality of harmony, order, and law, and the need and use of pointing them out, still to claim that to infer pantheism is philosophically false; that this system, with all its pretensions, accounts fully only for the succession and order of things; not for their rationality, since conscious reason alone is truly rational; nor for their energy, since mind alone is powerful; nor for their origin, since will alone can really bring into being; nor for their wise ends, since reason, power, and will are necessary to bring a rational end out of a blind universe. Philosophy must here show that the idea of a personal Creator, himself

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uncaused, is most rational, and is the only basis of the unity and energy of the universe.

Thus on the great questions preliminary to a revelation, we claim that philosophy has an exclusive voice, and that this is a point necessary to be insisted on in defining the relations of faith and philosophy.

And here we would not, for a moment, be understood to imply that the actual belief of men in God's existence and government is dependent upon such scientific analysis and proof: it is no more dependent on this, strictly speaking, than is man's belief in an external world on the refutation of idealism. Man was made for God, and all man's powers, in their right use, tend toward their great Author. Here is the actual stronghold of such belief against all sceptical systems. And when the belief is questioned, an argument for it may be derived from these tendencies; yet not hence alone, perhaps not most convincingly, in a philosophic point of view, as against the sceptic.

3. Having thus stated, in general terms, what we conceive to be the relations of these two powers in respect to the substance and to the foundations of the Christian system, claiming for faith the priority in the one, and for philosophy in the other; it becomes necessary to speak of their relations within the precincts of the revelation itself.

For though philosophy must, in the first instance, receive the revelation properly authenticated; yet, by virtue of its office in giving a systematic form to our knowledge, it may still render essential and needed service to faith.

And this is the same thing as saying that we need systematic theology. For systematic theology is the combined result of philosophy and faith; and it is its high office to present the two in their most intimate conjunction and inherent harmony. The whole history of the church gives us, in scientific theology, the best results of the conflict, and examples of the union of the highest faith and the wisest philosophy. In short, systematic theology may be defined, as the substance of the Christian faith in a scientific form. And our whole previous discussion bears upon this point as its culmination and result.

Systematic theology, by our ablest divines, is recognised as a

science, both theoretical and practical. It is not a mere arrangement of the facts and doctrines of the Bible in a lucid order; it is the unfolding of them in a scientific order; it is not a series of unconnected doctrines, with the definitions of them, it is the combining of doctrines into a system: its parts should not only be coördinate, they should be regularly developed. It should give the whole substance of the Christian faith, starting with its central principle, around which all the members are to be grouped. It must defend the faith and its separate parts against objections, and show that it is congruous with well-established truths in ethical and metaphysical science. And in proportion to the philosophical culture of the theologian, to the comprehensiveness of his principles, will be his ability to present the Christian faith in a fitting form. While it is partly true, that he who seeks for theology in philosophy is seeking the living among the dead; it is wholly true, that he who seeks for theology without philosophy is seeking the end without the instruments. We may be well assured that there is a statue somewhere in the block of marble; but the pick-axe, and the drill, and eyes that have no speculation in them, can never find it: it needs instruments of the finest temper, a hand of the rarest skill, guided by a mind able to preconceive the symmetry of the perfect shape.

The necessity of systematic theology we put, then, on the broad ground that we need a reconciliation between faith and philosophy. Simple faith might have been sufficient for the first ages of the church, though it was not; we live in an age of controversy, surrounded by minds drenched with objections to orthodoxy, among people who, whatever else they have asked, have always asked a reason; to defend our faith, to commend our faith, we need systematic theology. Let us never cease to pray that the age of perfect faith may come; that it come more speedily, let us arm ourselves for the contest. As well might a general lead a straggling troop of even patriotic men against marshalled and disciplined battalions, as we encounter the closed and firm phalanx of our foes without a compact army of even the sacramental host of God's elect. Systematic theology is necessary so far, and just so far, as there is any

meaning in the contest between faith and philosophy; just so far as we have anything to say, consistently and definitely, in defence of Christianity. Its necessity is indeed not vital, as is that of faith in the heart: it is not of universal educational necessity, as are preaching and teaching: but it is necessary so far as we need leaders thoroughly trained, able to define and defend the truth, to show its harmonies and relations. It is not necessary, as is the circulation of the blood, but like the knowledge of that circulation, which is important to all, and indispensable to the expert. It is necessary so far as the mind needs system and science at all, so far as a science of the highest objects is yet more necessary, so far as a science of the highest objects for the most urgent and practical ends is most necessary. It is necessary so far as it is a delight to the mind to see the fair proportions of its faith depicted in their symmetry; and surely, never is the soul better prepared to feel the deepest emotions of reverence and of trust, than when it has gazed upon the grand outlines and internal symmetry of the system of redemption. He who thinks highly feels deeply. From long meditation on the wonder of the Divine revelation, the mind returns with added glow to the simplicity of faith.

We do not, then, feel the force of the objection to doctrinal theology, that it is unfavourable to a life of faith. A technical system may be, but that is because it is technical. Mere formulas may be, but we should not hold any truth as a mere formula. And least of all does this objection apply to our New England systems; these have been held by the heart quite as much as by the head; no theology has ever insisted with such unrelenting earnestness upon the necessity of inward experience. Not written in catechisms, it has been engraved on fleshy tablets. We have not only discussed, we have also experienced almost everything; from conscious enmity to God, to the profoundest submission to his will; from the depths of a willingness to be condemned, to the heights of disinterested benevolence; from the most abstract decrees of a Sovereign, down, almost, to the power to the contrary; we have passed through the very extremes of doctrine, and known them to be real by our inward experience. We have not so much transformed

spirit into dogma, as we have transmuted dogma into spirit, We have never, never forgotten, that the begetting in man of a new life was the paramount end of all theology as of all preaching.

Nor are we sure that we understand the force of the objection to doctrinal theology, derived from the allegation that language is inadequate to embody spiritual truth; for though this be annihilating, yet it seems to us that it cannot be proved true, unless we utterly divorce language from all thought and feeling. It is of the very office of language to express what is consciously working in the soul; language is the express image of spirit. As soon as the mind is raised above the obscure state of spontaneous feeling, or the rude perceptions of sense, it begins to express its feelings and indicate its perceptions in audible language. In its whole training, words, thought or uttered, are the great instrument, as well as the result of its progress. And so it comes to pass, that though language be not life, yet there is not a deep or delicate emotion, not a subtle distinction or large concatenation of human thought, not an abstract principle or a simple idea, which language by simple words, by imagery, by definition, by description, or by system, is not adequate to convey. And though single words, when taken singly, may have many a sense, yet the single words only give us the separate parts of speech; but take language as a whole, put the word in a sentence, qualify it by adjuncts, limit it by its relations, define it by logic, fix it in a system, and the single word may have such an immovable significance, that no other term can be exchanged for that simple sound. It may have had its origin in the regions of sense; but by the action of the soul upon it, it has been transfigured; it has passed through all inferior stages, and at length has been claimed by faith or reason for its exclusive use; so that only a philologist knows its earthly origin, and to all others it is the apt and direct symbol of the highest ideas of reason, or the loftiest objects of faith.

And for the objection itself, we might be the more anxious, did we not find in the exquisite grace of the language of the accomplished thinker who has propounded it, that his own

theory is practically refuted by his own eminent example. None more skilful than he to express the subtlest moods of mind, the most delicate analogies of thought; no one who better exemplifies the fact, that the sublimest objects of Christian faith, and the tenderest play of Christian feeling may be so fully expressed in human language, that the only hearts unmoved are those themselves devoid of feeling and of faith.

In proceeding now to state, as concisely as we can, the mode in which faith and philosophy are to be harmonised in Christian theology, so that this shall be truly their nuptial state, we say, first of all, that that only can be a true System, which contains the very substance of the Christian faith; which gives us the very heart of the revelation in a systematic form. Hence the absolute necessity of Biblical study, as the prime condition; hence, too, he only who knows the inward power and reality of faith can be a true theologian. This results from the very fact that the Christian economy is both an historical and an experienced reality. "He is the best divine who best divines" the spirit of the Scriptures; and he alone has the power of divination whose heart is responsive to the oracles. In a higher sense than can be asserted of anything else, it holds true of the Christian faith, that "it can be really known only as it is truly loved." The illumination of the Spirit is as necessary as is the light of reason. Both the cherubic and seraphic virtues, in the old interpretation of them—the spirits of wisdom and the spirits of love, must preside over the work.

But, on the other hand, only the philosophic intellect can grasp the prime principles, can see the relations of the parts, can guard against inconsistencies, can show the harmony of the system with the powers of the mind, with ethical truth, and with our necessary and essential ideas. It alone can grapple with the real problems, and show how the Christian faith solves them. Without it, the interpretation of Scripture would be careless when not obscure. It alone can regulate and correct the definitions of doctrine; it alone can impart shape and comprehensiveness to the system.

Thus we have the substance of the system, that is, the revelation; and the power which is to shape this substance, and that



is the philosophic mind. But now come up the most important and decisive questions: whence are we to get the principle, and what is the principle, which is to be the central influence, and the controlling energy of the whole system? And here is where the inquiry really hinges about the relative supremacy of faith and philosophy. Is philosophy to bring this principle with it from ethics, from mental philosophy, or from natural religion; or is it to take it from revelation itself? And here perhaps is also the point on which turns the controversy between those who seem to contend on the one hand all for system, and on the other all for faith. If a system of Christian theology be a true expression of the Christian faith, there can be no incongruity between the system and the faith, we shall not be forced either to change spirit into dogma, or dogma into spirit; for in the doctrine we shall have the expression of the spirit: we shall be lifted above the misery of saying that we must be all doctrine or all life, all formula or all faith: and while we insist that faith is the essential thing, we may also be able to see that a true theological system is one of the noblest boons which faith can have, as well as a want of the Christian intellect.

All theological systems, now, which have any distinctive influence or character are based upon some ultimate principles, by which the arrangement and even the definitions of the doctrines are controlled. Consciously or unconsciously they are under the power of some dominant idea, which determines the shape of the separate parts.

Thus, the compact and consistent system, comprised in the Westminster Assembly's Catechism, rests, indeed, upon the basis of the Divine sovereignty, but this sovereignty is further modified by the idea of a covenant relation; and this it is which may, perhaps, be said to give shape to the exposition of the leading doctrines in the consistent Presbyterian church, so far as their views are different from the general orthodoxy.

Our New England theology has its basis in the same general idea of the Divine sovereignty, drawn out into a clear and articulate system of decrees, giving us the very anatomy of religion in its most abstract form. And such anatomy is necessary; if we believe in a God, and are consistent thinkers, we cannot

avoid believing in a sure and divine system of things ; thus alone can we keep alive the idea of the Divine agency and government, without which all theology would be unsupported. But besides the decrees, we have had two other modifying influences in our systems, which have given them their most distinctive character, and which have both come to us through the discussions of Jonathan Edwards, though they might easily be shown to be no arbitrary development of the Calvinistic system. What is the nature of true virtue, and what is the real freedom of the human will in connection with the Divine sovereignty, are the two questions which have chiefly determined the character of our theological systems and parties. Our views on these points have given character to our theology and our preaching on many of the most important articles of the Christian faith. It is here that we have had a distinctive character, an original theological cast ; it is here we have made "advances in theology." Our systems have indeed contained all the doctrines, from the being of God to the life everlasting ; but our pressure and force have been on these radical inquiries. We have met and not shrunk from the absorbing investigations which are forced upon the mind when it asks about the harmony of the doctrines of Christianity with ethical truth, and with indubitable facts of mental science.

But now we have fallen upon other times ; and other inquiries are brought home to us. We are compelled to meet questions, to which our theories about sovereignty, virtue, and free-agency, can give no definite response. Men are asking, what is Christianity as distinct from an ethical system ? Who and what is Christ, that we should love and believe in Him ? What is his nature ? what his relation to God and to us ? What is his place in the Christian system ? The questions of our times, in short, do not bear upon the point, whether the doctrines of the Christian system are in harmony with the truths of ethics and of mental philosophy ; but rather upon the point, what is the real nature of Christianity, what are its essential characteristics ? And no theory of ethics or of freedom can answer these questions.

To meet the wants of our times, then, we must endeavour to

get at that principle which gives its definite and distinct character to the Christian economy.

And it is here we claim, as a matter of philosophical justice also, that philosophy is not to bring this principle with it, but is rather to seek it in the Christian system itself. This is the dictate of the Baconian, of the Aristotelian induction. This is necessary in all science. To find the principles of optics, we study light. To find the laws of the mind, we study mind. To know Christianity, we must study Christianity. To get at a living Christian theology, we must have the central principle of Christianity itself.

We state our position again. The principle which is to give shape to a theological system ought, on the strictest philosophical grounds, to be taken from the Christian economy itself, so that what forms the substance and vitality of Christianity, shall be the centre of our theology also; this principle is not to be sought in ethics, or in nature, or in the will of man, but only in the revealed will of God.

And *where* we are to seek for this principle, who can doubt? The central idea of Christianity, as a distinct system, can only be found in Him of whom prophets did testify, evangelists write, and apostles preach; whose life was the crowning glory of humanity, as his death was its redemption; and from whose death and from whose life influences and blessings have streamed forth, constant and inestimable; in Him, whose nature, more wonderful than any other, unites the extremes of humanity and divinity; whose work, more glorious and needed than any other, reconciles heaven to earth and earth to heaven; and whose dominion is as intimate in its efficiency as it is eminent in its claims and beneficent in its results. He is the centre of God's revelation and of man's redemption; of Christian doctrine and of Christian history, of conflicting sects and of each believer's faith, yea, of the very history of this our earth, Jesus Christ is the full, the radiant, the only centre—fitted to be such because He is the God-man and the Redeemer: Christ—Christ, He is the centre of the Christian system, and the doctrine respecting Christ is the heart of Christian theology.

For, if theology be the science which unfolds to us the rela-

tions of God and man; if the Christian revelation contains the full and authoritative account of these relations; and if in the Christian revelation the wealth of the Divine manifestation and the wants and hopes of man are all convergent upon Jesus Christ; and if it be philosophically just to seek the central principle of Christian theology in that which forms the heart and life of the revelation—where else can we find this animating idea excepting in the Person of Jesus Christ? And that which constitutes the prime and peculiar characteristic of that Person, that it is the union of humanity and divinity, will most naturally be taken as the prime characteristic of the system which centres in Him.

And with that glorious Person all the other truths of our faith are inherently connected. The distinct personality of Christ is the starting point, from which to infer the reality of the distinctions in the Godhead; atonement and justification centre in Him; our very spiritual life is hid with Christ in God; if we believe in Him we are born of God; we are to be changed into the image of Christ; the sacraments of the church testify of Him until He come. And a theology which finds its centre in such a Being, cannot be a barren, abstract system; but it gives us a direct and personal object for our faith and love. Thus, and thus only, does Christian theology express the Christian faith in its perfect form.

This position—that in Jesus Christ is to be found the real centre of the Christian economy, and that here its distinction from any and all other forms of religion is chiefly to be seen, lies at the basis of all theological systems which acknowledge a real revelation and manifestation of God in the person and work of his only Son. It is at the very head of the whole theology of the Reformation; from reliance upon an outward church, there was a return to faith in Christ, as the only ground of justification. To have Christ, to have the whole of Christ, to have a whole Christ, is the soul of our Puritan theology; the rest is foundation, defence, or scaffolding.

This principle is also in entire conformity with the dictates of Christian experience; it is demanded by that experience. Whatever the theology may have been, whatever the conflicts of

sects, the name of Jesus has touched the tenderest and deepest chords of man's heart. You may cut a man loose from almost all the distinguishing doctrines of our faith, and he will still cling to the very name of Christ, as with a despairing energy. So vital is Christ in Christian experience, that many are withheld from speculating upon his nature by the unspeakable depth and tenderness of their love for Him.

Thus it is wherever Christ is truly known and loved. And it is a cause of devout congratulation, and an occasion for the most auspicious hopes, that in that land where infidelity has reached its most daring height, both in criticism and in speculation, there is also, in opposition to this infidelity, the strongest and most intelligent attempt to bring out this distinctive characteristic of the Christian system, in its philosophical and theological bearings. The later German Evangelical theology, in its return from a cold rationalism and its opposition to a daring and logical pantheism, is especially distinguished by the fact, that it is feeling more and more deeply the importance and reality of the doctrine respecting Christ, as expressing the prime principle of the Christian faith. One of the loveliest and most sagacious of all these evangelical men, Dr Ullmann, in an admirable article on the Real Nature of Christianity, thus writes,—“Christianity first appears in its distinctive nature and in its full objective character, when all that is embraced in it is referred back to the personality of its Founder, considered as uniting humanity with divinity. . . . Thus viewed, Christianity is in an eminent sense something organic; in its very origin it is a complete, spiritual, organic whole; from a personal centre it unfolds all its powers and gifts, imparting them to humanity and uniting men under Christ in a divine kingdom. From this central point, and only from this, everything else receives its full significancy; doctrine, as the expression of a real life, attains its full power; . . . atonement and redemption receive their objective basis and confirmation.”

These are not the words of a solitary thinker in that land of scholars and thoughtful men. They express the views common to the best German divines, the most philosophical and the most Christian. Pressed on all sides by the foes of our faith, they

have taken refuge in its very citadel. They have been forced to bring out the distinguishing characteristic of Christianity in the boldest relief. They have made the doctrine respecting Christ to assume its philosophical and theological importance. They have found in it the middle ground between dogmatism and mysticism, as well as a sure counteraction to all ritualism. Here is their bulwark against pantheistic and deistic abstractions. By means of it they are able to meet the man who makes Christianity a mere republication of natural religion, or who resolves it all into an ethical system. And though in some of their theologians this view may be connected with unsound or vague speculation; though others may use it chiefly to favour some mystical views about the efficacy and nature of the sacraments; yet it certainly is equally consistent with the highest orthodoxy, with any orthodoxy which does not rest in bare formulas.

And in this connection, and in this reverend presence, I may not refrain from offering my humble tribute to the memory of that man, much misunderstood, who led the German Christianity, in its returning course, to our Lord—to Frederic Schleiermacher, a noble and a venerable name! His it was to infuse into a critical and cold rationalism the fervent and almost mystic love to Christ which has ever burned in the hearts of the Moravian brotherhood—his it was to make Christ and his redemption the centre of one of the most skilfully developed systems of theology which the Christian church has known—his it was to draw broad the line between philosophy and Christian theology—his it was to impart such a true, profound, and continuous influence to many critical, speculative, and believing minds, that ever since that impulse, and in consequence of it, they have been coming nearer and nearer to the full substance of orthodox Christianity. If he is sometimes called pantheistic, it is only because he made the feeling of dependence to be the germ of all religion. To him must indeed be ascribed the modern revival of the vague heresy of the Sabellians; he is not free from the discredit of undervaluing many important historic facts of our Lord's life; with his views of the atonement we disclaim all sympathy; many were his errors, but

much was his love to our blessed Lord. By making Christ and his redemption the centre of Christian theology, we are fully persuaded that he rendered an invaluable service to the Christian science of his native land, in the time of its greatest need.\*

Permit me to say that on this point I am the more ready to bear my unambitious yet grateful testimony to the merits of Schleiermacher and of the theological science of that land of intellect, because in the present state of our popular criticism upon German theology and philosophy, I believe it to be an act of simple justice, due to them and to the truth. In the name of the republic of letters, in the name of all generous scholarship, in the very name of Christian charity, I dare not refrain from testifying, that the indiscriminate censure of all that is German, or that may so be called, is a sign rather of the power of prejudice than of a rational love for all truth. A criticism which describes a circumference of which one's ignorance is the generating radius can only stretch far beyond the confines of justice and of wisdom. A criticism which begins by saying that a system is absolutely unintelligible; which secondly, asserts that this unintelligible system teaches the most frightful dogmas, definitely drawn out; and which concludes by holding it responsible for all the consequences that a perverse ingenuity can deduce from these definite dogmas of the unintelligible system; is indeed a source of unintelligent and anxious wonder to the ignorant, but it is a profounder wonder to every thoughtful mind. A criticism which includes the Christian Neander and the pantheistic Strauss in one and the same condemnation is truly deplorable. Let us at least learn to adopt the humane rules of civilised warfare, and not, like the brutal soldiery of a ruder age, involve friends and foes in one indiscriminate massacre. Germany cannot give us faith; and he who goes there to have his doubts resolved, goes into the very thick of the conflict in a fruitless search for its results; but even Germany may teach us what is the real "state of the controversy" in our age; what are the principles now at work more

\* Those characteristics of Schleiermacher's system which have given to it its really beneficent influence, are only obscurely brought out in Mr Morell's unsound "Philosophy of Religion."

unconsciously among ourselves. And can we in our inglorious intellectual ease, find it in our hearts only to condemn the men who have overcome trials and doubts to which our simple or iron faith has never been exposed; who have stood in the very front rank of the fiercest battle that Christianity has ever fought, and there contended hand to hand with its most inveterate and wary foes; and who are leading on our faith—as we trust in Christ so will we believe it!—to the sublimest triumph it has ever celebrated?

When, oh! when, will scholars and Christian men learn, that orthodoxy can afford to be just, to be generous; and that in this age it cannot afford to be otherwise; since it thus loses its hold over the minds which are open to truth, and foes chiefly to bigotry? When shall we learn that it is quality and not quantity which gives its value to all criticism; that to stigmatise whole classes by opprobrious epithets, by names “of uncertain meaning yet of certain disparagement,” is the impulse of an unlettered zeal, which inflames the worst passions of our foes and arouses only the spurious ardour of our friends? When shall we learn the high lesson, that in our present conflicts, it is not nations, or men, or even parties that are to be conquered, but only error and sin; and that the victory belongs not alone to us, but to truth, to righteousness, and to God?

We have said, that the German Christianity, by the urgency of the pressure of the unbelieving systems of the times upon it, has been driven to the position, that all Christian theology centres in the doctrine respecting Christ, as to its very citadel. This principle, we have claimed, lies at the heart of all true Christian theology and Christian experience. We add, that it is eminently adapted, when brought out in its fulness and fitness, to counteract some of the extreme tendencies among ourselves, as also to present Christianity in its rightful attitude towards an unbelieving world.

No one moderately acquainted with our theological and philosophical discussions, can have failed to note the influence of one strong tendency bringing our speculations and doctrines to concentrate upon a single point, upon man's internal state. Everything is judged by its reference to man's soul and its



powers. We may call it the vast, subjective process of modern theology and philosophy. This tendency has its rights and necessity; it is perhaps a mark of Protestantism; it is more fully seen in Calvinism than in Lutheranism; it is a very distinct trait of many New England movements. And if most noticeable in those who have carried our systems to their extremes, or who have become aliens to the orthodox faith, we ought not to avoid feeling a deep interest in it, as a sign of the times; and we are bound to see how the general mind is working, whether it be centrifugal or centripetal in respect to ourselves. In this tendency, too, may be something of our strength; but here also is much of our danger.

We can only rapidly indicate some of its signs. Christianity is viewed rather as a system intended to cultivate certain states of feeling, than as a revelation to build us up in the knowledge of God and of Christ. The nature of man's affections is more fully discussed than the nature of Christ. Faith is defined, not as once by its objects, but by its internal traits; and if it be called trust in God, the emphasis is laid on the trust rather than on God. The efficacy of prayer is sometimes restricted to the believer's heart. The whole process of regeneration has been explained without reference to Divine agency. Sin is viewed chiefly as a matter of individual consciousness, and less in its connections with the race and with the Divine purposes. The atonement is regarded as a life and not as a sacrifice; it is defined by its relations to us and not by its relations to God; and many who call it a declaration of the Divine justice explain no farther. Justification is pardon; and pardon is known by a change in our feelings. Nor with these doctrines does the process end. The Incarnation is a vehicle for the communication of a vague spiritual life; the Trinity is resolved into a mere series of manifestations, which do not teach us anything of the real nature of the Godhead; it is like a dramatic spectacle, and when the drama has been played out, the persons retire, and leave us not a higher knowledge of God, but stronger and warmer feelings; as in a parable, the moral lesson is the great end.

Some of our philosophical tendencies are in the same line. Mental philosophy is studied, as if all philosophy were in know-

ing the powers of the mind; it is made the basis of theology. Self-determination is the great fact about mind and morals. Personal well-being is the great end, even when we act in view of the universal good; the sum of ethics is happiness, and this happiness in its last analysis is viewed as subjective and not as objective. Man becomes the measure of all things; not the glory of God, but the happiness of man is the chief end. God is for man, rather than man for God; and, as in the infancy of science, the sun again revolves around the earth.

Thus the grand objective force of truth and of Christianity, and of Christian doctrines, their reality in themselves and as a revelation of God, are in danger of being merged in the inquiry after their value as a means of moving us. If anything will move us as much, it is as well as Christianity. "We for whose sake all nature stands," is something more than poetry. A restless, morbid state of feeling ensues, different from the calm composure which hearty faith in a revelation is adapted to inspire. Men will be perfect at once; not merely strive to be so, which none can do too earnestly; but believe that they are so, which none can be too cautious in affirming. And the essence of their perfection is found in an intention of the will, of which they must be always conscious, or else their perfection is without evidence.

Thus in various ways this tendency shows itself. We have hinted at some of its extreme forms, identified with no one party or school. It is an avaricious principle. All that is not directly convertible into moods of mind, it will hardly allow to be current coin. The massive theological systems of past ages, so large, and careful, and intricate, are conceded to be imposing, but are felt to be cold and uncomfortable; we are not at home in them. The Bible, the church, Christ, the historic revelation, fade away one after another; all that remains in the last result is an internal revelation or an internal inspiration; religion is merged in a vague love to an abstract divinity. And where this state of mind has come, pantheism lieth at the door.

Now that this subjective tendency has its rights, as well as its force, that without internal experience all else is vain, that

the letter kills if the spirit be not there, no one can rationally deny. That our chief dangers lie in the extremes of this tendency, is equally undeniable. That there must be a reaction from this extreme is manifest from all history, from the very laws of the mind, from the very signs of the times.

The question for us to weigh, then, is this: how shall we both encourage and restrain this mighty current?

Some would bid us back to the rites and forms and alleged succession of a visible church; but let the dead bury their dead; let us rather arise and follow our Lord. We have outgrown the power and the necessity of the beggarly elements. As Dr Arnold said: "the sheath of the leaf is burst; what were the wisdom of winter, is the folly of spring."

Shall we insist with new tenacity upon our old formulas? But words and formulas alone have but slight force against such an inwrought and potent tendency. And they are no effectual guards against heresy, since, as has been well observed, heresy can as readily enter, and does as often couch itself under the guise of old terms as of new. Let us rather seek to know the real sense of the formulas; let us come to have a deeper sense of the grand realities of our faith.

To come to these is our safety, our defence. To see and feel and know what Christianity really is in its inward and distinctive character; to study those central truths which lie at its foundation; here is our strength. Let us come unto Jesus. When Christ is to us more than a doctrine, and the atonement more than a plan; when the Incarnation assumes as high a place in revealed, as creation does in natural theology; when the Trinity is viewed not as a formula, but as a vital truth, underlying and interwoven with the whole Christian system; when from this foundation the whole edifice rises up majestically, grand in its proportions, sublime in its aims, filled with God in all its parts; when we feel its inherent force streaming out from its living centres; then, then are we saved from those extreme tendencies which are the most significant and alarming sign of our times; then, then are we elevated above those lesser controversies which have narrowed our minds and divided our hearts. Here also we have a real inward experience, as well as

an objective reality, for the best and fullest inward experience is that which centres in Christ; and the centre of the experience is then identical with the centre of the Divine revelation.

Never are we so far from having any abstract ethical or metaphysical principles exercise an undue influence; never are we so far from a too fond reliance on self, and never is self so full and satisfied; never are we in a better position for judging all our controversies with a righteous judgment, or nearer to the highest Christian union; never do the Divine decrees shine in so mild a lustre, so benignant with grace, so solemn and severe in justice; never can we be more wisely delivered from the material attractions of an outward rite, or from the ideal seductions of a pantheistic system; never is doctrine so full of life, and life so richly expressed in doctrine; never does systematic theology so perfectly present the full substance of the Christian faith in a truly scientific form; and never are philosophy and faith so joined in hymeneal bonds, where they may "exult in over-measure;" as when Christ is set forth as the living centre of all faith and of all theology, in whom the whole body is fitly joined together, compacted by that which every joint supplieth. Here, if anywhere, we may discern

Concord in discord, lines of differing method  
Meeting in one full centre of delight.

Having traced, as far as we may, the course of the blood in the veins of the system, and scrutinised the delicate and intricate organism by which it is diffused through every part, we are better prepared to go back to the grand arterial structure, to the great central heart, where resides the life-imparting energy; and there, too, we shall learn whence comes the blood which courses through the veins. Having the necessity, we need not want the flexure. Having the anatomy of the Christian system, let us have also its physiology; for physiology is the science of life.

We have thus gone over the ground proposed, imperfectly, rapidly; and yet have been only too long for the occasion. We have spoken of the characteristics, the opposition, the reconciliation, and the respective rights of Faith and Philosophy. We have, then, maintained the positions, that their full reconcilia-

tion is the true aim of systematic theology, whose office it is to present the substance of the Christian faith in a scientific form, and in harmony with all other truth; that the central principle of the system, as of the revelation and of the believer's consciousness, is to be found in the person of Christ; and that such a view of Christianity will encourage whatever is healthful, and restrain what is noxious in the prevailing tendencies of our times.

And now, in conclusion, we say, the Christian system, thus viewed, gives us all that philosophy aims after, and in a more perfect form; that it also gives us more than philosophy can give; and this more than it gives is what man most needs and what reason alone never could divine. And, therefore, we conclude that it is not within the scope of the human mind to conceive a system more complete, richer in all blessings.

It gives us all that philosophy aims after, and in a more perfect form. For, in a harmonious system of Christian truth, nature, with all its laws and processes, is not denied or annulled; it is only made subservient to higher, to moral ends; its course is interrupted for a nobler purpose than a fixed order could ensure; and thus a higher dignity is imparted to it than when we consider it as only a mere succession of material changes. And its very order and harmony are best explained when regarded as the product of infinite wisdom and benevolence, acting with the wisest and most benevolent intent. All ethical truth and all great moral ends, human rights and human happiness, and a perfect social state, are included in the Christian system as truly as in philosophy; and a new glory is cast around them when they are made integral parts of a divine kingdom, established in justice and animated by love, which is not only to be realised here upon the earth, but is to reach forward even to eternity. Moral principles and ends thus retain all their meaning and value; but they are made more effective and permanent when contemplated as inherent in the nature and government of a wise and holy God, and as the basis and aim of an eternal kingdom. We thus have not merely a perfect social state here, but a holy state, animated with the very presence and power of God, for evermore. All that natural religion can prove or claim is retained, all that an internal revelation and inspiration ever boasted itself to have, is allowed by the Christ-

ian system ; but the truths of natural religion are fortified by a higher authority ; and the inward revelation is illumined by a clearer light, when it is seen in the brightness of that express manifestation of God in the person of his Son, whose teachings have both chastened and elevated all our views of God and of religion.

Thus may Christianity give us all that philosophy can give, and in a more perfect form. But it also gives us more ; and this more that it gives is what man most needs, and, unaided, never could attain. God is infinite, man is finite ; how, then, can man come unto and know his Creator and sovereign ? Man is sinful and God is holy ; how can a sinful man be reconciled to a holy God ? how can a sinful nature become regenerate ? Man is mortal, as well as sinful ; how can he obtain certainty, entire certainty, as to a future life and his eternal destiny ? Here are the real and vital problems of human destiny ; before them reason is abashed, and conscience can only warn, and man can only fear. The urgency, the intense interest of these questions no thinking mind can doubt ; the uncertainty and timidity of human reason, when it meets them, are almost proverbial. If these questions are not answered, if these problems are not solved in Christianity, they are absolutely answered nowhere. And precisely here it is that we contend that the Christian system has a permanent power, and a perfect fitness to man's condition ; for you cannot name a vital problem of our moral destiny which it does not profess to solve, and to solve in a way beyond which human thought can conceive of nothing greater, and the human heart can ask for nothing more ; in a way which is to the simplest heart most simple, and to the highest intellect most profound. The highest ideas and ends which reason can propound are really embraced, the deepest wants which man can know are truly satisfied, the sharpest antagonisms which the mind can propose, are declared to be reconciled, in the ideas, the means, and the ends which are contained in that revelation which centres in the Person of Jesus Christ our Lord.

For, the highest idea which man can frame is that of a union of divinity with humanity ; this is the very verge of a possible conception for the human intellect ; and in the Person of our

Saviour we have this idea realised in all its fulness, and with such a marvellous adaptation to human sympathies that they are made the very means of drawing us within the hallowed sphere of the glories of divinity. Through Jesus Christ, and Him alone, does finite man come to the Infinite I AM.

The highest moral problem which we can know is contained in the question, how can a sinful man be reconciled to a holy God? Here is absolutely the highest moral antagonism of the universe. And in the sacrificial death of this same Person, our great High Priest, this highest moral question is presented to us as entirely solved, and solved in such a way, that the sense of sin is not lessened but heightened, and the majesty of the law not impaired but made more glorious; while in the regenerating influence of the Holy Spirit we have the means of applying the benefits of this atonement in such a way to the heart of the sinner, that his very love of sin will at last be wholly eradicated.

The highest kingdom we can conceive to exist is one which aims at the holiness of all who belong to it; which has love for its common principle; which has for its head a Being who unites all human with all divine perfections, who has himself suffered for all the members of this kingdom, and in their stead, and who will reign over and within them, not only for this life, but also for that which is to come. In such a kingdom all are bound together by the strongest ties for the highest objects. And such is the kingdom of which Jesus Christ is the head, and redeemed men the body.

And all these questions are solved, these ideas realised, these antagonisms adjusted, and this kingdom is established, in one and the same person; all this system is concentrated in that God-man, who came from heaven to earth that he might raise us from earth to heaven, who adapted himself to our infirmities and necessities, that He might be made unto us wisdom and righteousness, sanctification and redemption.

And, therefore, dare we assert that beyond the idea of such a system, centering in such a Being, human thought is impotent to advance, and the human heart has nothing real to desire; it satisfies all within us which is not sinful, and it is its crowning glory that it subdues our sinfulness itself. Such a system-

brings together, recapitulates, all things in Christ, both which are in heaven and which are in earth; and by such a person, all things are reconciled to God, by him, the apostle says, whether they be things in earth or things in heaven.

Whence, whence came to our sinful race the idea of such a Being, of such a kingdom? Has man's reason framed it; and the human imagination, hath that gendered it? With cold eye and heart I might gaze on the face of nature in her grandest or her loveliest scenes; with intellectual delight I may scan the principles and follow out the deductions of an abstract scheme of philosophic speculation; with sublime wonder I may follow the astronomer as he describes the laws and order of firmaments and systems radiant in their solar light; I may feel all my human sympathies enlisted by any philanthropic scheme which would bring justice and love into this world so full of oppression and hatred; but when I think of the wonders of our Saviour's Person and of the glories of his redemptive work, of all his love, his love for me a sinner, his love to all so great that He could die for all; and of that blessed and perpetual kingdom which his blood has purchased and of which He is the ever-living Head; when, in some rapt moment, my heart can realise this in all its fulness, then, if ever, is my whole being filled with the profoundest emotions of awe, of gratitude, and of love. Never is the soul so conscious of its full capacities of thought and feeling, never does it throb with such unwonted and divine life, as when it has most fully grasped the majestic reality of the Christian faith, as a wondrous and harmonious whole, tending to the highest imaginable end, and centering in that glorious Being who unites divinity with humanity, and reconciles heaven with earth.

In comparison with the fulness, fitness, and sufficiency of such a system, the most colossal structure which pantheism ever reared is but as a palace of ice, cold and cheerless, contrasted with that heavenly city, whose gates are pearl, whose streets are gold, thronged with a company innumerable and exultant, vocal with the melodies of the redeemed, of which the Lamb is the light, and God the glory.

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