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ARTICLE I.

DOMESTIC LITERATURE.

Tallulah and other Poems. By HENRY R. JACKSON.
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POETRY is both the beginning and the climax of a nation's literature. It not only reduces the jargon of a half-formed language to harmony, but, when thus harmonized, adduces from it its highest and most perfect combinations. As the same spirit of God that arranged and beautified the primal chaos—separated also, from its unintelligent order, its last and highest work, man—so the genius of the poet not only combines, into a harmonious language, the rude accents of a semi-barbarous people, but exalts, so to speak, upon that language, when formed, its noblest and highest monument—the drama, or the epic.

The historical facts that prove this proposition are curious and interesting. The oldest literature in the world is the Jewish. Of that literature, Moses was (instrumentally) the father. But Moses was not only a poet, but the very prince of poets. The Song of Miriam at the Red Sea, and his Farewell to Israel on the plains of Moab, have never been surpassed. But he is the author, either by origin or translation, of the book of Job. The style, age, general character, and especially its incorporation into the Holy Scriptures, all indicate Moses as its author,

And we declare it as our solemn and fixed conviction, that the South can never be respected abroad—prosperous at home—and truly great—without a literature of her own. She must have not only her own schools and colleges, but her own books and authors—not simply her own newspapers, but her own reviews—not *a* literature, but *her own* literature. This will make her nobly independent—this will cast around her a defence better than fortresses—more powerful than armies. This will give her the consciousness of importance—will create genuine self-respect—and will make her to stand an equal among equals in the family of nations.

ARTICLE II.

VALIDITY OF POPISH BAPTISM.

[This article, which will be followed by others, in consecutive numbers of the Review, is a re-publication of a series of articles which appeared, in 1846, in the columns of the *Watchman and Observer*. They are now collected and re-published, not with a design to revive the controversy which occasioned them, but at the desire of many who are anxious to see them before the public in a more permanent and accessible form.—EDS. S. P. R.]

The remarks which appeared in the *Princeton Review*, the July number of the past year, [1845,] upon the decision of the Assembly, in regard to the validity of Romish baptism, deserve a more elaborate reply than they have yet received. The distinguished reputation of the scholar to whom they are ascribed, and the evident ability with which they are written—for, whatever may be said of the *soundness* of the argument, the *ingenuity* and *skill* with which it is put cannot be denied—entitle them to special consideration. And as the presumption is, that they embody the *strongest* objections which *can* be proposed to the decision in question, a refutation of them is likely to be a complete and triumphant defence of the action of the Assembly. Under ordinary circumstances, it might be

attributed to arrogance, in ordinary men, to enter the lists with Princeton; but truth always carries such fearful odds in its favor, that the advocate of a just cause need not dread, with far inferior ability, to encounter those whom he may regard in some degree the patrons of error.

As in the General Assembly it was maintained by those who denied the validity of Popish Baptism, that the ordinance itself was so corrupted in its constituent elements—its matter and its form—that it could not be treated as the institution of Christ—and that the Papal communion, as an organized body, being destitute of some of the indispensable marks of a true church, could not be recognized in that character—the strictures of the reviewer have been shaped with a reference to this two-fold argument. In opposition to the Assembly, he asserts that the essential elements of baptism *are* found in the Romish ceremony, and the essential elements of a church in the Papal communion; and, what is still more remarkable, he insists that, even upon the supposition that the Romish sect is not a church of the Lord Jesus Christ, it by no means follows that its baptism is not valid. The consent of the Protestant world, for ages and generations past, to the opinion which he has espoused, without being adduced as a separate and distinct argument, is repeatedly introduced as an offset to whatever weight the overwhelming vote of the Assembly might carry with it. Such is a general view of the Princeton remarks.

Now, I propose to show that their distinguished author has failed to prove any one of these positions, either that the essential elements of baptism *are* found in the Popish ordinance, or that, without being a church, it can have the sacraments of Christ, or that the testimony of Protestant Christendom is more clearly in his favor than it is against him. These are the points upon which issue is joined.

To the question, what constitutes the validity of baptism, the reply obviously is, the conformity of any rite with the definition of baptism, which may be collected from the Scriptures, and justified by them. Whatever ordinance possesses all the elements which belong to Christian baptism, *is* Christian baptism, and should be recognized as valid by all who bear the Christian name. The

validity of a sacrament does not depend upon any *effects* which it produces, either mysterious or common—but upon its *nature*: the question is, not what it *does*, but what it *is*; and, whatever coincides with the appointment of Christ, so as to be essentially the same ordinance which he instituted, must be received as bearing his sanction. When the Assembly, therefore, decided that Popish baptism is not valid, it intended to assert, that what in that corrupt communion is administered under the name of baptism, is really a different institution from the ordinance of Christ. Rome's ceremony does not answer to a just definition of the Christian sacrament.

In enumerating the elements of baptism, the reviewer seems to have fallen into two mistakes—one wholly unimportant—the other, materially affecting the question in dispute. *Intention* is treated as something distinct from the *form* of baptism,—and *matter*, form, and intention are represented as constituting the *essence* of the ordinance. Now, in the language of the schools, *form* and *essence* are equivalent expressions. The *form* of a thing is that which makes it what it is, which distinguishes it from all other beings, and limits and defines our conceptions of its properties.* According to Aristotle, it is the *forms* impressed upon the first matter, which enable us to discriminate betwixt different substances. As intention, according to the statement of the reviewer, is a part of the *essence* of baptism, it is consequently an error of arrangement to make it different from the form. The whole idea of baptism may be embraced under two heads. The reviewer, no doubt, had his eye upon the peripatetic division of causes; but the *intention* of which he speaks cannot be the *final* cause of Aristotle, because that was not an ingredient of the essence. The *use* of a table, or the pur-

* τὸ δὲ ὡς τὸ εἶδος; τὸ τὴν εἶναι. Arist. Met. L. 7. c. 4. "Form is that," says Stanly, quoting this passage, "which the thing itself is said to be *per se*—the being of a thing what it was—the whole common nature and essence of a thing answerable to the definition." Philos. part 4th, chap. 3d. "Now that accident," says Hobbes, "for which we give a certain name to any body, or the accident which denominates its subject, is commonly called the *essence* thereof—and the same essence, inasmuch as it is generated, is called the *form*." Philosophy. "Ens a forma habet," says Wolfius, "ut sit hujus generis vel speciei atque ab aliis distinguatur. Hinc scholastici aiunt, *formam dare esse rei, dare distingui*. Ontologia, part 2, sec. 3. c. 2. § 945.

pose of a mechanic in making it, is no part of the *nature* of the table. But the *intention* in baptism is indispensable to the existence of the ordinance—it is a necessary element of a just definition, and, therefore, belongs appropriately to the form. The true final cause exists in the mind of God. In the case of baptism, a definition which should set forth the matter and form fully and completely, would coincide exactly with the logical rule which resolves a definition into the nearest genus and the specific difference. The matter, *water*, is a generic term, and suggests every other kind of ablution besides that of baptism—while the form distinguishes this particular form of washing from every other mode of using this element.

As this mistake in arrangement, however, is a mere question of words and names, I pass to a more important error, the omission of one of the elements, which, according to the great majority of Protestant confessions, enters into the essence of Baptism. The *form* does not consist alone in washing with water, with solemn invocation of the name of the Trinity, and with the professed purpose of complying with the command of Christ. There must be some one to make the invocation, and to apply the water. These are acts which require an agent—services which demand a servant. Not *any* application of water, in the name of the Trinity, with the ostensible design of signing and sealing the blessings of the new and everlasting covenant, constitutes baptism—the water must be applied by one who is lawfully commissioned to dispense the mysteries of Christ. There must be an *instrumental*, as well as a *material* and formal cause. This fact the reviewer seems neither prepared to deny nor assert; and, though he takes no notice of it in his formal definition of baptism, he is yet willing to concede it for the sake of argument. The question, then, is, do these four things enter into the baptisms administered by the authority of the Romish church? Do her priests wash with *water*, in the *name of the Trinity*, with the *professed design of complying with the command of Christ*, and are *they themselves* to be regarded as *lawful ministers of the word*? The Princeton Review has undertaken, in all these instances, to prove the affirmative; and it is my purpose to show that it has signally failed—that, according to

their scriptural import, not one of these particulars is found in the Popish ordinance.

I. The reviewer expresses great surprise,* at the statement made on the floor of the Assembly, that Romanists were accustomed to corrupt the water, which they used in baptism, with a mixture of oil. It is rather a matter of astonishment that he himself should not have been aware of so notorious a fact. It is true that their church formularies make natural water the only thing *essential* to the *matter* of the ordinance; but it is equally indisputable that *such water* is only *used* in cases of urgent and extreme necessity. Whenever the rite is administered with solemn ceremonies—and these can never be omitted except upon a plea which is equally valid to dispense with the services of a priest—the water, instead of being applied in its natural state, in conformity with the command of Christ, is previously consecrated, or rather profaned, by the infusion of *Chrism*—a holy compound of balsam and oil. Innovations upon the simplicity of the sacraments began with the spirit of superstition in the Christian church, and grew, and strengthened, until they reached their consummation in the magical liturgy of Rome. The precise period at which this specific mode of consecrating the water was first introduced, I am unable to determine; but there is an evident reference to it in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, which goes under the name of Dionysius. “Immediately after the unction,” says Bingham,† “the minister proceeded to consecrate the water; or the bishop, if he were present, consecrated it, while the priests were finishing the unction; for so the author, under the name of Dionysius, represents it. “While the priests,” says he, “are finishing the unction, the bishop comes to the mother of adoption (so he calls the font), and, by invocation, sanctifies the water in it; *thrice pouring in some of the holy Chrism, in a manner representing the sign of the cross.*”

The Catechism of the Council of Trent not only insists upon this mixture, whenever baptism is performed with

* “We were, therefore, greatly surprised to see, that it was stated on the floor of the Assembly, that Romanists did not baptise with water, but with water mixed with oil.” Princeton Review, July 1845, p. 449.

† Origines Sacræ. Lib. xi. cap. x. § 1.

solemn ceremonies, but states distinctly that it *has always been observed* in the Catholic church, and traces its origin to apostolical tradition. "Illud vero animadvertendum est, quamvis aqua simplex, quæ nihil aliud admixtum habet, materia apta sit ad hoc sacramentum conficiendum, quoties scilicet baptismi ministrandi necessitas incidat, tamen ex Apostolorum traditione semper in Catholica Ecclesia observatum esse, ut cum solemnibus ceremoniis baptismus conficitur, sacrum etiam Chrisma addatur, quo baptismi effectum magis declarari perspicuum est."

This same catechism divides the ceremonies of baptism, as is usual among the Romish writers upon the subject, into three classes—the first embracing those which precede; the second, those which accompany; and the third, those which follow the administration of the ordinance. "In primis"—it begins the explanation of the first head—"igitur aqua paranda est, qua ad baptismum uti oportet. Consecratur, enim, baptismi fons, addito mysticæ unctionis oleo, neque id omni tempore fieri permissum est; sed more majorum, festi quidam dies, qui omnium celeberrimi et sanctissimi optimo jure, habendi sunt, expectantur; in quorum vigiliis sacræ ablutionis aqua conficitur," &c. "In the first place, the water to be used in baptism must be prepared. *The font is consecrated by adding the oil of the mystic unction.* Nor can this be done at any time; but, in conformity with ancient usage, is delayed until the vigils of the most celebrated and holy festivals." Part ii. § 60, Catechis. Conc. Trident.*

Durand enumerates *four* kinds of blessed water, among which he includes the water of baptism, and gives a full and particular account of the mode of sanctifying it. "Postremo sit admixtio Chrismatis in aqua, sicut dictum est. Unde dicitur in Burcardo, lib. iii. "benedicimus fontes baptismatis oleo unctionis;" et Augustinus eisdem verbis utens subjecit quod hoc magis tacite sive sine scriptura hac mystica ratione introductum est quam per aliquam Scripturam. Per hujusmodi ergo admixtionem unio Christi et ecclesiæ significatur. Nam Chrisma est Christus, aqua populus dicitur. Sanctificetur fons iste—ex quibus verbis

* Pars II. Cap. 2, § 11.

ad quid fiat admixtio satis datur intelligi."* To the same purport is the testimony of Alcuin, the famous preceptor of Charlemagne. "Quibus finitis ante fontes et facto silentio, stante sacerdote, sequitur benedictio fontis. *Omnipotens, sempiternus Deus, &c.* "Sequitur consecratio fontis; in modum præfationis decantanda: *Aeterne Deus, qui invisibili potentia sacramentorum tuorum.* Ad invocationem vero Spiritus sancti, quem sacerdos celsa voce proclamatur, id est, alto mentis affectu, deponitur cereus benedictus in aquam sive illi, qui ab eo illuminati sunt, ad demonstrandam scilicet Spiritus Sancti presentiam, sacerdote jam dicente; *Descendat in hanc plenitudinem fontis. Fonte benedicto, accipit Pontifex chrisma cum oleo mixto in vase ab Archidiacono et aspergit per medium fontis in modum crucis.*"†

These passages, from Durand and Alcuin, are extracted from their accounts of the solemnities of the GREAT SABBATH—the Saturday preceding Easter. This festival and Pentecost were the solemn seasons to which, in the times of Leo, the administration of baptism was confined, except in cases of necessity—and hence it is, in the description of these festivals, that we are to look for a detailed exhibition of the ceremonies connected with its due celebration. In the first book of Martene de Antiquis Ecclesiæ Ritibus, may be seen the forms, taken from various liturgies, of consecrating the font, and the *infusion of the Chrism* is,

* De Divinis Officiis, Lib. vi. p. 140. Lyons Edition, 1518. "In the last place, the water is mixed with chrisma—as we have previously mentioned. Whence it is said in Burcard, lib. iii. *We bless the fonts of baptism with the oil of unction.* And Augustin, using the same words, subjoins that it is done more from a mystical reason than from any authority of Scripture. By a mixture of this sort, the union of Christ with the Church is signified; the chrisma representing Christ, and the water the people."

† De Divinis Officiis, cap. xix. De Sabbato Sanctæ vigil. Paschæ. "These things having been completed before the fonts, and silence instituted, the priest standing, the benediction of the font follows: *Omnipotent, Eternal God, &c.* Then succeeds the consecration of the font, to be chanted, as in the preface to the mass. *Eternal God, who by the invisible power of thy sacraments.* At the invocation of the Holy Spirit, whom the priest proclaims with a lofty voice, that is, with deep affection of mind, the blessed candle is deposited in the water, or those which had been lighted, to show the presence of the Spirit, the priest now saying: *May he descend in this fulness of the font. The font, being blessed, the Pontiff receives from the Arch-deacon, the chrisma with oil mixed in a vase, and sprinkles it in the midst of the font in the form of a cross.*"

invariably, a part of the process.* Hurd, in his interesting work on religious rites and ceremonies, mentions among the solemnities of Easter-eve the consecration of the waters of baptism. "The officiating priest perfumes the font thrice with frankincense, after which, he takes some of the oil used in baptism, and pours it on the holy water crossways, mixed with Chrism, and this is reserved to baptize all the catechumens, or children, who shall be brought to the church."†

These authorities, I trust, are sufficient to diminish the Reviewer's surprise at the statement made on the floor of the Assembly, and to put it beyond doubt, that the *matter* of Romish baptism is *not simple, natural water*, but *water artificially corrupted*. Whether this corruption vitiates the sacrament to such an extent as seriously to affect its validity, is not so trivial a question as the reviewer supposes. As baptism is a species of ablution, whatever unfits the water for the purpose of cleansing, unfits it for the Christian ordinance. Such mixtures as are found in nature, in springs, pools, rivers and seas, so long as they do not affect the liquidity of the fluid, do not affect its adaptation to any of the ordinary purposes of life. Men still *wash* with it. But a water which cannot be used in *washing*, is not suitable matter for baptism; and, as *oil* evidently impairs its cleansing properties, it destroys that

* The following specimens may be taken:—1. Ex Missali Gothico-Gallicano. After a prayer for blessing the fonts, and the exorcism of the water, the rubric directs that the water shall be blown upon three times, and the chrism infused into it in the form of a cross.

Deinde insufflas aquam per tres vices, et mittis chrisma in modum crucis, et dici—Infusio chrismae salutaris Domini nostri Jesu Christi, ut fiat fons aquae salientis cunctis descendentibus in eo, in vitam æternam. Amen. Lib. 1. Art. 18. ordo i.

2. Ex veteri missali Gallicano.

After the prayers for blessing the fonts, the rubric directs, that *three crosses should be made upon the water with chrism*. "*Postea facis tres cruces super aquam de chrismo et dicis, &c.—Ibid. Ordo ii.*

3. From an old Paris Ritual, the form of administering baptism on the great Sabbath, the Saturday preceeding Easter, is extracted. *Ibid. Ordo x.* Among the other ceremonies enumerated, the infusion of the chrism is expressly mentioned. "*Inde,*" is the rubric for that purpose, "*inde accipiens vas aureum cum chrismate, fundit chrisma in fonte in modum crucis, et expandit aquam cum manu sua, tunc baptizantur infantes, primum masculi, deinde feminæ.*"

† Hurd's History of the Rites, Ceremonies and Customs (Religious) of the whole world, p. 218.

very quality in water, in consequence of which it is capable of representing the purifying influence of regeneration, and the renewing of the Holy Ghost. No more incongruous substances can be found than water and oil, and, to wash in such a mixture, is not to *cleanse*, but *defile*. The *significancy* of the rite is affected; it is not made to consist in simply washing with water, but in washing with a water duly consecrated with *oil*. In the present case, attention is called to the mixture: great importance is attached to it, and it is in *consequence* of the chrism that the mixed substance is used in preference to the pure, simple, natural element. It is not because it is *water*, but because it is *sanctified by oil*, that the priests employ it in baptism. This is, certainly, not making the significancy of the rite depend upon washing with water; it makes it equally depend upon the oil of the mystic unction. The very purpose of the mixture is to increase the significancy of the rite; to declare more fully the nature and effect of the baptism. The oil is, consequently, made a prominent element in the compound, and it is precisely that which, in ordinary cases, *fits* the water for its use. In other cases, the foreign element is left entirely out of view, and the adulterated substance is used *as* water and nothing but water. But here it is not, *notwithstanding* the mixture, but *because* of the mixture, that the corrupted water is employed. It is not used *as* water and nothing but water, but as water invested with new properties, in consequence of the oil. The presence of the foreign matter is an improvement, when canonically introduced, upon the original appointment of the Saviour; and so much importance is attached to it, that Rome permits simple water to be used only on the plea which may also dispense with the services of the priest, the plea of stern necessity. Water, without the chrism, may be employed in that class of cases in which Jews, infidels and Turks are authorized to baptize. Through the pressure of necessity, *God may* sanctify it without the oil; but, in ordinary cases, the charm lies in the mystic unction.

These two circumstances seem to me to distinguish the mixture in question, from all the combinations which are found in nature. 1. That the *oil* destroys the *fitness* of water for the purpose of ablution, and so affects the sig-

nificancy of the rite ; and 2d, that the mixture is not used *as* water, but that peculiar stress is laid upon the foreign element. It *enters into* the baptism as a very important ingredient. He who baptizes with rain or cistern water, or water impregnated with saline mixtures, *overlooks* the foreign matter, and attaches value *only* to the water. He uses the mixture simply *as* water. But Rome makes the *corruption* of the water a part of her solemn ceremonies—the chrism works wonders in the font, and imparts to it an efficacy which, only in rare cases, it would otherwise possess. The mixture of the chrism with the water is, according to Durand, a sign of the union between Christ and the Church—and as an evidence of the value attached to the chrism, he adds that *it* represents Christ, while the water represents the people ; and the Catechism of the Council of Trent teaches that additional significancy is given to the water by the holy chrism. We may concede to the Reviewer, “that water with oil thrown on it is still water ;” that is, it may be heated and used, notwithstanding the mixture, *as* water—that wine adulterated with water continues to be wine, or may be used as such, provided the mixture is not made a matter of prominent observation. But when the foreign elements are dignified into importance, and made to play a part in the offices performed, then the water is no longer simple water, but water and oil, the wine is no longer simple wine, but wine and water. If in the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper we were professedly to adulterate the wine, in order to give superior efficacy to it, and to use the compound not simply *as* wine, but as wine invested with *new* properties, *in consequence* of the mixture, the matter of the sacrament would be evidently vitiated, and that not because it *was a mixture*, but because it was *used as a mixture*. If the same wine were used *as wine, notwithstanding* the mixture, there would be no impropriety ; but when it is used *in consequence* of the mixture, the case is manifestly different.

It is not a little remarkable, that the Romanists themselves condemn a practice which seems to be fully as justifiable as their own. “Sed neque probandi sunt illi,” says Martene, “de quibus Eghertus Eboracensis archiepiscopus in Excerptis. cap. 42. (Sunt quidam, inquit, qui miscent vinum cum aqua baptismatis, non recto ; quia Christus non

jussit baptizari vino, sed aqua.)* And yet, in the very next section, this writer insists on the importance of using *consecrated* water, and not profane, whenever the ordinance is administered, and refers, among other authorities, to the passage from Dionysius, already quoted, which shews that the consecration embraced the infusion of chrism, in the form of a cross. It is difficult to see how a mixture with *wine vitiates* the sacrament, while a mixture with *oil improves* it. The command of Christ, which is very properly pleaded against wine, applies as conclusively to chrism. But whatever may be said of this self-condemnation on the part of Rome, I think it cannot be denied that, in that idolatrous communion, the *matter* of baptism is corrupted, and that the Reviewer has consequently failed in making out his first point, that papal baptism is a washing with water, and that this is the sole matter of the sacrament. But what, then, it may be asked, did baptism become extinct when this innovation was first introduced, among the churches that adopted it? My reply is, that I know of no sacredness in baptism, which should entitle it to be preserved in its integrity, when the ordinance of the Lord's Supper has been confessedly abolished in the Latin Church. Why should baptism be perpetuated entire, and the Supper transmitted with grievous mutilations? Or will it be maintained that the essence of the Supper was still retained when the cup was denied to the laity? Is it more incredible that an outward ordinance should be invalidated, than that the precious truths which it was designed to represent, should be lost? Is the shell more important than the substance? And shall we admit that the cardinal doctrines of the Gospel have been damnably corrupted in the Church of Rome, and yet be afraid to declare that the signs and seals of the covenant have shared the same fate? If Rome is corrupt in doctrine, I see not why she may not be equally corrupt in ordinances, and if she has lost one sacrament, I see not why she may not have lost the other, and, as the foundations of her apostacy were laid in the ages immediately succeeding the

* De Antiquis Ecclesiæ Ritibus, Lib. 1. cap. 1. art. 14. "But neither are they to be approved, of whom Egbert, Archbishop of York, says, (Excerpt. cap. 42.) *There are some who mix wine with the water of baptism. Not rightly, because Christ did not command to be baptized with wine, but with water.*

time of the Apostles, I cannot understand why the loss of the *real* sacrament of baptism may not have been an early symptom of degeneracy and decay.

But our business is with truth and not with consequences. We should not be deterred from admitting a scriptural conclusion, because it removes, with a desolating lesom, the structures of antiquity. We are not to say, a priori, that the Church in the fifth or sixth centuries, *must* have had the true sacrament of baptism, and then infer that such and such corruptions do not invalidate the ordinance. But we are first to ascertain from the Scriptures what the true sacrament of baptism is, and then judge the practice of the Church in every age by this standard. If its customs have at any time departed from the law and the testimony, let them be condemned; if they have been something essentially different from what God had enjoined, let them be denounced as spurious. The unbroken transmission of a visible Church in any line of succession is a figment of papists and prelatists. Conformity with the Scriptures, and not ecclesiastical genealogy, is the true touch-stone of a sound Church-State; and if our fathers were without the ordinances, and fed upon ashes for bread, let us only be the more thankful for the greater privileges vouchsafed to ourselves.

II. The *form* of baptism, or that which distinguishes this species of ablution from every other washing with water, consists in the relations which, according to the appointment of Christ, it sustains to the covenant of grace. The solemn invocation of the names of the Trinity,* though a circumstance attending the actual application of the element, and, perhaps, an indispensable circumstance, does not constitute the *whole* essence of the ordinance. A Socinian may undoubtedly employ the same formulary as ourselves. And yet, according to repeated admissions of the Reviewer himself,† his want of faith in the personal distinctions of the Godhead, would be sufficient to render void the pretended sacrament. To baptize in the name of Father, Son and Spirit, is not to pronounce these words as an idle form, or a mystical charm, but to acknowledge

* "Is it then correct as to the form? Is it administered in the name of the Trinity?" Princeton Review, July 1845, p. 450.

† p. (448) p. (446).

that solemn compact in which these glorious agents entered, from eternity, for the redemption of the Church. It is the *faith* of the Trinity, much more than the *names* of its separate persons, that belongs to the essence of baptism; and where this *faith* existed, some of the ancient fathers contended—how justly I shall not undertake to decide—that the ordinance was validly administered, even though done without the explicit mention of *all* the persons of the Godhead. “He that is blessed in Christ,” says Ambrose,* “is blessed in the name of the Father, and Son, and Holy Ghost; because the name is one, and the power one. The Ethiopian Eunuch, who was baptized in Christ, had the sacrament complete. If a man names only a single person expressly in words, either Father, Son, or Holy Ghost, so long as he does not deny in his faith either Father, Son, or Holy Ghost, the sacrament of faith is complete; as, on the other hand, if a man in words express all the three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but in his faith diminishes the power either of the Father, or Son, or Holy Ghost, the sacrament of faith is void.” Whatever objection may lie against the first part of this statement—that the explicit mention of all the persons of the Trinity is not indispensable to the due administration of baptism,—none can decently deny, that to name them without believing in them, is not to celebrate but to profane the ordinance.

As, therefore, the invocation of the Trinity may take place in ablutions which it is impossible to recognise as the baptism instituted by Christ, it cannot constitute the *whole* form of the sacrament. In this there is no real difference between the Reviewer and myself. He only uses the word *form* in a different sense from that in which I have been accustomed to employ it; but, by no means, confines the *essence* of the sacrament to what he denominates its *form*. On the contrary, he makes the *design* or *intention*† an essential part of the ordinance, and means

* Bingham, *Origines Ecclesiasticæ*, Book xi. chap. 3, § 3.

† “There is, however, a third particular included in this definition of baptism; it must be with the design to “signify and seal our ingrafting into Christ, and partaking of the benefits of the covenant of grace, and our engagements to be the Lord’s.” No washing with water, even if in the name of the Trinity, is Christian baptism, unless administered with the ostensible design of signifying, sealing and applying the benefits of the covenant of grace.” *Princeton Review*, July 1845, p. (448.)

by it precisely what I would be understood to convey, when I resolve the form of a sacrament into the relations which its material elements, according to the appointment of Christ, sustain to the covenant of grace. To eat bread and to drink wine is not necessarily to celebrate the sacrament of the Lord's Supper — to be immersed or sprinkled, — a formal invocation of the names of the Trinity accompanying the deed, is not necessarily to be baptized. There must be a reference to the economy of grace, a distinct recognition of that precious scheme of redemption, in its essential features and fundamental doctrines, without which ordinances are worthless, and duties are bondage. That which determines a specific ablution to be Christian baptism, which impresses upon the matter what may be styled the *sacramental form*, and which, consequently, constitutes its essence as a sacrament, is the relation which it bears to the covenant of God's unchanging mercy. To deny that relation, though all the outward appearances may be retained, is to abolish the sacrament. To tamper with the essence of an ordinance, is to tamper with its life. As the constitution of this relation, whatever it may be, depends exclusively upon the authority of Christ, it is competent to Him alone to define the circumstances under which it may be justly conceived to exist, to specify the conditions upon which its actual institution depends. For aught we know, He might have rendered every circumstance of personal ablution, or of eating and drinking, on the part of believers, a sacramental act. But He has chosen to restrain the sacramental relations within certain limits; and when his own prescriptions are not observed, no power of man, no intention of ministers, can impress the sacramental form upon material elements. The purpose of a family to convert its ordinary meals into memorials of the Saviour's passion, coupled with the fact that they are despatched with the usual solemnities of the eucharistic feast, is not sufficient to make them, in truth, the supper of the Lord. The emblems of His broken body and shed blood, are not made thus common and profane. If, to be more specific, the authority to administer the sacraments is entrusted exclusively to the ministers of the word, the same matter employed, in the same way, by

others, would be evidently destitute of the sacramental form. The *relation* to the covenant of grace, which depends upon the institution of Christ, could not be justly apprehended as subsisting, and the promises attached to the due celebration of the ordinance could not be legitimately expected to take effect.

He, therefore, that would undertake to prove that the Romish ceremony possesses the *form* or the *essential elements* of Christian baptism, must not content himself with shewing that Rome baptizes in the name of the Trinity. He must prove, besides, that she inculcates just views concerning the *nature* of the relationship which the outward washing sustains to the covenant of grace; that her conceptions of the covenant itself, that to which the ablution has reference, are substantially correct, and that she employs the outward elements in conformity with the conditions prescribed by the author of the sacrament. If she is fundamentally unsound upon any of these points, she abolishes the *essence* of the ordinance, she destroys its *form*. She may, for instance, be as orthodox as Princeton represents her to be, in regard to the personal and official relations of the Trinity,* she may teach the truth in regard to the scheme of redemption; and yet if her baptism bears a *different kind* of relationship to the covenant of grace from that instituted by the Redeemer, it is evident that it must be a *different* thing. If, on the other hand, she is sound as to the *nature* of the relationship, and yet corrupt as to the *object* to which the sacrament refers,† her baptism is only *analogous* to Christian baptism, and, therefore, cannot be the same. The relations are similar, but the things related are different. If again, she holds to the truth, both as it respects the relationship itself and the things related, and yet does not administer her ordinance according to the conditions on which the sacramental form may be expected to take place, she washes indeed, but not sacramentally;

* "There is not a church on earth, which teaches the doctrine of the Trinity more accurately, thoroughly or minutely, according to the orthodoxy of the Lutheran and Reformed churches, than the church of Rome. The personal and official relations of the adorable Trinity are also preserved." Princeton Review, July 1845, p. 450.

† "There can be no baptism where the essence of Christianity is not preserved." Burnet, xxxix articles, art. xix.

the authority of Christ is wanting. She administers no *baptism*. If to be unsound in any *one* of these points makes void a sacrament, what shall be said when there is unsoundness in *all*? Such an ordinance is trebly void. And that this is the case with Romish baptism, I think will be made to appear when the arguments of the Reviewer, the strongest, perhaps, that can be presented, to shew that it possesses the form or retains the essence of the Christian institute, shall have been duly weighed.

1. First, then, does Rome teach the truth in regard to the *nature* of the relationship involved in a sacrament? The answer to this question will depend upon the answer to the previous question, what the nature of the relationship is. How much soever they have differed upon other points, Protestant divines have generally agreed, that one prime office assigned to the sacraments is to *represent* to the eye, as preaching unfolds to the ear, Christ as the substance of the new covenant. They are *signs* which teach by analogy. As water cleanses the body, so the blood of the Redeemer purges the conscience, and the spirit of the Redeemer purifies the heart. As bread and wine constitute important articles of food, and administer strength to our feeble frame, so the atonement of Christ is the food of the spiritual man, and the source of all his activity and vigour!* This *analogy* is what Augustin meant when he said, "If sacraments had not a certain *likeness* and *representation* of the things whereof they be sacraments, then indeed they were no sacraments."† The *things themselves* unquestionably are not similar. There is no likeness between the water and the spirit, between bread and wine and the death of Jesus, but there is a resemblance in their *relations*. Water performs a similar office for the flesh, which the blood of Christ performs for the soul. Bread and wine sustain a similar relation to our natural growth which faith in Christ bears to our spiritual health. It is

* "The signification and substance is to show us how we are fed with the body of Christ; that is, that like as material bread feedeth our body, so the body of Christ, nailed on the cross, embraced and eaten by faith, feedeth the soul. The like representation is also made in the sacrament of baptism; that as our body is washed clean with water, so our soul is washed clean with Christ's blood." Jewell, Defence of the Apology.

† Quoted in the above mentioned treatise of Jewell.

obvious, that regarded simply as *signs* instituted by the authority of Christ, the sacraments are happily adapted to confirm our faith in the truth and reality of the divine promises. They place before us in a different form, and under a different aspect, in a form and aspect adapted to our animal and corporeal nature, the same grounds and object of faith which the word presents to the understanding. They do not render the promises of the covenant, in themselves considered, more sure or credible, but they help us, by images addressed to the senses, in apprehending what might otherwise be too refined for our gross perceptions.* They are a double preaching of the same Gospel; and confirm the word just as an additional witness establishes a fact. They are in short *visible promises*, which we cannot contemplate in their true character, without an increased conviction of the truth and faithfulness of God. But in addition to this, God may be regarded as declaring through them to worthy recipients, that just as certainly as water purifies the body, or as bread and wine sustain it, just so certainly shall their consciences be purged from dead works, and their spiritual strength renewed through the blood of the Redeemer. The certainty of the material phenomena, which is a matter of daily experience, is made the pledge of an equal certainty in the analogous spiritual things. It is in this way, I conceive, that the sacraments are seals of the covenant. They not only *represent* its blessings, are not only an authorized proclamation of its promises, addressed to the eye, but contain, at the same time, a solemn assurance that to those who rightly apprehend the signs, the spiritual good shall be as certain as the natural consequences by which it is illustrated; that the connection between faith and salvation is

* Hence Calvin very justly observes: "And as we are corporeal, always creeping on the ground, cleaving to terrestrial and carnal objects and incapable of understanding or conceiving of any thing of a spiritual nature, our merciful Lord, in his infinite indulgence, accommodates himself to our capacity, condescending to lead us to Himself even by these earthly elements, and in the flesh itself to present to us a mirror of spiritual blessings. "For if we were incorporeal," as Chrysostom says, "he would have given us these things pure and incorporeal. Now because we have souls enclosed in bodies, he gives us spiritual things under visible emblems; not because there are such qualities in the nature of the things presented to us in the sacraments, but because they have been designated by God to this signification." Institutes, Book iv. chap. 14, §3.

as indissoluble as between washing and external purity, eating and physical strength.

Is this the doctrine of the church of Rome? Does she regard her sacraments as instituted *signs* of spiritual things, or as visible *pledges* of the faithfulness of God in the new and everlasting covenant? If so, she has been most grievously slandered by the most distinguished Protestant divines, and the Princeton Review is the only work, so far as I know, of any merit, which has ventured to assert that her doctrine on this subject is precisely the same with that of the Reformed church. It is, indeed, admitted that there is a difference between Papists and Protestants as to the *mode** in which the design of baptism is accomplished. But did it not occur to the Reviewer that there could be *no* difference upon this point, if there were a perfect agreement as to the nature of that *relation* which baptism sustains to the covenant of grace? If Rome looked upon the sacraments in the same light with ourselves, as only *signs* and *seals*, and nothing more than signs and seals, though she might have disputed whether the benefits which they represent are, in every instance in which no serious obstruction exists, actually conveyed, the question as to *their inherent efficacy* never *could* have been raised. She would have taught their recipients, as we do, to look beyond the visible symbols to the personal agency of the Holy Ghost to render them effectual. As well might she have expected her children to become men in understanding by reading books in an unknown tongue, as have directed them to seek for grace in signs and seals, without any reference to the things represented. As it is the ideas which words suggest that constitute knowledge, so it is Christ's words and his benefits that constitute the value of the sacraments; and they cannot be used with any just conception of their *real nature* without leading the soul directly to him. Any theory of their office which even proposes the temptation to stop at themselves is utterly destructive of their true design. The questions which

* "The great difference between Protestants and Romanists relates not to the design of the ordinance, but to the mode and certainty with which that design is accomplished, and the conditions attached to it. In other words, the difference relates to the efficacy and not to the design of the ordinance."
—*Princeton Review*, July, 1845, p. 451.

have been agitated with so much zeal among the Popish Theologians, whether the consecration of a Priest imparts a mystic power to the external symbols, enabling them to produce effects which, independently of his benediction, they could not accomplish—whether his intention to bestow this magical virtue is absolutely essential to its actual communication, whether the appropriate results of the ordinances are secured *ex opere operantis* or *ex opere operato*, or by both conjointly—questions of this sort, which have been the fruitful themes of so much discussion among the sainted Doctors of Rome, are too obviously absurd to be asked upon the Protestant hypothesis. And yet Princeton tells us that Rome and ourselves are precisely agreed upon the *nature* of the sacraments;* that she, as we do, makes them signs and seals of the new covenant, and consequently fixes the hopes of her children *not upon them*, but upon the glorious object whom they represent. So thought not Calvin† when he inveighs so eloquently against the “*pestilent and fatal nature of the opinion*,” which he attributes to the Sophistical schools, and declares, in his celebrated Tract concerning the necessity of reforming the church, to have been universal before the Reformation,‡ “that the sacraments of the New Law, or

* “Then as to the essential part of the ordinance, the design, in this also their (Romish) baptism agrees with that of Protestants. According to our standards, the design of the sacrament is to signify, seal and apply to believers the benefits of the new covenant. This is the precise doctrine of the Romanists, so far as this.”—*Princeton Review*, July, 1845, p. 450.

† Institutes, book iv., chapter xiv., § 14. Vol. 2, p. 464–5, Bd’s Edition.

‡ “Besides, the consecration both of baptism and of the mass differs in no respect whatever from magical incantation. For by breathings and whispering and unintelligible sounds, they think they work mysteries, xx. The first thing we complain of here is, that the people are entertained with showy ceremonies, while not a word is said of their significancy and truth. For there is no use in the sacraments unless the thing which the sign visibly represents is explained in accordance with the word of God. Therefore when the people are presented with nothing but empty figures with which to feed the eye, while they hear no doctrine which might direct them to the proper end, they look no farther than the external act. Hence that most pestilential superstition under which, as if the sacraments alone were sufficient for salvation, without feeling any solicitude about faith, or repentance, or even Christ himself, they fasten upon the sign instead of the thing signified by it. And indeed not only among the rude vulgar, but in the schools also, the impious dogma every where obtained, the sacraments were effectual themselves, are not obstructed in their operation by mortal sin; as if the sacraments had been given for any other end or use than to lead us by the hand to Christ.” (Calvin’s Tracts, vol. 1, pp. 138–9, as published by Calvin Translation Society. See also pp. 166 and 194.)

those now used in the Christian Church, justify and confer grace, provided we do not obstruct their operation by any mortal sin." So thought not Turretin,* who evidently treats it as the doctrine of the Papists, that the sacraments are *not* signs and seals of the everlasting covenant, but *true, proper, physical causes* of the grace they are said to represent. This error, concerning the inherent efficacy of the sacraments, Pictet† also declares to be *contrary to their nature*. Owen‡ felt that there was a vital controversy betwixt us and Rome on this point when he renounced Popish baptism as a *species of idolatry*. It is impossible to read the Reformed confessions and the apologies which the Reformers made for them, without being impressed with the fact that their authors labored under a deep conviction, that the minds of the people were seduced, by the teachings of Rome, with dangerous and fatal error on the very *essence* of the sacraments, the nature of their relation to the covenant of grace, the precise office they discharge under the dispensation of the Gospel. This was, in fact, a standing topic of controversy between the two parties. Rome represented the new doctrines concerning gratuitous justification and the work of the spirit, as derogatory to the dignity and value of the sacraments, and artfully turned the tide of prejudice, growing out of the old associations of mystery and awe with which the people had been accustomed to look upon the consecrated symbols, against the restorers of the church. The cry everlastingly was, "you have robbed the sacraments of their glory. You have degraded them into *empty shows*.§ You have introduced your new fangled doctrines of faith and the Spirit in their place." These and similar accusations were continually alleged against the Reformers by the Papists, shewing that there was a radical difference between them as to the design of the sacraments. Rome felt that one of her strongest holds upon the people was their attachment to these mysteries of her faith, and hence she was anxious, as much as possible, to make the sacraments the seat of the

* Turretin, Instit., Theo., Vol. 3, p. 404.

† Pictet Theol. Chret., book xv., chapter 4.

‡ Owen's Works, vol. xvi., p. 95.

§ "You make Christ's sacraments," said Harding against Jewell, "to be only shows." (Richmond's British Reformers, vol. 7, p. 693.)

war. While the Papists charged the Reformers with prostituting these solemn and august ceremonies into *worthless signs*, the Protestants retorted upon Rome that she had converted them into *charms*, and had invested creatures of dust and earth, the beggarly elements of this world, with the high prerogatives of God. The question was not so much about the *mode* of operation, as Princeton insinuates, but about the *agent* that operated; it was a question whether the *sacraments themselves* conferred grace, or whether God the Holy Spirit conferred it, employing them simply as *means* which had no *intrinsic* power to do the work. It was a question whether the sacraments were really *signs* or *efficient agents*; and if this be not a question concerning their *nature*, it would be hard to raise one that is. If the impression of the Reformers was right, that Rome exalted the sacraments into true and proper *causes* of grace, there can be no doubt that whatever she may have professed in words, she did in fact deny them to be *signs*, and consequently changed their relations to the covenant of grace, and made them *essentially* different things from what Christ had appointed. It is a matter of no sort of consequence that the Reformers themselves failed to deduce this inference. The full application of a principle is not always perceived at once, and the soundness of a conclusion depends upon the truth of the premises and the rigour of the reasoning, and not upon human authority. If the essence of the sacraments is determined by their relation to the covenant of grace, and that relation consists in their being signs and seals of its blessings, then whoever denies the reality of the signs, or teaches doctrines inconsistent with it, evidently destroys the very being of the sacraments, and what he presents under their names, whether charms or magic or physical causes of grace, are an impious and blasphemous substitution. This is precisely what Rome does. While she retains the ancient definitions, and uses the expressions, signs and seals, she vacates their meaning by giving such a view of the actual offices they discharge in the economy of redemption, as to make signs no more signs, seals no more seals. They cease to be, in the ordinary sense of the phrase, *means* of grace, and become *laws* of grace. She teaches a *mechanical theory* of salvation, calculated at once to exalt her Priests and to degrade

God; and fritters down the personality of the ever glorious Spirit into the mere nexus which connects a cause with its effect, a law with its results. She teaches men accordingly to rely upon the *sacraments* and not upon *Christ*, to stop at the external act, as if water, bread and wine were our Saviours, instead of looking to him in whom all the truths of the gospel centre and terminate; an error which could not be committed if she held the sacraments to be real signs. These statements I shall endeavor to make good.

It is universally admitted in the Church of Rome, that the sacraments confer the grace which they signify *ex opere operato*.* If it should be conceded, for the sake of argument, that Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, and Zuingle, mistook the meaning of this anomalous phrase, and that the cautious definitions of Bellarmine and Dens contain the true explanation of the subject, still the conclusion will seem to be inevitable, that the sacraments produce their spiritual effects, either in the way of physical causes, or of mechanical instruments. Both hypotheses are inconsistent with the theory of *signs*. It would be obviously absurd to say, that fire was a symbol of heat, or that the combined forces which keep the planets in their paths are *signs* of the elliptical orbits they describe, or that the screw, the lever, and the wedge, represent the effects they respectively produce. The relation of a cause to its effect, or of a machine to the phenomena of motion, is widely different from that of a sign to the thing it denotes. According to Bellarmine,† to confer grace *ex opere operato* is

* Si quis dixerit, per ipsa novæ legis Sacramenta ex opere operato non conferri gratiam, sed solam fidem divinæ promissionis ad gratiam consequendam sufficere, anathema sit. Trident. conc. Sessio Septima, cap. (8)

† Igitur ut intelligamus, quid sit opus operatum, notandum est, in justificatione, quam recipit aliquis, dum percipit Sacramenta, multa concurrere; nimirum, ex parte Dei, voluntatem utendi illa re sensibili; ex parte Christi, passionem ejus; ex parte ministri, potestatem, voluntatem, probitatem; ex parte suscipientis, voluntatem, fidem et pœnitentiam; denique ex parte Sacramenti, ipsam actionem externam, quæ consurgit ex debita applicatione formæ et materiæ. Ceterum ex his omnibus id, quod active, et proxime, atque instrumentaliter efficit gratiam justificationis, est sola actio illa externa, quæ Sacramentum dicitur, et hæc vocatur opus operatum, accipiendo passive (operatum) ita ut idem sit Sacramentum conferre gratiam ex opere operato, quod conferre gratiam ex vi ipsius actionis Sacramentalis a Deo ad hoc institutæ, non ex merito agentis, vel suscipientis: quod S. Augustinus lib. 4, de Baptismo, ca. 24 expressit illis verbis: Ipsum Per Seipsum Sacramentum multum valet. Nam voluntas Dei, quæ sacramento utitur, concurrat quidem active,

to confer grace by virtue of the sacramental action itself, instituted of God for this very purpose. The effect of the ordinance does not depend either upon the merit of him who receives, or of him who dispenses it, but upon the fact of its due administration. Though the authority of God which institutes the rite—the death of Christ which is the ultimate meritorious ground of grace—the intention of the minister which consecrates the elements, and the dispositions of the recipient, which remove obstacles from his mind, all concur in the production of the result; yet, that which immediately and actively secures the justification of the sinner, is the *external action*, which constitutes the sacrament. This, and this alone, however other things may be subsidiary, is according to the appointment of God, the immediate instrument in effecting, when not prevented by obstacles or hindrances, the grace which is signified. *How* this is done, is said to be an open question in the Church of Rome;* but the different opinions which have divided her divines, and distracted her schoolmen, may be

sed causa est principalis. Passio Christi concurrat, sed est causa meritoria, non autem effectiva, cum non sit actu, sed praterierit, licet moneat objective in mente Dei. Potestas, et voluntas ministri concurrunt necessario, sed sunt causæ remotæ; requiruntur enim ad efficiendam ipsam actionem Sacramentalem, quæ postea immediate operatur. Probitas ministri requiritur, ut ipse minister non peccet Sacramenta ministrando, non tamen ipsa est causa gratiæ in suscipiente, nec juvat suscipientem per modum Sacramenti, sed solum per modum impetrationis et exempli. Voluntas, fides, et paenitentia in suscipiente adulto necessario requiruntur, ut dispositiones ex parte subjecti, non ut causæ activæ: non enim fides et paenitentia efficiunt gratiam Sacramentalem, neque dant efficaciam Sacramentis, sed solum tollunt obstacula, quæ impedirent ne Sacramenta suam efficaciam exercere possent; unde in pueris, ubi non requiritur dispositio, sine his rebus sit justificatio. Exemplum esse potest in re naturali. Si ad ligna comburenda, primum exsiccarentur ligna, deinde excuteretur ignis ex silice, tum applicaretur ignis ligno, et sic tandem fieret combustio; nemo diceret, causam immediatam combustionis esse siccitatem, aut excussionem ignis ex silice, aut applicationem ignis ad ligna, sed solum ignem, ut causam primum, et solum calorem, seu calefactionem, ut causam instrumentalem. Bellarmine, De sacramentis, Lib 2 cap 1.

* Secundo notandum, non esse controversiam de modo quo Sacramenta sint causæ, id est, an physice attingendo effectum, an moraliter tantum; et rursum si physice, an per aliquam qualitatem inhaerentem, an per solam Dei motionem; ista enim ad questionem fidei non pertinent: sed solum generatim, an Sacramenta sint veræ et propriæ causæ instrumentales justificationis, ut vere ex eo quod quis baptizatur, sequatur, ut justificetur. Nam in hoc conveniunt omnes Catholici, ut Lutherus ipse fatetur, in lib. de captiv. Babyl. cap. de Baptismo: Arbitrati, inquit, Sunt quam plurimi esse aliquam virtutem occultam spiritualem in verbo. et aqua, quæ operetur in anima re-

embraced under the general theories of moral power, and physical causation.* The patrons of the former, slow to comprehend how material elements can achieve a spiritual result, ascribe the efficiency not to the sacraments themselves, but to the agency of God. They suppose that He has pledged His omnipotence, in every instance of their due administration, to impart the benefits which the matter represents. He has inseparably connected the effectual working of His own power with the external action. Grace always accompanies the rite, their union is fixed by divine appointment, cemented by divine energy, and as indissoluble in the experience of the faithful, as they are in the purpose of the Almighty. This theory, though not so gross and palpably absurd as the other, reduces the sacraments, in their relations to us, to the category of machines, machines in the kingdom of God, to which spiritual phenomena may be ascribed, just as truly as the wheel, the pulley, and the wedge, are mechanical contrivances for bending nature to our wills. In their relations to God, they would seem to be somewhat analogous to *laws*, since they are described as *stated modes* of divine operation, and may evidently be regarded as compendious expressions for a class of facts, which take place with unvarying uniformity. In the schools of philosophy, no more inherent efficacy is attributed to natural laws, than the Romanists, who support the theory of moral power, are accustomed to bestow on the operation of the sacraments. It is God in each case, who acts, and the law simply declares the regularity and order of His conduct. But, however this may be, to resolve the connection between

cipientis gratiam Dei. His alii contradicentes statuunt, nihil esse virtutis in Sacramentis, sed gratiam a Solo Deo dari, quia assistit ex pacto Sacramentis a se institutis: omnes tamen in hoc concedunt, Sacramenta esse efficacia signa gratiae. Bellarmine. Ibid.

Salva autem fide, inter Catholicos disputatur, an Sacramenta novae legis conferant suos effectus physice, an tantum moraliter. Dens vol. 5 p. 90.

* Quidam tenent causalitatem physicam, et sese explicant, quod Sacramenta, tanquam Divinae Omnipotentiae instrumenta, vere et realiter concurrant ad productionem effectuum in anima, per virtutem supernaturalem a principali agente sibi communicatam, et per modum actionis transeuntis sibi unitam. Qui vero adstruunt causalitatem moralem tantum, dicunt quidem Sacramenta non esse nuda quaedam signa, nec mere talia, quibus positus, Deus gratiam infundat, sed esse velut chirographa et authentica monumenta pacti, quo Deus se quodammodo obstrinxit, ut ad praesentiam signorum Sacramentalium gratiam conferret debite suscipientibus.—Dens vol. 5. p. 90.

outward ordinances and spiritual benefits; into the fixed uniformity of a law, is to make the external action, in reference to men, a species of machine. As motion, in the last analysis, must be attributed to God, those mechanical instruments which are adapted to its laws, are only contrivances for availing ourselves of His power, to compass ends which our own strength is inadequate to reach. Experience, by giving us the laws of nature, acquaints us with the methods of the divine administration. And mechanism consists in a skilful disposition of materials, with reference to these laws, so as to make them subsidiary to the purpose which we propose to achieve. If, accordingly, there be a fixed connection between the due dispensation of the sacraments, and the reception of grace, we can avail ourselves of them to secure spiritual good, with as much certainty, and as little piety, as we can depend upon the wheel, the pulley, or the lever, to raise enormous weights; rely upon the wedge to break the stoutest cohesion, or trust to the screw for an immense compression. The external action is adapted to the law of sacramental union, as the ordinary mechanical powers are instruments adjusted to the laws of motion. Hence regeneration is effected, in flat contradiction to the scriptures, by the will of man, and justification is as much our own work, as the erection of a building, or the destruction of a monument. We can use the instrument which secures it.

The other theory of the operation of the sacraments represents them as *causes*. Its advocates seem to have believed, in opposition to the prevailing conclusions of modern philosophy, that what, in material phenomena, are dignified with this appellation, are possessed of a latent power to accomplish their effects. Regarding the invisible nexus which binds events in this relationship together, as something more than the established order of sequences given by experience, they were led to ascribe mysterious efficacy to the cause by which it not only preceded the effect with unvarying uniformity, but actually gave it existence. They attributed to physical facts that potency, according to their measure, which our instinctive belief of causation leads us to recognize somewhere; and sound philosophy centres in God. The sacraments, accordingly, are represented, by the advocates of their physical efficacy,

as invested with a virtue, force or power, in consequence of which they produce the grace they are said to signify. This theory is not only the most common in the Church of Rome, but seems to me to be the only one strictly accordant with the views of Trent. The sixth canon of the seventh session of that council pronounces its usual malediction upon those who shall deny that the sacraments of the gospel *contain* the grace which they signify, or that they *confer* that grace upon those who place no obstacles in the way.* But whatever may be said of the decrees of the council, its catechism seems to be clear and unambiguous. Having spoken of signs which are only significant and monitory, it proceeds to observe,† that “God has instituted others which have the power, not only of signifying, *but of effecting*, and in this class must evidently be reckoned the sacraments of the new law. They are signs, divinely prescribed, not invented by men, which, we certainly believe, contain in themselves the *power of effecting the sacred thing* (the grace) which they declare.” A sacrament is defined to be a “thing subjected to the senses, which, in consequence of the appointment of God, possesses the power, not only of signifying, but also of *effecting*, holiness and righteousness.” They are said to have been instituted as “remedies and medicines, for restoring and defending the health of the soul,” and are commended as pipes which convey the merit of the Saviour’s passion to the consciences of men.§ What language can be stronger,

* Si quis dixerit, Sacramenta novae legis non continere gratiam, quam significant, aut gratiam ipsam non ponentibus obicem non conferre, quasi signa tantum externa sint acceptae per fidem gratiae vel justitiae, et notae quaedam Christianae professionis, quibus apud homines discernuntur fideles ab infidelibus; anathema sit. Trident. con. Sess. 7. can 6.

† Alia vero Deus instituit, quae non significandi modo sed efficiendi etiam vim haberent, atque in hoc posteriori signorum genere sacramenta novae legis numeranda esse liquido apparet: signa enim sunt divinitus tradita, non ab hominibus inventa, quae rei cujuscumque sacrae, quam declarant, efficientiam in se continere certe credimus. Trident, Catechism, p. 158. Lyons edition.

‡ Quare, ut explicatius quid sacramentum sit declaretur, docendum erit rem esse sensibus subjectam, quae ex Dei institutione sanctitatis, et justitiae tum significandae, tum efficiendae vim habet. Trident Catechism, p. 159.

§ Tertia: Tertia causa fuit, ut illi tanquam remedia, ut scribit sanctus Ambrosius, (3) atque Evangelici Samaritani medicamenta ad animarum sanitatem, vel recuperandam, vel tuendam praesto essent: Virtutem enim, quae ex passione Christi manat, hoc est, gratiam quam ille nobis in ara crucis meruit, per sacramenta, quasi per alveum quemdam, in nos ipsos derivari oportet, aliter vero nemini ulla salutis spes reliqua esse poterit, Ibid p. 162.

than that which the authors of the Catechism have employed, in treating of the first effects of the sacraments.* "We know," say they, "by the light of faith," and all true papists must respond amen, "that the power of the omnipotent God exists in the sacraments, and they can, consequently, effect that which natural things, by their own energy, cannot achieve."

In the comparison which is instituted between the sacraments of the *new*, and those of the *old* dispensation, the pre-eminence is given to the former, in consequence of possessing what the others did not possess, the ability of effecting that which their matter represents.† The latter availed to the cleaning of the flesh, the former reach the impurities of the soul; the latter were instituted simply as signs of blessings to be afterwards conferred by the ministry of the gospel, but the "former flowing from the side of Christ, who, through the Eternal Spirit, offered himself without spot unto God, purge our consciences from dead works to serve the living God, and so work, through the power of Christ's blood, that grace which they signify." The general current of this phraseology seems to be incompatible with any hypothesis but that of physical causation; the same sort of relationship is attributed to the outward matter and the inward grace which subsists between impulse and motion, fire and heat.

This view of the subject is confirmed by the prevailing tone which the Popish theologians adopt in discussing the doctrine of the sacraments. "Grace," says Bellarmine,‡ "is the effect of the sacrament, and hence is con-

* At fidei lumine cognoscimus, omnipotentis Dei virtutem in sacramentis inesse, qua id efficiant, quod sua vi res ipsae naturales praestare non possunt. Ibid. p. 173.

† Ex iis igitur quae de priori sacramentorum] effectu, gratia scilicet justificante, demonstrata sunt, illud etiam plane constat, excellentiorem, et praestantior vim (2) sacramentis novae legis inesse, quam olim veteris legis sacramenta habuerunt: quae cum (3) infirma essent, egenaque elementa, (4) inquinatos sanctificabant ad emundationem carnis, non animae: quare, ut signa tantum earum rerum quae ministeriis nostris efficiendae essent, instituta sunt. At vero sacramenta novae legis ex Christi latere manantia, (5) qui per Spiritum Sanctum semetipsum obtulit immaculatum Deo, emundant conscientiam nostram ab operibus mortuis, ad serviendum Deo viventi, atque ita eam gratiam, quam significant, Christi sanguinis virtute operantur, Ibid. p. 174.

‡ Gratia enim effectus est sacramenti, proinde in sacramento continetur, ut quilibet alius effectus in sua caussa. Bellarmine, De Sacramentis, Lib. 1, cap. 4.

tained in the sacrament, as every other effect is contained in its own cause. That which is chiefly and essentially signified,"* he observes again, "by the sacraments of the new law, is only justifying grace. For, as we shall subsequently see, the sacraments of the new law effect that which they signify. They do not, however, effect the passion of Christ, nor future blessedness. They presuppose, on the contrary, his passion, and promise future blessedness; but they do, properly, import justification." In discussing the question whether a sacrament can be logically defined, he announces a truth which seems to be fatal to those who, like the Reviewer, would inculcate the identity of Popish and Protestant views in regard to the nature of the sacraments. "A sacrament, as such," says he,† "not only signifies, it also sanctifies. But to signify and to sanctify belong to different categories, the one being embraced under that of relation, the other under that of action." "It is more proper," he states, in another connection,‡ "to a sacrament to *sanctify* than it is to signify." In rebutting Calvin's account of the nature of the sacraments, he does not scruple to assert,§ that "they are efficacious causes of grace, when no obstacles interpose." His critique of the great Reformer's definition, so strikingly illustrates the fundamental difference between Protestants and Romanists on this whole subject, that I hope the reader will excuse me for extracting the part which relates to the sign. Calvin says that a sacrament is "an outward sign, by which the Lord seals in our consciences the promises of his good will towards us, to support the weakness of our faith: and we, on our part, testify our piety towards him, in His presence and that of angels, as well

* Est autem hoc loco notandum, id quod praecipue et essentialiter significatur per sacramentum novae legis, esse solam gratiam justificantem. Nam ut infra dicemus, sacramenta novae legis efficiunt, quod significant; at non efficiunt passionem Christi, nec vitam beatam sed solam justificationem: passionem enim praesupponunt, et vitam beatam promittunt; justificationem autem proprie adferunt. Ibid. cap. 9.

† Secundo, sacramentum, ut sacramentum, non solum significat, sed etiam sanctificat, ut Catholici omnes docent de sacramentis novae legis. Ibid, cap, 16.

‡ Prima propositio: Ad rationem sacramenti in genere non satis est, ut significet, sed requiritur etiam, ut efficiat sanctitatem seu sanctificationem: immo magis proprium est sacramenti sanctificare, quam significare. Ibid, cap. 12.

§ Sacramenta esse causas gratiae efficaces, nisi ponatur obex. Ibid, cap. 16.

as before men." "This whole definition," says Bellarmine,* "is vitious, as will evidently appear from a close examination of it word by word. The first expression is *an outward sign*. This, indeed, is absolutely true, but not in the sense in which Calvin intends it. He means a naked sign, a symbol which signifies only, but effects nothing. For, throughout his whole definition, he contemplates no other effects of the sacraments than to seal the promises of God and to testify our own piety. It is no objection to this statement that he asserts, in his antidote to the Council of Trent, (Sess. 7, can. 5,) that the *sacraments are instruments of justification*, for he calls them instruments, because they excite and strengthen faith, and that not efficiently, but only objectively. Beza has very clearly expressed the same idea in his book *de Summa rei Sacramentariæ*, question 2, where he says—"Whence is the efficacy of the sacraments? It depends entirely upon the operation of the Holy Spirit, and not upon the signs, except so far as the outward objects may excite inward perceptions." Thus Beza. For the same reason, the signs which hang on the doors of inns might be called instruments of eating, since they suggest the idea of a table within. The Scriptures, however, everywhere teach that the sacraments are *operative*, inasmuch as they cleanse, wash, sanctify, justify, regenerate. John, 3 chap.

* His explicatis refellenda est hæc definitio: tota enim est vitiosa, ut perspicuum erit, si percurramus singula verba. Primum verbum est; *Symbolum externum*: quod quidem verum est absolute, non tamen in eo sensu, quo accipitur a Calvino. Ille enim intelligit esse nudum symbolum, id est, symbolum quod solum significet, non autem operetur aliquid: nam in tota definitione non ponit alios effectus hujus symboli, nisi obsignare promissiones, et testificari pietatem nostram: neque obstat, quod Calvinus dicat in antidoto Concilii Tridentini, Sess. 7, can. 5. Sacramenta esse instrumenta justificationis; nam intelligit esse instrumenta, quia excitant, vel alunt fidem; idque non per aliquam efficientiam, sed mere objective. Id quod explicat clarissime Theodorus Beza, in lib. de summa rei sacramentariæ, quest. 2, cum sic ait: Unde efficacia illa sacramentorum? A Spiritu sancti operatione in solidum, non autem a signis, nisi quatenus externis illis objectis interiores sensus moventur. Hæc ille. Qua ratione certe signa etiam, quæ in foribus publicorum hospitiorum pendent, instrumenta dici possunt caenationis, quia movent hominem, ut cogitet in ea domo paratam esse mensam, &c.

At Scripturæ passim docent, sacramenta esse res quasdam operantes, nimirum quæ mudent, lavent, sanctificent, justificent, regenerent. Joan. 3. I. Cor. 6, Eph. 5, ad Tit. 3, Actor 22, Immo nusquam Scripturæ dicunt, sacramenta esse testimonia promissionum Dei et nostræ pietatis, aut certe non tam expresse hoc dicunt, ut id quod nos asserimus, nimirum quod sint causæ justificationis. Ibid, cap. 16.

1 Cor. 6 Ephes. 5, Tit. 3, Acts 22. Never do they assert that the sacraments are testimonies of God's promises and of our piety, or, at least, they do not certainly teach this with as much directness as they inculcate the doctrine which we have asserted, that the sacraments are causes of justification." The point most offensive to the mind of Bellarmine, in the doctrine of Protestants, was, evidently, that in which they represent the effect of the sacraments as depending upon the Holy Spirit, and the truths and promises which they address to faith. He regarded the external action as the secret of their power. When duly administered, they just as truly, according to him, confer grace, as impulse communicates motion, or fire communicates heat. They were causes containing their effects, not figuratively, but really and properly, instruments producing their results by immediate and direct efficiency. Precisely to the same purport is the doctrine of Dens. "In the fourth place," says he,* "a sacrament is a sign, efficacious and practical, effecting that which it signifies." The recipient is said to be passive under its power,† and the sacraments are represented as truly and properly the causes of grace to those who do not interpose obstacles,‡ "they contain the grace causally and instrumentally, and that not simply as they are signs of it, which was the case with the sacraments of the old law, but as instrumental causes from which it might be extracted.§ Harding, the Jesuit, in his celebrated controversy with Jewell,|| says: "There be seven sacraments, which do not only signify a holy thing, but also do sanctify and make holy those to whom they be exhibited, being such as, by institution of Christ, contain grace in them and power to sanctify." "The sacraments of the new law," he teaches again,¶ "work the thing itself that they signify,

* Quarto, est signum "efficax et practicum," scilicet efficiens id, quod significat.—Dens, vol. 5, p. 68.

† Quia subjectum non concurrat active, sed tantum passive. Ibid, p. 70.

‡ I. An sacramenta novæ legis causent Gratiam?

Responsio Fidei contra sectarios est, ea vere et proprie causare Gratiam non ponentibus obicem, non tanquam causas principales, (hoc enim solius Dei est), sed tanquam instrumentales. Ibid. p. 89.

§ Sed quod Gratiam contineant causaliter et instrumentaliter, vel, ut dicit Steyaert, quatenus non sunt tantum signa Gratia, ut illa veteris Legis, sed et causæ instrumentales, de quibus eam depromere liceat. Ibid. p. 90.

|| Richmond's British Reformers, vol. 7, p. 685.

¶ Ibid. p. 690.

through virtue given unto them by God's ordinance to special effects of grace. Sacraments contain grace, after such manner of speaking, as we say, potions and drinks contain health."*

The theory of causation is kept up even in the doctrine of obstacles. There is a striking analogy betwixt the resistance which is offered by material hindrances to the action of physical causes, and that of the obstacles which, according to the Romish doctors, defeat the operation of the sacraments. What is technically called an obstacle—I allude not to those essential ones arising from perverseness of will, or from gross hypocrisy, which render void the sacrament, but to those accidental ones, which do not invalidate, but only impede the efficacy of the ordinance: what is technically called an obstacle of this sort is, either some disposition directly repugnant to the sanctifying tendency of the sacrament, or the want of such a state of mind as is suited to its action. There must be some congruity, as in material phenomena, between the tendencies of the cause and that upon which they are expended. Fire has a tendency to burn, but then the fuel must be dry. Motion once begun has a tendency to continue, but then friction and resistance must be removed; and so the sacraments are fitted to sanctify, but then the subject must be adapted to their action.†

Whatever may be the mode in which the sacraments operate, whether mechanical or efficient, the relation in which they are conceived to stand to the covenant of

* *Ibid.* p. 686

† *Est carentia, says Dens, definitionis necessaria ad recipiendum sacramenti effectum; sive est defectus alicujus non impediens valorem sacramenti, sed ejus effectum seu collationem Gratiae ob indispositionem suscipientis; ut si quis in affectu peccati mortalis, vel cum ignorantia necessariorum necessitate medii, suscipit aliquod sacramentum, præter Pœnitentiam.*

Quotupliciter continget, poni obicem accidentalem?

R. Dupliciter: scilicet per obicem sacramenti positivum seu contrarium, et per obicem negativum seu privativum.

Obex positivus seu contrarius sacramenti consistit in indispositione actuali repugnante infusioni Gratiae sanctificantis.

Talis est quodcumque peccatum actuale mortale, sive cujus actus vel effectus in suscipiente sacramentum adhuc moraliter dici potest perseverare; sive quod in ipsa sacramenti cujuscumque susceptione committitur.

Obex negativus consistit in carentia dispositionis necessariæ ad effectum sacramenti ex ignorantia vel inadvertentia nullo modo, vel saltem non graviter culpabili: v. g. ignorantia inculpabilis necessariorum necessitate medii. Dens, vol. 5, p. 107.

grace is essentially different from the representations of the Scriptures. Instead of being signs and seals of the benefits of redemption, conducting the mind beyond themselves to Jesus, the author and finisher of faith, they usurp the office of the Holy Ghost, and undertake to accomplish what he alone is pledged to effect. It cannot be doubted that the only Holy Spirit, whom Rome practically recognizes, is what she denominates her sacraments. Her whole theory of grace is grossly mechanical. The Tridentine Catechism runs the parallel between natural and spiritual life, and shows that the sacraments are to the latter, what birth, growth, nutriment and medicine are to the former.* The sinner is renewed by baptism, strengthened by confirmation, nurtured by the eucharist, restored to health by penance, and dismissed into eternity, prepared for its awful solemnities by extreme unction. Baptism is the birth, confirmation the growth, the eucharist the food, penance the medicine, and extreme unction the consummation of the spiritual man: call them causes,

* *Catholicae igitur Ecclesiae sacramenta, quemadmodum ex Scripturis probatur, et Patrum traditione ad nos pervenit, et (1) conciliorum testatur auctoritas, septenario numero definita sunt. Cur autem neque plura neque pauciora numerentur, ex iis etiam rebus, quae per similitudinem a naturali vita ad spiritualem transferuntur, probabili quadam ratione ostendi poterit. Homini enim ad vivendum, vitamque conservandam, et ex sua reique publicae utilitate traducendam, haec septem necessaria videntur: ut scilicet in lucem edatur, augeatur, alatur; si in morbum incidat, sanetur; imbecilitas virium reficiatur; deinde, quod ad rempublicam attinet, ut magistratus nunquam desint, quorum auctoritate, et imperio regatur; ac postremo, legitima sobolis propagatione seipsum et humanum genus conservet. Quae omnia quoniam vitae illi, qua anima Deo vivit, respondere satis apparet, ex iis facile sacramentorum numerus colligetur.*

Baptismus—Primus enim est baptismus, veluti ceterorum janua, quo Christo renascimur.

Confirmatio—Deinde confirmatio, cujus virtute fit ut divina gratia augeamur, et robaremur. Baptizatis enim jam apostolis, ut Divus Augustinus testatur, inquit Dominus: Sedete in civitate, donec induamini virtute ex alto.

Eucharistia.—Tum Eucharistia, qua, tanquam cibo vere caelesti, spiritus noster alitur, et sustinetur. De ea enim dictum est a Salvatore: "Caro mea vere est cibus, et sanguis meus vere est potus."

Pœnitentia—Sequitur quarto loco pœnitentia, cujus ope sanitas amissa restituitur, postquam peccati vulnera accepimus.

Extrema-unctio—Postea vero Extrema-Uinctio, qua peccatorum reliquiæ tolluntur, et animi virtutes recreantur, siquidem D. Jacobus, cum de hoc sacramento loqueretur, ita testatus est: Et si in peccatis sit, remittentur ei. p. 166.

or call them machines, no matter how they act, while it is conceded that the sacraments confer grace *ex opere operato*, their relation to the economy of salvation is substantially that which the Eternal word assigns to the third person of the Trinity.

Lying vanities, as they are, according to the teaching of the mother of harlots, they are yet the Saviours to which the millions of her deluded children cling for acceptance before God. They are accustomed to use nothing higher in the scale of excellence than the empty pageantry of ceremonial pomp, or to dream of nothing better in the way of felicity than the solemn farce of sacerdotal benediction; their hopes are falsehood and their food is dust. Strangers to the true concision of the heart, which they have experienced who worship God in the Spirit, rejoice in Christ Jesus and have no confidence in the flesh, the miserable votaries of Rome confound the emotions of mysterious awe, produced by the solemnities of a sensual worship, with reverence for God and the impressions of grace. Doomed to grope among the beggarly elements of earth, they regale the eye, the fancy and the ear; but the heart withers; imagination riots on imposing festivals and magnificent processions, symbols and ceremonies, libations and sacrifices; the successive stages of worship are like scenes of enchantment; but the gorgeous splendors of the liturgy, which famish the soul, while they delight the sense, are sad memorials of religion "lying in state surrounded with the silent pomp of death." The Holy Ghost has been supplanted by charms, and physical causes have usurped the province of supernatural grace.

As to the point, whether the sacraments are seals, it deserves to be remarked, that there is a discrepancy between some of the most distinguished Popish theologians, and the Catechism of Trent. The latter teaches,* that, "as God in the Old Testament was accustomed to attest the certainty of his promises by signs—so also in

* Quemadmodum igitur in veteri Testamento Deus fecerat, ut magni alicujus promissi constantiam signis testificaretur; ita etiam in nova lege Christus Salvator noster cum nobis peccatorum veniam, caelestem gratiam, Spiritus Sancti communicationem pollicitus est, quaedam signa oculis et sensibus subjecta instituit; quibus eum quasi pignoribus obligatum habemus, atque ita fidelem in promissis futurum dubitare nunquam possemus. p. 162.

the New Law our Saviour Christ, having promised us the pardon of our sins—heavenly grace, the communication of the Spirit—has instituted signs, subjected to the eyes and senses, which serve as pledges of his truth, so that we cannot doubt but that he will be faithful to his promises.” And yet of the same doctrine, as announced by Luther, Bellarmine remarks,* “that it is so absurd, that nothing can be conceived more so. Signs and prodigies,” he continues, “may justly be employed for confirming the message of a preacher, since they are known and striking of themselves; and depend not at all upon the message. But the sacraments have no power of themselves; they cannot be even apprehended as sacraments, except as confirmed by the testimony of the Word. Those who see the sick suddenly healed, demons expelled at a word, the blind restored to sight, and the dead raised from their graves by a preacher of the Divine Word, are so struck and prostrated by the intrinsic power and splendor of the

* Sed hæc sententia tam est absurda—ut nihil fere cogitari possit absurdius. Nam signa atque prodigia ad confirmandam prædicationem merito adhibentur, cum sint ex se nota et illustria neque a prædicatione ulla ratione dependant: contra autem sacramenta nullum ex se vim habent, ac ne sacramenta quidem esse intelliguntur, nisi testimonio verbi confirmentur. Itaque qui a prædicatore divini verbi, vel morbos repente curari, vel Dæmones verbo pelli, vel cæcos illuminari, vel ab inferis mortuos revocari conspiciunt, ipsa miraculi vi tanquam fulgore quodam ita percelluntur, ac prosternuntur, ut vel inviti verbis tanti viri fidem habere cogantur. Qui vero aquis hominem ablui, quod in baptismo facimus, vident, nihil mirantur, neque facile credunt in ea lotionem aliquid sublimius latere, nisi verbo Dei ante crediderint. Quod si non ante sacramenta suspicere incipimus, quam verbo Dei fidem habeamus; quo pacto, quæso, fieri potest, ut sacramentis divina eloquia confirmentur? An non ridiculus esset, qui ethnico diceret; “ut credas vera esse quæ dico, amphoram istam aquæ super caput tuum effundam?” Egregia sane probatio; nisi enim ex Dei verbo disceremus lotionem illam unctionem ad purgandos animos valere, quis crederet? quis id non rideret? neque enim id habet aquæ natura, ut morbos animi curet, et cordis maculas eluat; sed quidquid in hoc genere potest, ex institutione divina potest, divinam autem institutionem divina eloquia patrefaciunt.

Porro comparatio illa, qua verbum diplomati, sacramentum sigillo ab adversariis, passim confertur, tam est inepta, ut nihil ineptius fingi queat; multoque rectius verbum Dei sigillum sacramenti, quam sacramentum verbi Dei sigillum dici possit. Nam ut sigillum, etiam sine diplomate, vim suam habet atque agnoscitur et honoratur; diploma sine sigillo non agnoscitur esse diploma, nec vim ullam habet; sic etiam verbum Dei, sine testimonio sacramenti, suam, eamque summam habet auctoritatem; sacramentum vero sine verbi testimonio, nullam. Non igitur sacramentum, ut illi volunt, sigillum verbi, sed verbum, sigillum sacramenti nominari debuisset. Bellarmine, præface to vol. 3 De Sacrament.

miracle, that, even against their wills, they are compelled to credit his message. Those, however, who perceive a man washed with water—which is what we do in baptism—see nothing wonderful, and are slow to believe that anything of unusual sublimity lies hid in the act, unless they shall have previously credited the Word of God. If we do not begin to honor the sacraments until we have faith in the Divine Word, how, I pray, is it possible that the sacraments should confirm that word? Would he not be ridiculous who should say to a heathen—in order that you may believe what I say, I will pour this pitcher of water upon your head? An admirable proof, truly! Unless taught by the word of God, that that washing, and that unction, avail to purify the soul, who would believe it? Who would not laugh at the thought? There is nothing in the nature of water to cure diseases of the mind, or to cleanse the stains of the heart. Whatever virtue of this sort it possesses is derived from Divine institution, and that institution is made known by the word of God. Besides, the comparison, so common among our adversaries, of the word to a charter, and the sacrament to its seal, is so inapt, that nothing can be conceived more so. With much more propriety can the word be called the seal of the sacrament, than the sacrament of the word. For as the seal, even without the charter, has its own power, and is acknowledged and honored—while the charter, without the seal, is not recognized as such, and has no force—so also the word of God, without the testimony of the sacrament, has its own, and that the highest authority, while the sacrament, without the testimony of the word, has none. The sacrament, therefore, should not be called the seal of the word, but the word the seal of the sacrament.” Many other passages, of the same nature, might be extracted from this writer, in which the doctrine of sacramental seals is repudiated, scouted, scorned. Can it then be regarded as an authoritative dogma of Rome? Her leading theologians despise it—make it a spurn and trample in their controversies with Protestants—pronounce it the very height of absurdity—the perfection of inaptitude. The Decrees of Trent nowhere allude to it—and the only place in which it seems to be remotely favored is a single short paragraph, in the Tridentine Catechism,

occurring in the midst of a long, elaborate dissertation on the sacraments. The *emphasis*, most clearly, in the Church of Rome, is laid upon the power of the sacraments to sanctify. This is their distinguishing feature—this, according to Bellarmine, their *differentia*.* Their *essence* lies here, and whoever denies to them their power, destroys their reality.

I cannot, therefore, disguise my astonishment, that Princeton should have represented that the views of Rome and of *ourselves*, in regard to the nature of the sacraments, are precisely the same. She teaches that they are *causes* of grace, and we that they are *signs*. She teaches that they dispense the blessings of salvation by their own power; we, that they are nothing without the Holy Ghost. According to her, they justify, regenerate and sanctify. According to us, they point to Him who, of God, is made unto us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption. According to Rome, they work infallibly, where material dispositions exist. According to us, they are lifeless and unmeaning, when estranged from faith. We insist that they are seals of the everlasting covenant, and Rome, if she speaks at all, upon this point, mutters the confused gabble of Babel. Rome's sacraments and our's belong essentially to different categories. They are as wide apart as action and passion. Her's is a species of deity, and our's are content to be elements of earth. When she baptizes, her water penetrates the soul, purges the conscience, and purifies the heart. When we baptize, we wash only the flesh, while our faith contemplates the covenant of God, and His unchanging faithfulness. *Our* baptism *represents* what the blood of the Redeemer, applied by the Eternal Spirit, performs upon the souls of believers. Rome's does the work itself. Our's is vain without the Holy Ghost. Rome's is all the Holy Ghost she needs.

From the foregoing discussion it will be seen, that Rome vitiates the *form* of the sacraments, by inculcating the dogma, that they produce their effects *ex opere operato*.—It is this principle which changes them from *means* into laws or causes of grace, and converts them into a species of machinery, by the use of which, men become the ar-

* Proinde signum, est veluti genus; sanctificans, veluti differentia. Bellarmine De Sacramentis, Lib. 1, cap. 10.

chitects of their spiritual fortunes. The argument, therefore, as urged against Rome, does not apply with equal force to the strictly Lutheran and the English Churches, unless it can be shown that these communions embrace the principle, that the sacraments confer, *ex opere operato*, the grace which they signify. The churches of the East I have no disposition to ridicule. There is sad reason to apprehend, that the gospel has long since departed from their sanctuaries. But the great Protestant communions of England and Germany, glorious from the strife of other days, I cannot contemplate, with all their defects, without veneration and love, and it will require something more than the unsupported word of the Reviewer, to convince my mind, that they symbolize with Rome in one of her deadliest errors.* The English reformers have expressed themselves with great clearness upon the subject of the sacraments—this having been one of the hottest points of controversy in England—and their Catechisms, Letters, Protestations, and Creeds, are free from any tinge of error. The articles, adopted in London in 1552, and published by the King, Edward VI. in 1553, are as explicitly Protestant as words can make them. The 26th treats of the sacraments, in which it is said that “in such only as worthily receive the same, they have a wholesome effect and operation, and yet not that of the work wrought (*ex opere operato*) as some men speak; which word, as it is strange and unknown to holy Scripture, so it engendereth no godly, but a very superstitious sense.”† The Catechism adopted by the same Convention, and published at the same time, is almost as bald in its definition or description, as Zuingli himself could have desired.‡ The articles as now exist-

* “Besides, if baptism is null and void when administered by those who hold the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, what shall we say to the baptism in the Church of England, in the strict Lutheran churches, and in all the churches of the East? On this plan, we shall have to unchurch almost the whole Christian world; and Presbyterians, instead of being the most catholic of churches, and admitting the being of a church, wherever we see the fruits of the spirit, would become one of the narrowest and most bigoted of sects.” Princeton Rev. July 1845, p. 452.

† Richmond's British Reformers, p. 334.

‡ Master.—Tell me, what thou callest earliest sacraments?

Scholar.—They are certain customary reverent doings and ceremonies, ordained by Christ, that by them he might put us in remembrance of his benefits; and we might declare our profession, that we be of the number of

ing, have undergone considerable changes since the reign of the good King Edward; the clause condemning the *opus operatum* doctrine of Rome, is no longer retained, but the opposite truth is most clearly expressed. What there is in the Lutheran symbols to subject them to the just imputation of the Romish error, I am unable to discover. Luther himself, says Bellarmine,* has defined a sacrament "to be nothing else than a divine testimony, instituted for exciting and increasing faith, which, like a miracle, confirms, and like a seal, ratifies the promise of grace." "A ceremony in the New Testament without faith," says the Augsburg Confession,† "merits nothing either for the agent or others. It is a dead work, according to the saying of Christ, the true worshippers shall worship the Father, in spirit and in truth. The whole eleventh chapter of Hebrews proves the same. By faith, Abel offered a better sacrifice; without faith it is impossible to please God. Therefore, the Mass does not merit remission of guilt or punishment *ex opere operato*. This reason clearly refutes the merit which they term *ex opere operato*." If there be any one principle of the gospel which Luther saw in a steady light, and held with a firm grasp, that principle was justification by faith, a principle as utterly opposed to the sacramental grace of Rome as to the ceremonial righteousness of the Jews; and it is grossly improbable that Luther, who understood so fully, appreciated so highly, and labored so severely, for the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free, should have been entangled with the galling yoke of ceremonial bondage. How could he, the business of whose life it was to unfold the blessedness of faith, have taught in the same breath in which he proclaimed the

them, which are partakers of the same benefits, and which fasten all their affiance in him; that we are not ashamed of the name of Christ, or to be termed Christ's scholars. Ibid. p. 369.

* Princeps Lutherus, cum in Babylone, tum in assertionem articulorum, nihil aliud sacramentum esse voluit nisi divinum testimonium ad excitandam, vel nutriendam fidem institutum, quod instar miraculi confirmet, et instar sigilli obsignet promissionem gratiæ. Quocirca Sacramenta fere conferre solet cum vellere Gideonis, cum signo, quod Isaias obtulit regi Achaz, cum aliis ejusmodi miraculis, atque prodigiis, quibus ad faciendam fidem Prophetæ, et Apostoli utebantur. Bellarmine Præfatio to vol. 3. De Sacramentis.

† Augsburg Confession, De Missa; compare also article 13 which is very strong.

glories of the cross, that we are justified by any external work, however sacred? Tell it not in Gath, publish it not in the streets of Askelon! It is true that he did teach, what the Liturgy of England is supposed to sanction, that infants are regenerated at the time of baptism. But he was far from teaching the mortal heresy of Rome, that baptism itself renewed them. He treated the sacrament as only a sign and seal, but he supposed that God wrought in their hearts by the power of his Holy Spirit that faith upon which the grace of the sacrament depended. The sacrament, in other words, profited them precisely as it does all other believers. It was a symbol and a seal in every case, whether of infants or adults, addressed to faith. "Perhaps," says he in the *Babylonian Captivity*,* after having explained the necessity of faith to the efficacy of baptism, "perhaps the baptism of little children may be objected to what I say as to the necessity of faith. But as the word of God is mighty to change the heart of an ungodly person, who is not less deaf nor helpless than an infant, so the prayer of the church, to which all things are possible, changes the little child, by the operation of the faith, which God pours into his soul, and thus purifies and renews it." "The Anabaptists," he says again,† "greatly err in preventing infants from being baptized. For though little children, at another time, want the judgment of reason, yet when they are baptized, God so operates upon their minds, that they hear His word, and know and love Him, as formerly the holy John, in the womb of his mother, perceived the presence of Christ, and leaped for joy." If other evidence were wanting, that he was far from embracing the *opus operatum* fiction of Rome, I might refer to his sermon on Baptism, in which he denounces this heresy of schools, and while he admits that the master of the sentences, and his followers, have treated well of the dead matter of the sacraments, he asserts that "their spirit, life, and use, which consist in the verity of

* Quoted in D'Aubigne's *Hist. Ref.* vol. 2, p. iii, Carter's Edition.

† Potius graviter errant Anabaptistæ, homines fanatici ac furiosi, dum infantes baptizari prohibent. Nam etsi parvuli alio tempore iudicio rationis carent, tamen dum baptizantur, sic in eorum mentibus operatur Deus, ut et verbum Dei audiant, et Deum etiam agnoscant, ac diligant; quemadmodum olim sanctus Joannes in utero matris Christi præsentiam sensit, et præ gaudio exultavit. Bellarmine *Pref.* as above.

the divine promise, and our own faith, have been left wholly untouched ;”* and nothing more is needed to vindicate the Lutheran Church, than Melancthon’s defence in his Apology, of the passage already extracted from the Augsburg Confession.† “Here we condemn,” says he, “the whole rabble of scholastic doctors, who teach that the sacraments confer grace upon him who interposes no obstacle, *ex opere operato*, without any good motion on the part of the recipient. This opinion is pure Judaism, to suppose that we can be justified by a ceremony, without a good motion of the heart—that is, without faith—and yet this impious and superstitious opinion, is taught with great authority in the whole kingdom of the Pope.” Such proofs might be indefinitely multiplied.‡ The Reviewer, I think, must have been misled by the ambiguity of the phrase, baptismal regeneration. It may mean regeneration produced by the ordinance itself, *ex opere operato*, or as Bellarmine expresses it, the external action, which is the doctrine of Rome ; or it may mean, regeneration effected by the spirit of God, at the time of baptism, which was unquestionably the opinion of Luther, and perhaps of the compilers of the English Ritual. The first destroys the *nature* of the sacrament as a sign and seal, the other does not impair it ; and hence the argument, so fatal to Rome, leaves untouched the English and Lutheran communions.

To obviate a difficulty which may suggest itself to the minds of some, it may be well to remark, that the errors

* *Esto contemptor Magistri Sententiarum cum omnibus suis scribentibus, qui tantum de materia, et forma sacramentorum scribunt, dum optime scribunt, id est, mortuam, et occidentem literam Sacramentorum tractant ; cæterum spiritum, vitam, et usum, id est, promissionis divinæ veritatem, et nostram fidem prorsus intacta relinquunt.* Bellarmine, *De Sac. Lib. 1 cap. 2.*

† *Hic damnamus totum populum scholasticorum Doctorum, qui docent, quod Sacramenta non ponenti obicem conferunt gratiam ex opere operato, sine bono motu utentis. Hæc simpliciter Judaica opinio est, sentire, quod per ceremoniam justificemur, sine bono motu cordis, hoc est, sine fide : et tamen hæc impia, et superstitiosa opinio magna auctoritate docetur in tota regno Pontificis.* *Ibid, cap. 3.*

‡ This matter is discussed pretty fully in the third volume of Bellarmine’s “*Disputationum de Controversiis*” Ingolstadt Edition, 1601, which is the edition constantly referred to in these articles. The Arch-Jesuit quotes passages from Luther which seem to insinuate the papal doctrine, but which, he proves conclusively, were not intended to teach it. Bellarmine contends that it was absolutely impossible for him to teach it, as long as he held the doctrine of justification by faith.

of an individual minister, do not invalidate the ordinances dispensed by him, so long as the church, with which he is connected, teaches in her symbols, and retains as a body, just conceptions of their nature. He is guilty of aggravated sin in trifling with the mysteries of Christ. But his public and official acts must be measured, not by his private opinions, since it is not man's prerogative to search the heart, but by the standards of the society to which he belongs, and by whose immediate authority he acts. Those who, in Christian simplicity, receive the sacraments at his hands, will receive them with profit to their souls. He, indeed, is a heretic, but his church is sound; and the ordinances which he dispenses are those received by the church, and not the inventions of his own mind. Hence, baptism administered in the Church of England, by an Arian or a Puseyite, though the one denies the Trinity, and the other the essence of the sacrament, is unquestionably valid, because the church itself is sound upon both. And so there may be, perhaps are, priests in the Papal communion, who hold the true, Protestant, scriptural doctrines of the sacraments; and yet, as they act under covenanted articles, and are consequently presumed to do what the church intends, the ordinances dispensed by them cannot be regarded as valid. The *creed* of the church, not the intentions of individuals, must be our standard of judgment. Here we have what the Reviewer calls "the professed, ostensible design;" and Rome's baptism I feel solemnly bound to reject, because her design is not the design of Christ. She professes to do a different thing from what the Saviour instituted.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

ARTICLE III.

THE MILLENNIUM.

Much has been written on the subject of the Millennium, and the second coming and kingdom of Christ. It was agitated in the days of Paul, 2. Thess. II: 2. It seems,

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ARTICLE I.

VALIDITY OF POPISH BAPTISM.

[CONTINUED FROM PAGE 52.]

2. The most conclusive proof that Romish baptism is essentially different from the ordinance of Christ, remains yet to be considered. It might, for the sake of argument, be conceded to the Reviewer, that both consist of the same matter, and are administered in the same manner; that both are regarded as instituted symbols, and nothing more, which, at once, represent and confirm our interest, in that which is represented; still their *identity* could not be asserted unless they were signs of the same truths, and seals of the same promises. It is just as essential to the form of a sacrament that it have a relation to the *right things*, as that it have the right kind of relationship itself. While it must be a sign and seal, it is equally indispensable that it be a sign and seal of the *covenant of grace*. Its specific purpose, according to the Westminster Confession, is "to represent Christ and His benefits, to confirm our interest in Him, and to put a visible difference between those that belong unto the Church and the rest of the world, and solemnly to engage them to the service of God in Christ, according to His word." Hence all Protestants, however they have differed in other points, have regarded the sacraments as badges of Christian profession. Proclaiming as they do to the eye, the great distinguishing features of re-

demption, they cannot be consistently received, nor decently administered, when the scheme of salvation, in its essential elements, is denied or repudiated; and as their purpose is to confirm our interest in Christ, they evidently involve such a profession of christianity, as is consistent with a reasonable hope of personal acceptance through His blood. To assert, consequently, of Romish baptism, integrity of form, is to assert that he who receives it, if arrived at years, or his sponsors who present him, if an infant of days, make a credible profession of vital union with Him who is the substance of the eternal covenant, and in whom all its promises are yea and amen. Baptism administered to those who do not profess to believe the Gospel, is evidently null and void; it is an empty ceremony, a sign and seal of nothing. The question, therefore, at issue between the Assembly and the Reviewer, is whether a man, by submitting to the Romish ordinance, becomes a "professing Christian;" or, in other words, whether, consistently with the faith that the Church requires, and the obligations she imposes upon him, in imparting to him this first sacrament, he *can* cherish a scriptural hope of "his engrafting into Christ, of regeneration, of remission of sins, and of his giving up unto God, through Jesus Christ, to walk in newness of life." These are the benefits which baptism signifies and seals; and if the profession, which is actually made or necessarily implied, is incompatible with the reception of these blessings, it is not a *profession* but a *denial* of the Gospel; and such baptism does not *seal* but *gives the lie* to the covenant of grace. It is important to bear in mind that the *profession* which the validity of the ordinance requires, is not that of a general belief in Christianity, without specific reference to what is, *par excellence*, called the Gospel, but one which is consistent with a saving interest in Christ. The two things are evidently distinct, though the Reviewer has more than once confounded them. There is a loose and general sense in which the term Christian is applied to all who trace their religion, whatever may be its doctrines or precepts, to the authority of Christ. It is an epithet which distinguishes them from the Jews, Pagans and Mohammedans, and all who do not believe in Jesus as a teacher sent from God.— In this application it does not indicate any particular type

of doctrine, whether Calvinism, Arianism, Pelagianism or Socinianism; it expresses simply the fact that whatever be the system, it is professedly received upon the authority of Christ.

In this sense, no one denies that Papists are Christians; no one has ever dreamed of ranking them in the same category, as the Reviewer asserts,* with Mohammedans and Pagans—with Jews, infidels and Turks. They are Christians upon the same principle which extends the epithet to Pelagians, Arians, Universalists and Socinians. But there is another and a stricter sense in which the term denotes a peculiar relation to Christ, and is confined exclusively to those who believe, or profess to believe, the fundamental doctrines of the Gospel, or what is distinctively styled the way of salvation. To be entitled to this application of it, something more is required than a general belief in Jesus of Nazareth, as the author of a new dispensation of religion. The religion itself which He taught—not any system which men may choose to ascribe to Him, and recommend to the world under the sanction of His name—but that which He proclaimed in His own person, or committed to the inspired founders of His Church, which is emphatically the way of life, and the only basis of human hope, must, in its leading principles, be cordially embraced. They only can be Christians, in this strict and proper sense, who profess to receive, under the name of Christianity, nothing that subverts the economy of grace.

It may be cheerfully conceded, the Assembly has not denied, and the whole Protestant world has asserted, that, in the first sense, the Church of Rome is Christian—Christian, as the schoolmen would say, *secundum quid*, accidentally and not essentially—Christian, as professing to trace her scheme of doctrine, whatever it may be, to the instructions of Christ. She may be Christian in this sense, and yet all her children go down to hell. She may have the *name* without the *Gospel* of Christ. As the sacraments, however, contemplate the covenant of grace as a scheme of salvation—as it is not the *name* but the *religion* of Jesus which they signify and seal—if Rome, in dispensing her baptism, demands a faith and

* Princeton Review, July No. p. 465.

imposes obligations, which are inconsistent with a saving relation to Christ, however she may make professing Christians in one sense, she makes none in the only sense in which the title is important. If she does not baptise into Christianity, in its peculiar and distinguishing features, as the scheme of redemption, and the foundation of human hope, she might as well, so far as any valuable result is concerned, baptise into the name of Confucius or Mahomet.

If she is not Christian in the second sense which I have indicated—if her Gospel is not the Gospel of Christ—her religion not the religion of the Son of God, her baptism cannot be that which He instituted. Though Christian in name, she is anti-Christian in reality. The real question, consequently is, whether or not, in what she denominates baptism, Rome requires a profession and imposes obligations which are inconsistent with a saving interest in Christ, or the application of those very benefits which the Christian sacrament was appointed to represent and seal. Can a man believe what she commands him to believe, and engage to do what she obliges him to do, and be, at the same time, a spiritual disciple of Jesus Christ? This is the issue. Princeton says that he can—the Assembly and all the Protestant world have declared that he *cannot*. To determine the matter, the profession and engagements must be previously apprehended, which a man makes when he is baptized in the Church of Rome. The statements of the Reviewer upon this point are wide of the truth. By a most extraordinary paradox, as it seems to me, the merits of which will be afterwards discussed, he has been led to maintain that the recipients of Romish baptism are not made Romanists, and that the heresies of popery are not exacted in the ordinance.* But what says Rome herself? She certainly is a better witness of what she actually imposes on her children than those that are without. “Whosoever shall affirm,” says the Council of Trent,† “that the baptized are free from all the precepts of

* “It was hence argued that the recipients of Romish baptism are made Romanists, and are baptized into a profession of all the heresies of Popery. This appears to us an entirely wrong view of the subject.*** No man, therefore, is made a Papist by being baptized by a papist.” Princeton Review, p. 468, 9.

† Si quis dixerit, baptizatos liberos esse ab omnibus sanctæ ecclesiæ præ-

holy Church, either written or delivered by tradition, so that they are not obliged to observe them, unless they will submit to them of their own accord, let him be accursed." This is sufficiently explicit, and so strong is the obligation which baptism imposes to observe these precepts which make up what Rome calls a "Christian life," that those who when arrived at years, may be disposed to relinquish the vicarious promises of their sponsors, can yet be *compelled* to redeem them.* It is true that the Apostles' Creed is the summary which is actually professed at the time of baptism, but then, this contains only the heads of doctrine, the details of which must be embraced according to the system of Rome. "The true Catholic faith, out of which none can be saved," and into which consequently all must be baptized, is the symbol of Pius IV. This creed, all proselytes to the Romish Church are required publicly to adopt; and hence, it must be the creed which all her children are presumed to embrace. They are at liberty to put no other interpretation upon the sacred Scriptures, much less upon minor symbols of faith, than that which the Church has authorized. Baptism is regarded as a sort of oath, to observe her statutes and ordinances, and whatever articles she proposes at the time must be taken in her own sense. The *animus imponentis* determines what the catechumen must believe, or be understood to profess, when he gives his assent to those sections of the creed which treat of the holy Catholic Church, the forgiveness of sins, the communion of saints, and the state of the dead. As she makes a public declaration beforehand, that all whom she baptizes are subject to her authority in faith and practice, as this is the known condition on which the ordinance is dispensed, it is undeniable, that those who receive it at her hands *do* virtually profess "her whole complicated system of truth and error," and become,

ceptis, quæ vel scripta tradita sunt, ita ut ea observare non teneantur, nisi se, sua sponte, illis submittere voluerint; anathema sit. Conc. Trident, Sess. 7. can. 8. De Baptis.

* Si quis dixerit, hujusmodi parvulos baptizatos, cum adoleverint, interrogandos esse, an ratum habere velint, quod patrini eorum nomine, dum baptizarentur, polliciti sunt; et ubi se nolle responderint suo esse arbitrio relinquendos, nec alia interim poena ad christianam vitam cogendos, nisi ut ab Eucharistiæ aliorumque Sacramentorum perceptione arceantur, donec resipiscant; anathema sit. Ibid. Can. 14.

ipso facto, Romanists or papists. Her notorious claim to exact obedience afterwards, *upon the ground of baptism*, would be grossly preposterous upon any other hypothesis. Bellarmine accordingly enumerates it among the advantages of the ceremonies which Rome has appended to her ordinances, that those who are baptized with them, are distinguished, not merely from Jews, Infidels and Turks, but also from heretics or Protestants; that is, they *profess*, by the reception of the rite with its papal accompaniments, not simply *Christianity* as contra-distinguished from *Paganism*, but *Popery* as contra-distinguished from *Protestantism*.*

The Reformers too, seem to have understood the matter in the same light. Regarding baptism as a species of communion with the Church, which implies the sanction of its doctrines and a promise of subjection to its precepts, they deemed it to be inconsistent with attachment to the true religion, to submit to the institute of Rome. It was not merely that she had corrupted by additions, and obscured by her mummeries the simple appointment of Christ,—this, though one, was not the principal ground of objection. But according to the Confession and Discipline of the Reformed Church of France,† those who received baptism at her hands, polluted their consciences by consenting to idolatry; they virtually endorsed the Synagogue of Satan and treated it as the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ. There is a very striking passage in the “Confession and Protestation of the Christian Faith,” drawn up by John Clement on the first day of April, 1556. This Clement was a remarkable witness for the truth in the reign of Queen Mary, and like many others, was doomed to the stake for his opinions, from the horrors of which he was mercifully saved by a natural death in prison. His Con-

* *Sexta est distinctio Catholicorum ab hæreticis. Nam Sacramenta sunt quidem symbola quædam, quibus discernimur ad infidelibus, tamen ab hæreticis vix per Sacramenta distingui possumus, sed per cæremonias optime distinguimur. Bellarm. de Sac. Lib. 2. cap. 31.*

† In the mean while because of those corruptions which are mingled with the administration of that sacrament, no man can present his children to be baptized in that Church without polluting his conscience. Confession of French Ref. Ch., art. 28. Quick's Synodicon, p. 12.

Such as by their proxies present children to be baptized in the Church of Rome, shall be severely censured, because they consent thereby unto idolatry. Ibid. p. 46. Discipline Fr. Ref. Ch.

fession, it would seem from the testimony of Strype, was transcribed and circulated as a faithful manual of the Reformed doctrines in England. The passage to which I have referred occurs in the seventeenth article. "Howbeit," says he, "this I do confess and believe, no Christian man ought to bring or send his children to the papistical church, or to require (request) baptism of them, they being anti-Christ; for in so doing, he doth confess them to be the true Church of Christ, which is a grievous sin in the sight of God, and a great offence to his true congregation."* Notwithstanding this extraordinary protestation, Clement acknowledged the validity of such baptisms; his objection was, not that the *child* would fail of receiving a true baptism, but that the *parent* professed by implication a false faith. He knew nothing of the Princeton theory, the Reformed Church of France had never heard of it, that baptism was simply an introduction to the Church in general, and involved a profession of the creed of no church in particular. If this hypothesis be correct, which I had previously been accustomed to consider as only a katabaptist riddle, it is hard to perceive in what the wickedness consists of receiving baptism from Rome. If her priests are true ministers of Jesus, as Princeton affirms, and impart a valid baptism, as she also asserts, if those who submit to it hold no communion with her errors, if they are made professing Christians and not papists, introduced into Christ's body and not into the papal congregation, where is the sin? What have they done that deserves the censures of the Church? surely there can be no crime in being made professing Christians, if nothing more nor worse is done. And what more! Is it that they have acquiesced in the superstitious ceremonies which precede, accompany and follow the administration of the ordinance? Was it for *ceremonies only* that the Churches of France and Scotland, and the noble army of Reformers denounced participation in the Romish rites as polluting and idolatrous, and excluded those from their own communion, who had presented their children in papistical assemblies? The Lutheran Church retained many ceremonies. Was it a sin to be baptized in it? The English Church in her palmy days was defiled with many frag-

* Richmond's British Reformers, vol. 4, p. 292.

ments of Popery. Was the participation of her baptism idolatrous? Why then if *ceremonies* are so fatal in Rome, were they not equally fatal in Germany and Britain? The truth is, *ceremonies* were the smallest item in the account. It was the *faith* of Rome which the Reformers abhorred, and because they regarded all who sought baptism at her hands as professing *that faith*, they subjected them to discipline as transgressors and *idolaters*. They believed, as all the world but Princeton believes, that he who requests baptism from Rome, declares by the act that he *is* a Romanist. He goes to the Pope because he loves the Pope.

But whatever Reformers thought, and whatever Princeton may think, it is plain, from the testimonies already adduced, that Rome herself looks upon all to whom she administers the ordinance as *bound to be papists*. The profession which is made *is* the profession of *her own creed*, the obligation assumed, an obligation to obey all *her statutes and ordinances*. Now the creed of Pius IV. which is the only distinctive creed of Rome, binds the subscriber, and every human being that hopes to be saved, to receive the canons and decrees of Trent, to render true obedience to the Pope, and to submit, by consequence, to every bull which may be issued from the Pontifical throne. The very circumstance that this creed is pronounced to be indispensable to salvation, shows conclusively, that those *must* profess it to whom in baptism is imparted the remission of sins. Now the question recurs, is *such* a profession consistent with a saving interest in Christ? *Can* a man believe the Gospel, and, at the same time, believe the doctrines of Trent, and the still more detestable doctrines of the memorable Constitution Unigenitus? Can a man "enter into an open and professed engagement to be wholly and only the Lord's," and at the same time, engage to observe all the precepts, whether written or traditive, enjoined by the papal Church?

This is substantially the issue which the Reviewer himself accepts in discussing the question, whether or not the Church of Rome is a true Church of the Lord Jesus Christ. "If a man," says he, "makes no profession of faith, we cannot regard him as a believer; nor can we so regard him, if he makes any profession inconsistent with the ex-

istence of saving faith. And, consequently, if a body of men make no profession of faith, they cannot be a Church; nor can they be so regarded, if they make a profession which is incompatible with saving faith in Christ.** If, therefore, we deny to any man the character of a Christian, on account of the profession which he makes, we must be prepared to show, that such faith is incompatible with salvation.** And in like manner, if we deny to any body of men the character of a Church, on account of its creed, we thereby assert that no man holding that creed can be saved.** Hence the doctrine of the Reviewer is, that a cordial profession of the Romish creed—for what signifies profession, without the corresponding motion of the heart—Rome being a true Church of the Lord Jesus Christ—is not incompatible with saving faith—a man may, in other words, be a sincere papist, and still be a spiritual child of God. If this proposition can be sustained, no argument can be drawn from her views of the Covenant to invalidate the baptism of Rome; if not, the decision of the Assembly is according to truth and righteousness.

It is amusing to see the Reviewer, after having himself given so clear a statement of the issue in dispute, proceeding in the very next breath, to discuss a different question, or if it be the same, so disguised, as to suggest a different one to the mind of the reader. There are evidently two general causes which may invalidate a profession of saving faith, *ignorance* and *error*. The grounds of suspicion in the one case, are *defective* views of the economy of grace; in the other, those that are incompatible with its principles. In the one case, we apprehend that enough of truth is not received and understood to save the soul; in the other, that wrong notions and contradictory opinions destroy its efficacy. In the one case, the resolution of our doubts depends upon the minimum of truth essential to salvation; in the other, upon the maximum of error inconsistent with it. The question then is, not as the Reviewer insinuates, whether Rome teaches truth enough to save the soul, but whether she teaches error enough to damn the soul; it is not a question of *ignorance* but *heresy*, not whether her system *falls short* of the Gospel standard by *defect*, but whether it is *inconsistent* with it by *error*; not whether

* Princeton Review, July No., 1845, p. 461.

she *fails* to profess something that *ought* to be professed in order to salvation, but whether she professes something that *cannot be professed in consistency with* salvation. These questions are obviously distinct, and yet the Reviewer has strangely blended and confounded them, confining his discussion to the first and deducing his conclusion in reference to the second. His whole argument is a glaring instance of *ignoratio elenchi*.

There are two forms of heresy incompatible with salvation. In the one, the foundation is directly denied,—in the other, necessarily subverted,—in the one, the contradictory of the Gospel is openly professed—in the other it is secretly insinuated,—the one destroys by the boldness of its attacks,—the other by the subtlety of its frauds. The Socinians may be taken as examples of the one,—the Pelagians as illustrations of the other. This last form of heresy is the most dangerous, because least suspected. It steals upon the soul in insidious disguises, recommends its errors by the truth it adopts, labels its poisons as healthful medicines, and administers its deadly draughts under the promise of life. To this class of heresy, it was contended in the Assembly, that the doctrines of the Church of Rome must be referred. Whatsoever of the Gospel she retains, is employed simply as a mask to introduce her errors without suspicion. She is a fatal graft upon the living stock of Christianity, and though the root be sound, yet she, as a branch, brings forth nothing but the fruit of death. Her creed contains some truth,—this cannot be disputed; it contains enormous error,—this is equally unquestionable. The truth is not her creed; the error is not her creed, but the two combined; and to ascertain whether her *creed* is incompatible with salvation, we must take it as a *whole*, and compare the system, which, *as a whole*, it presents, with the essential principles of the Gospel. If it is inconsistent with them, or subversive of them, it cannot be regarded as a *saving creed*. The connexion and dependence of the truth and error in a complicated system, will determine the sense in which each is apprehended, and often give a result entirely different from that which would be reached by the isolated and sole contemplation of either. It is possible to assent to propositions which, in themselves considered, contain vital and saving

truth, but yet, *as modified* by others, they may be far from having a salutary tendency. Men, for example, may profess to believe that Jesus Christ is the Saviour of the world—in making this profession they assent *in words* to a fundamental doctrine of the Gospel, and yet they may so limit and restrain it, by other propositions, as to make Christ, after all, the tool of human merit, and grace the foundation of a claim of law. The formularies of Rome may contain all the important principles of Christianity which the Reviewer thinks he has found there, and yet, after all, they may be so modified, by the introduction of different principles, as to give a result utterly incompatible with the salvation of the soul. As *she* teaches them, and as she requires her children to *believe* them, they may be essentially another Gospel. It is not enough that she mingles the elements of Christianity in her creed, she must mingle them with nothing that shall convert them into a savor of death unto death. The most discordant properties, not unfrequently, are produced by different modes of combination, when the same materials are employed.—Sugar and Alcohol contain the same chemical ingredients, but how different their qualities and effects! And so the articles which make up the creed of a child of God, may enter into the profession of a papist, and yet the system, embraced by the one, be as widely different from the system of the other, as alcohol from sugar. The question in dispute is, whether the *creed* of Rome is a saving creed; and as neither her truth nor her errors, separately taken, constitute her creed, it is as incongruous to argue from either *alone* as to infer the nature of a compound from the properties of one of its ingredients. And yet this is the fallacy which the Reviewer has perpetrated. He has seized upon the fundamental doctrines of the Gospel, which he asserts that Rome holds, and *because* she holds these, he infers that her creed *must* be saving, without stopping to enquire whether they are not so linked and connected with fundamental errors, so checked, modified and limited as to convey a meaning widely remote from the teachings of the Bible.

It is nothing to the purpose to say that the doctrines of the Trinity, incarnation and atonement, are saving doctrines; no one denies it when they are scripturally under-

stood and cordially embraced; and if Rome believed nothing more or nothing inconsistent with orthodox conceptions of them, the dispute would be ended. But as these constitute only a fragment of her creed, it was incumbent upon Princeton to show that her additional articles were not incompatible with the saving application of these others.

In most instances of the mixture of error with important truth, they are brought simply in juxtaposition without any attempt to define the system which results from their combination. In such cases it is hard to determine the character of the whole, and to pronounce with confidence upon its saving or pernicious tendencies. Minds are so differently constituted that the form of words, which shall be the means of conducting one to salvation, shall prove fatal to another. The *real creed*, as it is impressed upon the heart, may be very different from what the examination of its elements might lead us beforehand to determine. But in the case of Rome, no such difficulty exists. She has stated her truths, she has announced her errors, she has gone farther and detailed the system of salvation which she deduces from the whole. Her Gospel is full and minute in the directions which it gives to the sinner who inquires, with the jailor, what he must do to be saved.

If these directions are inconsistent with the instructions of the Apostles, if their obvious tendency is to subvert and set aside the way of salvation as revealed in the Scriptures, the dispute is ended. Rome repudiates the covenant of grace of which baptism is a seal, and consequently destroys the form of the Christian sacrament.—Now the Reviewer has no where attempted to show that the creed of Rome, which is the creed of Pius IV.,* including the decrees of Trent, (in conformity with which it is expressly provided that all previous symbols must be interpreted,) and the subsequent bulls of the Vatican—contains nothing incompatible with the cordial reception of the scriptural method of salvation. This, the *real point* in dispute, he has wisely left untouched, and has wasted all his strength upon another, that Rome proclaims certain

* See an able article on the creed of Rome, in *Papism in xix. Cent.* p. 214.

propositions from which, separately taken, the essence of the Gospel may be drawn.*

His second argument, founded on the concession that there are true believers in the papacy, is not less fallacious than the first.† It proceeds upon the assumption that they were made Christians by the creed they ostensibly profess in the sense which the Church teaches and requires her children to adopt; that is, it begs the very question in dispute. If these true believers reject, in their hearts, the complicated system of the Pope, and were instrumentally converted by a different Gospel from that of Trent, the truth of their piety is no proof that the Romish creed is saving. Now it is certainly possible to be *in* Rome and not to be *of* Rome—to be in nominal connection with the Church, without believing its creed; and that this is the precise condition of true believers in the papacy, is indicated by the intense anxiety, which, in proportion to their light, they generally feel to escape from her borders. But then they are converted by no other *means* of instruction than those afforded by Rome. The *means* she affords, and the *use* to which the Spirit of God may turn them, are quite distinct. That the Holy Ghost should bring light out of darkness, and truth out of error, is proof of His own power and grace, but none that darkness is light, and error is truth. The Godly in Babylon, are saved by the mercy of our Heavenly Father, in having their attentions diverted from her monstrous corruptions, and fixed upon those propositions, which, scattered up and down in her formularies, may be made to suggest ideas, not by any means contemplated in the *real creed* of the Church. It

† “If these principles are correct, we have only to apply them to the case in hand, and ask, does the Church of Rome retain truth enough to save the soul? We do not understand how it is possible for any Christian man to answer this question in the negative. They retain the doctrine of Incarnation, which we know, from the infallible word of God, is a life-giving doctrine. They retain the whole doctrine of the Trinity. They teach the doctrine of atonement, far more fully and accurately than multitudes of professedly orthodox protestants. They hold a much higher doctrine as to the necessity of divine influence, than prevails among many whom we recognise as Christians.” Princeton Rev. July, 1845, p. 463.

‡ “It is further evident that the Church of Rome retains truth enough to save the soul, from the fact that true believers, who have no other means of instruction than those therein afforded, are to be found in that communion. Wherever the fruits of the Spirit are, there is the Spirit; and wherever the Spirit is, there is still the Church.” Ibid. p. 465.

is the force of that truth which Rome ostensibly retains, applied by the Spirit, in a sense which Rome expressly repudiates, which delivers these men from the power of Satan, and introduces them into the Kingdom of God.— They are saved *in spite* of her creed.

But, says the Reviewer, these men evince the fruits of the Spirit, and “wherever the Spirit is, there is still the Church.” I cheerfully concede that wherever a true Church is, there is the Spirit, but I am not prepared to convert the proposition without a limitation. If the Spirit is only in the Church, how are men to be converted from the world? The Bible requires them to be believers before they can belong to the Church—they cannot be believers without the Spirit, and, according to Princeton, they cannot have the Spirit unless they are *in* the Church. So that those who are without, are in a truly pitiable dilemma. They cannot have the Spirit because they are not in the Church—they cannot belong to the Church because they have not the Spirit. What, then, is to become of them? It is our unspeakable comfort that the Bible knows nothing of the Princeton doctrine upon this point. The Holy Ghost is a Sovereign, working when, where and how He chooses. In the lowest depths of paganism, in the dungeons of crime, amid Hindoo temples and Indian pagodas, in the darkest chambers of imagery, as well as the congregation of Christian people, He may be traced accomplishing the end of election, and preparing the vessels of mercy destined from eternity to glory. He works as well *out* of the Church as *in* the Church. He knows no limits but His sovereignty, no rule but the counsel of his will. Wherever He is, there are life and grace, because there is union with the Son of God,—there, too, is a membership in the *invisible* Church; but it is an act of the believer, *subsequent* to his conversion, and *founded* upon it, to seek a corresponding membership in that *visible* congregation to which the ordinances are given. True faith will engender the desire to be connected with the true Church, and hence converted papists are, for the most part, eager to renounce the Mother of harlots, as those called from the world are anxious to renounce *it*.

I have now examined the arguments by which the Reviewer would prove that the Romish creed is not incon-

sistent with a saving interest in Christ, and the reader, I trust, is prepared to render the verdict, *they are found wanting*. For aught that appears, this creed may belong to that species of heresy which, without directly denying, subverts the foundation by subtlety and fraud. It may take away our Lord, not by gross and open violence, but by stratagem and craft; it may, like Judas, betray the Son of Man with a kiss. This was the opinion of the General Assembly. It was on the ground of *heresy, fatal, damnable heresy*, that Rome was declared to be apostate, and her ordinances pronounced to be invalid.

It was indeed asserted, and asserted in full consistency with this explanation of the issue, that she *did not retain truth enough to save the soul*. The meaning was, that the *system* resulting from the combination of her truths and errors, the *real* creed which was the product of these jarring and discordant elements, as developed by herself in the accounts of the plan of salvation, left so little scope for the operation of any of the distinctive doctrines of the Gospel, according to their native tendencies, that the impression made upon the heart was not that of the truth, but of a lie. In the compound whole there was too little truth practically efficacious, or capable of being practically efficacious, to resist the working of the deadly errors.—The poison was too strong for the healthful medicine. The Romish creed is a mixture of incongruous materials,—among these materials some truth is found, but in the tendencies of the mixture, the characteristics of the truth are so lost and blended, that it fails to preserve its distinctive properties, or to produce its distinctive effects. It was only in this aspect of the case, that she was regarded as retaining too little truth to save the soul, and that in this sense the imputation is just, I shall endeavor by God's grace to prove.

The substance of the Gospel is compendiously embraced by John,* under the three-fold record of the Spirit, the Water, and the Blood—in which phraseology of his Epistle, there is obviously a reference to the circumstance, very particular mentioned in his Gospel, of the miraculous effusion from the Saviour's side, when pierced by the spear of the soldier. The Water and the Blood I take to

* 1 John v: 8, compare his Gospel xix: 34.

be emblematical expressions of the two great divisions of the work, which the Redeemer came to accomplish.—They define the nature, and specify the elements of that salvation which He dispenses to His children. A change of state, and a change of character—justification and sanctification—both equally indispensable, are the immediate benefits of the covenant of grace. The change of state is fitly represented by the Blood—an emblem of that death which consummated obedience to a broken law, satisfied its awful curse, brought in an everlasting righteousness, and reconciled the pardon and acceptance of sinners with the Justice of God—the change of character is, with equal fitness, represented by the Water—the scriptural symbol of purity and holiness—the washing of regeneration, and the renewing of the Holy Ghost. When, therefore, it is said that the Redeemer came by Water and by Blood—not by Water only, but by Water and by Blood, the meaning is, that He came to justify and sanctify—not simply to restore to men the lost image of God, by the infusion of Grace, but as the foundation of every other blessing, to restore them to the lost favor of God, by the merit of His death. The Apostle guards us against the defective view of His work which overlooks the Blood—which confounds pardon and holiness—righteousness infused and righteousness imputed. As He came by *both*, the integrity of the Gospel requires *both*—and as they flowed simultaneously, and in consequence of the same act, from His side, so they are indissolubly joined together in the experience of the faithful, and are imparted without confusion, and yet without division, to all who are called by God's grace. The Spirit, on the other hand, indicates the process by which these benefits—the Water and the Blood—justification and sanctification—are applied to men. It is a compendious phrase, as I understand it,—for the whole of experimental religion. The Apostle represents the Spirit as bearing witness to the fact that Jesus came by Water and by Blood, which, I suppose, is done in that inward work of Grace, which convinces sinners of their guilt and misery, enlightens their minds in the knowledge of Christ—unites them to Him by a living faith, and seals upon their hearts a full persuasion that they are born of God. When the Spirit, the Water and the Blood

are all found in their Scriptural meaning, and their Scriptural proportions, in any Creed, that Creed is a saving one—and error in regard to any one of them singly, or their mutual relations to each other, is always dangerous, and may be fatal. He that gives us the Blood without the *Water*, is an Antinomian—he that retains the *Water* without the Blood, is a *Legalist*. And he who, either admitting or rejecting the *Water* and Blood, discards the Spirit, is a Pelagian. Our Saviour has settled the question, that Antinomians,* as such, cannot enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. Paul has taught us that Pharisees and Legalists are fallen from Grace†—and Pelagians, from the very nature of the case, exclude themselves from Christ. These heresies are deadly—in irreconcilable opposition to the characteristic principles of the Gospel—and any Creed, which derives its shape and form from them, or is a consistent developement of any of them, must be regarded as fatal. No man can be saved by such a Creed. It is true that men, professing to believe it, may be saved—for they may really embrace principles in their hearts, widely removed from the verbal declaration of the lips. But Antinomianism, Legalism, Pelagianism, never *did*, never *can*, save any one; and he who in *fact*, as well as in *form*, rests upon either of these systems, is building, if there be truth in the Bible, his house upon the sand.

In attempting to determine the question, whether a Creed is a saving one, our attention must be directed to two points: What are the benefits which it proposes to communicate—and how are these benefits dispensed? A Creed may be obviously sound as to *what* constitutes salvation, and yet grossly at fault as to *how* it is to be obtained. Justification and Sanctification may be properly exhibited in their Scriptural meaning, as the great blessings of the Gospel—and yet union with Christ—through whom alone we partake of them, may be made to turn upon a principle, which Christianity does not recognize, and which must infallibly defeat the hopes of all who rely on it.—Who would pronounce that a saving Creed which, while it commended Christ as the ultimate Saviour of the lost, taught that union with Him was effected by carnal ablu-

* Matt. v: 19.

† Gal. v: 2, 3, 4.

tions, periodic fasts, by alms and penances; which promised eternal life to every Ascetic who should starve on Fridays, flog himself on Mondays, and give tithes of all he possessed—which insisted that the mere *doing* of such things was all that God required to make men partakers of Christ, and was infallibly connected with all the benefits of the new and everlasting covenant? Who would dare to say that such a Creed was a saving one? It sets forth indeed a *true Saviour*, but it preaches a *false Gospel*—it embraces many precious and glorious truths *about* Christ, but it can never avail to introduce the sinner *into fellowship with* Christ. Should it be conceded, for the sake of argument, that Rome confesses in her symbols the true nature of justification and sanctification—that she insists alike upon the reality of the atonement, and the necessity of holiness, yet her Creed would not be proved to be a saving one, unless it were likewise shown, that she inculcates the Scriptural method of union with the Son. The Water and the Blood can never reach us, except through the Spirit. It avails little to be taught *what* salvation is—if we are not further instructed *how* salvation may be had. In regard to both points, however, Rome is fundamentally in error. She denies alike the Blood and the Spirit; and even the Water, which she professes to retain, is so miserably defiled, that it can hardly be received as a stream from Siloah's brook.

I. She denies the Blood. The Apostle, it would almost seem, had a prospective reference to her heresy, when he added so emphatically, that Jesus came not by *Water only*, but by *Water and by Blood*. The great cardinal doctrine of Christianity—so clearly revealed, so earnestly inculcated, and so variously illustrated—that of justification by grace, is robbed in her Creed of all that is distinctively evangelical and precious. The peculiarity of the Gospel is, not that it teaches justification—the Law had done this before—but that it teaches justification **BY GRACE**. Here lie the glory of the Cross and the hopes of man. This is precisely the point at which Rome begins to pervert the Truth. She does not object to justification—but justification *by grace* she cannot abide. Where the Gospel enters, Rome protests. Unfortunately for those who can trace in her features the lineaments of a true

Church, the only justification she admits, is essentially that which Paul declares impossible to man—*justification by works*. Grace, in its Scriptural acceptation, at least when used in connection with this subject, she entirely repudiates as the source of all licentiousness, and sends its advocates to hell. She is not content to put forth essentially another Gospel, but she must needs belch forth her anathemas against the true Gospel of the blessed God.

There can be no question that when the Scriptures inculcate that justification is by grace, they mean that it proceeds from the mercy of God in Christ Jesus, without any reference to *personal obedience, or inherent righteousness*. To be justified freely by God's grace, is to be justified without the deeds of the law. To be saved by grace is to be saved independently of works, lest any man should boast. "And if by grace, then it is no more of works; otherwise grace is no more grace. But if it be of works, then it is no more grace; otherwise work is no more work." This, then, is a settled point, that grace, in the sense in which it enters into the scriptural doctrine of justification, excludes all reference to our own performances, and any creed which attributes our acceptance, either in whole or in part, to works of righteousness which we have done, *denies the grace of the Gospel*. Grace and works cannot be amalgamated; the law and gospel are fundamentally distinct. From the very nature of the case, a compound system, which proposes to justify us partly by one and partly by the other, involves a contradiction in terms. "Behold I Paul say unto you, that if ye be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing. For I testify again to every man that is circumcised that he is a debtor to do the whole law. Christ is become of no effect unto you, whosoever of you are justified by the law; ye are fallen from grace." To rely at all upon personal obedience is to appeal to the justice and not to the mercy of God. The argument in the Epistle to the Romans, to prove the ultimate triumph of believers over sin, proceeds on the assumption, that law and grace are incapable of confusion or mixture. "Sin," says the apostle, "shall not have dominion over you; for ye are not under the law, but under grace." This conclusion would be miserably lame if it were possible to be under both at once, or in any third

state distinct from each. There are, then, but two conceivable dispensations—one of law, the other of grace—and consequently but two possible methods of justification—one by inherent righteousness and the other by the free mercy of God. The difference of the two systems may be placed in another light. To justify is to pronounce righteous. A holy God cannot, of course, declare that any one is righteous unless he is so. There are no fictions of law in the tribunal of Heaven—all its judgments are according to truth. A man may be righteous because he has *done* righteousness, and then he is justified by law, or he may be righteous because he has received righteousness as a gift, and then he is justified by grace; he may be righteous in himself, and this is the righteousness of works, or he may be righteous in another, and this is the righteousness of faith. Hence, to deny imputed righteousness, is either to deny the possibility of justification at all, or to make it consist in the deeds of the law—both hypotheses involving a rejection of the grace of the gospel. There are plainly but three possible suppositions in the case: either there is no righteousness in which a sinner is accepted, and justification is simply pardon—or it must be the righteousness of God, without the law, or the righteousness of personal obedience—it must either be none, inherent or imputed. The first and last suppositions are both embraced by Rome in one sweeping anathema. “Justification,” she declares, is not “remission of sin merely,” and subsequently adds: “Whosoever shall affirm that men are justified solely by the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, or the remission of sin, to the exclusion of grace and charity, which is shed abroad in their hearts, and inheres in them; or that the grace by which we are justified is only the favor of God, let him be accursed.”*

She is, therefore, shut up to the position which she cheerfully assumes: that men are accepted in their own personal obedience. When, according to Bellarmin,† we are said to be justified freely by *God's grace*, the meaning is that we are justified by the *effects* of His grace, or the personal holiness it generates within us. Such also was the view of Trent, when it damned those who resolved

* Concil. Trident. Sess. vi: cap. 7. Canon de justificat. 11.

† De Justificat. Lib. ii: c. 3.

this grace into the unmerited favor, or free mercy of God: Rome, then, takes her stand upon inherent righteousness—justification and sanctification in her vocabulary are synonymous terms, and men are justified, *not* by *grace*, but by their *graces*. “The sole formal cause” of justification, says Trent, “is the righteousness of God; not that by which he himself is [righteous, but that by which he makes us righteous; with which, being endued by him, we are renewed in the spirit of our mind, and are not only accounted righteous, but are properly called righteous, and are so, receiving righteousness in ourselves, each according to his measure, which the Holy Spirit bestows upon each as he wills, and according to our respective dispositions and co-operation.” “Justification,” it is previously said,* “is not remission of sin merely, but also sanctification, and the renewal of the inner man by the voluntary reception of grace and divine gifts, so that he who was unrighteous is made righteous; and the enemy becomes a friend and an heir according to the hope of eternal life.” “The state of the whole controversy,” says Bellarmin,† “may be reduced to this simple question—whether the formal cause of absolute justification be inherent righteousness or not. To prove the affirmative, is, at the same time, to refute all contrary errors. For if the formal cause of justification is inherent righteousness, it is not, of course, the in-dwelling righteousness of God, nor the imputed righteousness of Christ, nor solely the remission of sin, without the renovation of the inner man. And if inherent righteousness is the formal cause of absolute justification, then, of course, the imputation of Christ’s righteousness is not required, which would dispense with an inchoate and imperfect justification. Neither is faith alone our righteousness; since faith, the Lutherans themselves being witnesses, cannot absolutely justify—and therefore, according to the fourth article of the Augsburg Confession, is not reputed as righteousness by God. And so none of these errors are placed for inherent, but only for extrinsic righteousness; or if they admit inherent, they deny that it absolutely justifies. They will all consequently be refuted by proving that what simply and absolutely justifies, is inherent righteousness.” This being the doctrine of Rome, I have no hesi-

* Concil. Trident. Sess. vi: c. 7.

† De Justificat. Lib. ii: c. 2.

tation in saying that it amounts to a complete subversion of the gospel. It substitutes *law* for *grace*, works for the sovereign mercy of God. It embraces the characteristic principle of a legal dispensation, and renders the blood of Christ of no effect. The Scriptures teach that the grace, by which we are justified, excludes all reference to our own works—Rome affirms that its immediate office is to produce them, and that it actually justifies only in so far as it produces them. The Scriptures teach that the obedience of Christ, freely imputed to us of God, constitutes the righteousness in which we are accepted. Rome asserts that our own obedience, achieved by the exercise of our own free wills, in co-operation with the Spirit of God, is the only righteousness in which we can appear. The difference is certainly fundamental—precisely the difference between a covenant of works and a covenant of grace. Now my argument is a short one. No creed which teaches justification by the deeds of the law can be a saving one. The proof is the positive declaration of the apostle that the thing is impossible, and that as many as are under the law are under the curse. But Rome teaches justification by the deeds of the law, and the proof is that she makes inherent righteousness, or works, the immediate ground of acceptance. Therefore the Creed of Rome cannot be a saving one.

The second proposition in this argument is the only one, I apprehend, that can create any difficulty, that justification by inherent righteousness is justification by the deeds of the law. To my mind, however, it rests upon sure warrant of Scripture.

Paul declares, as we have seen, that there are but two methods of justification; and, as they are the immediate contraries of each other, the characteristic principle of the one must be the opposite of the characteristic principle of the other. The characteristic principle of grace, however, is, that *it excludes works*; then, the characteristic principle of law must be that *it admits them*. This follows necessarily from the doctrine of immediate contraries.* If law and grace stand in this relation to each other, as the apostle teaches, and it is the distinctive peculiarity of grace

* Paul reasons upon this principle in the 4th chap. Hebrews. See Owen's commentary on the 3rd verse.

to *reject* works, it must necessarily be the distinctive peculiarity of law to *require* them. If whatsoever is *not* of works is grace, then whatsoever *is* of works is law. Inherent righteousness most certainly does not *exclude* or *reject* works, then it must *admit* and *require* them, and consequently must be brought under the category of law.

The evasion of Rome, that the works which are excluded, are only those which precede faith and justification, and are consequently destitute of merit, is nothing worth.* The expression of the apostle applies indiscriminately to *all* works performed with a view to Divine acceptance; and as to merit, the word and the thing, in the relations of the creature to God, are both equally unknown to the Bible. According to Bellarmine,† the works excluded are those which are performed in the strength of nature without the assistance of grace. "Gratuitous justification," he informs us "does not exclude merits absolutely, but only those which are proper, which proceed from ourselves and not from God." Hence, the justification which takes place in consequence of works produced by grace, is as truly justification by grace, as that which takes place independently of works. We may accordingly be justified freely, without the deeds of the law, and yet be justified by the inherent righteousness which the Spirit effects within us. This sophistry, to which the wily Jesuit again and again recurs, is a miserable play upon the ambiguity of the word *grace*. There are two senses in which it is used; in one, which so far as I know, is seldom or never found in the Scriptures, it implies those operations of the Spirit which are connected with holiness. In the other it denotes the sovereign mercy or unmerited favor of God. Now in this first sense it is *never* opposed to law. If it were, justification by law would be under all circumstances and to all classes of creatures, hopelessly impossible. On the contrary, a legal dispensation, until its disadvantages are forfeited by failure, necessarily implies that degree of grace which shall fit its subjects to render the obedience exacted. It would shock all our notions of justice, it would be gross and revolting tyranny, to create beings wholly unfurnished for a work, and yet demand it from them as the condition

* This is the evasion of Trent. Sess. vi. c. 8.

† De Justificat. Lib. i. c. 21., comp. c. 9 of the same book.

of life. Whatever may be the law which God, in the first instance, prescribes to His creatures, He imparts to them strength abundantly adequate to keep it. Adam was unquestionably placed under an economy of works. If he had kept his first estate and been justified, he would have been justified as a doer of the law, and yet the ability, with which he was endowed, in his first creation, was as truly from God, as that which the saints receive at their new creation in Christ Jesus. Hence it is evident, that obedience does not cease to be legal, because it is rendered by Divine aid. To be justified by graces is not to be justified by grace. The proud Pharisee attributed to God his superiority to other men. It was by *grace* that he professed to have performed his alms, penances and devotions; yet, with all his pretended gratitude and love, he was a legalist at heart. Legalism and Pelagianism, though generally co-existent, are not necessarily the same. That obedience is legal, which is performed with a view to *justification*, whatever may be the strength in which it is achieved. It is the *end*, and not the *source* of it, that determines its character. And that is a legal dispensation, which prescribes a law and attaches the promise of eternal life to conformity with its precepts. To give the law is an act of grace, but to dispense the reward when the obedience has been rendered, is the discharge of a debt which God's faithfulness has imposed upon His justice. The *obedience itself*, not the strength in which it has been performed, is all that the law contemplates. If it demanded a *particular kind* of obedience, then that would be a part of the precept, and consequently no *true* obedience could be rendered, if the kind in question were withheld. The law looks to nothing and can look to nothing but the fact, that the *obedience* it requires is given or denied, and it rewards or punishes accordingly. To resolve justification, consequently, into inherent righteousness, how sincerely soever that righteousness may be attributed to the grace of God, is to resolve it into the deeds of the law. The man who is justified, therefore, upon the principles of Rome, is as truly justified by works, as Adam would have been if he had kept his integrity. Adam's original nature was as much the offspring of God as the believer's *new* nature. Adam was *free* to fall, and so, according to Rome, is every

true believer—good works being the result of our wills co-operating with grace. Adam was able to stand in consequence of what God had done for him, and so are the faithful of Rome. Adam's life depended upon personal obedience, and so, says Rome, does the salvation of the saints. The parallel is perfect; and the conclusion is inevitable that Rome utterly rejects the gospel as a dispensation of grace and turns all its glorious provisions into a covenant of works.

But what sets the legalism of Rome in a still stronger light, is the estimate which she puts upon the performances of men, achieved through the co-operation of their own wills with the stimulating grace of God—for it is, after all, but a partial agency that her creed attributes to the Holy Spirit.

Tenacious of what the schoolmen denominate the merit of congruity, she distinctly teaches, that men in the exercise of their own free-wills, concurring with the grace of God, prepare and dispose themselves for justification.* God gives them the ability to work, but it depends upon themselves whether or not they will improve it. The diligent are rewarded with larger accessions of strength, until finally "they resolve to receive baptism, to begin a new life, and to keep the Divine commandments." Then the critical point is reached, they are fully prepared to be justified, *they have done well and deserve ex congruo*, the august benefit. If this detestable combination of the pride of the Pelagian and the haughtiness of the Pharisee can be termed grace, then it

"Is of all our vanities the motliest,
The merest word that ever fooled the ear
From out the schoolman's jargon."

My soul sickens at the blasphemy that men, independently of union with Christ, can bring themselves into a state in which, though they have no claim upon the *justice* of God, they *have* a claim upon His *sense of decency*, in which He cannot refuse to receive them into favor, without the perpetration of an ugly deed.

A system which can find a place for such a doctrine, stumbles on the very threshold of Christianity, and those

* Concil. Trident. Sess. vi. c. v. canon 4.

who can embrace it are strangers to what be the first principles of the oracles of God. But the climax of iniquity and legalism is reached in the odious dogma, first broached in the schools, subsequently incorporated into the public symbols of the church, and audaciously defended by her most distinguished divines, that the good works of the faithful are truly and properly meritorious upon principles of *justice*, so that God cannot fail to reward them without the surrender of His holiness. "We shall therefore prove," says Bellarmin* "what all Catholics believe, that the good works of the just are truly and properly merits, deserving, not of any reward, but of eternal life itself." "It is the will of God," he declares in another place,† "that His children who have the use of reason, should acquire eternal life by their own labors and merits, so that it may be due to them by a double title, a title of inheritance and a right of reward, since it is more honorable to obtain by merit than by free gift alone; God, that He might honor His sons, has so arranged it, that they can procure eternal life for themselves by their own merits." The merit of these works, we are further instructed, depends partly upon the promise of God. His own sovereign appointment which brings him under an obligation of debt to reward them, and partly upon their own intrinsic excellence.‡ "Whoever shall affirm," says Trent, "that the good works of a justified man are in such sense the gifts of God, that they are not also his own good merits; or that he, being justified by his good works, which are wrought by him, through the grace of God and the merits of Jesus Christ, of whom he is a living member, does not really deserve increase of grace, eternal life, the enjoyment of that eternal life if he dies in a state of grace, let him be accursed."§

With such statements before him how can any man, who has any adequate conceptions of the distinction between law and grace, hesitate for a moment, to affirm that the system of Rome is eminently legal? that, like the Jews of old, she goes about to establish her own righteousness, and refuses to submit to the righteousness of God? She requires works, these works are to be done with a

* De Justificat. Lib. v. c. 1.

‡ Bellarmin De Justificat. Lib. v. c. 17.

† Ibid. c. 3.

§ De Justificat. canon 32.

view to justification and eternal life, and not only obtain but *deserve* both in consequence of the compact of God and their own inherent excellence. If this be not law, it would be hard to specify an economy that is; and if it *be* law, how can the inference be avoided that it can *save* none who rely on its provisions? Is there a man who can lay his hand upon his heart and say that he honestly believes that any sinner can, consistently with the Scriptures, be accepted in the righteousness in which Rome says he must be accepted before God? If the Galatians, by submitting to circumcision, fell from grace and became debtors to the whole law, what shall be said of those who boldly proclaim that Heaven can be bought by works, and audaciously put eternal life to sale in the market of human merit? If such principles are saving, or a creed can be saving which admits them, in the name of truth and righteousness, what creed on earth can be a damning one?

In the face of all these clear and positive proofs of the most disgusting legalism, the Reviewer asserts, that Rome "holds that we are justified by the merits of Christ," and that she teaches the doctrine of atonement far more fully and accurately than multitudes of professedly orthodox Protestants." The proof of these bold assumptions turns upon the fact, that Christ is uniformly represented as the *meritorious* cause of all the blessings we receive. Trent says, in the passages quoted by Princeton, that "our sins are freely forgiven us by the Divine mercy, for Christ's sake," that "the meritorious cause of justification is the well beloved and only begotten Son of God, who, when we were enemies, for the great love wherewith he loved us, merited justification for us by his most holy passion on the cross; that Christ by his most holy passion on the cross, merited justification for us, satisfied God the Father on our behalf, and no one can be righteous unless the merits of the passion of the Lord Jesus Christ are communicated to him." To these extracts are added two sentences from Bellarmin, one affirming that "we are justified on account of the merits of Christ," and the other, according to the Reviewer, containing a true statement of the Scriptural doctrine of imputation.

As to the expression that Christ is the meritorious cause of pardon and acceptance, though taken by itself and apart

from its connection, it might be interpreted as Princeton seems to have understood it, yet Rome is far from employing it to denote our justifying righteousness, or that which immediately commends us to God. She does not mean to teach that the personal obedience of the Saviour is the ground on which a sinner is declared to be just. That which constitutes him righteous, she denominates, not the *meritorious* but the *formal* cause of justification, and as this consists in the graces of the Spirit, whatever sense should be attached to the phrase, *meritorious cause*, the legal feature of her system, inherent righteousness, is by no means excluded. But we are not left in darkness as to the meaning of the phrase itself. "The merits of the righteous," says Bellarmin,* "are not opposed to the merits of Christ, but spring from them; and whatsoever praises the merits of the righteous are entitled to receive, redounds to the glory of the merits of Christ. He is the vine, we are the branches; and as the branch cannot bear fruit except it abide in the vine, so we can do nothing without Christ. And as no one was ever stupid enough to assert, that it detracted from the glory of the vine when its branches bore much fruit; so none but a fool would say that it detracts from the glory of Christ, when his servants, by his grace, by his Spirit, by faith and charity inspired by him, perform good works, which are so truly righteous, that a crown of righteousness is due to them from a just judge. The objection is without foundation that if the merits of men are required, those of Christ are unnecessary. For the merits of men are not required on account of the insufficiency of those of Christ, but on account of their very great efficacy. For the works of Christ merited from God, not only that we should obtain salvation, but that we should obtain it by our own merits; or what is the same, they merited for us not only eternal life, but also the power of meriting it ourselves. Because God uses the sun to enlighten the world, fire to heat, and wind and showers to refresh it, it is not to be ascribed to weakness as if he were unable to accomplish these things by Himself, without sun, fire or breeze, but to His omnipotence, by which He is not only able to do these things Himself, but also to bestow upon creatures the power of doing them."

* De Justificat. Lib. v. c. 5 sub fine.

“Neither do our merits,” says Dens,* “diminish the virtue of those of Christ, as heretics yelp, since our merits derive all their power of meriting from those of Christ, as the branches derive their power of bearing fruit from the vine. Wherefore our merits commend the merits of Christ, inasmuch as he, by his merits, has procured for us the power of meriting.” When, therefore, Trent affirms that “the meritorious cause” of justification is God’s “only-begotten and well-beloved Son,” she means that the passion of the Divine Redeemer has established that dispensation, under which we are required to procure salvation for ourselves, and are furnished with the necessary helps for the arduous work. His atonement is the immediate ground of pardon and acceptance to no one; it simply places the race in a new relation to God, and that a relation of law, in consequence of which they can be and do what God exacts from them. Without the death of Christ they could not have been favored with this new opportunity of life. His merits have given them another *chance*, but success or failure depends upon themselves; He merited justification, by meriting that their own works should be accepted as a justifying righteousness. Hence his *passion* is only the basis on which a *legal scheme* of salvation is erected for *fallen man*; as the goodness of God was the basis on which a similar scheme was erected for man in innocence. As God’s kindness furnished Adam and gave him strength for his first trial, so the death of the Redeemer has instituted a new trial, and fitted and qualified men to comply with its provisions. Such is the honor which Rome gives to Christ.

Princeton says, however, that Rome as a community “holds that we are justified by the merits of Christ.” This proposition, I am constrained to deny. Some of her Divines have held it, but the Church in her public symbols, in the decrees and canons of Trent, in her authorized creed, has taught no such principle. Rome teaches that we are justified, in the language of Bellarmin, “*on account* of the merits of Christ,” but not *by* them. To say that we are justified *by* them, is to affirm that they constitute the righteousness in which we are accepted, to say that we are justified *on account* of them is to teach that they

* Vol. 2. p. 459. Tract. de Merito. No. 35.

are the meritorious cause of acceptance in the sense already explained. Bellarmin* has accurately noted the distinction: "In strict propriety of speech," says he, "it is not *on account of* (propter) but *by* (per) which is used to designate the formal cause. If one should ask *by* what man lives, *by* what fire is warm, *by* what the stars shine, it would be rightly answered *by* the soul, *by* heat, *by* light, which are formal causes. But if he should ask *on account of what* the commander triumphs, *on account of what* the soldiers fight, it will be answered not by assigning the *formal*, but the *meritorious* or *final* cause." Hence the first sentence which Princeton has quoted from Bellarmin contains a very different view of justification from that which she asserts that the papal community maintains. His own exposition of his terms is conclusive proof, that in saying we are justified *on account* of the merits of Christ, he intended to deny that we are justified *by* them, or that they constitute the righteousness which immediately commends us to God. Of precisely the same import is the next passage. Occurring in the midst of a chapter, expressly devoted to the disproof of the doctrine of imputation, and taken from a book which contains an elaborate and crafty defence of inherent righteousness, it cannot, without violence to the author, and violence to its connection, be interpreted as Princeton understands it. There is, indeed, no necessity for this violence. All the expressions are in perfect harmony with the dogma, that Christ is the *meritorious*, in contradistinction from the *formal* cause of justification. His merits are given to us, by being made available to generate merits within us; they are given, not by imputation but by infusion, and whatsoever efficacy our righteousness possesses, is derived from the passion of Christ. If he had not died, we should neither have been able to perform works of righteousness, nor would works of righteousness have saved us. It is in consequence of what He has done that our own doings are effectual. His merits are given in the same way that His wisdom is given, the one to make us meritorious as the other removes our ignorance; and we can present them to the Father for our sins, because in consequence of them, remission may be expected according to the tenor of the new law under

* De Justificat. Lib. ii. c. 2.

which they have placed us. Our prayers, penances, satisfactions and obedience could not purge our consciences from guilt, unless the blood of the Redeemer had imparted this efficacy to them, as the sun could dispense no light without the sovereign appointment of God. Such I take to be the meaning of Bellarmin.

Of what has been spoken upon the first point, the denial of the blood, this then is the sum. It has been proved, in the first place, from the testimony of Paul, that no creed which teaches salvation by works can be a saving one. In the second place, that the creed of Rome *does* teach it, because she resolves our justifying righteousness into personal holiness, damns the doctrine of imputation, audaciously proclaims the figment of human merit, both of congruity and condignity, and makes Christ only the remote and ultimate cause of pardon and acceptance. These premises being established, the conclusion necessarily follows, that the creed of Rome cannot be a saving one. It robs God of His glory, and the Saviour of His honor, gives us ashes for bread, a scorpion for an egg, and death for life.

ARTICLE II.

CHIVALRY AND CIVILIZATION.

This juxtaposition of names may at first suggest an association of ideas somewhat singular and paradoxical. The coupling of these topics may seem to involve the notion of variance and contrast, rather than of affinity and analogy. The question starts up, what combination in the nature of things, or in the events of history, can justify us in bringing Chivalry and Civilization into one view? What, and wherein, have they to do with each other?

At first blush, the subjects here linked together may seem to have slender relations to each other, and much in their nature essentially and widely different. Chivalry

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ARTICLE I.

J. A. Thomwell

VALIDITY OF POPISH BAPTISM.

[CONTINUED FROM PAGE 207.]

II. To make acceptance with God dependent upon personal holiness, is to repudiate the distinction between depravity and guilt, and to endorse the detestable doctrine of the Socinians, that repentance is an adequate ground of pardon, since it effaces those moral qualities the possession of which is what renders men liable to punishment. Rome and the Fratres Poloni differ, not in the principle on which justification immediately proceeds—both ascribe it to inherent righteousness—but in the source whence the principle in reference to the fallen derives its efficacy. The change of character, which is supposed to be inseparably connected with the favor of God, and a title to happiness, is, according to the Socinian hypothesis, attainable by the strength of nature, without the assistance of grace. Rome, on the other hand, contends that, although free will has not been extinguished in men by the fall, yet they have become so completely the slaves of sin and the subjects of the devil, that neither Jews nor Gentiles, independently of the passion of Christ and the aid of the Spirit, could be restored to liberty and peace. The inherent righteousness, by which we are justified, is, in the theology of Rome, the *infusion of grace*; in the theology of Socinus and his followers it is the product

and offspring of nature. When the question is asked *how* we obtain it, these Doctors differ; but when it is inquired *what it accomplishes* or *what is its office*, Herod and Pontius Pilate are agreed—the Papist and Socinian strike hands in harmonious accord, impelled by equal fury against the most glorious truth of the glorious gospel of the blessed God—*justification by grace*. That which, according to both, effaces guilt and exempts from punishment, is the possession of personal righteousness. The inward purity which expunges the stain, obliterates the crime. Men cease to be *punishable* as soon as they cease to be wicked. Though their personal identity remains unchanged, yet, as guilt attaches only to *character*, it must be expunged as soon as the character undergoes a change. God deals with men according to the present condition of their moral qualities, and he, consequently, who would escape from punishment, must escape from that moral pollution which the law condemns, and acquire those traits which the law approves. Men can cease to be guilty only by becoming just—their righteousness covers their iniquities—their purity cancels their guilt. Abandoning the grounds of displeasure against them, they procure the favor of God.

Whatever objections may be drawn from the ordinary conduct of Providence, and however fallacious the reasoning itself may be, yet the conclusion at which it aims must be confessed to be plausible—it falls in with our instinctive conviction of propriety; and as the government of God is moral, dispensing rewards and punishments according to the principles of distributive justice, there is felt to be a manifest incongruity in treating the righteous, no matter how or when they become so, as if they were wicked. The fact of being righteous would seem to be sufficient to exempt from punishment, though it might entitle to no positive rewards. Accustomed to regard purity as the parent of happiness, and misery as the offspring of vice, we spontaneously pronounce it to be absurd, no less than a contradiction in terms, to suppose that the holy can ultimately perish, or the good be abandoned of God. Still the claims of violated law are sacred and immutable. God has inseparably linked together punishment and crime, and it is the dictate alike of reason and revela-

tion—*the soul that sinneth it shall die.* Whatever changes may have been experienced in the moral qualities of the agent, his personal identity is untouched—he is the man who sinned—and as the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, and as the sin cannot be visited except in the person of the transgressor himself—he is the man that must suffer. It would appear, then, that if a sinner could repent of his iniquities, and undergo a complete and thorough transformation in his moral nature, so as to be possessed of all the qualities which God requires, the change in his character would create an emergency in the divine administration, the issue of which it would be impossible for us, upon any principles of natural religion, to predict with certainty. Penal justice, constituting an indispensable ingredient of the holiness of God, would be evidently forfeited if the *past* offences of the guilty were permitted to escape with impunity; and yet the idea that hell should be peopled with the righteous—with those who bear the image of their Maker, and are intent, even amid their agonies, upon the glory of His name—cannot for a moment be endured.

How, then, shall this problem be resolved? Most evidently by denying the possibility of the case. Piety instinctively suggests what reason and Scripture concur to authenticate—that the government of God is too wisely ordered in all its arrangements to permit emergencies to arise, as they often occur in human administrations, which cannot be adjusted without inconsistency, compromise or concession. It can never consequently happen, in the course of the divine economy, that moral fitness shall be violated by dooming the upright to punishment; neither can penal justice be foregone by allowing the guilty to escape. These two principles, equally sacred and immutable, must be preserved in inviolable harmony—their demands can never be permitted to clash. Hence the guilty must necessarily be incapable of rectitude. They can never acquire the character which moral fitness shall approve, while they continue in the state which penal justice must condemn. Pardon is accordingly indispensable to repentance; the liability to punishment, or what Protestants denominate guilt, must be cancelled, before refor-

mation is possible or holiness attainable. Sanctification, independently of a previous justification—previous in the order of nature, though not necessarily in the order of time—involves a gross contradiction in terms. Personal holiness, according to the uniform teachings of the Scriptures, results from union with God; and union with God necessarily implies the possession of His favor. Good works—proceeding as they do from the love of God as their source, governed by His law as their rule, and directed to His glory as their end—cannot be conceived to exist among outcasts and aliens. Men without God are without hope in the world. As the light of the sun is the prolific parent of life, beauty, vegetation and growth to the earth, so the light of the divine countenance diffuses health, cheerfulness and vigor in the hearts of the children of men. His favor is to the moral what the sun is to the material world, and the soul that is darkened by His frown can no more “move in charity and turn upon the poles of truth,” than a soil covered with perpetual night can be enriched with verdure or adorned with animals and plants. In the beautiful language of the Psalmist—*HIS FAVOR IS LIFE, AND HIS LOVING KINDNESS IS BETTER THAN LIFE.* Union with Him is the only source of strength, purity and peace. This is what the Scriptures denominate *life*.

Now what is the condition of an unpardoned sinner? His first transgression, upon the necessary principles of retributive justice, has *doomed* him to the *curse*. But to be under the curse, and at the same time enjoy the favor of God, are contradictory states. The curse implies something inconceivably stronger than a bare negation of favor—it fixes an illimitable chasm between the sinner and his Judge. It effects that awful separation from God, that banishment from His presence, that aggregate of all that is terrible, which the Bible compendiously expresses by death: in this condition of wretchedness and of exile, the dominion of sin must be unbroken and complete. Corruption riots on its victim. The curse which banishes from God banishes from holiness. The unpardoned sinner, consequently, from the very nature of his state, is as incapable of aspiring to holiness as a corpse is incapable of the functions of life. It is his doom, like the serpent, to crawl upon his belly and to lick the dust. The con-

demnation which sends him out, like Cain, from the presence of the Almighty, forever precludes the possibility of repentance—places him beyond the pale of communion with his Maker—beyond the reach of spiritual impulses, and leaves him to wither in the atmosphere of death. Such is the strength of the law to crush the victims of its penalty. All that are under the curse are dead—cut off from the fountain of life; the only works they are competent to perform are *dead* works.

The effect of a single sin upon the relations of a creature to God is by most men inadequately apprehended, in consequence of confounding spiritual death with the extinction of the moral nature.

As long as habits of incurable wickedness are not formed, while conscience in any measure continues to discharge its office, and the understanding recognizes the distinctions of right and wrong, there is supposed to be a form of spiritual life, which, by vigilance and culture, may be restored to strength and nurtured to maturity. Death in trespasses and sins is represented as the result of a *course* of transgression, a permanent condition of depravity produced by the natural operation of habit. This is to confound the cause with its effects, the tree with its fruits—death as a *state*, with its ultimate and complete exhibitions. According to the Scriptures, the slightest sin, like a puncture of the heart, is instantly attended with this awful catastrophe. It dissolves the union betwixt the sinner and God—it superinduces the condemnation of the law, and whatever operations the moral nature may subsequently perform, are destitute of the only principle which can render them acceptable.

As natural death consists in the separation of the soul and body, so spiritual death consists in the separation of the soul and God. As the body, though destitute of life, may long resist the process of putrefaction—preserving the integrity of its members and all the features and lineaments of the man—so the soul, though banished from God, may long resist what may not unaptly be styled the process of moral putrefaction, continuing to possess sensibility of conscience, delicacy of perception, and revolting at the thoughts of abandoned wickedness. As the body may be beautiful in death, so the soul, deserted of God and bereft

of the light of holiness, may yet retain something of original brightness in its form, and reveal in the grandeur of its ruins, the glory of the state from which it fell. It is a great mistake to suppose that spiritual death is the destruction of all moral susceptibilities and impressions. There may be total depravity without desperate atrocity, a complete alienation from God without degradation to the fiendishness of devils, an utter destitution of holiness without the possession of all conceivable wickedness. The condition which the moralist and Pharisee might acknowledge to be death, is that to which spiritual death necessarily tends. As soon as the soul is cut loose from God, it begins a career which, sooner or later, effects the prostration of the whole moral nature. It is in a state to form the habits which bind it in fetters of massive depravity, as the body ultimately moulders in decay from which the soul has taken its flight.

Spiritual death, consisting as we have seen in the separation of the soul from God, must continue to reign until a re-union shall have been effected. There can be no holiness until the sinner has been restored to the favor of his Maker, and he cannot be restored to this state until the curse of the law has been removed. He must, therefore, continue to be incapable of holiness as long as the law continues to condemn. Its penalty is an awful barrier betwixt his soul and life, and until that barrier is some way or other destroyed, he must remain the victim of everlasting death. Hence the removal of the curse is the first step in his progress to holiness; the removal of the curse implies pardon, so that he must be pardoned before he can repent, he must cease to be condemned before he can breathe the atmosphere of life. Repentance and reformation, proceeding from communications of divine love, involve the possession of divine favor, and can never consequently obtain among those whom God pronounces to be vessels of His wrath. To suppose that a sinner can be sanctified, is to suppose that he can enjoy fellowship with God, and perform those works which flow from the participations of divine love. To suppose that he can be sanctified without being justified, is to suppose that he can be in a condition in which God denounces him as the object of vengeance, and at the same time in a state of reconcil-

iation and favor, that he can be and not be at one and the same moment under the curse. Repentance, therefore, implying restoration to favor and communion with God, is incompatible with a state of condemnation which debars from both ; and, consequently, an unpardoned sinner cannot repent.

If now, pardon be essential to repentance, acceptance indispensable to holiness, it necessarily follows from the hypothesis of Rome, which confounds the water and the blood, that repentance and holiness are hopelessly impossible. The object of justification is to put the sinner in a state in which the light of the divine countenance can be lifted up upon him, in which he can receive communications of grace, and enjoy communion and fellowship with God. If these manifestations of favor are indispensable to holiness, and can only be imparted when the sinner is justified, justification must be the only basis on which righteousness of life can be reared. Rome, however, has reversed this order, and made holiness essential to acceptance ; the necessary consequence is, that justification is denied to be of grace, and sanctification is impossible. With all her pretended zeal for the interests of righteousness, her extravagant adulation of works and her presumptuous confidence in merit, she has proclaimed a creed, which, whoever cordially embraces and consistently endeavors to embody in his life, must everlastingly remain an alien from God, under sentence of condemnation, in bondage to spiritual death. Philosophy and Scripture concur in declaring, that whoever would be holy, must be in union with his Maker, that union with God is inseparably connected with the possession of His favor, and the possession of His favor a fruit of justification, so that whoever would be holy must necessarily be justified. Rome on the other hand, proclaims in foolish confidence of boasting, that the sinner must begin in holiness and end in the favor of his judge, begin at a point which he can never reach, and of course end precisely where he was, under the wrath and curse of the Almighty. Here, then, is the insuperable difficulty of Rome, she denies the *blood*, and in denying the blood, inevitably corrupts the *water* ; she takes away the cause, and of course must renounce the

effect. Upon her hypothesis sanctification is subverted. How then can hers be a saving creed?

The impossibility of constructing a system of sanctification, independently of a gracious justification, does not strike men at once, because they are apt to confound two widely different conditions, that of a fallen and an unfallen creature.

In an unfallen state, justification is possible by the deeds of the law, because personal obedience is within the power of the agent. Created in the image of God, possessed of a holy nature and governed by holy impulses, there are no obstructions in their persons and character to the free communications of divine favor. They are united with God, are consequently able to do all that His law demands. But so long as they are not justified, this union is precarious, they may fall from their integrity, and lose their rectitude of nature; justification confirms this union, and renders their apostacy forever impossible, giving them at the same time a right to whatever rewards had been promised to obedience, so that perpetual security is one of its leading and characteristic benefits. But the justification of a sinner, of a fallen being, though essentially the same, yet in consequence of the different condition of the subject, includes the imparting of an element which in the other case was previously possessed. As an unfallen creature already enjoys the favor of God, he is simply confirmed in its possession, while a fallen creature, who, from the nature of the case is alienated from his Maker, must first acquire this privilege before he can be confirmed in it; his union with God must be instituted as well as established. As then in the justification of a sinner, communion with God is to be procured as well as confirmed, he cannot be justified by deeds of law, which pre-supposes its existence. His acceptance must be of grace, or it cannot be effected at all. It must precede personal obedience, or personal obedience can never take place.

It is vain to allege in extenuation of the beggarly theology of Rome, that in consequence of the work of the Redeemer, communications of grace may be imparted to the guilty, which enable them to repent, to bring forth the fruits of righteousness, and so to be justified by works. These communications either imply the possession of the

divine favor and deliverance from the condemnation of the law, or they do not. If they do, the sinner is already justified without works, and pardoned independently of repentance, which is contrary to the hypothesis. If they do not, then they leave him under the curse, in the power of spiritual death, and of course do not impart spiritual life, so that the works which they enable him to perform are only dead works. The conclusion is, therefore, unaffected, that without a gracious justification, no sinner can be sanctified. Pardon and acceptance must precede repentance and holiness.

The practical effects of the Romish system are so modified by the temper and constitution of those by whom it is received, as to present no uniform appearance. In some, it produces an awful bondage. Anxiously solicitous about the salvation of their souls, and taught to seek for the divine favor in works of righteousness, which their hands have wrought, they exhaust the resources of their nature in vain and servile efforts to compass obedience to the law. Tortured by conscience, which always in the guilty forecasteth grievous things, groaning in spirit under the intolerable burden of aggravated guilt, they multiply devices of superstition and will-worship, in the delusive hope of bringing peace to their troubled and agitated breasts. They know nothing of the liberty of the sons of God. Strangers to that glorious spirit of adoption, which the sense of acceptance generates, existence is felt to be a curse, and God dreaded as a terrible calamity. Their obedience is the effort of a slave to propitiate a tyrant, and after a life dragged out in galling servitude, death comes to them, clothed with ten-fold terror. Eternity is shrouded in insupportable gloom, and the dismal tragedy of life closes with an awful catastrophe. To such sensitive and conscientious minds, Rome presents her system in the aspect of unbending severity. She imposes penances and privations, pilgrimages and fasts, vows of poverty and self-denial, hair-cloth and rags, the torment of the body for the good of the soul.

Eternity alone can disclose the groans, the sufferings, the agony, which the cells of her monks, and the chambers of her nuns have witnessed among them, who are anxiously enquiring wherewith they should appear before

the Lord, and bow themselves before the Most High God. And all this anguish has been occasioned by her devilish cruelty, in suppressing the grace of God. She has refused to point the wounded spirit to the fountain opened in the house of David, for sin and for uncleanness; she has refused to proclaim a free and glorious justification through the obedience unto death of the Son of God, to open the doors of the captive and strike the fetters from the hands of the prisoner. Instead of acting as the herald of mercy, she has betrayed the cruelty of a tyrant; brooding in vindictive malice over the woes and anguish, which, with the scorpion whip of the law she has wrung from hearts, where the oil of grace should be imparted; she has rejoiced in thickening the horrors of superstition, where she was bound to diffuse the light of the gospel. Like the ancient Pharisees, she binds heavy burdens upon men and grievous to be borne, and lays them on their shoulders, and will not move them with one of her fingers. She shuts the kingdom of heaven against them, neither entering herself nor permitting others to do so. Like ancient Egypt to the Hebrews, she is literally the house of bondage. Some, like Luther, have escaped from her cruelty. The key which opened their prison doors, and enabled the soul to laugh at her terrors, was justification by grace. This precious truth, for which their hearts had panted in Babylon, was the talisman of joy, of peace, of holiness. Delivered from the curse of law, the dominion of the devil, and the horrors of conscience, they could serve God acceptably with reverence and godly fear, in holiness and righteousness before Him, all the days of their lives.

There are others whose apprehensions of sin are less feeble and impressive; disposed to make a mock of its consequences, they indulge in presumptuous hopes, and treat the salvation of the soul as an easy and comparatively light matter. These, Rome flatters with the deceits of a frivolous and deadly casuistry; corrupting the first principles of morals, she makes sin to be no more sin, law to be no more law; with elaborate ingenuity, she has undertaken to solve the problem, what is the minimum of decency, and the maximum of sin, with which men can enter into heaven. She has confounded the distinctions of truth and falsehood, of right and wrong, and left no-

thing certain, but her own pretended authority, and all to accommodate easy consciences, to reconcile hopes of heaven with a careless and wicked life.

Such is the working of the system. Theoretically, it makes sanctification impossible—practically, it verifies the truth of the theory.

Extremes meet. An old writer has pithily observed, that the least touch of a pencil will translate a laughing into a crying face. In illustration of the proverb, it would not be difficult to prove, that the vaunting legalism of Rome really terminates in a filthy and disgusting antinomianism. She degrades the majesty of the divine law, substitutes a fictitious standard of excellence, and represses those emotions which must characterize the heart of every true penitent. Her doctrine of venial sins, which are confessed to be transgressions of the divine commandments, is utterly incompatible with those awful impressions of the malignity of the least departure from rectitude, which the holiness of God, and the atonement of the Redeemer alike inculcate. She teaches that men may disregard the authority of their maker, and yet not be deserving of death; that there are some precepts so insignificant, and some offences so trivial and harmless, that a few signs of the cross, and muttered incantations, a little holy water, an Ave Maria, or a Pater Noster, are abundantly sufficient to expiate. Is not blasphemy written on the portals of a church which can preach such a doctrine as this? Does she not make the commandments of God of none effect by her traditions?

But the odious tendencies of her doctrine are not only manifested in her slight estimate of some of the commandments—one she has absolutely expunged.

The pure and sublime idea which the Scriptures inculcate of a spiritual God, neither possessed of a corporeal figure, nor capable of being represented by visible symbols, is as much a stranger to the theology of Rome, as to the “elegant mythology of Greece.” Hence we are told that “to represent the persons of the Holy Trinity by certain forms, under which, as we read in the Old and New Testaments, they deigned to appear, is not to be deemed contrary to religion or the law of God.” Accordingly the second commandment is annulled by the hierarchy, (in

books of popular devotion it is wholly suppressed,) the windows of papal churches are frequently adorned with images of the Trinity, the breviaries and mass-books are embellished with engravings, which represent God the Father as a venerable old man, the Eternal Son in human form, and the blessed Spirit in the shape of a dove.

Sometimes grotesque images, hardly surpassed in the fabulous creations of heathen poets, where centaurs, gorgons, mermaids, with all manner of impossible things hold undisputed sway, are employed to give an adequate impression of Him who dwells in majesty unapproachable, whom no man hath seen or can see. To picture the Holy Trinity with three noses and four eyes and three faces, and in this form these divine persons are sometimes submitted to the devout contemplation of papal idolaters—is to give an idea of God, from which an ancient Roman or a modern Hindoo might turn away in disgust. Such gross and extravagant symbols, however carefully explained, or allegorically interpreted, involve a degradation of the Supreme Being, which it is impossible to reconcile with the sublime announcement of our Saviour, that God is a Spirit, and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth. The adoration which is paid to the Deity, under any corporeal figure or visible representation, cannot be vindicated from the charge of idolatry upon any principles, which do not exempt from the same imputation every form, whether ancient or modern, of pagan superstition. It is quite certain, from the accounts of heathen philosophers and poets, that the images of their Gods were regarded simply as visible memorials of invisible deities, as signs by which their affections were excited, and through which their worship was directed.

The veneration with which they were treated, was purely of that relative kind, which the Romish doctors impute to the devotees of their own communion. Pagan statues and Romish pictures are due to the operation of the same principle—an attempt to accommodate the receding majesty of a spiritual being to human sympathies, and to divest the adoration of an infinite object of some of its awful and mysterious veneration, by reducing its grandeur to the feeble apprehension of human capacities. Fallen humanity, having originally apostatized from God, and lost

the right as well as the power of intimate communion with the Father of Spirits, seeks to gratify its religious aspirations by tangible objects, around which its sympathies can readily cling. Unable to soar to the unapproachable light in which Deity dwells in mysterious sanctity, it spends its devotion upon humbler things, to which it imparts such divine associations as may seem, at least, to reconcile the worship with the acknowledged supremacy of God. When we cannot rise to God, the religious necessities of our nature will drag Him down to us. In the Papal community, the degradation of the Supreme Being seems to have reached its lowest point of disgusting fetishism in the adoration of the bread and wine of the sacramental feast. I know of nothing in the annals of heathenism, that can justly be compared with this stupendous climax of absurdity, impiety, blasphemy and idolatry. The work of the cook, and the product of the vintage, bread and wine, the materials of food which pass through the stages of digestion and decay, are placed before us, after having been submitted to the magical process of sacerdotal enchantment, as the eternal God, in the person of the incarnate Redeemer. The eucharistic elements are not memorials of Christ, nor visible symbols of his love, they are, after the pretended consecration of the priest, the Son of God himself. They are worshipped and adored, eaten and drunk, received into the stomach and passed into the bowels, as the Creator, Preserver, and Saviour of mankind.

The ancient Egyptians, in paying religious veneration to inferior animals, and to a certain class of vegetables, regarded them as sacred, as we learn from Herodotus and Cicero, on account of their subservience to purposes of utility. They were considered as instruments of divine providence—not as Gods themselves—by which the interests of husbandry were promoted, and noxious vermin were destroyed.

But where in the whole history of mankind, among the darkest tribes of Africa, or the benighted inhabitants of the isles of the sea, is another instance to be found of a superstition so degraded, or a form of idolatry so horribly revolting, as that which is presented in the doctrine of the Mass?

The infernal incantations of the witches in Macbeth, chanting their awful dirges over the boiling caldron, in which are mingled the elements of death, are to my mind less insupportably disgusting, less terrifically wicked, than the priests of Rome, pretending to subject the Saviour of the world, in cold-blooded cruelty, and for purposes of hire, and that in increasing millions of instances, to the unutterable agonies of Gethsemane and Calvary.

While she thus depresses the divine standard of holiness, mutilates the first table of the law, and makes idolatry a part of devotion, she fabricates a standard of her own. She assumes to be a law-giver, and proclaims her impious precepts upon the pains of the second death.

Men may violate the law of God with impunity, but the authority of Rome must be guarded with the awful sanctions of eternity. She has instituted days, and months, and years—she has appointed confessions, penances and ceremonies—she has constructed a vast system of will-worship, and has conceded the palm of distinguished holiness to the sanctimonious hypocrites, who most scrupulously comply with her minute and painful observances, although they may be living in flagrant contempt of some of the most palpable injunctions of God.

And what shall be said of the fiction of supererogatory merits, of the competency of one man to satisfy for the sins of another, and of the power of the Church to dispense indulgences for gold? What shall be said of purgatory, private masses, auricular confession, and priestly absolution? What are all these but so many proofs of the desperate blindness of Rome, in regard to the nature of holiness, the beauty and simplicity of spiritual truth, and the compass, purity and extent of the divine law; so many monuments of presumptuous confidence in the resources and ability of man, and contempt for the provisions and efficacy of God's grace?

Her whole system, in regard to the water, is fundamentally corrupt. She renders the sanctification of the gospel hopelessly impossible, substituting for a spiritual devotion, the grievous bondage of superstition, and for holiness of life, the sanctimonious hypocrisy of will worship.

3. Having shewn that Rome is essentially unsound in regard to the water and blood, I proceed to consider her

doctrine of the Spirit, or the account which she gives of the application of redemption to the hearts and consciences of men. Upon this point, although the reviewer has asserted that she holds "a much higher doctrine as to the necessity of divine influence, than prevails among many whom we recognize as Christians," yet, according to the standard of the Reformation, the theology of the Vatican is in fatal and fundamental error. If we take the Creed of Rome—not from the speculations of private doctors—nor the peculiar opinions of chosen schools—if we appeal, not to Dominicans, Thomists and Jansenists, but to the public and authorized symbols of the Church, it seems to me impossible to deny, that her theory of grace is exactly in accordance with the conditions of a legal system, and presents as wide a departure from the simplicity of the gospel, in regard to the operations of the Spirit, as her views of justification, in regard to the righteousness of Christ. Representing the economy of salvation as a new dispensation of law, she makes its blessings contingent and precarious, dependent upon the decision of its subjects, and not upon the agency of God. As freedom and mutability of will are evidently essential to a state of proper probation—freedom, as implying the power to fulfil whatever conditions are exacted—mutability, as denoting that the power may be abused, and the required obedience withheld, Rome can consistently admit no other operations of the Spirit than those which shall impart ability to stand, without affecting the liability to fall.

Able to stand and liable to fall—this is a compendious description of man in his condition of innocence, and must appertain to him, under every economy which suspends acceptance upon personal performances. Hence, Rome places the destiny of the sinner in his own hands—*Suæ quisque fortunæ faber est*. Whatever may be her pretensions on the subject, and they are vain enough, the supernatural gifts which she attributes to the Spirit, since they are intended to qualify men for a legal dispensation, are no more entitled to be denominated grace, than the natural endowments of the Pelagian. They stand in the same relation to salvation, spring from the same source, and are dispensed for the same end. If, as Rome contends, we are the subjects of an original pro-

bation, whatever is necessary to fit us for the trial, must be imparted on principles of justice—and it is a mere question of priority of time, whether the necessary qualifications which must be possessed, shall be traced to creation or to some act subsequent to birth; it is equally a question of words and names, whether they shall be called nature or grace. To be born with them is as truly to receive them from God, as to acquire them by an extraordinary communication, and in either case they are intended to adapt us to the exigencies of a legal condition. Gifts springing from the same source, directed to the same end, accomplishing the same results, are unquestionably of the same nature, whatever may be the order of time in which they are bestowed. The only point in which the hypothesis of Rome has the advantage of the most unblushing Pelagianism, is in relation, not to the doctrine of grace, but the natural condition of man. In the papal creed, the fall, as a federal transgression, is admitted, and guilt and depravity confessed to be the inheritance of Adam's descendants. In the Pelagian creed, it is denied to be any thing more than a private sin, and its penal consequences are accordingly restricted to the author of the act.

But both parties represent the *present* as a legal state, the Pelagian as a continuance of our first trial, and therefore he supposes that we are born with all that is requisite to meet it. The Papist as a new trial superinduced upon the ruins of the first, and, therefore, as he must admit that we first reap the consequences of the original failure, he confesses that we are *born* in sin, yet because of the *new* dispensation, he makes provisions to fit us for the race which is now set before us. The creed of one has more truth, but not more *grace* than the other, for both are equally a covenant of works, and equally destructive of the principles of the gospel.

In conformity with this reasoning, no operations of the Spirit can be justly denominated grace, which leave the decision of his destiny in the hands of the sinner. The agency of God may be carried so far as to make men *able* to stand, yet if it depends upon themselves to stand or fall, to use or reject the assistance which is given, there is nothing in such a state to distinguish it from the grossest

legalism. The spirit is evidently the *servant* not the *master* of the man, grace *obeys* but *does not reign*. All such schemes, whatever honor they may pretend to ascribe to the Holy Ghost, are insulting to God, since they lay a foundation for boasting in the creature. That alone is grace, in the strict and proper application of the term, which independently of works on our part, determines the will, and not only makes it able to stand, but guards it against the possibility of failure. As in justification, it is the righteousness of God that reigns, to the exclusion of human obedience; so in regeneration, it is the will of God that reigns, to the exclusion of that of man. This is the doctrine of the Scriptures. Of His own will begat He us; it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy. This is the only view of the subject which is consistent with the doctrine of gratuitous justification, and hence, those who have attributed a sovereignty to the human will, which God cannot control without destroying its nature, have invariably denied the imputation of the Saviour's righteousness. From the very necessity of the case they must be legalists—the reason why one is justified and another not, they must seek in the sinner himself, and hence justification cannot be wholly irrespective of works. What is commonly called free-will, is as directly contradictory to the grace of the spirit in effectual calling, as works of righteousness to the grace of the Redeemer in justification. Grace must reign, or it ceases to be grace, and the office of the human will is not so much to concur with it, as to obey it; its efficacy consists in removing the spirit of resistance and implanting the spirit of obedience. "The Grace of God," says Quesnel, in his 'Moral Reflections on the New Testament,' "is nothing else but His Omnipotent will." "God," says a higher authority, "worketh in us both to will and to do of his good pleasure." All the analogies by which it is illustrated in Scripture show that, in regeneration, man is the subject of an Almighty operation, extending to all the faculties of the soul, the will itself included. It is not a change *in* man, it is a change *of* man. In his natural condition he is as completely *nothing* in regard to the proper ends of his existence, as if he possessed no being at all, and the power which recalls him from this state is as independent

of his concurrence, as that which originally created him from nothing. The human will, therefore, must be excluded from any participation in the work of regeneration, or grace ceases to be grace, man reigns, God is dethroned, and a legal system is established. Grace is the antithesis of the sovereignty of man. Hence, the Reformers who reviewed the doctrines of grace, were deeply impressed with the indispensable necessity of laying deeply the foundation of the Spirit's work in the bondage of the human will. They perceived at a glance, that gratuitous justification could not be maintained a moment, if it depended upon man himself whether he should be justified or not. Luther, accordingly, while he denominated justification by grace, the "*articulus stantis aut cadentis ecclesiae*," attached no less importance to the resistless power of the Spirit in the new birth, as that by which alone the grace of the former could be preserved. What appeared to his age his most extravagant paradoxes, were put forth on the natural impotence of man. His sense of the necessity of maintaining the servitude of the will, as the only adequate foundation of grace, may be judged from the fact that he paid to Erasmus, who had written an elaborate defence of its freedom, the distinguished compliment of being the only champion of the papacy who understood the controversy betwixt the Reformers and Rome. "I must acknowledge," says Luther, "that in this great controversy, you alone have taken the bull by the horns." It is evident, that if the doctrine of justification were the hinge upon which the Reformation turned, the servitude of the will was the hinge upon which the controversy about justification turned. The supremacy of the divine will, and of Christ's righteousness, stand or fall together. Effectual grace, and free justification, are inseparable elements of the same system. These precious truths carry in their bosom the kindred doctrines of personal election, final perseverance, and particular redemption, which are so indissolubly united together, that to deny one is logically though not always in fact, to deny them all, and to admit one is logically though not always in fact, to admit them all. These are the truths, which, combined into a system, constitute pre-eminently the doctrines of grace, which after having been buried and obscured for ages—with the

exception of a cloister here and there, or a few hearts doomed to solitude and suffering, in which their light still dimly burned—burst upon the world in their original lustre at the time of the Reformation. These are the truths which bring glory to God in the highest, and distribute peace among men. They are the hope of our race—the stars which adorn the firmament of revelation. In their light we behold the sovereignty of God, and the nothingness of man—here the Creator is supreme, while the creature is prostrate in the dust. They force from us the doxology of earth, “not unto us, not unto us,” and the pealing anthem of heaven, “the Lord God Omnipotent reigneth.”

That Rome denies the efficacy of grace, which is equivalent to denying its reality, as contradistinguished from the qualification of a legal state, may be inferred not only from the logical necessity of her system, but from the canons of Trent, and the subsequent bulls of her Popes.

The Tridentine Fathers affirm, in the first place, that liberty of will is not extinguished by the fall, it is only enfeebled and bent. This cautious phraseology implies, that notwithstanding the ruins and desolation of sin, there yet lingers in man some germ of spiritual life, some latent susceptibility of holy emotions, which proper nourishment and care may develope into heartfelt exercise. Man is not dead in trespasses and sins—he is only crippled and exhausted; he does not require to be created anew, it is amply sufficient to nurse his attenuated power, to stop the progress of disease, and leave to nature the action of its *vis medicatrix*. “Free will,” says Andradius,* in explaining this very statement of the council, “without the inspiration and assistance of the Spirit cannot perform spiritual actions. This, however, does not result from the fact that the mind and will which man possesses from his birth, are, previously to conversion, utterly destitute of any of the power, abilities or faculties, which are necessary for beginning or consummating spiritual actions. It is rather because these natural abilities and faculties, though neither effaced, nor extinguished, are so involved in the snares of sin, that man cannot by his own strength extricate him-

* As quoted in Chemitzii Exam. Conc. Trident Pars i. Loc. 7. § 2. p. 169.

self from the net. As he who is fettered with iron shoes may have the natural ability to walk, yet although he possesses, he cannot use it and actually walk, until the fetters are broken which hinder and retard his motion." Here is the famous distinction, which should always have been confined to the forges of Rome, between natural and moral ability. The sinner possesses the power to act, but his energies are restrained by superior strength. Conversion simply throws off the superincumbent pressure, and permits the wearied and exhausted faculties of man to develope and expand. Grace imparts no new susceptibilities, communicates no supernatural faculties, it only takes from the garden of nature the weeds which infest it.

An illustration similar in import to that of Andradius, is employed by Bellarmin.* In answer to the question, how the will can possess the power of contrary choice, when it is unable to do good, he observes: "That the will is indeed free, but its liberty is bound and restrained; it becomes released and disentangled when the proximate power or working is imparted to it by the preventing grace of God. Something similar we experience in regard to the power of vision, where the sensible species is absent; man still possesses the power and liberty of seeing, for that species is not the cause of either. The power, however, is remote, and the liberty bound, until the species being present, the power is perfected and may be actually exercised."

The doctrine of Trent then plainly is, that man is possessed of natural, though not of moral ability, to comply with the commandments of God, and if this doctrine has recently been regarded as fatal in the Presbyterian Church, it is hard to understand how it can be saving in the Church of Rome. Anywhere and everywhere it breathes the spirit of a legal covenant.

In the next place, the phrases by which Trent distinguishes the operations of the Spirit, are studiously accommodated to this absurd theory of the freedom of the will. Grace excites and helps,—expressions which obviously imply that there are dormant energies to be stimulated and fainting strength to be assisted.

* De Gratia et Lib. Arbit. Lib. vi. c. 15.

But the most detestable feature in her theory is, that the influences of the Spirit derive their efficacy not from the will and power of God, but from the consent and concurrence of man. Such is the sovereignty of the human will that all the efforts of the Almighty to regenerate the heart may be rendered abortive by an obstinate resistance. The will is *above* the reach of Deity Himself. God may persuade, but He cannot subdue. To ascribe such dominion to man, is utterly destructive of the reality of grace—and yet Trent expressly teaches* that it is by the free consent and co-operation of the sinner that the agency of God accomplishes his conversion; that he is fully competent to reject the inspiration of the Spirit, and so is what every subject of a legal dispensation must be, able to stand and liable to fall. The fourth canon on justification, though awkwardly and even absurdly expressed, was obviously aimed against the Lutheran, which is the scriptural hypothesis, that man is passive in regeneration, a doctrine absolutely essential to preserve the completeness of the analogy betwixt Christ and Adam. There must be a double union with both, in order that the effects of their respective covenants may be communicated to their respective seeds—a federal union, which renders their public conduct *imputable*—a personal union, through which it becomes actually imputed.

Now the personal union with Adam, which consists in descent from his loins, is unquestionably instituted without any concurrence on our part. The very act which makes us men makes us his children, and, by necessary consequence, the heirs of his guilt and ruin. Why, then, should not our union with Christ, which is constituted in effectual calling, be also independent of our own co-operation? If our connection with the head of the first covenant is confessedly involuntary, why should not the analogy be sustained, and our connection with the Head of the second be equally involuntary? If the act which makes us the *seed* of Adam is prior to our possession of natural being, why should not the act which makes us the *seed* of Christ be also prior to our possession of spiritual existence? The truth is, we are new-created in Christ, as we were

* De Justificatione, Cap. 5, Can. 4.

originally created in Adam—we are the *subjects* of both operations, and *active* in neither. We can no more be our own spiritual than our natural fathers.

The attempt of the Dominicans to reconcile the Tridentine theory of grace with the doctrines of their great master, Augustin, deserves to be briefly noticed, as it has led to the impression which the Reviewer himself has sanctioned—that the decrees of the Fathers are ambiguous. The council said expressly that “man can dissent from God, exciting and calling him, if he should will to do so.”* This seems to be a plain denial of efficacious grace, and yet, by a quibble grossly contradictory and absurd, the Dominicans endeavored to prove that it was not inconsistent with their favorite doctrine. They admitted that man might dissent if he should *will* to do so, but they denied that it was possible to have such a will when the grace of God was imparted.

It was the essence of grace to take from him the power of willing to the contrary. In the midst of this trivial sophistry the Dominicans had forgotten what Bellarmine commends to their attention, that the council had previously determined that man could *reject* the grace itself. How could he reject it without a previous will? “The impossibility of willing to dissent,” continues Bellarmine,† “is utterly inconsistent with free will, if it be maintained, as the adversaries maintain, that this impossibility of willing to dissent results from the fact that grace actively and intrinsically determines the will to the contrary. We have already declared that man can believe or love God, if he will—that he cannot will, however, without assisting grace. There is no inconsistency here, because free will is feeble for good, and therefore requires assistance. But when the assistance is imparted we affirm that man can will, and not will, and that in this way he is truly and properly free. But, if grace being present, man cannot will to dissent—grace being absent, he cannot will to consent—there is no liberty of will, no departure from the opinion of heretics.”

The Dominican interpretation is further contradicted by notorious facts. For the space of a century and a half after

* Biblical Repertory, April, 1846, p. 342.

† De Gratia et Lib. Arbit., Lib. vi. Cap. 15.

the dissolution of the council of Trent a bitter and ferocious controversy was waged in the Church of Rome upon the doctrines of grace—and all the authoritative documents which were published during that period were decidedly semi-pelagian, and sometimes worse. They are, to be sure, for the most part negative, but they are negations of the fundamental truths of Christianity.

On the first of October, 1567, Pius V. issued a bull condemning the seventy-six propositions which were said to have been extracted from the works of Baius. It is nothing to my purpose whether or not this distinguished professor really entertained all the sentiments which his enemies ascribe to him; it is enough to know what the oracle of the faithful pronounced to be heresy. Among the repudiated propositions are the following:

XX. No sin is of its own nature venial, but every sin deserves eternal punishment.

XXXV. All the works of unbelievers are sins, and the virtues of the philosophers are vices.

XXXVII. Free will, without the assistance of God's grace, can do nothing but sin.

XXXVIII. It is a Pelagian error to say that, by free will, man can avoid any sin.

XXXIX. What is done voluntarily, though it be done necessarily, is done freely.

XLI. The only liberty which the Scriptures recognize is not from necessity, but sin.

LXV. To admit any good use of free will, or any which is not evil, is Pelagian error, and he does injury to the grace of Christ who so thinks and teaches.

LXVI. Violence alone is repugnant to the natural liberty of man.

When the authenticity of the bull denouncing these propositions had been seriously called into question, it was solemnly confirmed by a constitution of Gregory XIII., bearing date the 28th January, 1579.

Upon the infallible authority of two Popes, Urban VIII. in 1642, Innocent X. in 1653, five propositions, purporting to be taken from the Augustin of Jansen, were subjected to the odious imputation of heresy. These propositions asserted the impotency of man—the invincibility of grace

—the certainty of predestination, and the definite nature of the atonement. I give them in order.

I. There are some commands of God which righteous and good men are absolutely unable to obey, though disposed to do it—and God does not give them so much grace that they are able to observe them.

II. Inward grace in the state of fallen nature cannot be resisted.

III. To constitute merit or demerit in the state of fallen nature, man does not require liberty from necessity—liberty from coercion being sufficient.

IV. The semi-pelagians admitted the necessity of inward preventing grace to every act, even the beginning of faith, but their heresy consisted in this—that they maintained this grace to be such that the human will could resist or restrain it.

V. It is semi-pelagian to say that Christ died for all men.

The first of these propositions is condemned as “rash, impious, blasphemous, heretical”—the second and third are declared to be “heretical,” the fourth is pronounced to be “false and heretical,” and all the vials of Pontifical abuse seem to be emptied on the fifth; it is denominated “impious, blasphemous, contumelious, derogatory to piety, and heretical.”*

The last document to which I shall refer, is the memorable constitution, *Unigenitus*, signed by Clement XI. at Rome, on Friday, the 8th of September, 1713, the birthday, as Romanists assert, of the Immaculate Virgin. This Bull,† whose professed object was to condemn one hundred and one propositions, extracted from a work of Quesnel, entitled *Moral Reflections upon each verse of the New Testament*, contains a formal reprobation of the distinguishing doctrines of grace. How far in each case the censure extends it is difficult to determine. The propositions are “respectively” denounced as “false, captious, shocking, offensive to pious ears, scandalous, pernicious, rash, injurious to the Church and her practice, contumelious not only against the Church, but likewise against the secular powers, seditious, impious, blasphemous, suspected

*Leydekker's *Historici Jansenismi*, p. 126, p. 278. Mosheim, vol. 3, p. —.

† I have made my extracts from the copy given in Lafiteau's *History of it*.

of heresy, and plainly savoring thereof, and likewise favoring heretics, heresies and schism, erroneous, bordering very near upon heresy,—often condemned, and in fine even heretical, and manifestly reviving several heresies, and chiefly those which are contained in the infamous propositions of Jansenius, even in the very sense in which those propositions were condemned." The term "respectively," indicates that this medley of epithets is to be distributed, that all are not to be applied to each proposition, but only that each epithet should find a counterpart in some proposition, and each proposition be embraced under some epithet. But the allusion to Jansenius shows that whatever may be said of the rest, the propositions containing his doctrines, are to be regarded as heretical.

Among the one hundred and one condemned articles are the following truths of the word of God, numbered as they are numbered in the Bull.

I. What else remains to the soul that has lost God and His Grace, but sin and the consequences of sin, haughty poverty and lazy indigence, that is, a general impotence to labor, to prayer, and to every good work?

II. The grace of Jesus Christ—the efficacious principle of every sort of good, is necessary to every good work—without it nothing either is done or can be done.

V. When God does not soften the heart by the inward unction of His grace, exhortations and external advantages serve only to harden it the more.

IX. The grace of Jesus Christ is sovereign—without it we can never confess Christ, and with it we shall never deny him.

X. Grace is the operation of God's Almighty hand, which nothing can let or hinder.

XII. When God wills to save a soul at any time or place, the effect indubitably follows the determination of His will.

XIII. Whenever God wills to save a soul and touches it with the inward hand of His grace, no human will resists Him.

XIV. However remote an obstinate sinner may be from salvation, whenever Jesus is revealed to him in the saving light of His grace he yields, embraces him, humbles himself and adores the Saviour.

XIX. The grace of God is nothing else than His omnipotent will. This is the idea which God himself gives us in all the Scriptures.

XXI. The grace of Jesus Christ is strong, mighty, sovereign, invincible, being the operation of God's Almighty will—the consequence and imitation of the working of God in making the Son incarnate, and raising Him from the dead.

XXIII. God has given us the idea of the almighty working of His grace in representing it as a creation out of nothing, and a resurrection from the dead.

XXX. All whom God wills to save by Christ are infallibly saved.

XXXVIII. The sinner is free only to evil without the grace of the Saviour.

XXXIX. The will, without preventing grace, has light only to wander, heat only for rashness, strength only to its wounding. It is capable of all evil and incapable of any good.

XLI. Even the natural knowledge of God, such as obtained among the gentile philosophers, must be ascribed to God, and without grace produces only presumption, vanity and opposition to God, instead of adoration, gratitude and love.

LXIX. Faith—its use, increase and reward, are wholly the gift of God's pure liberality.

LXXIII. What is the Church but the congregation of the sons of God, dwelling in His bosom, adopted in Christ, subsisting in His person, redeemed by His blood, living by His spirit, acting by His grace, and waiting for the grace of the future life?

These documents establish by the most conclusive negative testimony, that Rome repudiates the only theory of grace which can bring salvation to the lost. She utterly denies its power. The terms efficacious grace are indeed found in the writings of her cherished theologians, but in a sense widely different from that which the Reformers taught. It is an efficacy consisting in the skilful adaptation of motives on the part of God, to the mind of man, by which the will is determined in conformity with the divine desire. God does not determine it, but only presents considerations, which from His knowledge of the

man, He perceives beforehand will induce it to determine itself. It is the efficacy not of power but of persuasion—God acts the part not of a sovereign but of an able orator. “It cannot be understood,” says Bellarmin,* “How efficacious grace consists in an inward persuasion which may be spurned by the will, and yet infallibly accomplishes its end—unless we add, that with all those whom God has infallibly decreed to draw, He employs a persuasion which He sees to be adapted to their disposition, and which He certainly knows will not be despised.”

It is not a little strange that Princeton should attribute to Rome a “much higher doctrine as to the necessity of Divine influence than prevails among many whom we recognize as Christians,” when the orthodox portion of the Protestant world has already condemned her opinions. The creed of Rome differs only for the worse, from the creed of the Remonstrants; it is not so full and clear upon the subject of depravity, and much bolder in the freedom of the will. Still their respective theories of grace are substantially the same, and if the orthodox world in the seventeenth century conspired to suppress the errors of the Remonstrants, as dangerous and fatal, what magic has extracted their malignity in the lapse of two hundred years and upwards, so that they are harmless in the hands of the Pope? So striking is the similarity between the principles of the Remonstrants, and the decrees of Trent, that I am constrained to place them in a note, in juxtaposition, that the reader may see at a glance, what Princeton denominates a “much higher doctrine as to the necessity of divine influence, than prevails among many whom we recognize as Christians.”† Both seem willing to ascribe

* *De Gratia et Lib. Arbit.* Lib. 1. cap. 12., last sentence.

† “Man”—says the Remonstrants—“has not saving faith of himself, nor by virtue of his own free will, for as much as being in a state of sin, he can neither think, will nor do, by or of himself, any good, especially such as proceeds from a saving faith. But it is necessary he should be regenerated and renewed by God in Christ, through His Holy Spirit, in his understanding, will and all his faculties, to the end that he may rightly understand, reflect upon, will and fulfil the things which are good and which accompany salvation. But we maintain that the grace of God is not only the beginning but likewise the progress and completion of all good: insomuch that even the regenerate themselves are not able without this previous, or preventing, exciting, concomitant, and consequent grace to think, will, or effect, any good thing, or resist any temptation to evil; so that all good works and actions

every thing to God, but the conquest of the will. He may teach, enlighten, remonstrate and persuade, but He cannot subdue. The will sits as a sovereign upon her throne, and can laugh at all his thunder.

If the Creed of Rome is fatally unsound in regard to the nature of effectual calling, there is nothing to redeem its errors, but much to heighten its dangers, in what it teaches of the reason, office and operations of FAITH—in the production of which the mystical union is completed and upon which the whole application of redemption depends. The calling, indeed, is never effectual, and the condition of the sinner is never safe until faith is actually wrought. To it all the promises of salvation are addressed—it is pre-eminently the work of God—that which He requires at our hands—without which it is impossible to please Him—with which it is impossible to be condemned. It is the characteristic principle of Christian life, comprising, in its nature and results, the whole mystery of Christian experience. “I am crucified with Christ, nevertheless I live: yet, not I, but Christ liveth in me; and the life which I now live in the flesh, I live by faith upon the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me.” The blessedness and joy—the light, fortitude and peace—the hopes which stimulate the zeal and the beauties which adorn the char-

ought to be ascribed to God. Nevertheless we do not believe that all the zeal, care and pains employed by men in order to the working out their salvation, are before faith and the Spirit of renovation, vain and unprofitable, and even more prejudicial than advantageous; but on the contrary we maintain, that to hear the word of God, to be sorry for and repent of our sins, earnestly to desire saving grace and the Spirit of Renovation, (which however cannot be done without grace,) are not only not hurtful, but rather very useful and absolutely necessary to the attaining faith and the spirit of renovation. The will has no power in the state of sin, and before the call, of doing any good to salvation. And, therefore, we deny that the will has, in every state of man, the liberty or freedom of willing the saving good as well as evil. Efficacious grace whereby men are converted, is not irresistible, and though God works in such a manner by His word, and the internal operations of His Spirit, as to communicate the power of believing and supernatural strength, and even to cause men actually to believe; yet, nevertheless, men may of themselves reject this grace, and refuse to believe, and consequently be lost through their own fault.”

In the first place—says Trent, “the holy council maintains that it is necessary, in order to understand the doctrine of justification truly and well, that every one should acknowledge and confess that since all men had lost innocence by Adam’s prevarication, and had become unclean, and, as the Apostle says, “by nature children of wrath” as is expressed in the decree

acter of those who love God, their change of state and the gradual transformation of their minds, are all in the Scriptures ascribed to *Faith*—without it, the WATER and the BLOOD are nothing worth—the invitations of the Gospel, the monitions of Providence, the persuasions of the ministry, and even the signs in the Holy sacraments are vain and nugatory lifeless appeals, which play around the head or amuse the fancy, but are incapable of reaching the heart. The spirit of faith is the spirit of life. Faith justifies the guilty and cleanses the impure; faith is the shield, in the panoply of God, which quenches all the fiery darts of the wicked, the victory which overcomes the world, and extracts lessons of experience from trials of patience. Faith conquers death and opens the kingdom of heaven to the triumphant saint—it is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.

The contrast is amazing betwixt the importance which the Scriptures every where attach to this grace and that which is assigned to it in the Theology of Rome. While, according to the unvarying tenor of the Gospel, which is, BELIEVE AND BE SAVED, faith is the first, second, third thing, comprehending every thing else in the department of personal religion—according to the Creed of the Papacy it is at best a very slender accomplishment, having

on original sin, they are so completely the slaves of sin, and under the power of the Devil and of death, that neither could the Gentiles be liberated or rise again by the power of nature, nor even the Jews by the letter of the law of Moses. Nevertheless free will was not wholly extinct in them, though weakened and bowed down." The council further declares that in adult persons, the beginning of justification springs from the preventing grace of God, through Christ Jesus; that is, from his calling, wherewith they are called, having in themselves no merits; so that those who, in consequence of sin were alienated from God, are disposed to betake themselves to His method of justifying them by His grace which excites and helps them, and with which grace they freely agree and co-operate. Thus while God touches the heart of man by the illumination of His Holy Spirit, man is not altogether passive, since he receives that influence which he had power to reject, while on the other hand he could not of his free will, without the grace of God, take any step towards righteousness before Him. Whoever shall affirm that all works done before justification, in whatever way performed, are actually sins and deserve God's hatred; or that the more earnestly a man labors to dispose himself for grace, he does but sin the more, let him be accursed."

These extracts are taken, the first from Brandt's History of the Reformation, vol. 3, book 35, p. 87-8; the second from Cramp's Text book of Popery, the article of Justification, chaps. 1, 5, and canon 4.

no necessary connection with salvation, capable of existing among those who are without Christ, without God, and without hope in the world. It may distinguish as well the victim of perdition as the heirs of heaven. The single fact that Rome declares that believers may be lost, while the Bible asserts that every believer shall be saved, is conclusive proof that her theology and that of the Bible are fundamentally at variance.

There are two principal points, in connection with this subject, in regard to which she is grossly and fatally unsound—the relation of faith to the Christian life, and the immediate reason of faith itself.

1. The distinguished efficacy which the Scriptures uniformly attribute to this grace does not depend upon its own intrinsic excellence, nor the natural operation of the truths, important as they are, which it receives and assimilates. These, however exalted, however cordially embraced, however admirably adapted to generate the active principles of love, hope and fear, could never achieve the splendid results which proceed from the influence of faith. As an accomplishment of the spiritual man—an integral element of inherent righteousness, charity is certainly entitled to precedence, yet charity is never said to justify—it applies neither the Water nor the Blood, but pre-supposes the application of them both. It is not, then, as a grace, or an act of formal obedience to the authority of God, that faith performs its wonders. The source of its power is not in itself—in moral dignity and worth it is the least of graces—nor are the propositions, abstractly considered, which it brings in contrast with the understanding and the heart; the result of these could only be the production of diligence, zeal, gratitude, love, hope and fear, which, singly or combined, avail nothing in the justification of the guilty. The secret of its efficacy lies in its relation to Christ. It is a bond of union with Him. As an exercise of holiness, it has its appropriate place among the elements of personal obedience. It receives the whole revelation of God, and becomes the medium through which the different emotions are excited which the various aspects of the word are suited to inspire. Through it divine truth penetrates the heart, presenting the terrible majesty of God to the consternation of the guilty, and disclosing the ineffable tenderness of His

love to the consolation of the humble ; but faith saves us, not because it believes the truth, but because it unites us as living members with a living Head. It is not the believer that lives or works ; it is Christ who lives in him ; *He* is our life, and faith is the channel through which His grace is efficaciously imparted. He dwells in us by His Spirit and we dwell in Him by faith. And as He possesses all the elements of salvation in Himself—wisdom, righteousness, sanctification and redemption ; faith, which cements a union with His person, must involve communion in His graces. As He is emphatically the LIFE, those who are possessed of the Son must be possessed of life. We are justified by faith, because, in connecting us with Christ, it makes us partakers of His righteousness and death. We are sanctified by faith, because the Spirit is communicated from the Head to the members, revealing the true standard of holiness in the Person of the Son, presenting the true motives of holiness in the grace and promises of the Gospel—implanting operative principles of holiness in gratitude, love, hope and fear, and giving efficacy to all subordinate means by the omnipotent energy of His will. Faith saves us, because it joins us to Him who is salvation, and who is able to save to the uttermost all that come unto God through Him.—Such is its potency. Nothing in itself, it makes us one with Christ—by it we suffer with Him—we die with Him, we are buried with Him, we rise with Him, and with Him we are destined to reign in glory.

Rome, however, knows nothing of this mystical union with Christ, and consequently the only efficacy which she attributes to faith, in the application of redemption, is that of a spiritual grace, constituting one of the elements of the formal cause of justification. It is a *part* of the righteousness in which the sinner is accepted before God. “The principal reason,” says Bellarmin,* “why our adversaries attribute justification to faith alone, is because they suppose that faith does not justify after the manner of a cause, or on account of its dignity and worth—but only *relatively*, as it receives in believing what God offers in the promise.”

“For if they could be convinced that faith justifies by

* Bellarmin De Justificatione, Lib. i. cap. 17; of Lib. i. cap. 3.

procuring, meriting, and, in its own way, beginning justification, they would undoubtedly acknowledge that the same might be predicated of love, patience and other good acts. We shall prove, therefore, that true and justifying faith is not, as the adversaries affirm, a naked and sole *apprehension* of righteousness, but is an efficacious cause of justification. All the arguments to this point may be reduced to three heads. The first shall be taken from those testimonies which teach that faith is a cause of justification in general, the second those which prove that in faith justification is begun, the third from those which demonstrate that by faith we please God, and procure and in some way merit justification." In developing these arguments Bellarmine repeatedly ridicules the idea that faith is an instrument which apprehends the righteousness of Christ. According to him, it contributes to our justification only in so far as it is an act of righteousness itself—its value depending not upon its relation to Christ, but upon its own intrinsic excellence. Its inherent dignity and worth are an element of personal holiness. To the same purport the council of Trent declares that* "we are said to be justified by faith, because faith is the *beginning* of human salvation—the foundation and root of all justification, without which it is impossible to please God, and come into the fellowship of His children." In other words, faith is the *first* grace which, among adults, enters into the disposition or the state of heart which is preparatory to the reception of this great blessing. It is the *first* element of righteousness which is infused into the soul, and, as being first and intimately connected with all the rest, it is the root and foundation of a holy life. But its only influence is that which it possesses as an inward grace, meritorious in itself, and capable, through the truth which it embraces, of generating other motions of good. But as the righteousness in which we are accepted must correspond to all the requisitions of the law, and as faith alone is only a partial obedience, Rome teaches that it must be combined with other graces, particularly with charity, in order to secure our justification. Charity indeed she pronounces to be the end, perfection and form of all other virtues—without it,

* Trident. Concil. Sess. vi. cap. 8.

faith is unfinished and dead, incapable of meriting life or of commending to the favor of God.

If there be any one doctrine of the Bible against which Rome is particularly bitter, it is, that we are justified by faith alone, without the deeds of the law. This principle strikes at the root of the whole system of infused and inherent righteousness. It removes all occasion of glorying in the flesh. It prostrates the sinner in the dust, and makes Christ the Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end—the all in all of human hope. Hence Trent enumerates no less than *seven acts** as constituting the disposition preparatory to the reception of justification—among which faith is found, and it entitled to no other pre-eminence than that it is the first in the series, having, from the nature of its operations, a tendency and fitness to excite the rest. Hence, also, it pronounces† its anathema upon all who, in conformity with the Scriptures, shall affirm “that the ungodly is justified by faith only, so that it is to be understood that nothing else is to be required to co-operate therewith in order to obtain justification, and that it is on no account necessary that he should prepare and dispose himself to the effect of his own will.” Hence, too, the doctrine of imputation is condemned, being consistent with no other hypothesis but that which makes faith a bond of union with Christ as a federal head—appropriating His obedience and pleading the merits of His death. “Whosoever shall affirm that men are justified only by the imputation of the righteousness of Christ or the remission of sin, to the exclusion of grace and charity, which is shed abroad in their hearts, and inheres in them: or that the grace by which we are justified is only the favor of God, let him be accursed.”‡

* Trident. Concil. Sess. vi. cap. 6. Bellarmin remarks—De Justificatione Lib. i. cap. 12, “The adversaries, therefore, as we have before said, teach that justification is acquired or apprehended by faith alone. Catholics, on the other hand, and especially the Tridentine Synod, which all Catholics acknowledge as a mistress, (Sess. vi. cap. 6,) enumerates seven acts by which the ungodly are disposed to righteousness: faith—fear—hope—love—repentance—the purpose of receiving the sacrament and the purpose of leading a new life and keeping the commandments of God.” This opinion he goes on in several successive chapters to establish.

† Conc. Trident. Sess. vi. can. 9.

‡ Conc. Trident. Sess. vi. can. 11.

It cannot fail to be observed that the Romish theory of faith is peculiarly unfavorable to the cultivation of humility. Abstracting the attention from the fullness and sufficiency of Christ, and dignifying personal obedience into a meritorious cause of salvation, it must bloat the heart with spiritual pride, and generate a temper of invidious comparison with others, equally fatal to the charity which thinketh no evil, and the self abasement which should characterize debtors to grace. When the efficacy of faith is attributed to the relation which it institutes with Christ, it is felt to be nothing in itself; every blessing is ascribed to the sovereign mercy of God; it is no more the sinner that lives—but Christ lives in him—it is no more the sinner that works, but Christ works in him. The Divine Redeemer becomes the all in all of his salvation—his wisdom, righteousness, sanctification and redemption. It is only when faith is apprehended as a bond of union with Christ that it produces the effect which Paul attributes to it, of excluding boasting—in every other view it furnishes a pretext for glorying in the flesh: as an instrument, it exalts the Redeemer—as a meritorious grace, entering into the formal cause of justification, it exalts the sinner—as an instrument, it leads us to exclaim that, by the grace of God, we are what we are: as a meritorious grace, to thank God that we are not as other men.

2. But the Papal creed is hardly less unsound in reference to the *nature* than it is in reference to the *office* of faith.

If there be any thing in the Scriptures clearly revealed and earnestly inculcated, it is that the faith, by which we apprehend the Redeemer as the foundation of our hope, depends upon the *immediate testimony* of God. It is supernatural in its *evidence*, as well as supernatural in its origin. The record which God has given of His Son bears upon its face impressions of divinity which are alike suited to command the assent of the understanding, and to captivate the affections of the heart.

The argument by which we ascend from redemption to its author is analogous to that (though infinitely stronger in degree,) which conducts us from nature to nature's God. The Almighty never works without leaving traces of Himself; a godlike peculiarity distinguishes all His operations.

He cannot ride upon the heavens, but His name *Jah* is proclaimed—the invisible things of Him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal *power* and Godhead. But if the material workmanship of God contains such clear and decisive traces of its Divine Author—if the heavens declare His glory, and the firmament sheweth his handy-work—if sun, moon, and stars, in their appointed orbits, demonstrate an eternal Creator, and leave the atheist, skeptic and idolater without excuse—much more shall that stupendous economy of grace, which bears pre-eminently the burden of His name, reveal the perfections of His character, and authenticate the divinity of its source. The evidence that it sprang from the bosom of God, and that its voice is the harmony of the world, must be sought in itself. It stands—a temple not built with hands—bearing upon its portals the sublime inscription of God's eternal purpose—of His wisdom, power, justice, goodness, and grace. It is the palace of the great King—where His brightest glories are disclosed—His choicest gifts bestowed. Jesus is *seen*, is *felt* to be the *image* of the invisible God—the first born of every creature. The believer has only to look upon His face, and he beholds His glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth. God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, has shined into our hearts, and revealed the light of the knowledge of the glory of God, in the face of Jesus Christ.

But while redemption contains the evidence of its heavenly origin, such is the deplorable darkness of the human understanding in regard to things that pertain to God—and such the fearful alienation of men from the perfection of His character—that though the light shines conspicuously among them, they are yet unable to comprehend its rays. Christ crucified proves to all, in their natural condition, whether Jews or Gentiles, a stumbling block or foolishness. Hence, to the production of *faith*, there must be a heavenly *calling*, in order that the infallible evidence, which actually exists in the truth itself, may accomplish its appropriate effects—the eternal Spirit, who sends forth His cherubim and seraphim to touch the lips of whom He pleases, must be graciously vouchsafed to illuminate the darkened mind, and manifest in the provision of the Gos-

pel the power of God, and the wisdom of God unto salvation. It is the Spirit that quickeneth—the flesh profiteth nothing. Redemption is a spiritual mystery, and faith is the spiritual eye, supernaturally imparted, that beholds it. He that believeth hath the witness in himself—the divine illumination of the Spirit is the immediate and only reason of a true and living faith. Other arguments may *convince*, but they cannot *convert*—they may produce *opinion*, but not the *faith* of the Gospel—and those who, in their blindness, rely upon miracles and prophecy—upon the collateral and incidental proofs with which Christianity is triumphantly vindicated from the assaults of skeptics and infidels—they who rely upon the fallible deductions of reason to generate an infallible assurance of faith, have yet to learn in what the testimony of God consists, which establishes the hearts of His children. *Their* witness is not within themselves—it lies without them, in historical records, musty traditions, and the voice of antiquity.

The Romish Doctors are not reluctant to admit that faith is supernatural in its origin. “Whoever shall affirm,” says Trent,* “that man is able to believe, hope, love, or repent, as he ought, so as to attain to the grace of justification, without the preventing influence and aid of the Holy Spirit—let him be accursed.” “It is impossible,” says Stapleton, as quoted by Owen,† “to produce any act of faith, or to believe with faith, rightly so called, without special grace, and the divine infusion of the gifts of faith. “This is firmly to be held,” says Melchior Canus,‡ I again quote from Owen—“that human authority, and all the motives before mentioned, nor any other which may be used by him who proposeth the object of faith to be believed, are not sufficient causes of believing as we are obliged to believe; but there is moreover necessary an internal, efficient cause, moving us to believe, which is the especial help or aid of God. Wherefore all external human persuasions or arguments are not sufficient causes of faith, however the things of faith may be sufficiently proposed by men; there is moreover necessary an internal cause—that is, a certain divine light, inciting to believe, or certain

* Conc. Trident. Sess. vi. can. 3.

† Owen on the Reason of Faith. Works, vol. 3, p. 364.

‡ Owen on the Reason of Faith. Works, vol. 3, p. 364-5.

external eyes to see, given us by the grace of God." But there is a still more remarkable passage in Gregory of Valentia.* "Whereas," saith he, "we have hitherto pleaded arguments for the authority of Christian doctrine, which, even by themselves, ought to suffice prudent persons to induce their minds to belief; yet I know not whether there be not an argument greater than they all—namely, that those who are truly Christians, do find or feel by experience their minds so affected in this matter of faith, that they are moved (and obliged) firmly to believe, neither for an argument that we have used, nor for any of the like sort that can be found out by reason, but for somewhat else, which persuaded our minds in another manner, and far more effectually than any arguments whatever. It is God Himself, who, by the voice of His revelation, and by a certain internal instinct and impulse, witnesseth unto the minds of men the truth of Christian doctrine, or of the Holy Scriptures." And the same doctrine is maintained by Bellarmin in the second chapter of his sixth book on grace and free will.

All this seems wonderfully orthodox. But it is a deceitful homage rendered to the work of the Spirit. Rome grants that He enables us to believe, but departs widely from the truth, and assigns to the Spirit a mean and subsidiary office, when she undertakes to specify the evidence through which He produces a living faith. The immediate end of His illumination, according to her theology, is not to reveal the evidence which lies concealed in the Gospel itself, but to ascertain the inquirer of the Divinity of her own testimony. The office of the Spirit is to prove that she is the prophet of God, his lively oracle, which must be devoutly heard, and implicitly obeyed. The testimony of the Church, and not of God's Spirit, she makes to be the immediate and adequate ground of faith. Whatever light the Spirit imparts, is reflected from her face, and not from the face of Jesus Christ—and whatever witness the believer possesses, he possesses in her, and not in himself. Hence Stapleton,† while he admits the necessity of divine illumination, gives it a principal reference to the judgment and testimony of the Church. "The secret tes-

* Owen on the Reason of Faith. Works, vol. 3, p. 365.

† Owen on the Reason of Faith. Works, vol. 3, p. 365.

timony of the Spirit is altogether necessary, that a man may believe the testimony and judgment of the Church about the Scriptures." Bellarmin says,* "in order that faith may be certain in relation to its object, two infallible causes are required—the cause revealing the articles, and the cause proposing or declaring the articles revealed. For, if he who reveals, and upon whose authority we rely, can be deceived, faith is obviously rendered uncertain. Therefore, the cause revealing should be none other than God. And, by parity of reason, if he who proposes or declares the articles revealed, is liable to error, and can propose anything as a divine revelation, which, in fact is not so, faith will be rendered wholly uncertain. Mahometans and heretics, therefore, although they suppose that they believe on the ground of a divine revelation, yet in fact they do not, but simply believe, because they rashly choose to believe, inasmuch as they acknowledge not a cause infallibly proposing and declaring the revelation of God. For if one should enquire of the heretics, how they know that God has revealed this or that article, they will answer, from the Scriptures. If it should be further enquired, how they know that their interpretation of Scripture is correct, seeing that it is differently expounded by different persons, or how they ever know that the Scriptures are the word of God, they can answer nothing, but that this is their opinion. They reject the judgment of the Church, which alone God has declared to be infallible by numberless signs and prodigies, and many other testimonies, and every one claims for himself the right of interpreting Divine Revelation. Who, without great rashness, can believe his own private judgment of divine things to be infallible, since such infallibility can be proved, neither by divine promise nor human reason? Catholics, on the other hand, have a faith altogether certain and infallible, since it rests on the authority of revelation. That God has given the revelation, they are equally assured, since they hear the Church declaring the fact, which they are certain cannot err, since its testimony is confirmed by signs and wonders, and manifold arguments." Whatever the Church authoritatively enjoins, is a material

* Bellarmin, *De Grat. et Lib. Arbi* Lib. vi. cap. 3.

object of faith. "The authority of the Church," says Dens, "affords the first and sufficient argument of credibility."* The Rules of Faith are divided by Dens† into two classes, animate and inanimate, the latter comprehending the Holy Scriptures and tradition, and the former embracing the Church, General Councils, and the Pope. "The inanimate rule of faith is that which declares to us the truth, which God has revealed, so that it may propose them with sufficient authority, to be believed as it were by a divine faith." Even Erasmus,‡ half-reformer as he was, could utter such detestable language as the following: "With me the authority of the Church has so much weight, that I could be of the same opinion with Arians and Pelagians, had the Church signified its approbation of their doctrines. It is not that the words of Christ are not to me sufficient, but it should not seem strange, if I follow the interpretation of the Church, through whose authority it is that I believe the Canonical Scriptures. Others may have more genius and courage than I, but there is nothing in which I acquiesce more confidently, than the decisive judgment of the Church."

It is a point on which all Romanists are heartily agreed, that somewhere in the papacy, either in the Pope, a General Council, or the Pope and a General Council combined, an infallible tribunal exists, whose prerogative it is to settle controversies, and to determine questions of faith. From its decisions there is no appeal, its voice is the voice of God, it is the Urim and Thumim of the Christian Church. The possession of such a living oracle is made the distinguishing glory of their sect. The Doctors of Rome are accustomed to boast that in consequence of this boon, they have the advantage of an infallible faith, while Protestants are doomed to the uncertainty of opinion, or the delusions of a private spirit. Their divine faith consequently, depends upon the testimony of an infallible Church, and not upon the witness of the Spirit of truth. They believe, because the Church declares, and, of course,

* Dens, vol. 2. De Virtutibus, No. 18.

† Dens, No. 59. De Reg. Fidei. vol. 2. p. 93. See particularly No. 20. De Resolutione Fidei. vol. 2. p. 30.

‡ Erasmus as quoted in Waddington's History of the Reformation, vol. 2. p. 165, chap. 23.

must believe what the Church declares. The practical working of the system, is to make every parish priest, and every father confessor, lords alike of the conscience and understanding. Every man, upon the Papal hypothesis, no matter what may be his condition and attainments, has infallible evidence, that the material objects of his faith are divine revelations. But to the great mass of private individuals, the testimony of their priests or confessors is all the evidence that they can have, and hence these priests and confessors must themselves be infallible.—“Though there have been infinite disputes,” says a writer in the *Edinburgh Review*, “as to where the infallibility resides, what are the doctrines it has definitively pronounced true, and who to the individual, is the infallible expounder of what is thus infallibly pronounced infallible; yet he who receives this doctrine in its integrity, has nothing more to do than to eject his reason, sublime his faith into credulity, and reduce his creed to these two comprehensive articles: “I believe whatsoever the Church believes,” “I believe that the Church believes whatsoever my father confessor believes that she believes.” For thus he reasons, nothing is more certain than whatsoever God says, is infallibly true; it is infallibly true that the Church says just what God says; it is infallibly true that what the Church says is known; and it is infallibly true that my father confessor, or the parson of the next parish, is an infallible expositor of what is thus infallibly known to be the Church’s infallible belief, or what God has declared to be infallibly true. If any one of the links, even the last, in this strange *sorites* be supposed unsound, if it be not true that the priest is an infallible expounder to the individual, of the Church’s infallibility, if his judgment be only ‘private judgment,’ we come back at once to the perplexities of the common theory of private judgment.”

Now, as the whole doctrine of Papal infallibility is a fiction, all pretences to a divine illumination which reveals it must be a delusion of the devil, and that faith which rests upon nothing but the testimony of men, whether collectively or individually, whether called a Church, Pope or Council, is human, earthly, fallible—it is not the faith of God’s elect. The degree of assent should rise no higher than the evidence which produces it, and as the

Romanist can never be assured that his Church is inspired; he can never have assurance, according to his principles, that Jesus Christ is the Saviour of men, much less can he be assured of his own interest in the Redeemer. Doubt, perplexity, apprehension and uncertainty, must characterize his whole Christian experience.* As faith is measured by the testimony of the Church, and it is not the office of the Church to disclose the state of individuals, none can be certain of their own conversion or order their cause with confidence before God. They may hope for the best, but still, after all, it may be their fate to endure the worst. Unquestionably the direct witness of the Spirit to the fact of our conversion, is one of the most comfortable elements of Christian experience; it is the only evidence which is productive of full and triumphant assurance, and yet upon the hypothesis of Rome, which interposes the Church betwixt the sinner and Christ, it is difficult to conceive how the Spirit can impart this testimony to the hearts of God's children. It is, therefore, in consistency with the analogy of her faith, that she denounces her anathemat upon those who pretend to assert that they know that they have passed from death unto life, by the Spirit which God hath given them. "It is on no account to be maintained, that those who are really justified, ought to feel fully assured of the fact, without any doubt whatever, or that none are absolved and justified, but those who believe themselves to be so; or that, by this faith only, absolution and justification are procured, as if he who does not believe this, doubts the promise of God, and the efficacy of the death and the resurrection of Christ. For while no godly person ought to doubt the mercy of God, the merit of Christ, or the virtue and efficacy of the sacraments, so, on the other hand, whosoever considers his own infirmity and corruption, may doubt and fear whether he is in a state of grace, since no one can certainly and infallibly know that he has obtained the grace of God."

So important an element of personal religion is the direct witness of the Spirit, that, where it is cordially em-

* See this subject discussed in *Dens. De Justificatione*, No. 31, vol. 2. p. 452, seq.

† *Cone. Trident. Sess. 6. chap. 9.*

braced, it will infuse vitality into a dead system, counteract the principles of a professed Remonstrant, and mould his experience into a type of doctrine which he ostensibly rejects. It is the redeeming feature of modern Arminianism, to it the school of Wesley is indebted for its power, it is a green spot in the desert, a refreshing brook in the wilderness. Wherever it penetrates the heart, it engenders a spirit of dependence upon God, a practical conviction of human imbecility, and an earnest desire for supernatural expressions of divine favor; it maintains a constant communion with the Father of lights, a habitual anxiety to walk with God, which, whatever may be the theory of grace, keeps the soul in a posture of prayer, and cherishes a temper congenial with devotion and holiness. He that seeks for the witness of the Spirit, must wait upon God, and he that obtains it, has learned from the fruitlessness of his own efforts, his hours of darkness and desertion, his long agony and conflicts, that it is a boon bestowed in sovereignty, the gift of unmerited grace. It is through this doctrine that the personality of the Spirit as an element of Christian experience is most distinctly presented. It compels us to adore Him as a living agent, working according to the counsel of His will, and not to underrate Him as a mere influence connecting moral results with their causes. Rome, consequently, in discarding this doctrine from her creed, has discarded the only principle which could impregnate the putrid mass of her corruptions with the seeds of health and vigor.

3. Not satisfied with displacing faith from its proper position, and corrupting the evidence by which it is produced, Rome proceeds to still greater abominations, in ascribing to the sacraments the same results in the application of redemption, which the Scriptures are accustomed to ascribe to faith. The mode of operation, however, is vastly different. The sacraments, according to the Papal hypothesis, are possessed of an inherent efficacy to generate the graces which render us acceptable to God, while faith, according to the Scriptural hypothesis, makes us one with Christ. The sacraments, according to Rome, enable us to live. Faith, according to the Scriptures, makes us die, and Christ lives in us. The sacraments, according to Rome, are efficient causes of salvation. Faith, accord-

ing to the Scriptures, is but an instrument which appropriates and applies it. In the operation of the Sacraments, therefore, Rome combines the work of the Spirit, and the functions of faith. By baptism we are alike regenerated and justified; whatever takes place before the administration of the ordinance, is only in the way of preparation; that which crowns the whole, and actually introduces us into a state of favor, is the reception of the sacrament.* Those, too, who, subsequently to baptism, have fallen into mortal sin, are recovered from their error, not by the renewed exercise of faith in the Son of God, but by the fictitious sacrament of penance. The weak are established, not by looking unto Jesus, the author and finisher of faith, and praying for the unction from the Holy One, which shall enable them to know all things, but by submitting to Episcopal manipulation, and trusting to Episcopal anointing. If the soul feeds upon the body and blood of the Redeemer, it is not as the food of faith to the spiritual man, but the food of sense to the natural man, which, instead of uniting us to Christ, assimilates Him to our mortal flesh. Her ministers are called to her altars by a sacrament; a sacrament blesses the marriage of her children; her first office to the living is a sacrament, her last office to the dying is a sacrament, and she follows the dead into the invisible world with sacramental sorcery. Her power to bless, to justify and save, depends upon her sacraments; these constitute her spiritual strength, these are her charms, her wands of spiritual enchantment.

If Rome were sound upon every other point, her errors in regard to the application of redemption are enough to condemn her. What though she speak the truth as to the essential elements of salvation, yet if she directs to an improper method of obtaining them, she still leaves us in the gall of bitterness and in the bonds of iniquity.

The application of redemption—this is to us the question of life and death, and a wrong answer here, permanently persisted in, must be irretrievably fatal. Christ will profit none who are not united to him by faith. Baptism will not save us. Confirmation will not impart to us the Spirit—the Eucharist is an empty pageant, penance a

* Conc. Trident. Sess. 6. chap. 7.

delusion, and extreme unction a snare, without the faith of God's elect. Christ is the power of God, and the wisdom of God unto salvation to believers, to believers only and not to the baptized, and whatsoever creed sets aside the office of faith, practically introduces another gospel. In Christ Jesus neither circumcision avails anything, nor uncircumcision, but faith which works by love. Here, then, is the immeasurable distance between the way of life proposed in the Scriptures, and that which is proposed in the papacy. The Bible says "believe and be saved," Rome says, be baptized and be justified—it is the difference between the spirit and the flesh, the form of godliness and its power.

I have now finished what I intended to say upon the Romish creed. Having compared it with the standard of an inspired Apostle, I think that it has been sufficiently convicted of fundamental departures from the doctrines of the gospel—it corrupts the blood, the water, and the Spirit. It denies the doctrine of gratuitous justification, it makes the Redeemer the minister of human righteousness, converts his death into the basis of human merit, destroys the possibility of Scriptural holiness, degrades the perfection of the divine law, exalts the Church into the throne of God, and erects a vast system of hypocrisy and will-worship upon the ruins of a pure and spiritual religion. Divine grace is divested of its efficacy, and the Almighty is reduced to the pitiful condition of an ancient German Prince, whose sole influence consisted in the authority to persuade, but not in the power to enforce.

Faith is dislodged from its legitimate position, perverted in its nature, and corrupted in its evidence, while the sacraments, clothed with preternatural power, are foisted in its place. Such is the creed which, to the astonishment of the land, Princeton has pronounced to be not incompatible with a Scriptural hope of life. I have never said, neither do I now assert, that all who are nominally in Rome, must necessarily be of Rome—that every man, woman, or child, who ostensibly professes the papal creed must be hopelessly doomed to perdition. It is the prerogative of God alone to search the heart, and He may detect germs of grace in many a breast which have never ripened into the fruit of the lips. But I do confi-

dently assert, that no man who truly believes and cordially embraces the papal theory of salvation, can, consistently with the Scriptures, be a child of God. If his heart is impregnated with the system, it is impregnated with the seeds of death. To make his own obedience, and not the righteousness of Christ, the immediate ground of his reliance—to look to the power of the human will, and not to the potency of divine grace, as the immediate agent in conversion—to depend upon the sacraments, and not upon faith, for a living interest in the benefits of redemption—to defer implicitly to human authority and reject the Spirit except as He speaks through a human tribunal—this is to be a papist; and if these characteristics can comport with sincere discipleship in the school of Jesus, the measures of truth are confounded, humility and pride are consistent, and grace and works are synonymous expressions. Even Hooker, the semi-apologist for papists, is compelled to admit that though in the work of redemption itself they do not join other things with Christ, yet “in the application of this inestimable treasure, that it may be effectual to their salvation, how demurely soever they confess that they seek remission of sins not otherwise than by the blood of Christ, using humbly the means appointed by Him to apply the benefits of His holy blood, they teach indeed so many things pernicious to the Christian faith, in setting down the means whereof they speak, that the very foundation of faith which they hold, is thereby plainly overthrown on the force of the blood of Jesus Christ extinguished.” This witness is true, and if true, the baptism of Rome is nothing worth. It wants the form of the Christian ordinance, which derives its sacramental character from its relation to the covenant of grace—it is essential to it that it signifies and seals the benefits of redemption. Apart from the gospel it cannot exist. The institute of Rome is neither a sign nor a seal, however she may apply these epithets to it—and even if it were, as she has introduced another gospel, and another scheme of salvation—she must necessarily have introduced another baptism. The one baptism of Paul is inseparably connected with the one Lord and the one faith. When the truths of the covenant are discarded, its signs lose their efficacy, and its seals their power.

[NOTE.—For some admirable remarks on the immoral tendencies of the Romish doctrines, see Taylor's *Dissuasive from Popery*. See also the preface to his *Ductor Dubitantium*, for a brief account of Papal Casuistry. If I can do so without offence, I would also refer to a recent work on the Apocrypha, for some arguments not altogether common, upon the tendencies of Rome to skepticism, immorality and superstition. Some use has been made of this work in the present article.]

ARTICLE II.

S. J. Cassel

ARMINIANISM RESTRICTIVE OF DIVINE FREE AGENCY.

It has been alleged, again and again, that Calvinism destroys the liberty of the human will, and thereby renders man a mere passive instrument in the hands of his Creator. It is our design in the present article to prove the converse of this—that Arminianism, if legitimately carried out, restricts the free agency of the Creator, and thus leaves the infinite interests of the universe under the control of an Almighty Governor, it is true, but one whose will is perpetually intercepted and thwarted by His creatures. We mean no controversy with our neighbors of the Arminian school, but simply to retort an argument, whose very verbiage is almost worn out by the frequency of its use.

The fundamental doctrine of the Arminian school of theology is, that no act of a creature can be free, and yet predestinated. According to this system, predestination and free agency are the antagonists of each other. Where predestination exists, free agency falls; and where free agency exists, predestination falls. The school of the Calvinist, on the contrary, embraces these seemingly contrary elements of doctrine. It is so charitable and comprehensive as to maintain that God may predestinate, and yet man remain free. It denies neither human free agency on the one hand, nor divine foreordination on the other. It admits them both; and it is for this admission that Calvin-