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ARTICLE I.

THE PLENARY INSPIRATION OF THE SCRIPTURES.

1. *Theopneusty, or the Plenary Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures.* By S. R. L. GAUSSEN, Prof. of Theology in Geneva, Switzerland. Translated by EDWARD NORRIS KIRK: Fourth American, from the second French edition, enlarged and improved by the author. New York: John S. Taylor, 143 Nassau-st. 1850.
2. Chapter vi. *Philosophy of Religion.* By J. D. MORELL, A. M., author of the *History of Modern Philosophy, etc.* New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1849.

In an article on the United States, in the October number of the Edinburgh Review, a writer to whom our country appears to contain only New England and an *outside-barbarian* territory, among many anti-slavery and some rationalistic utterances, well and truly says, that "*the question which lies at the root of all dogmatic Theology is the AUTHORITY OF THE LETTER OF SCRIPTURE.*" And there are many indications of the interest which that question is exciting on both sides of the Atlantic. The appearance of the fourth American from the second French edition of Gausсен's work, is one of these indications. Another is, that even the literary Reviews of the day are discussing it. The Edinburgh devotes to it some paragraphs in the article above named.

stooping even to our weakness, is pleased, not only to reveal to us the highest thoughts of heaven in the simplest language of earth, but also to offer them to us under forms so living, so dramatic, so penetrating, often compressing them, in order to render them more intelligible, within the narrow space of a single verse.

“It is then thus, that St. Paul, by these words thrown at hazard even into the last commission of a familiar letter, casts for us a rapid flood of light over his ministry, and discovers to us by a word, the entire life of an Apostle; as a single flash of lightning in the evening, illuminates in an instant, all the tops of our Alps; and as persons sometimes show you all their soul by a single look.” (pp. 239, 243.)

ARTICLE II.

MATTHEW XXII. 29.

“Jesus answered and said unto them, Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God.”

The triumphal entry of Jesus into Jerusalem, amid the shouts and hosannahs of the multitude; his authoritative purgation of the Temple, and his prophetic denunciations of the impending judgments of God against the Jewish Commonwealth, had roused the resentment of the Jewish authorities against him to the utmost pitch. They determined, by some means, to bring about his death. The fear of the people prevented them from open violence. They, consequently, resort to stratagem, that they might find some ground of accusation against him, which should have the effect of turning the current of popular favour into a tide of indignation, and give them a pretext, for consummating, without danger to themselves, their murderous design. The only expedient they could think of was an effort to entangle him in his talk. The Pharisees, accordingly, sent out some of their disciples with the Herodians, who proposed to him a question, so adroitly framed, that answer it as he might, it seemed impossible to avoid giving offence, either to the people, or the partizans of Cæsar. “What thinkest thou? Is it lawful to give tribute unto Cæsar, or

not?" "But Jesus perceived their wickedness and said, Why tempt ye me, ye hypocrites? Shew me the tribute money. And they brought unto him a penny. And he saith unto them, Whose is this image and superscription? They say unto him, Cæsar's. Then saith he unto them, Render therefore unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's." This answer put them completely to silence, as it turned their own traditions against them, and made them settle the question for themselves, without committing him to any principle which could justly give offence. The Pharisees being thus taken in their own craftiness, the Sadducees assailed him, with the design, it would seem, to convict him of ignorance, and in that way, to destroy his reputation as a prophet. This sect denied the reality of a future state, "they say that there is no resurrection, neither angel, nor spirit." They accordingly propounded a question which, to their minds, involved the popular faith, the faith, too, which they knew that Jesus held, in inextricable confusion. Proceeding upon the gratuitous assumption, that if men are to exist after death, the future life will be, in all respects, analogous to the present, a continuation, or rather, resumption of present relations and affinities, they could not comprehend how the conflicting rights and interests of earth could be harmoniously adjusted hereafter. It was a case which might obviously happen under the Jewish Law and in full accordance with the Divine will, that the same woman might be successively the wife of seven husbands. In the resurrection the rights of all would seem to be equal, and if each should insist upon his claim, no scheme could be devised of settling the dispute. Under this state of the controversy, we may well imagine the air of confidence with which the Sadducees approached the Saviour and put to him the question: "Therefore in the resurrection, whose wife shall she be of the seven, for they all had her?" Little did they dream that the tables would be turned against them, and their boasted wisdom made to seem but folly: that an answer, so complete and satisfactory as that contained in the text, could be returned to their question—much less that the very Moses in whom they trusted could be made to bear witness against them and establish the truths which they denied. Jesus answered and said unto them, "Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the

power of God. For in the resurrection, they neither marry, nor are given in marriage; but are as the angels of God in heaven." The hypothesis, in other words, upon which your argument proceeds, and from which it derives all its consistency, is gratuitous and false. You have assumed that the future state is to be, in all respects, analogous to the present—that the world after death is to be, on a broader scale, a reproduction of this sublunary scene. In this you are mistaken. "For in the resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven." But however difficult it may be to reconcile the doctrine of the resurrection with your preconceived opinions, and however incompatible it may seem to you with the general tenor of the Scriptures, it is clearly taught in the Bible—even in that part of it which you have represented as indirectly denying it—"But as touching the resurrection of the dead, have ye not read that which was spoken unto you by God, saying, I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob? God is not the God of the dead but of the living."

Whether modern commentators have hit the true point of our Saviour's reply or not, or whether it is possible, without larger acquaintance with the state of Jewish opinion, to apprehend its pertinency or not, are questions which I am not concerned at present to discuss. It is enough that it was felt to be conclusive at the time, both by those who assailed him and those who stood by and witnessed the rencontre—so conclusive that the multitude could not repress the expression of their astonishment, or rather, admiration and delight. "And when the multitude heard this they were astonished at his doctrine." The important thing with us is to fix our attention upon the principles involved in the discussion. We shall find them, if I am not greatly mistaken, reappearing at every stage in the history of the church. There is nothing new under the sun. This little scene at Jerusalem, in which the great founder of Christianity vindicates the fundamental doctrine of all religion, whether natural or revealed, from the ignorant and captious objections of a conceited and arrogant group of skepticks, may be taken as a type, or miniature picture of all the great battles which revelation has had to fight from that day to this, and of those other battles through

which it must yet pass until the final triumph of the Son of Man. It is true the Sadducees did not professedly reject revelation—they admitted the Divine authority of Moses and the prophets—they conceded the inspiration of the whole Jewish canon.* But there is no difference in principle betwixt rejecting a revelation wholly and absolutely on the ground of objectionable doctrines, and denying that such doctrines can by possibility be taught in an admitted revelation. It is precisely the same thing to say the book is Divine and therefore the doctrine cannot be there, and to say that the doctrine *is* there, and therefore the book cannot be Divine. He who would exclude the doctrine upon the ground that, from its intrinsic incredibility, it cannot be revealed, would exclude the revelation which professedly contained it. The Sadducees may, accordingly, be taken as the type of all who deny the possibility of any revelation, or the possibility that any particular doctrines are revealed, from measures of natural probability. They are alike the representatives of rationalists in the Church who admit the Divine authority of the Bible in general, while they deny the Divine authority of every thing in it which makes it of real value, and of rationalists out of the church who treat all claims to inspiration as contradictory and absurd and look upon prophets and apostles in the same light in which Festus contemplated Paul.

The opposition of the Sadducees, so far as it can be gathered from the Scriptures, to the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, arose from a perverse application of the laws of intrinsic probability to questions which depended upon testimony. They judged of the future by the present, and made the experience of this life the measure of possibility to the next. If it had been a question naturally suggested in the course of their speculations, or had been presented simply as a problem of philosophy to be solved by reason, they would have had no alternative but to apply the standard of intrinsic probability. As contradistinguished from instinctive beliefs, and necessary deductions from them, likeness or analogy is always the measure of inherent probability. We can judge of the unknown only by its resemblance to the known. No fact, which is

*Bucher, vol. II. p. 721. Pearson, Vindicat. Ignat. Pt. I. c. 7.

not intuitively given, or logically contained in one that is, can authenticate itself in any other way but by its correspondence to experience. The inlets of knowledge, however, are not restricted within this narrow compass. There are other measures of credibility beside the intrinsic and inherent; events can be known through other channels beside themselves. There is a credibility, arising from extrinsic considerations, considerations utterly independent of the nature and character of the phenomena themselves, which, in many cases, is found to counterbalance the strongest antecedent presumptions. Testimony is a real source of knowledge, as real as experience. It is indeed the means through which the experience of the world becomes accumulated—the channel which conducts the waters of the past into the streams of the present, and without which all intelligent communications betwixt rational creatures must be hopelessly cut off.

In all cases of testimony, in which the laws which regulate and determine its credibility are complied with, the limit of belief is no longer analogy or experience, but the will and omnipotence of God. The only instance in which it can be set aside is that in which it involves palpable contradictions. This is the doctrine of our Saviour in the text. "Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God." Nothing, in other words, is essentially incapable of being Scripture, which it is within the compass of omnipotence to make true. Whatever *can* be, *may* be, and hence the only species of internal argument which can be successfully employed against the authenticity of competent testimony is that which convicts it of contradictions to itself, or what is known to be true, and so places it beyond the province of Divine power. Possibility is always a sufficient answer to objections.

The error of the Sadducees, accordingly, was not that, in a matter dependent upon intrinsic considerations, they reasoned from what *is* to what is *likely* to be, but that, in a matter professedly of testimony, and that, too, the testimony of God, they virtually asserted that He *could* not depart from the uniform course of their experience. The unknown must be analogous to the known—what shall be a counterpart of what is.

This fundamental postulate of the Sadducee has been

pushed, in modern times, to the extreme of denying that there can be any such thing as a direct testimony from God. Every thing supernatural is excluded from the range of credibility—so that Divine truths can never be measured by any other standard but that of inherent probability. They must either prove themselves, or they can never be commended to our reason. It is, therefore, a question of immense importance, nothing less than the destinies of Christianity being involved in it, whether or not God *can* stand to man in the attitude of a *witness to truth*. The whole system of evangelical religion is a system of *authority*. It includes a series of stupendous facts, a development of purposes, plans and operations upon the part of God, which, from the nature of the case, never could be known, unless He should choose to communicate them. There are no lines of ratiocination, there are no measures of experience, there is no range of intuition, which could authenticate to us the sublime mysteries of the Gospel. What elevation of consciousness, or what intensity of moral and spiritual enthusiasm, could ever ascertain to us the appointment of a great mediator, on the part of Heaven's high chancery, to bring in an everlasting righteousness, and to open the kingdom of Heaven to all believers? Sense, indeed, might tell us that a babe was born in Bethlehem, but how shall we know that Mary's infant, wrapped in swaddling clothes, and laid in a manger, was the mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of peace? Sense might tell us that this same infant, when he had come to years, was a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief, that he was poor and houseless, that while the foxes had holes and the birds of the air had nests, he had not where to lay his head. Experience might testify that he died a death of agony and shame, the victim of a nation's vengeance and a nation's hate. But how shall we learn that the griefs which he bore were our griefs, the sorrows he carried were our sorrows—that he was wounded for our transgressions and bruised for our iniquities? How are we to reach the secret meaning in the mind of God of all that series of events which make up the biography of Jesus? These are things which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, and which never could enter into the heart of man by the natural processes of thought. They are deep things of

God, which none can know in themselves, but His own eternal Spirit; and unless He has revealed them, they are and can be to us little better than sick men's dreams. They must be known by a *Divine Testimony*, or they cannot be known at all. The question, then, is one of incalculable importance: Can God be a witness of truth to man? Can He declare to other intelligent creatures facts which *He* knows, as one man can communicate knowledge to another? What we mean by the inspiration of the Scriptures is, that they are the word of God, in a sense analogous to that in which the recorded deposition of a witness, in any case of human testimony, is *his* word. We do not mean that God has enabled men to reason out and discover for themselves truths which, without His assistance, they never could have compassed, but that He himself has informed them of the facts, and demands their faith upon the ground of His supreme veracity. They are to believe because *He says* the things are true, and not because they can *see* them to be so. This is the grand question betwixt the rationalists and the Church—whether there can be a Divine testimony—whether religion is a matter of authority or deduction—of reason or of faith.

It would be obviously impossible to show, by any direct processes of argument, that there is any thing in the mode of the Divine existence, which precludes the Deity from holding intercourse with His creatures, analogous to that which they hold with each other. We can perceive nothing in the nature of things which would lead us to suppose that God could not converse with man.

Analogy, on the contrary, would suggest that, as persons can here communicate with each other—as they can be rendered conscious of each other's existence—as they can feel the presence of one another, and interchange thoughts and emotions, the same thing might be affirmed of God. It is certainly incumbent upon the rationalist to show how God is precluded from a privilege which, so far as we know, pertains to all other personal existences. Capacity of society and converse seems to be involved in the very nature of personality, and it cannot be demonstrated that there is any thing more incomprehensible in the case of a Divine than of a human testimony. How one man knows that another man, another intelligence is before him—how he

reads the thoughts and enters into the emotions of another being, are problems as profoundly inscrutable as how a man shall know that God talks with him, and imparts to him truths which neither sense nor reason could discover. It deserves farther to be considered, that as all worship involves a direct address of the creature to the Deity, as man must *talk* to God as well as obey His laws, must love and confide in Him, as well as tremble before Him—it deserves to be considered how all this is practicable, if the communications are all to be confined to the feebler party. Religion necessarily supposes some species of communion with the object of worship, some *sense* of God; and if this is possible, I see not why the correspondence may not be extended into full consistency with the analogy of human intercourse. Certain it is that the moral nature of man, which leads him to converse with God, has in all ages induced him to hope and expect that God would converse with him. Every age has had its pretensions to Divine revelations—there have always been seers and prophets. Many have been false—have had nothing intrinsic or extrinsic to recommend them, and yet they have succeeded in gaining a temporary credit, because they addressed themselves to the natural belief that a revelation would indeed be given. Whence this natural expectation, whence this easy credulity, if the very conception of a direct communication from God involved a contradiction and absurdity?

Arguments of this sort are certainly not without their weight. They never have been and they never can be answered in the way of direct refutation. The approved method is to set them aside by the sweeping application of the principle upon which the Sadducees set aside the resurrection of the dead. Revelation and its proofs are equally supernatural, and whatever is supernatural must be false. “No just notion of the true nature of history,” says Strauss, “is possible, without a perception of the inviolability of the chain of finite causes, and of the impossibility of miracles.” The first negative canon, which this remarkable author prescribes, for distinguishing betwixt the historical and fabulous, is “when the narration is irreconcilable with the known and universal laws, which govern the course of events.” He affirms that “according to these laws, agreeing with all just philosophical conceptions, and all credible

experience, the absolute cause never disturbs the chain of secondary causes by single arbitrary acts of interposition, but rather manifests itself in the production of the aggregate of finite causalties, and of their reciprocal action." In opposition to this desolating doctrine, I shall undertake to set, in a clear light, the principle inculcated by our Saviour in the text, that in all cases of competent testimony, where the witnesses have honestly related their own convictions, and where they could not be deceived as to the facts, possibility is the sole natural limit to belief. We are bound to believe, upon competent testimony, what is not *demonstrably impossible*. The application of this law to all other cases of antecedent improbability but the supernatural will hardly be questioned, and I shall therefore discuss it with special reference to miracles.

It would seem to be a self-evident proposition, that whatever is, and is, at the same time, adapted to our cognitive faculties, is capable of being known. No doubt but that man is a little creature, and that there are and forever will remain things, locked up in the bosom of omniscience, which his slender capacities are unfitted to comprehend. But, then, there are other things, to which his faculties are unquestionably adjusted—which are not only cognizable in themselves, but cognizable by him. All that is necessary in reference to these is, that they should stand in the proper relation to the mind. When this condition is fulfilled, knowledge must necessarily take place. If an object be visible, and is placed before the eye in a sound and healthful condition of the organ, it must be seen—if a sound exist, and is in the right relation to the ear, it must be heard. Let us now take a supernatural fact—such as the raising of Lazarus from the dead, as recorded in the Gospel of John. There is not a single circumstance connected with that event which lies beyond the cognizance of our faculties. Every thing that occurred could be judged of by our senses. That he was dead, that he was buried, that the process of putrefaction had begun—that he actually came from the grave at the voice of Jesus, bound hand and foot in his grave-clothes, and that he subsequently took his part in human society, as a living man, are phenomena which no more transcend the cognitive faculties of man than the simplest circumstances of ordinary experience. I am not

now vindicating the reality of this miracle—that is not necessary to the argument in hand. All that I contend for is, that if it had been a fact, or if any other real instance of the kind should ever take place, there would be nothing in the nature of the events, considered as mere phenomena, which would place them beyond the grasp of our instruments of knowledge. They would be capable of being known by those who might be present at the scene—capable of being known according to the same laws which regulate cognition in reference to all sensible appearances. Our senses would become the vouchers of the fact, and the constitution of our nature our warrant for crediting our senses.

The skeptic himself will admit that if the first facts submitted to our experience were miraculous, there could be no antecedent presumption against them—and that we should be bound to receive them with the same unquestioning credence with which a child receives the earliest report of its senses. This admission concedes all that we now contend for—the possibility of such a relation of the facts to our faculties as to give rise to knowledge—such a connection betwixt the subject and object as to produce, according to the laws of mind, real cognition. This being granted, the question next arises, does the standard of intrinsic probability, which experience furnishes in analogy, destroy this connection? Does the constitutional belief, developed in experience, that like antecedents are invariably followed by like consequents, preclude us from believing, subsequent to experience, what we should be compelled, by the essential structure of our nature, to believe antecedent to experience? Does analogy force a man to say that he does not see what, if it were removed, he would be bound to say that he *does* see?

To maintain the affirmative is to annihilate the possibility of knowledge. The indispensable condition of all knowledge is, the veracity of consciousness. We have the same guarantee for the sensible phenomena, which are out of the analogy of experience, as for those phenomena from which that experience has been developed. If, now, consciousness cannot be credited in one case, it can be credited in none—*falsum in uno, falsum in omnibus*. If we cannot believe it after experience, it must be

a liar and a cheat, and we can have no grounds for believing it prior to experience. Universal skepticism becomes the dictate of wisdom, and the impossibility of truth the only maxim of philosophy. Consciousness must be believed on its own account, or it cannot be believed at all; and, if believed on its own account, it is equally a guarantee for every class of facts, whether supernatural or natural. To argue backwards, from a standard furnished by consciousness, to the mendacity of consciousness, in any given case, is to make it contradict itself, and thus demonstrate itself to be utterly unworthy of credit. There is no alternative betwixt admitting that, when a supernatural phenomenon is vouched for by consciousness, it is known, and, therefore, exists—or admitting that no phenomenon whatever can be known. This knowledge rests upon the same ultimate authority with all other knowledge.

But it may be asked, is not the belief of the uniformity of nature a datum of consciousness, and does not the hypothesis of miracles equally make consciousness contradict itself? By no means. There is no real contradiction in the case. The datum of consciousness, as truly given, is that, under the same circumstances, the same antecedent will invariably be followed by the same consequents. It is not that when the antecedent is given, the consequent will invariably appear, but that it will appear, if the conditions, upon which the operation of its cause depends, are fulfilled. Cases constantly happen in which the antecedent is prevented from putting forth its efficacy—it is held in check by a power superior to itself. “Continually we behold, in the world around us, lower laws held in restraint by higher—mechanic by dynamic, chemical by vital, physical by moral—yet we say not, when the lower thus gives place to higher, that there was any violation of law, that anything contrary to nature came to pass: rather we acknowledge the law of a greater freedom swallowing up the law of a lesser. Thus, when I lift my arm, the law of gravitation is not, as far as my arm is concerned, denied, or annihilated: it exists as much as ever; but is held in suspense by the higher law of my will. The chemical laws which would bring about decay in animal substances, still subsist, even when they are hemmed in and hindered by the salt which keeps these substances

from corruption.”* When the consequents, therefore, in any given case, are not such as we should previously have expected, the natural inference is, not that our senses are mendacious, and that the facts are not what consciousness represents them to be, but that the antecedents have been modified or counteracted by the operation of some other cause. The conditions upon which their connection with their sequences depends do not obtain. The facts, as given by the senses, must be taken, and the explanation of the variety is a legitimate problem of the reason.

Suppose, for example, that a man, uninstructed in physical science, should visit the Temple of Mecca, and behold the coffin of Mahomet, if the story be true, unsupported by any visible support, suspended in the air, would it be his duty to believe that, because all experience testifies that heavy bodies, left to themselves, fall to the ground, therefore the phenomenon, as given by his senses, in the present case, must be a delusion?—or would it not rather be the natural inference, as he could not possibly doubt what he saw,—that the coffin was *not* left to itself—that, though inscrutable to him, there must be *some* cause which counteracted and held in check the operation of gravity. “In order,” says Mill, in one of the most valuable works which has been published in the present century,† “that any alleged fact should be contradictory to a law of causation, the allegation must be, not simply that the cause existed, without being followed by the effect, for that would be no uncommon occurrence, but that this happened in the absence of any adequate counteracting cause. Now, in the case of an alleged miracle, the assertion is the exact opposite of this. It is, that the effect was defeated, not in the absence, but in consequence of a counteracting cause, namely, a direct interposition of an act of the will of some being who has power over nature, and, in particular, of a being whose will having originally endowed all the causes with the powers by which they produce their effects, may well be supposed able to counteract them. A miracle, as was justly remarked by Brown, is no contradiction to the law of cause and effect; it is a new effect, supposed to be produced by the introduction of a new cause.” A man is, accordingly, in no case, permit-

* Trench, on Miracles.

† Mill's System of Logic.

ted to call into question the veracity of his senses ; he is to admit what he sees, and what he cannot but see, and, when the phenomena lie beyond the range of ordinary experience, it is the dictate of philosophy to seek for a cause which is adequate to produce the effect. This is what the laws of his nature require him to do.

It is obvious, from these considerations, that, if sensible miracles can exist, they can be *known* ; and, if they can be known by those under the cognizance of whose senses they immediately fall, they can be proved to others through the medium of human testimony. The celebrated argument of Mr. Hume, against this proposition, proceeds upon a false assumption as to the nature of the law by which testimony authenticates a fact. He forgets that the credibility of testimony is in itself—not in the object for which it vouches : it must be believed on its own account, and not that of the phenomena asserted. In all reasoning upon this subject, the principle of cause and effect lies at the basis of the process. A witness, strictly speaking, only puts us in possession of the convictions of his own mind, and the circumstances under which those convictions were produced. These convictions are an effect for which the constitution of our nature prompts us to seek an adequate cause ; and, where no other satisfactory solution can be given, but the reality of the facts, to which the witness himself ascribes his impressions, then we admit the existence of the facts. But, if any other satisfactory cause can be assigned, the testimony should not command our assent. There is room for hesitation and doubt. If a man, for example, afflicted with the jaundice, should testify that the walls of a room were yellow, we might be fully persuaded of the sincerity of his own belief ; but, as a cause, in the diseased condition of his organs, could be assigned, apart from the reality of the fact, we should not feel bound to receive his statement. Two questions, consequently, must always arise in estimating the value of testimony. The first respects the sincerity of the witnesses—do they or do they not express the real impressions that have been made upon their own minds ? This may be called the fundamental condition of testimony—without it, the statements of a witness cannot properly be called testimony at all. The second, respects the cause of these convictions—are there any known principles, which,

under the circumstances in which the witnesses were placed, can account for their belief, without an admission of the fact to which they themselves ascribe it? When we are satisfied upon these two points—that the witnesses are sincere, and that no causes apart from the reality of the facts, can be assigned in the case, then the testimony is entitled to be received without hesitation. The presumption is always in favor of the cause actually assigned, until the contrary can be established. If this be the law of testimony, it is evident that the intrinsic probability of phenomena does not directly affect their credibility. What is inherently probable, may be proved upon slighter testimony than what is antecedently unlikely—not that additional credibility is imparted to the testimony—but additional credibility is imparted to the phenomena—there being two separate and independent sources of proof. The testimony is still credible only upon its own grounds. In the case, accordingly, of sensible miracles, in which the witnesses give unimpeachable proofs of the sincerity of their own belief, it is incumbent upon the skeptick to show how this belief was produced, under the circumstances in which the witnesses were placed, before he is at liberty to set aside the facts. He must show “how the witnesses came to believe so and so,” if there were no foundation in reality. The testimony must be accounted for and explained, or the miracle must be admitted through the operation of the same law which authenticates testimony in every other case. It is an idle evasion to say that men sometimes lie: no doubt there are many lies, and many liars in the world. But we are not speaking of a case in which men fabricate a story, giving utterance to statements which they do not themselves believe. That is not properly a case of testimony. We are speaking of instances in which the witness *honestly* believes what he says; and, surely, there are criteria by which sincerity can be satisfactorily established. With respect to such instances, we affirm that there can be but two suppositions—either the witness was deceived, or the facts were real. The question of the credibility of the testimony turns upon the likelihood of delusion in the case; and, where it is one in which the delusion cannot be affirmed without affirming at the same time, the mendacity

of the senses, the miracle is proved, or no such thing as extrinsic proof exists on the face of the earth.

But it may be contended that although testimony has its own laws, and must be judged of by them, yet, in the case of miracles, there is a contest of opposite probabilities—the extrinsic, arising from testimony in their favor—and the intrinsic, arising from analogy, against them, and that our belief should be determined by the preponderating evidence, which must always be the intrinsic, in consequence of its concurrence with general experience. The fallacy here consists in supposing that these two probabilities are directed to the same point. The truth is, the internal probability amounts only to this, that the same antecedents, under the conditions indispensable to their operation, will produce the same effects. The external is, that in the given case, the necessary conditions were not fulfilled. There is, consequently, no collision, and the law of testimony is left in undisturbed operation. It is clear that Mr. Hume would never have thought of constructing his celebrated argument against the credibility of miracles, if he had not previously believed that miracles were phenomena which could never authenticate themselves—that they were, in their own nature, incapable of being known. This is the conclusion which he really aimed to establish, under the disguise of his deceitful ratiocinations—the conclusion which legitimately flows from his premises, and a consistent element of that general system of skepticism which he undertook to rear, by setting our faculties at war with each other and making the data of consciousness contradictory, either in themselves or their logical results. If he had believed miracles to be cognizable, he would, perhaps, have had no hesitation in admitting, that what a man would be authorized to receive upon the testimony of his own senses, he would be equally authorized to receive upon the testimony of the senses of other men. What is cognizable by others—all having the same essential constitution—is cognizable by us through them. We see with their eyes, and hear with their ears. The only case in which the intrinsic and extrinsic probabilities come into direct collision, is that in which the alleged fact involves a contradiction, and is,

therefore, impossible. In all other cases, testimony simply gives us a new effect.

The skepticism of Mr. Hume, and the disciples of the same school, it is almost needless to observe, is in fatal contradiction to the whole genius and spirit of the inductive philosophy. Observers, not masters—interpreters, not legislators, of nature—we are to employ our faculties, and implicitly receive whatever, in their sound and healthful condition, they report to be true. We are not to make phenomena, but to study those which God has submitted to our consciousness. If antecedent presumptions should be allowed to prevail, the extraordinary, as contradistinguished from the facts of every-day life, the new, the strange, the uncommon—the mirabile any more than the miraculum—never could be established. To make a limited and uniform experience the measure of existence is to deny that experience itself is progressive, and to reduce all ages and generations to a heartless stagnation of science. The spirit of modern philosophy revolts against this bondage. It has long since ceased to wonder—long since learned to recognize every thing as credible which is not impossible—it explores every region of nature, every department of existence—its excursions are for facts—it asks for nothing but a sufficient extrinsic probability; and, when this is furnished, it proceeds with its great work of digesting them into order, tracing out their correspondencies and resemblances, referring them to general laws, and giving them their place in the ever-widening circle of science. When they are stubborn and intractable, standing out in insulation and independence, and refusing to be marshalled into systems, they are still retained, as phenomena yet to be accounted for, and salutary mementoes of human ignorance. But no man of science, in the present day, would ever think of rejecting a fact because it was strange or unaccountable. The principle is universally recognized that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamed of in our philosophy. If Hume's laws were the law of philosophy, where would have been the sciences of chemistry, of galvanism, electricity, geology and magnetism? With what face could the palaeontologist come out with his startling disclosures of the memorials of extinct generations and

perished races of animals? What would be said of aerial iron and stones?—and where would have been that sublimest of all theories, the Copernican theory of the heavens? The philosopher is one who regards everything, or nothing, as a wonder.

The remarks of Butler are not only philosophically just, but worthy of Bacon himself, when he asserts that miracles must not be compared to common natural events, or to events which, though uncommon, are similar to what we daily experience, but to the extraordinary phenomena of nature. It is nothing worth to say that these extraordinary phenomena may be subsequently explained, in the way in which physical philosophers account for events. That was not known, when they were first authenticated to consciousness. They had to be believed, before they could be explained. Miracles, too, when we reach a higher pinnacle of knowledge, may appear to be as natural as the wonders of physicks. The conclusion, then, would seem to be established, that as the will of God is the sole measure of existence, so the power of God, or the possibility of the event, is the sole limit to the credibility of testimony.

The only question, therefore, which remains to be discussed—is whether miracles are possible. And as all who admit a God who is not himself the victim of fate, nor identical with the universe He has made, will readily acknowledge the physical possibility of supernatural events, the form in which the question deserves to be discussed, is, whether we have any reason to believe that God; in fact, never will disturb the settled progress of events. Is it inconsistent with any of the perfections of His character?

A miracle differs from an ordinary phenomenon, not in the power which is necessary to produce it, but in the conditions under which that power is exerted. “The grass growing, the seed springing, the sun rising” are as much the results of the will and omnipotence of God, as “the water made wine, the sick healed, the blind restored to vision,” or the dead raised to life. The distinction betwixt the miracle and ordinary events is not, that in the one case God is the agent, and, in the other, He is not, but that in the one case, His agency is conducted in conformity with general laws, and in the other it is not. In the course of nature, appearances take place according to a fixed order,

there is an established succession of antecedents and consequents, of causes and effects. Changes never occur in material substances but by virtue of properties in consequence of which, when the proper adjustments take place, they can act upon each other. But God gave the substances these properties, preserves them in being and concurs in all their operations. Without His will, which is only another name for His power, they could neither be, nor act. Indeed it may be doubted whether general laws, even when employed to express the active properties of matter are any thing more than compendious statements of facts which the Deity, under certain conditions, uniformly produces. It may be doubted whether the only efficient agent in the Universe be not the Almighty himself. But in the miracle, the power of God is exerted independently of general laws. "An extraordinary divine causality belongs to them. The unresting activity of God, which at other times hides and conceals itself behind the veil of what we term natural laws, does in the miracle unveil itself; it steps out from its concealment and the hand which works is laid bare." According to this distinction the question before us is whether the Almighty, after having once put forth an extraordinary exercise of power in the creation of the Universe and the arrangement and adjustment of all the substances which compose it, has forever restricted His subsequent operation to the analogy of the laws He has established. The only philosophical argument which I have ever seen alleged against the subsequent freedom of the Deity, proceeds upon an hypothesis, in relation to the nature of the universe, which has always appeared to me to have more poetry than truth. It represents it as an organic whole, whose unity is preserved by a regular series of separate developements concurring in a common result. This seems to be the notion, if he had any, which Strauss intended to convey, when he said—"since our idea of God requires an immediate, and our idea of the world, a mediate Divine operation; and since the idea of combination of the two species of action is inadmissible; nothing remains for us but to regard them both as so permanently and immoveably united, that the operation of God on the world continues for ever and every where twofold, both immediate and mediate; which comes just to this, that it is neither

of the two, or this distinction loses its value." The universe, in conformity with what I take to be the meaning of this passage, is not unfrequently represented as a living organism, the properties of matter being strictly analogous to vital forces, the developement of which is like the growth of an animal body. This view, I am sorry to say, disfigures that masterly work, the *Cosmos* of Humboldt. The design of his introductory remarks, is "not solely to draw attention to the importance and greatness of the physical history of the universe, for in the present day these are too well understood to be contested, but likewise to prove how, without detriment to the stability of special studies, we may be enabled to generalize our ideas by concentrating them in one common focus, and thus arrive at a point of view from which all the organisms and forces of nature may be seen as one living, active whole, animated by one sole impulse."

This scheme, so far as the question of miracles is concerned, differs nothing from the old mechanical theory of the universe. According to that hypothesis the world was a machine, constructed by the Deity and subjected to the operation of general laws which were to preserve and regulate its motions. According to this, it is an animal, endued with vital energies which secure its developement and growth. In that case, God stood aloof as a passive spectator to contemplate the operations and results of His workmanship, or if He interfered it was only to keep the machine agoing; in this He stands aloof in the same way with something more of admiration at His skill, or only interferes to keep the animal alive. The argument against miracles in either case is that the order and unity are broken.

When we consider the immensity of the universe, and the magnitude and extent of that government, physical and moral, which God has been conducting, from the beginning, over all His creatures, whether material or intelligent, the conclusion forces itself upon us, that the plan of the universe is a point upon which we have not the faculties to dogmatize. The idea of comprehending all things in their causes and relations has sprung from that philosophy which sneering at the induction of experience, as nothing more than empirical pretensions, has undertaken

to ascend to the fountain of universal being, and thence surveying existence in itself, and in its relation, to unveil to us the nature of the Deity, and explain, from first to last, the derivation of all created things. True science, on the other hand, aspiring only to a relative knowledge of existence, instead of futile and abortive attempts to construct a universe, or to fix the *το παν* as a positive element of consciousness, takes its stand, in conformity with the sublime maxim of Bacon, as the minister, not the master, the interpreter, not the legislator of nature. Professing its incompetence to pronounce beforehand what kinds of creatures the Almighty should have made, and what kinds of laws the Almighty should have established, and what kinds of agency He himself should continue to put forth, it is content to study the phenomena presented to it, in order to discover what God has wrought. Without presuming to determine what *must* be, it humbly and patiently inquires what *is*. The spirit of true philosophy is much more a confession of ignorance than a boast of knowledge. Newton exhibited it, when after all his splendid discoveries, he compared himself to a child who had gathered up a few pebbles upon the sea shore, while the great ocean of truth lay undiscovered before him. Laplace exhibited it, when he spoke of the immensity of nature, and human science as but a point; and Butler was a living example of it, in the uniform modesty of his confessions and the caution and meekness of his researches. Shall man, the creature of yesterday, whose mother is corruption and whose sister is the worm, who at best can only touch, in his widest excursions, the hem of Jehovah's garment, shall man undertake to counsel the Holy One as to the plan He shall pursue? Is it not intolerable arrogance in a creature, whose senses are restricted to a point, who is confessedly incompetent to declare what ends it may be the design of the Deity to accomplish in creation and providence, who cannot explain to us why the world has sprung into being at all with its rich variety of scenery, vegetation and life, who is unable to tell the meaning of this little scene in the midst of which he is placed, is it not intolerable arrogance in him, to talk of comprehending the height and depth, the length and breadth of that Eternal purpose, which began to be unfolded, when creation was evoked from emptiness and the

silence and solitude of vacancy were broken by the songs of angels bursting into light, and which shall go on unfolding, in larger and fuller proportions, through the boundless cycles of eternity? Our true position is in the dust. We are of yesterday and know nothing. This plan of God, it is high as heaven, what can we know—deep as hell, what can we do? Our ignorance upon this subject is a full and sufficient answer to the folly and presumption of those who confidently assert that its order would be broken and its unity disturbed by the direct interposition of Omnipotence? Who told these philosophers that the plan itself does not contemplate interventions of the kind? Who has assured them that He, who knew the end from the beginning, has not projected the scheme of His government upon a scale, which included the occasional exhibition of Himself in the direct exercise of power? Who has taught them that miracles are an invasion, instead of an integral portion, of the Divine administration? It is frivolous to answer objections which proceed upon the infinitely absurd supposition that we know the *whole* of the case.

But though the idea of a universe as a living, self-developing organism cannot be sustained, though the unity of nature is nothing but the harmony of Divine operations, and creation and providence only expressions of the Divine decrees, though the whole case is one which confessedly transcends our faculties, yet something we can know, and that something creates a positive presumption in favour of miracles. We know that God has erected a moral government over men, and that this sublunary state, whatever other ends it may be designed to accomplish, is a theatre for human education and improvement. We cannot resist the impression that the earth was made for man and not man for the earth. He is master here below. This earth is a school in which God is training him for a higher and nobler state. If the end, consequently, of the present constitution and course of nature can be helped forward by occasional interpositions of the Deity, in forms and circumstances which compel us to recognize His hand, the order of the world is preserved and not broken. When the pantheist "charges the miracle with resting on a false assumption of the position which man occupies in the universe, as flattering the notion that nature is to serve him, he not to

bow to nature, it is most true that it does rest on this assumption. But this is only a change would tell *against* it, supposing that true, which, so far from being truth, is, indeed, its first great falsehood of all, namely the substitution of a God of nature, in the place of a God of men." Admit the supremacy of God's moral government, and there is nothing which commends itself more strongly to the natural expectations of men than that He shall teach His creatures what was necessary to their happiness according to the exigencies of their case. Miraculous interventions have, according, been a part of the creed of humanity from the fall to the present hour.

But laying speculation aside, the researches of modern science are rapidly exploding the prejudices which pantheism, on the one hand, and a blind devotion to the supremacy of laws on the other, have created and upheld against all extraordinary interventions of God. The appearances of our globe are said to be utterly inexplicable upon any hypothesis which does not recognize the fact that the plan of creation was so framed from the beginning as to include, at successive periods, the direct agency of the Deity. The earth proclaims, from her hills and dales, her rocks, mountains and caverns, that she was not originally made and placed in subjection to laws which themselves have subsequently brought her to her present posture. She has not developed herself into her present form, nor peopled herself with her present inhabitants. That science which, at its early dawn, was hailed as the handmaid of infidelity and skepticism, and which may yet have a controversy with the records of our faith, not entirely adjusted, has turned the whole strength of its resources against the fundamental principle of rationalism. It has broken the charm which our limited experience had made so powerful against miracles, and has presented the physical government of God in a light which positively turns analogy in favor of the supernatural. The geologist begins with miracles—every epoch in his science repeats the number, and the whole earth to his mind is vocal with the name. He finds their history wherever he turns, and he would as soon think of doubting the testimony of sense as the inference which the phenomena bear upon their face. Future generations will wonder that in the nineteenth century men gravely dis-

puted whether God could interpose, in the direct exercise of His power, in the world He has made. The miracle, a century hence, will be made as credible as any common fact. Let the earth be explored—let its physical history be traced—and a mighty voice will come to us, from the tombs of its perished races, testifying, in a thousand instances, to the miraculous hand of God. Geology and the Bible must kiss and embrace each other, and this youngest daughter of science will be found, like the eastern magi, bringing her votive offerings to the cradle of the Prince of peace. The earth can never turn traitor to its God, and its stones have already begun to cry out against those who attempted to extract from them a lesson of infidelity or atheism.

The case of Christian miracles is strikingly analogous to those with which Geology presents us in the physical government of God. Christianity is a new creation—the production of a new order of things, from the chaos and ruin of the Fall. All beginnings must be extraordinary. A fact so stupendous as the incarnation of the Deity, and His personal appearance in a world which He came to renovate and redeem, could not be without some visible attestations. Behold, says he, I come to make all things new. “He came,” says the eloquent author of the history of the Reformation, “to create a new world, new heavens and a new earth. He came to achieve a spiritual creation, no less wonderful than the visible creation. Who, then, will be astonished that God displayed His power when He came to create, and that He acted directly and not according to certain laws which He had made, when He came to form something entirely new, and had not yet been subjected to any rule or law? I am not astonished that, at the first creation, God said, Let there be light, and there was light. I am not astonished that, at the sound of His mighty voice, the earth produced its fountains, the trees sprang forth and bore fruit, and the waters, the earth and the air produced living creatures in abundance. Neither do I wonder that when, in the second creation, that voice which created the heavens and the earth was again heard, the blind recovered their sight, the maimed walked, the deaf heard, the winds and the waves were calmed, the water was turned into wine, and five barley loaves and

two fishes, being multiplied, at the hands of the Being who formed the world, with all its productions and its treasures, were sufficient to nourish five thousand persons." The great miracle is God *manifest* in the flesh, and all the other prodigies recorded in the Gospels are just the species of phenomena we should have expected when He was present on the mysterious errand of His grace. They are consistent parts of the scheme, and are brought into full and perfect analogy with the undoubted miracles which the earth reveals to the investigations of science.

Whatever presumptions may operate against mere prodigies, without aim or end, cannot be brought to bear against miracles, intended to confirm religion, and much less a religion whose fundamental doctrine would exact them as a matter of course. Under no circumstances impossible—under these they are actually credible.

We have now proved that miracles can exist—that the only natural limit to the credibility of testimony does not obtain in their case, and that consequently they should be admitted as readily as any other facts, when they are duly authenticated by evidence. That the testimony is sufficient in the case of Christian miracles, no one would ever have dreamed of doubting, who acknowledges the possibility of the supernatural at all. Rationalism has never fairly encountered the historical facts in the case. It has sweepingly asserted that the phenomena could not have been as they are represented to have been, and then proceeds to explain the narrative according to this arbitrary hypothesis. But if the facts *could*, indeed, have been precisely what the sacred writers have affirmed, there is no presumption which sets aside their testimony. The miracles were wrought.

What, then? The inspiration of the Scriptures, in the sense which makes them a real testimony of God, is unanswerably established. I am far from asserting that miracles are so connected, in the nature of things, with a Divine commission, that, wherever they are proved to exist, inspiration must be admitted as a necessary inference. There is no logical connection that the human mind is capable of tracing between the supernatural communication of power and the supernatural communication of knowledge. It is certainly conceivable that one might be able to heal the

sick and raise the dead, who could neither predict future contingencies nor speak with the authority of God. But the proposition which I maintain is this: that wherever a man professes to be charged with a Divine message, and appeals to miracles as the proof of his commission, the miracles, in that case, are conclusive of the point. They are the great seals of Heaven which authenticate his claim, and establish his right to be believed. The reason is obvious. The antecedent presumption against the pretension to work miracles is precisely the same as the antecedent presumption against his pretensions to inspiration. When he actually performs the miracle, he removes that presumption against his veracity—his testimony stands clear of all suspicion—there is rather additional presumption in its favour. The miracle is a specimen of that intimacy of connection with the Deity, which inspiration supposes, and on account of which it is inherently improbable. In addition to this, as the power of all creatures over nature is nothing but a skilful obedience to her laws, none can work, apart from those laws, but the Almighty himself. It is a great mistake to suppose that devils, angels, or men, without a special interposition of the Deity, can produce effects independently of the properties of matter, or the laws which regulate the universe. They may reach the mirabile, but never the miraculum. They may, through superior knowledge, effect combinations and invent machinery, which, to the ignorant and uneducated, may produce effects that shall appear to transcend the capabilities of a creature, but they never can rise above nor dispense with the laws they have mastered. God, then, alone can perform a real miracle. When, then, a man professes to have a commission from Him, and appeals, in proof, to a phenomenon which none but God could achieve, it is contrary to all our notions of the Divine character, that God should aid him in a lie. He affirms that God is with him, and God responds to the declaration by manifesting His presence. Can we suspect that He would thus countenance deceit?

If miracles, therefore, pledge the Divine veracity to the truth of a man's own statements when he appeals to them, the inspiration of the Scriptures may be easily confirmed. Apostles and prophets professed to speak according to the motions of the Holy Ghost. The words which they uttered

and the records which they wrote, they ascribed to Him who alone can search the deep things of God, and impart something of the Divine omniscience to the feeble capacities of man. God confirmed their testimony by signs and wonders. He set His own seal to the truth of their declarations, and the Bible is, accordingly, what they have represented it to be, or they have palmed a lie upon the world, and God was a party to the fraud. We have, then, in the Scriptures, a *Divine Testimony*—the word of God, which liveth and abideth forever.

I have been earnest in insisting on the credibility of miracles, from a painful and growing apprehension that some of the worst forms of rationalism are likely to get a footing among us. The scheme of interpretation which was begun by Eichhorn and completed by Paulus, which, while it retains the historical facts of the New Testament, attempts to reduce the miracles to natural phenomena, has died out in the land of its birth. The natural and supernatural are so inseparably blended in the sacred narratives that one cannot be abandoned without the surrender of the other. Neither is it likely that the system which succeeded it, and which has drawn able defenders to its standard, and in which the historical books of the New Testament are treated as myths and legendary stories, "the halo of glory with which the infant church gradually, and without any purpose of deceit, clothed its founder and its head," it is not at all likely that this system will ever prevail among us. When we deny the authenticity of the Scriptures, we shall turn scoffers at once. But there is a school agreeing with the naturalist and mythical interpreters in rejecting every thing supernatural, and particularly the personal union of two natures in Christ—which yet undertakes to find a foundation in fact for a real redemption and for a real Christ. And as it rejects the authority of the Scriptures, the question arises, how shall we know who Christ is, and what he has done? The answer is characteristic: We are not, with the Protestant, to appeal to the authority of Scripture, nor with the Catholic to the authority of the Church. We are to plunge into the depths of Christian consciousness, to study the effects which have been wrought in believers by their connection and sympathy with the Christian community, and from these effects ascend to the

causes which produced them in the living power of an original example. The feelings of believers are the sole standard of religious truth—this is the Bible, the law and the testimony of Eclectic Rationalists. In their own souls is the only history of Christ recorded which is worthy of credit. We ask in vain how feeling becomes a voucher for fact? Why an ideal example may not have the same effect as a real one?—and how it happens, if the supernatural must be rejected, that the beginning is more perfect than the end? It is for the sake of such wretched speculations that we are modestly asked to close our Bibles, and to listen to the dreams of transcendentalists and visionaries. And why these schemes? Why has the testimony of antiquity to the historical authenticity of the Sacred Scriptures been set aside? Why are they represented as a collection of legendary stories, invented as the drapery of religious enthusiasm? Why has a Divine testimony been denied, and a religion of authority and faith sneered at and scouted? Only because these High Priests of nature have determined, in their wisdom, that a miracle is impossible. To this crotchet of a conceited and pantheistic philosophy we are to sacrifice a system which is as glorious to God as it is precious to man. We are to give up the mystery that God was manifest in the flesh—we are to trample on the blood of Jesus as an unmeaning thing—renounce as a dream his intercession for us at God's right hand, and consign to the folly and superstition of Pharisees and Galileans the sublime hopes connected with the resurrection of the dead! My brethren!—shall we do it? Never, while there is a sin to be pardoned, a grave to be feared, a hell to be dreaded, a God to be met—never. The blood of Jesus is too unspeakably precious, the hopes of the Gospel too unspeakably glorious, to be abandoned and despised for the mystical rhapsodies of the darkest philosophy that ever puzzled the earth. Jesus and the resurrection I know; but to these speculatists and sophists I may say—who are ye?

But it is time to bring these remarks to a close, and I shall do it in a brief application to yourselves. You will perceive, if my reasoning has been conclusive, that the ground on which the doctrines and statements of the Scriptures are to be received is extrinsick, and not intrin-

sick probability. It is the witness we credit, and not the inherent credibility of the truth. The argument of the Bible is a brief one—the mouth of the Lord hath spoken; and if in the case of human testimony, the only natural limit to belief is the limit of possibility, *a fortiori*, in the case of a Divine testimony, we are implicitly to receive whatever does not involve a contradiction. It is upon this principle that we find the word of God uniformly commending that faith as the strongest and most excellent, which, in the midst of objections that analogy could not answer, boldly entrenched itself in the power of God.—Abraham is a conspicuous example. The command to sacrifice his son, while the continued existence of that son was evidently indispensable to the fulfilment of the promise, that Isaac should have a seed, numberless as the stars of Heaven, or the sands upon the seashore, was well fitted to stagger his reason. The difficulty was one which no principles of analogy could surmount; and yet the Patriarch triumphantly fell back upon the omnipotence of God—being fully persuaded that what the Almighty had promised, He was able also to perform. Paul, too, when pressed with the difficulties which, upon the principles of nature, beset the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, cut the knot by a similar appeal to the almightiness of God: “Why should it be thought a thing incredible with you that God should raise the dead?” My young friends, follow these examples. Believe God at all hazards—this is the highest reason—and you may rest assured that the Divine power will always be the guarantee of the Divine veracity. Hath He said, and shall He not perform it? Hath He spoken, and shall He not make it good? Stagger not through unbelief, until you encounter an impossibility.

In the next place, remember, I beseech you, that faith in miracles, or even in the Divine authority of Christianity, is not faith in Christ. It is to be feared that too many, who have zealously defended the miracles of nature, have yet been a stranger to the nobler miracle of grace. Jesus is presented to us distinctively as a Saviour, and it will avail nothing to admit that His claims are worthy of credit, while we refuse to entrust to Him the salvation of the soul. The faith which communicates redemption is

not in a record about Christ, but in Christ Himself. It is an eye which sees His glory— a ear which hears His voice—a heart which feels His preciousness—a life which obeys His commands. We must be in Christ—we must die with Him and rise with Him, if we ever hope to reign with Him. This faith is no offspring of nature,—it is the production of God's Holy Spirit—it is Heaven's own gift; and if we would indeed be saved, we should give no rest to our eyes, nor slumber to our eyelids, until we have found Him, of whom the Scriptures are only a testimony. To this faith, my friends, during your whole course in College, I have assiduously endeavoured to bring you—I have argued, entreated, expostulated and warned; and my heart trembles within me, as the terrible suggestion occurs to me, that some of you, too many of you, are leaving these walls without it, and may yet die in your sins. Let my voice, I beseech you, still ring in your ears, when you leave these scenes. As you encounter the allurements and temptations of the world, think of that friend who has often—amid sickness, exhaustion and despondency, pointed you to the Lamb—that Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world. Think of that friend, not personally, though he would love to be remembered in your affections, but of his counsels, his labours, and prayers; and God may yet permit me, after many days, to find the bread which I have cast upon the waters.

Finally, my brethren, let me beseech you to make the Bible your habitual study. I feel that there is a peculiar propriety in my addressing you in this strain, as you did me the honour to make a striking manifestation of your regard by the present of this splendid copy of the Scriptures. This book is, in some sort, a sign betwixt you and me. You are about to enter into life amidst troublous scenes. Dark clouds are gathering in the atmosphere, and our country is calling on us to stand by her side in the dangers which beset her. Depend upon it that the loftiest patriotism is that which is inspired by the precepts of the Bible. My firm conviction is that the commotions which are agitating the nations and people of the present day—the angry strifes of conflicting parties and sects in the political world—will never be hushed until the authority of the Bible is permitted to supersede the vain speculations

of man. We can never hope to roll back the tide of fanaticism, which is setting not merely against our institutions, but against all that stimulates industry and secures property, until we oppose the rock of Christianity against the heaving billows. The spirit of radicalism which is abroad in the earth is the legitimate fruit of pantheism. It sprang from the schools of philosophy, and the havock and desolation which it every where threatens to scatter among existing institutions, can be successfully resisted, only by the principles of that Book, which is "the pillar of society, the safeguard of nations, the parent of social order, which alone has power to curb the fury of the passions, and secure to every one his rights; to the laborious, the reward of their industry, to the rich, the enjoyment of their wealth, to nobles the preservation of their honours and to princes the stability of their thrones." Go then, my friends, with the Bible in your hands and the doctrines of the Bible in your hearts, and your country may well bid you welcome to the scenes in which you must mingle—go forth as Christian patriots and may the God of nations go with you.—Farewell.

ARTICLE III.

THE FREE GRACE OF GOD AND THE FREE WILL OF MAN.

The following is a translation from the Latin, of a part of a Treatise with the above title, written in England in the latter part of the sixteenth century, by William Perkins, one of the old Puritan Divines.*

* Wm. Perkins was born in 1558, educated at Cambridge, where he became fellow of his College, and also a parish priest. He died in 1602, aged 44. In early life he was profane, prodigal and given to intemperance; but when reformed, he became eminent for piety and an exemplary life.

He was a Puritan, and as such repeatedly persecuted: was strictly Calvinistic, a very popular and faithful preacher, and a voluminous writer. His works, which were printed at Geneva, 1603, in three vol. fol. have been much read and admired, on the continent.

See Brook's *Lives of the Puritans*, vol. II. p. 129, &c.

Murdock's *Ed. Mosheim's Ch. Hist.* vol. III. p. 220, note 79.