

SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

NUMBER I.

JULY, MDCCCLV.

ARTICLE I.

FURTHER OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY ANSWERED.

A consideration of the Heathen Doctrine of the Trinity, the opinions of the ancient Jews, and the almost universal testimony of the Christian world, both ancient and modern.

We have now endeavoured to meet fairly, fully and candidly, the objections offered as presumptive arguments against the doctrine of the Trinity.

There is, however, one other objection that occurs to our minds, and which may deserve a passing notice. It has been said that if this doctrine of the Trinity is so essential, and so practically important as we allege, it would have been revealed as clearly in the Old Testament as in the New. To this objection we would reply, *first*, that the objection admits that the doctrine of the Trinity is taught clearly in the New Testament. But, if the doctrine of the Trinity is clearly revealed, as true, in the New Testament, then to all who receive it as containing the doctrine taught by Christ and his apostles, it becomes fundamental, and vitally essential, whatever may have been the degree in which it was revealed to believers under the Old Testament. But, in the *second* place, we reply, that the doctrines of a future life, of the resurrection of the dead, of the nature of everlasting life, of the mercy of God, the way of acceptance with him, and the principle of obedience, not to mention others, are, on all hands, admitted to be of fundamental and

harden and to ruin, and to make them occasions of scandal. And many who have never professed religion, have yet, by their having been subjected to a strained system of effort, become insensible, not only to all less exciting influences, but even to the most moving appeals. Let us therefore heed the lessons of experience. Above all, let us be careful to adhere, in all our labours, to the word of our Master. "Let us not be weary in *well doing*, for in *due season* we shall reap, if we faint not. The husbandman *waiteth* for the precious fruit of the earth, and hath *long patience* for it." Doing this, we shall at least serve Christ. Doing otherwise, we have no assurance of any real success.

ARTICLE V.

BIBLE PRINCIPLES ON THE SUBJECT OF TEMPERANCE.

We wish to ascertain, by a candid investigation of the Scriptures, what are the true rules by which men are to be guided, in relation to the great subject of Temperance, both in regard to the use and traffic of intoxicating liquors. The world has been tremendously agitated on this subject for the last twenty years. The awful ravages of intemperance on private and public interests have excited, and continue to excite the intense investigations of moralists, and more latterly of politicians, as to the causes, operation and consequences of this vice, and the principles of policy by which it is to be checked. The most prodigious efforts have been made: the pulpit and the public forum, the press and the arm of the law have all been put into requisition. Associations of various forms, and of the most extensive ramifications, have been formed; large amounts of capital have been invested in the agencies and conduct of the reform, and high qualities of intellect and private virtue have been enlisted in its advocacy. A degree of interest so intense, producing efforts so vast and complicated, has necessarily accomplished a great deal of good, and like all other en-

terprises in the hands of fallible beings, and in a world like ours, although substantially good in themselves, it has also done a great deal of incidental evil. The doctrines by which the great effort to extinguish the vice and the consequences of drunkenness has been animated, have been placed on the most extreme ground. The use of every fluid possessing an intoxicating property, has been proscribed. *The use of such fluids* has been denounced, as well as *the abuse* of them, and sometimes as being the worst of the two. The occasional use has been confounded with *the constant*; the *temperate* with the *intemperate*; the *conditional* with the *unconditional* use. The principles which the Bible lay down on the subject, have by some, been openly denounced, and by others either so strained or overslaughed in their attempt to explain them, that they have practically ceased to control public sentiment on this branch of morals. The public expositors of the new doctrines, whenever they are compelled to allude to the miracle of Cana, invariably endeavor to explain it away, and when they discuss the doctrines of expediency, as laid down by Paul, they always push them far beyond the limitation which the apostle sets for their employment, and endeavor not only to make a principle temporary and limited, universal and permanent, but also to canonize the *weakness*, as the apostle terms it, in deference to which this principle is enunciated, as the only sound and permanent sentiment which an enlightened conscience should ever admit. Indeed, so far has this thing proceeded, that it is at the peril of a man's reputation for integrity as a Christian, and as an advocate for public morality, that he undertakes to stand on the example of Christ, and maintain the teachings of the word of God on this subject. Unless he goes the full length to which the boasted enlightenment of modern morality may please to lead him, he is looked at with the oblique suspicion that there is something wrong about him, or he is at once denounced as the enemy of temperance and the opposer of public and private virtue. To oppose the extravagant lengths to which the advocates of temperance go, is to oppose temperance itself. To oppose an advocacy of morality which is ashamed of the example of Christ, and is perplexed to dispose of the

various precepts of the Scriptures, is to oppose morality itself. To discriminate between abstinence and temperance—between the occasional and the constant, or the temperate and intemperate use of intoxicating liquors,—between such a traffic in it as can be guarded from direct tendencies to foster vice, and such a traffic as feeds the vices and swells the miseries of the poor, by the pint and the gill, is to forfeit all right to denounce drunkenness, or any of the collateral or direct causes of it. To all this we have only to say, that if we are to encounter it for returning without equivocation, to the teachings of the Bible, we shall do so with perfect content. We shall not attempt to base our advocacy of the virtue of temperance upon any maxims of expediency drawn from our own minds. Human reason is too much dis-tempered by the passions of the heart, and in too confined a position to behold all the relations involved in the settlement of an issue like this. God has been pleased to give us a revelation, setting forth the true principles by which our moral conduct is to be guided, and pointing out to us unmistakably what is the true nature of his will in the case. Nor can we conceive any course better calculated either to set aside the Bible as useless, or to discredit it, as a book of inspiration, as either to pass by its teachings altogether, in the settlement of these questions, or to be ashamed and afraid of its determinations of the issue. We wish it to be understood then, that we go to the Bible for the truth on this subject; that we go to it, not to interpret it by pre-conceived opinions upon our own part, but to learn simply what it teaches; and that we shall not flinch from any consequence which flows unequivocally from the principles enunciated in the Scriptures.

There are two modes by which the word of God teaches on questions of morality: by example, or by incidental, or direct assertion. Whatever is done by Christ is by that very fact stamped with the divine approval, and to say that anything done by the Son of God is censurable for anything—for intrinsic evil, or for mere inexpediency, is to assume ground directly infidel and deistic. In investigating the question, whether wine, as a beverage, is properly to be used or not, we are at once arrested

by the miracle at Cana. It cannot fail to have struck every observer of the current course of instruction given by the modern advocates of temperance, that whenever occasion has called upon them to explain this miracle, that they have been greatly embarrassed by it, and that they have been compelled to adopt some theory of explanation, which indicated a *consciousness* of embarrassment. The whole tone of allusion is the tone of apology. Now, we must say plainly, we have no apologies to make for it. We shall not attempt to explain it away. We shall not put on an air of embarrassment, as if the Saviour had set a very equivocal example here—an example, if not wicked *per se*, at least very *inexpedient*, to use the phrase with which these moralists dodge the charge of implicating the character of Christ. We say that the example was neither wicked nor inexpedient. We say it was an example fit to be made and fit to be followed. We say moreover, that whoever goes *beyond* this example, or its logical limitations, are as foolish as they are wicked, when they attempt to justify their excess by an appeal to this example. We say that whoever thinks this example a warrant for drunkenness, and those who maintain the propriety of it, are the advocates of the vice and are to be denounced themselves as the enemies of the Gospel. No man can, consistently, be a believer in the divine original of the Christian religion, and yet entertain in secret, or openly avow sentiments which arraign the purity of his acts and character. If this example is made the occasion and excuse of excess in wine, it is because the example is perverted from its true implications, and that for all such perversions the individual perverting it is himself responsible, and alone responsible for it. The example warranting a *right use*, must be perverted when used to justify a *wrong use* of a thing; and those individuals assume a fearful responsibility who either pervert the example of Christ, or who use it as an occasion of evil. Nor do those assume a responsibility one whit the less solemn who endeavour to evade or explain away the real nature of this example, from a guilty and weak apprehension that they will do mischief if they do not apologize for it. It is that spirit of apology for the example and teachings of the Bible which is

doing so much to extend the spirit of infidelity. The morality of slavery and the right and conditional use of wine has been denounced on such principles that no man could, consistently, hold those views, and yet allow the Bible to be a revelation from God. A distinguished infidel, quoted in a late work by a Minister of the Virginia Conference, declares that when he wished to disseminate infidel views, he did not attack Christianity as such; he only inculcated such principles on the subject of temperance, slavery, and other popular topics, as would necessarily undermine all confidence in the Bible, as an inspired revelation of truth. We are sick of this perpetual complaint of the morality of the tenth commandment, and of the morality of Christ. Any argument from the tenth commandment which would prove the lawfulness of a man having a wife, or owning an ox or an ass, would equally prove the lawfulness of owning a man-servant, or a maid-servant. Any argument from the example of Christ in attending and countenancing a wedding, which prove the lawfulness of marriage, would equally prove from his supplying the guests with wine, the lawfulness of using it. He was denounced, in his own day, as a wine-bibber, and the friend of sinners, and we suppose that the cry is to be repeated until the advancing power of his kingdom on the earth shall dispose men to submit to his authority and receive his teachings without limitation or reserve, as the truth of God.

It is argued in explanation of our Saviour's conduct by some, that to suppose him to have created wine, when the company *were well drunk*, is to make him "the minister of excess." This explanation which we have heard attempted, is the most absurd of all ever given of it. It proceeds on an assumption utterly false, and falls short in its conclusion of everything but an attack on the character of Christ. We would inquire if this position means to deny that wine was made at all at the wedding of Cana: for to avoid the charge upon Christ as a minister of excess, it is either necessary to deny that he made wine at all, or that he made it when "they were well drunken," both of which assertions are positively contradicted by the record. If this inference is correct,

that to suppose Christ to have made wine under such circumstances, is to make him the minister of excess, then *he is the minister of excess*: for it is unquestionable that he did create wine under these circumstances. But the argument proceeds on a supposition utterly unfounded: the phrase when *they were well drunken*, does not mean *when they had drunk enough, or that they were all intoxicated*. It simply means when *they were nearly done drinking, when the entertainment was well nigh over*. It was in these circumstances, the entertainment *nearly*, but not *completely* over, that the supply of wine failed, and Christ displayed his power to make up the deficiency. That this is the interpretation of the circumstances is clear, not only from the words themselves, but from the remark of the guests to the master of the feast, that he kept the best wine to the latter part of the entertainment, contrary to the custom, which set the best wine forward at first. This exposition of the passage completely answers the fling of those who wish to cover all defenders of the Saviour's conduct with shame, as representing him as supplying a parcel of drunken rioters with the means of dissipation. Those who find it necessary to pervert the statements of the Scriptures in this way, in order to sustain their views and bring reproach upon those who are presumptuous enough to defend the word of God, exhibit a consciousness that a candid statement of the facts would not be favorable to their opinions. Christ did not act tapster for a parcel of drunken rowdies: he supplied a festive company with wine for their enjoyment when the supply fell short; and the man who represents the one as being identical with the other, or who declares both acts to be the same in point of propriety, must answer at the judgment for a libel on his God.

Another sapient explanation of this act of Christ is, that he did not design to furnish wine, but simply to display his power and show forth his glory,—that he did not mean to sanction the use of wine as a beverage, but merely to prove his divinity. This is as true and as sensible as to say that a wagoner in building a wagon, did not mean to build a vehicle, but only to make money for his support; or a lawyer in making a speech,

did not design to make a speech, but only a fee. The absurdity of this is obvious: it confounds the *ultimate* with the *immediate* end, and overlooks an issue about the propriety of a *means*, by tacitly affirming the impropriety of the *means* and aiming to apologize for it by the excellence of the *end* to be attained. This is a question as to the propriety of *means* not of *ends*: it is not whether it was right for Christ to display his power and prove his divinity; but whether it was right for him to do *in this way*, by making wine for the enjoyment of a wedding party. The *end* does not justify the *means*. This doctrine Paul pronounces to be damnable. Can Christ be supposed to act on it? It is certain that he did design both to make wine and to display his power: he designed to do one in order to do the other: the one was his ultimate and the other his immediate purpose; and his act is not only a perfect guarantee of the propriety of the end, but it is equally a guarantee of the propriety of the *means* he used in order to effect it. We are as much at liberty to condemn him for the one as to condemn him for the other.

Another plea equally unsound: it is that Christ did not provide wine on this occasion, *as a beverage*. We are at a loss to imagine then, for what he did supply it. It is obvious that he supplied the deficiency of wine for the same purpose for which the original supply was provided. He came in to meet a loss in the provision for a certain end: what that end was in the original supply of wine by the master of the feast no one in his senses can doubt. The end was the same in both cases: the master of the feast provided a part of the means to it, Christ provided another. Such canvassing of the facts is puerile in the extreme. All of these pleas, it will be seen, proceed on the assumption that it would have been wrong in Christ to have acted contrary to what they endeavor to prove he did do. But this is to beg the question—assume the very point in dispute. The question to be decided is, whether it is wrong to use wine as a beverage; and they first assume this as admitted to be true, and then endeavor to explain away the conduct of Christ to an accordance with their views. We appeal boldly to the example of Christ, as proving it to be *right*

to use wine as a beverage. Even admitting that the miracle of Cana could be explained away, this is not the only passage of Scripture which clearly sanctions the use of wine as a beverage. The Psalmist declares of God, *he causeth the grass to grow for the cattle and herb for the service of man; that he may bring forth food out of the earth: and wine that maketh glad the heart of man, and oil to make his face shine, and bread which strengtheneth man's heart.* If this passage authorizes the use of *bread*, or *oil*, it also, and to the same extent, authorizes the use of *wine*. The law of Moses distinctly warrants the use of it in many places. The whole Bible is full of implied and direct assertions on the point. The blessings of redeeming mercy are repeatedly compared to wine; they are called the *feast of wine on the lees well refined*. Could this have been the case if it had been esteemed the odious and destructive thing it is now supposed to be!—the juice of hell—the water of damnation? What is the testimony of Jehu about John the Baptist and himself? He says to the Pharisees and lawyers, *John the Baptist came neither eating bread nor drinking wine: and ye say he hath a devil. The son of man is come eating and drinking; and ye say, Behold a gluttonous man and a wine-bibber, a friend of publicans and sinners. But wisdom is justified of her children.* This passage just as clearly shows that wine was used as an ordinary comfort of the table, as it proves that bread was used. It is also shown that Jesus himself was a user of wine, as well as the creator of it: and it proves beyond a doubt, that whether a man under peculiar circumstances, and for religious reasons, abstains from bread, or wine, as did John, or whether he employs his liberty in using both as did Jesus, he is in both cases justified of wisdom. *If he eateth he eateth unto the Lord: if he eateth not, unto the Lord he eateth not.* To condemn the man who, for good reasons, declined to use his liberty, is just as improper as to condemn him who chooses to use his.

It is argued lastly, and with far more dignity of argument, though with no improvement in the soundness of the plea, that the wine created by the Saviour, *did not possess any intoxicating property*,—that it was the sim-

ple juice of the grape, prior to fermentation, and unpolluted by the presence of alcohol. This is an assumption which is not borne out by facts: it is not true, as alleged, that the wines of Canaan did not intoxicate. Noah got drunk on it: Nabal did the same: Eli evidently knew that the wines of his day were intoxicating, when he told Hannah, when he thought she was praying drunk in the temple, to put away her wine. Isaiah knew that the wine of his day was intoxicating, when he denounces woe on the drunkards of Ephraim as overcome through wine, when he inveigles against them that have erred through wine, and when he exclaims concerning the inhabitants of Ariel, *they are drunken, but not with wine; they stagger, but not with strong drink.* Solomon marks the signs of intoxication, and ascribes it to wine: *who hath we, who hath sorrow, who hath contentions, who hath babbling, who hath wounds without cause, who hath redness of eyes? They that tarry long at the wine; they that go to seek mixed wine.* The New Testament writers are equally decisive in their testimony to the intoxicating property of the wine of their day. *Be not drunk, says Paul, with wine, wherein is excess.* Peter declares, *the time past of our life may suffice us to have wrought the will of the Gentiles, when we walked in licentiousness, lusts, excess of wine, revellings, banquetings, and abominable idolatries.* These testimonies are overwhelming against the supposition that the wine made by Christ did not possess an intoxicating property. There can be no demand for such a supposition, except by begging the question in dispute. To say, as has been said,* that Christ could not have created a wine containing an intoxicating property, because it would have been morally wrong, is to assume for granted the very thing in dispute, and to contradict the whole testimony of other parts of Scripture. The general fact that the wines of that day would intoxicate if improperly used, is unquestionable. To say that in the case of this miracle a particular exception is made, is to assert what cannot be proved, and throws the burden of proof upon him who asserts it,—an assertion which has a presumption against it absolutely

* Ed. G., Delaware quoted in Repertory, April, 1841, p. 271.

overwhelming,—a presumption not only created by the general character of the wines in use, but by the other parts of Scripture, which clearly commend their use, on account of this very power in the fluid to produce exhilaration. It by no means follows, as these reasoners suppose, that because a man may use a fluid with an intoxicating property, he may therefore get intoxicated upon it, any more than because a man may use an article which has a poisonous quality in it, that he may therefore poison himself. There is a deadly poison in tobacco; yet it does not give a man a *right* to use it to such excess as to kill, or even to injure himself. Nor does it prohibit the limited and temperate use of the weed. The simple truth is, that although there is an intoxicating property in wine, yet *excess in the use of it is a condition* to this property coming into play, and to use wine within the conditions which are appended to the use of it, is really to use a fluid which cannot intoxicate. Though this quality exists in it, it exists in a state unsusceptible of doing harm, and only susceptible of doing good.—The conditions which are prescribed for its use, provide against the power for harm, and secure only its power for good. Whoever, therefore, violates this condition, by using wine in excess, does it at his peril: he makes a property useful when properly used,—an instrument of evil when improperly used; and for this, he alone is responsible. It is impossible to make God responsible for the abuses of his mercies. All his gifts are conditional, and the grand condition of all is to *use without abusing*. To take the ground that wine cannot be used without abusing it, is to charge God with authorizing in its use all the consequences of its abuse,—a course in which it is hard to tell which is the most conspicuous quality, the blasphemy or the folly. The simple truth is, God gives wine for one end: men use it for another. He gives it on one set of conditions; they use without any limitation, but their own gratification and will. He gives it as a beverage: they use it as an agency of intoxication. He gives it as a gratification: they use it, when they abuse it, because it gives in excess a stimulus which is not the gratification God had in view, and which, in itself, is utterly polluting and destructive.

He has given it on the same general grounds on which he has given coffee,—to be used as a beverage: men, instead of using it as an occasional and temperate gratification, pervert it by constant or excessive use into an habitual source of criminal excitement. Suppose a man uses coffee as a constant drink, and in excess,—not merely at table, or as an occasional beverage between meals,—but as an incessant and excessive potation,—would any man say that he was innocent? Still less would any man say that, because this mode of using coffee was wrong, that all use of it is censurable? Coffee possesses an injurious property,—nay, the vital air we breathe, contains a gas which, in an uncombined condition, is deadly to all living things; but shall we, therefore, declare it to be sinful to use them. Would not the plainest understanding in the world be able to see that, while we may use coffee under certain limitations, within which it is not only harmless, but profitable, we are not thereby authorized to use it in such excess as to bring its injurious qualities into play? It is so with the use of wine and intoxicating drinks. The excess in the use of them, as a general rule, is the indispensable condition to the active movement of its intoxicating influence, and the prevention of that excess is one of the conditions which God has appended to the use of them.

What, then, are these conditions, which God has appended to the use of wine? They are in the most general terms of expression, that we may use so as not to do harm to ourselves and harm to others. It is evident that the first of these conditions—indeed both of them are of variable operation upon different persons, and upon the same person at different times. The zealot of modern reform will probably say that these conditions prohibit the use altogether, because a man cannot use wine under any circumstances without exposing himself to risk or others to contamination by his example. But it is evident to any man that such logic is a contradiction: it is to grant a right to use, and then follow it by a condition which nullifies the grant, and prohibits the use of it altogether. The allegation is properly met by a full contradiction: we deny that it is impossible to use wine without harm to ourselves or others: we affirm

that such is possible. But these conditions prescribe a different course of conduct to different persons under different circumstances, or to the same person under different circumstances, simply because one man may do, without harm to himself, what another cannot do: a man may do at one time, say under a certain state of health, what he could not do with impunity at another; and all men may do at some times, without harm to their neighbours, what they could not do at others. A man, too, may not so traffic in intoxicating drinks as to minister directly to the vices of his fellows. A man has no right to sell wine, or intoxicating liquors, to all persons indiscriminately. If he knows a person to be a drunkard, and will abuse the fluid, he has no more right to sell it to him than an apothecary has to sell laudanum to a man when he knows he means to use it as a poison, and take his own life with it, although he may sell it when he knows that it will be used for proper purposes, or at least has no right to suppose the contrary. This is a part of the responsibility of one trading in liquors; and while it is absurd to announce that a merchant may sell no article until he has first received a certificate from the purchaser that he will do no harm with it, the maxim is of sufficiently easy practical application, if not of a complete and definite logical statement. A merchant has no right to sell powder or arms, if he has reason to believe the purchaser will use them on his own, or the life of his neighbour. This is the consideration which makes the indiscriminate retail traffic in the articles of intoxicating drinks so excessively improper,—a traffic which, in nine hundred cases out of a thousand, ought to be prohibited by law. No man can sell in this way without doing harm. He cannot sell in this way to those who will use, without also selling to those *who abuse it*; and it is at the peril and responsibility of the seller that he does it. If he is at a loss how to discriminate in the case, the only safe chance is to alter his trade. A merchant may lawfully sell wines to customers from whom he can derive a reasonable assurance from their character and habits, that they will not abuse it. No man has a right to sell it so indiscriminately that he cannot tell what is the effect of his trade. The responsibility is his, and he

must determine on that responsibility what is that effect. He has no more right to sell to an indiscriminate mass of people, some of whom he knows must be abusing it, than an apothecary has to sell laudanum to an indiscriminate mass, some of whom he has strong reason to believe, even though he may not be able to tell who they are exactly, mean to use it as a poison on their own persons, or on the persons of others. These are the general principles which regulate the use and traffic in wines and other intoxicating drinks,—principles which afford a wide field for the exercise of a wise and discriminating judgment in the application. The word of God allows the *conditional* use of wine—*temperate*, as distinguished from *excessive*,—*occasional*, as distinguished from *constant*. The *intemperate* use of it, all will condemn. The *habitual* use of it, even when *temperate*, is, in the general, dangerous and improper. It is the *constant* use of wine *temperately*, which lays the foundation for the habit of intemperance, and it is against *this* the cry is so properly raised against *temperate drinking*, as it is called. The damage is, however, not in the *temperate* nature of the use, but in its *constancy*. An *occasional* temperate use of wine, as at a wedding, or as a refreshment in weariness, or as an occasional gratification, is *right*, in itself, and tends to no evil consequences whatever. Evil can only possibly result when the *occasional* is altered into the *constant*, and the temperate expands into the *intemperate*. Who will dare to say that when God authorizes the one, he either authorizes the other, or improperly exposes men to it in his permission to do the first?

The last limitation upon the use and traffic of wines which we shall notice, is the limitation expounded by Paul, founded upon the *weakness* of conscience in a sincere, but erring brother. This principle we shall enunciate briefly with the causes upon which it proceeds, and the limitation upon its action. It is contained in these passages. *Him that is weak in the faith receive ye, but not to doubtful disputations. For one believeth that he may eat all things: another who is weak eateth herbs. Let not him that eateth despise him that eateth not; and let not him which eateth not, judge him that eateth: for*

*God hath received him. Who art thou that judgest another man's servant? To his own master he standeth or falleth; yea, he shall be holden up, for God is able to make him stand. Let us not, therefore, judge one another any more: but judge this rather, that no man put a stumbling block, or an occasion to fall in his brother's way. It is good neither to eat flesh, nor to drink wine, nor any thing whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak.**

We shall extend the discussion of this principle, and urge, without reserve, both the positive and negative side of it. The sum of it, that it is good neither to eat meat nor drink wine, or anything by which our brother is offended. We shall discuss the nature of this offence hereafter. But where it exists, we are *imperatively required* by this principle of duty, to suspend our use of a right which is offensive or injurious to the conscience or conduct of our brother. It applies as much to the use of meat, as it does of wine. *But it does not require us to endorse and approve the weakness to which we yield.* We must still call it a *weakness*, and we are bound to *resist*,—not only not to endorse and endeavour to enforce it as a universal rule of faith and practice,—but to *resist* it. Paul tells us, if our brother is offended at our use of wine, we must cease to use it; but he calls the state of feeling that would call for such a suspension of our liberty in the case, a *weakness*; and sure any conscience must be admitted to be *weak*, and somewhat crazy to boot, which offends at the example of our Divine Lord himself. We will, to avoid offence, yield to the weakness of our brother; but we will both call it a *weakness*, and endeavour to instruct his conscience into a more complete accordance with the morality of the Bible. But, we must not be misunderstood: we do not mean that a man cannot relinquish the use of wine at all, except by displaying weakness. Far from it. There is a mode in which a man can suspend the use of wine, which is not weak, but honorable and proper, in the highest degree. If, with a clear conviction that he has perfect liberty to do otherwise, he admits his right, yet declines, on any

* See the whole of 14th chapter of Romans.

grounds satisfactory to himself, to use it, he is worthy of all honour. If, for the honour of religion, a man, with a rational and complete perception of his entire liberty to use meat, should relinquish the use of it, we should honour him highly. But, if he declines from superstitious ideas of the merit or efficacy of it, and denounces every body who will not do likewise, we can neither respect nor tolerate him. It is so with the use of wine. The use of wine is as clearly warranted in the Scriptures as the use of meat. If a man declines to use meat under the above views, he is worthy of high respect; but the man who does not choose to follow his example, is just as worthy of it as himself. It is only when individuals, or societies, get off from this high, clear scriptural ground, that they cease to deserve the unqualified respect of all who honor the Bible. But when they come urging that the use of wine is wrong under all conditions,—contending that the dislike to its use is essential to Christian character,—and total abstinence should be made a term of communion,—and denouncing every body who stands in good faith on Bible grounds, we shall not hesitate to arraign them as inconsistent with truth, and insubordinate to the word of God.

We have said the right to use or traffic in it is conditioned upon the obligation *to do no harm with it to ourselves or others*. This, of course, prohibits all excess in wine, of every degree. We have no right to use wine, or so to traffic in it, as to bring reproach upon our good name, or on the church of God,—to injure our health, or to debauch our morals. It is manifest that this condition applied, a certain state of public sentiment would require a temporary and circumstantial abandonment of both the use and the traffic. Public opinion may be in such a condition,—an exaggerated and wrong condition it may be,—a condition not only unreasonableness, but unscriptural, so that a man may even, by a use or traffic of the article, right in itself, expose himself or the church to obloquy. It would then be required, by a due regard to his own reputation, and the honour of the church, to abandon them. But it would not be required of him to approve the state of opinion to which he yields. On the contrary, it would be his duty, so far as in him lay, to

defend the truth of the Bible, and *endeavour, in all prudent ways, to bring back public sentiment to an accordance with the will and truth of God.* If, for this, he brings his good name into peril, he must bear it, and leave consequences to God. It is one thing for a man to imperil his own and the honor of the church by an imprudent pressure of a liberty of his own in the face of a strong, though perverted public feeling. It is altogether another, for him to peril his reputation in defence of the truth of the Bible, and the honour of his Lord and Saviour. In one word, as a matter of course, this obligation to use without doing harm is of a variable application, and consequently requires a prudent judgment to decide when it becomes obligatory, and when it does not. It is variable in its application, simply because, what can be done without harm in one case, cannot in another. A man may take a glass of wine in his own house, for example, when it would be unbecoming in him to go to the bar of a tavern and call for it. We would not, as a minister, take wine at a social party, not because we should think it wrong to do so, but because, as a matter of prudence, in the present state of public opinion, it would be best not to do it. But the state of public opinion would be *the chief, if not the only* ground of our declining to do it; and if public opinion is suffered to become much more exaggerated on this subject, it will become absolutely necessary for all who mean to stand by Christ and his truth, to resist by their example as well as their arguments, all insinuations that the miracle at Cana was a breach of morality. To a certain condition of public sentiment, we should deem it our duty to yield. To another state of it, we should feel it to be treason against the Master to yield the division of an inch, and we would resist it sternly, both by argument and by example, and to strengthen the logic, as a jury packed by the devil to bring in a libel upon the Bible, and to pronounce his example a breach of morality.

It will be said that the use of wine, under any conditions, will do harm, because it would set a dangerous example. To assert this broadly, as an universal proposition, subject to no limitation, is to condemn Christ at Cana, without a doubt. It is to pronounce all those

Scriptures which warrant the right use of wine as a license to sin. God has given a right to use; but this notion, that no man can take advantage of that right without setting an evil and dangerous example, is to say, in other words, that God has given a right to set such an example,—that he has given a license to sin. The simple truth is, that this assertion is an assumption of the very point in dispute: the question to be decided is, whether this is a *bad* example. What do you mean by a bad or improper example? Do you mean an example intrinsically wrong? Then it is always wrong; and Christ is a sinner. Do you mean an example which is susceptible of perversion, or of being made the excuse and plea of evil? Then, all example whatever, good or bad, is wrong; and Christ is again convicted of sin; for it is certain that his example has been perverted, and many a sinner has gone raving into a drunkard's hell, pleading the example of Christ as his justification. It is clear that whoever goes *beyond* the example of Christ, or of any one else, by the very terms of the proposition, does not follow it. The whole system of morals is a system of limitations upon action, going to a certain extent as right, and there limiting itself, and becoming wrong beyond. Will it be called a proper following of an example, to walk with it up to the limit where it stops, to go beyond, and then appeal to the example for justification?

There is another consideration in relation to this matter of example. An example, right in itself, may become objectionable when attended by some circumstantial and temporary relation to other things. Paul orders that no man put a stumbling block; or an occasion to fall, in a brother's way, and declares that if our brother is grieved with our meat, or is led by it into an improper use of it, we do not walk charitably. One branch of the Corinthian Church could participate in the feasts of the heathen festivals merely as festivals, and without any sentiment of religious worship being mingled with it. But others were unable to do this; they could not participate in them as festivals, without participating in them as worship: and they were emboldened to engage in these splendid celebrations by the example of their stronger

brethren. On this ground, then, Paul prohibited all classes of Christians from engaging in them, because the act of the strong, though in itself right, or at least indifferent, was made an occasion of stumbling to the weaker and less clear-minded brethren. Here, an example, proper, in itself considered, from its relation to the mere circumstantial and temporary state of incomplete emancipation from superstitious notions existing in the minds of the weaker portion of the church, was pronounced to be improper, and inhibited by the apostle. Of course, the force of the obligation in this case to refrain from doing what was proper in itself, resting altogether on the circumstantial and temporary condition of feeling in the weaker brethren, was merely circumstantial and temporary in its existence. This is the grand peculiarity of these rules and maxims of Christian ethics: what belongs to the essence of an act, always belongs to it, and if wrong, it is always wrong. But a thing, right in itself, can only become wrong by some mere circumstantial and temporary relation attached to it by circumstances. The very highest forms of intrinsic good or evil are subject to this partial and limited transformation. Of this sort is the use of wine as warranted by Scripture. In itself, and under the general conditions annexed to its use, it is right, and no intelligent and unperverted moral sense can condemn it. Under peculiar circumstances, ascertainable under the general descriptions and maxims of the Scriptures, even this right, limited and conditional use is entirely suspended. But this suspension is merely circumstantial in its reasons, and temporary in its duration; and to endeavour to establish it as a permanent and universal law, governing through all time, and throughout all possible contingencies, is to change the whole form of the obligation. It is to make grounds nominally circumstantial, really essential, and, of course, an obligation properly temporary, absolutely eternal.—To take ground which makes the absolute exclusion of wine, through all time, and under all circumstances, the law of all enlightened Christian conduct, is to take ground which, however it may be qualified and softened by deprecatory phrases, is essentially deistic. It makes the imitation of Christ at Cana, an impossibility, because

a wrong under all conditions of things and to the end of time. If the imitation is made so absolutely improper, the original example itself, was improper. To say this, is to take the crown from the head and the honor from the character of Christ; and if this is not deistic in nature and effects, whatever it may be in design, we protest we are not able to understand in what deism consists. But, let it be remembered, that the obligation, circumstantial in its grounds, and temporary in its duration though it is, is still of imperative force, as far as it goes, and will be neglected at the peril of him who neglects it.

The obligation to yield to the requirements of a weak brother's conscience is of the same general character with this general law of not doing harm in the use of our liberty. This offence consists in one part in offending his sense of right, and partly in inducing him to do wrong, by doing a thing in itself right, while his own conscience is not satisfied of the right of it. We are not unnecessarily, to offend the honest prejudices of our brethren, even though they may be weak and unscriptural. We may, and must endeavor to correct them, and under the pressure of circumstances, in order to defend the truth, we may and must entirely overlook them. But we may not do this *unnecessarily*: we are required by the broad and vigorous spirit of charity required in the Bible, to yield the use of a mere liberty temporarily, to the honest prejudices of our brother, while we endeavor kindly and firmly to remove them. We are ordered not to despise him that cannot conscientiously eat meat, who, because of his weakness, eateth herbs. It may be that his views are mistaken; but his conscience is honest. To the Lord he eateth not, and therefore his principle, or motive power, is commendable, though his judgment may be mistaken as to what it requires him to do. We are then, not to offend by an unnecessary, or wanton use of our liberty, the honest prejudices of such a mind: we must then, in deference to his views, yield temporarily our right to act, while we are also bound to endeavor to instruct him. If he becomes clearly factious in opposition to the truth, we are no longer bound to yield to his prejudices. But if he is humble, willing to submit to the truth yet unable at

once to perceive it, our obligation to honor his views continues to exist. At the same time this rule works both ways. It seems to be generally considered in the discussion, that it is only necessary to consider these rules in their application to the strong brother and the limitations upon his liberty. But there is also, an application of them to the weaker brother. Why, says the apostle, *is my liberty judged of another man's conscience? Who art thou that judgest another man's servant?* What right have you to come forward and insist upon your mistaken convictions becoming the rule of my conduct? In other words, there is a solemn duty binding on the weak brother, to look into the real nature of his convictions, to bring them honestly to the test of Scripture, and not to assume the responsibility of rashly, or unwisely limiting the rights given to his brother by God himself. Paul, while he insists on the strong brother yielding to the honest, though mistaken prejudice of his brother, insists with equal force on the weak brother's promptly setting about examining the foundation of that prejudice. The strong is bound to instruct the weaker to seek instruction, and when both unite in the humble, earnest, affectionate spirit of real brethren, animated by a simple desire to know the will of God in the case, it cannot be long before the prejudice of the one will be removed, and the other be enabled to resume the exercise of his rights and liberties given by God, without any offence to a brother's mistaken sense of duty.

The apostle guards with the same mutual fidelity against the other sense of offending our brother, which is to induce him to do as we do in a thing which, though right or indifferent in itself, is wrong to him on account of his mistaken convictions in regard to it. The thing is right in itself, and therefore we may do it, who are clear in conscience as to its propriety. But to our brother in his weakness it seems wrong: therefore he cannot innocently do it, on the principle laid down by the apostle, *to him who thinketh it to be sin, to him it is sin.* A person in this condition of mind may be led by the example of another to do it *before his conscience is clear as to its propriety.* He therefore sins, in doing what is

in itself right, because he violates his conscience. To guard against such violations of propriety, the apostle lays down two rules. He first directs the strong brother that whenever he has reason to believe that his example in doing a thing right in itself, will be the occasion of stumbling to a weak brother, that is, of leading him to do the same before his conscience is clear as to its lawfulness, he must not use his liberty in such a case without strong and sufficient reasons. He directs secondly, that one universal rule shall be observed by the weak brother, and that is, never to act in imitation of any one, until his own conscience is clear on the point. The example may be right in itself, but it is wrong to him because his conscience is not clear about it. *Let every man be persuaded in his own mind. All things indeed, are pure: but it is evil for that man who eateth with offence. Happy is he that condemneth not himself in that which he alloweth.* Not that every man is permitted to think just as he pleases,—not that any and every kind of notion is to be allowed in every mind; but that every man is solemnly bound to examine his convictions, to bring them honestly to the test of Scripture, to resist all unscriptural and unfounded convictions. But, that while this gradual process of rectifying his views is going on, and before his conscience has become clear, he dare not do what he is certain is right. *He that doubteth is damned if he eat; for whatsoever is not of faith is sin.* It is obvious, that the grounds on which these obligations are binding, both on the strong and the weak brother, are variable, or moveable in their nature, creating an obligation of the same variable temporary nature. It will be then seen at a glance, how mistaken is the ethics which lays down one rigid and universal rule, permanent and universal in its application, requiring at all times and under all circumstances, of all classes of men, as equally obligatory on all, and requiring the same conduct in all. The maxim of total abstinence, as an universal and permanent rule of moral conduct, finds no foundation whatever in the Scriptures. The great duty of man is obedience to conscience: the necessary correlative of that is to educate conscience entirely by the word of God, simply seeking to know its teachings, and al-

ways seeking for the Holy Spirit to guide us into the truth. Else it may often happen that a man will be placed in the unhappy dilemma of conscience ordering one thing and God ordering another, in which he can neither do right without guilt, nor refrain from doing wrong without a similar responsibility.

The obligation of total abstinence is not the same in its application to all—not the same in force, in duration, or in the grounds upon which it reats. Upon the man who has once been the victim of intemperance, it is an absolute and unalterable obligation. He can never touch liquor again, except under the most stringent and unavoidable necessity of health, without guilt, because a melancholy experience has shown that no reformed inebriate can ever touch it again without imminent risk, nay, almost the inevitable certainty of reviving the sleeping devil of his ancient vice. It is the duty of all men to be temperate: it is the duty of some men to be uniformly abstinent, because it is only by being entirely abstinent they can be temperate. It is the liberty of some to use with a limited and conditional use, which limited and conditional right is susceptible of being entirely suspended on circumstantial and temporary grounds. The circumstances of individual men may impose upon them a specific and confined and temporary obligation to total abstinence which they would be guilty to neglect. But this obligation cannot be expanded into one rigid and universal rule, simply because it exists only on the circumstances of the individual and expires with them. In all these cases, the individual must determine his own duty, by a consideration of his own circumstances; but he is as unwise as he is uncharitable, when he infers that what may be obligatory on him is obligatory on his neighbour, and fiercely denounces all who do not follow his example.

This brings us to the last point which we wish to consider, which is, the right of man to suspend his liberty in the use of wine, the true grounds on which Temperance Societies may be erected, and the relations of these Societies to the church of God, and the duty of church members in relation to them.

We have already indicated the principle which lies at

the foundation of this subject. If a man chooses to relinquish the *liberty* which God has given him, he may do it, only, provided he does so on no ground which conveys the remotest shadow of a hint that the *liberty itself* was improper. If he does it on any such grounds he is to be resisted. The relinquishment of his liberty will be controlled as to its moral character, entirely by the reasons upon which it proceeds. If a man chooses to relinquish it with a clear perception of the true nature of his liberty, that feeling that he is at perfect liberty to do otherwise, on grounds purely circumstantial, and with an entire relinquishment of all right to dictate the line of duty to others, and for the purpose of doing good to man, arresting the progress of a vice and staying its consequences, he is worthy of the highest respect. Others, acting on the same views, may unite with him and form a Society, and the Society so formed, and so remaining, is worthy of the high regard of all good men. But if a man relinquishes his liberty on grounds that proclaim *no liberty*, or a liberty to sin, on grounds essential and permanent, and with a disposition to suspect the integrity and denounce as suspicious, all who will not join him in his views and unite in an association with him, then he is to be resisted, and any Society formed on these grounds and maintaining them, is to be resisted. If, as we have already said, in different connection, a man chooses to relinquish the use of meat, with a clear and scriptural sense of his right to use it, it is well; he is worthy of all honor. But if he requires that every one else shall follow his example on penalty of denunciation, he is not to be respected. If he does it on superstitious or extravagant grounds, believing either in the efficacy or merit of not using meat, neither his understanding nor conscience is to be respected, except when these notions co-exist with great weakness of mind and evident and high honesty of conscience. It is so with wine; for the use of both of them, or the relinquishment of both of them, are placed on the same footing by the apostle. If a man chooses, with a clear conscience of his right, to use the limited and conditional privilege given in the Scriptures, to relinquish it in order to avoid offence, or to get a vantage ground to do good, on

grounds circumstantial in their nature, and which convey no reproach on the liberty he relinquishes, relinquishing all right to force others to do the same, then his action is worthy of all honor. Any Society taking such grounds is worthy all honor, the respect and countenance of all good men. But when a man relinquishes his liberty, with a feeling that it is a *liberty* to sin, or because his use of his liberty as conditioned in the Bible, would set an example permanently censurable,—when he forgets the nature of his relinquishment as a relinquishment of liberty, or as a compliance with an individual obligation, and consequently, does not see that he has no right to require others to relinquish theirs,—when any individual or Society takes this ground, no matter what may be the *design* in the matter, *the principles* on which they act are opposed to the word of God, undermine all confidence in it as an inspired revelation of truth, censure the example of Christ as an example which had far better never been set; and thus becomes essentially deistic. The proscriptive spirit and the unscriptural theories which have too often disfigured the Temperance Associations of the world, are separable adjuncts of the Associations themselves, and therefore opposition to them, or to the particular Societies which hold them, is not opposition to Temperance Societies as such, much less to the general cause they are seeking to promote. Temperance Societies based on the grounds already indicated, are valuable institutions of society, just as Societies for the suppression of gambling, for taking care of the poor, for the support of orphans; and when properly managed are sources of great good. But, to say that because they are such, therefore every individual, and particularly every member of the church, is absolutely bound to join them, is absurd. As a general rule, there is no obligation at all to join them; it is a mere matter of liberty. Particular circumstances might make it the duty of an individual to join an association of this sort, just as they might make it the duty of a man to join a Masonic Order, or an Orphan Assylum Association; but will any one say that such an obligation is universal and unlimited, requiring every member of the church to become *de facto* a member of these various

orders and associations, though good in themselves? The argument that every good man is bound to aid in every good thing, and must therefore, join a Temperance Society, is absurd as an unlimited proposition. The Missionary operations of the Baptist Church are very good things; so of the Methodist; so of the Episcopal Church. Is it, therefore, the duty of a Presbyterian to join all these churches at once? A Masonic Order is a good thing. Is it, therefore, the duty of all members of the church to join it? Is it the duty of all members of the church to join an anti-gambling association? Any member may: it may be the duty of some, and the ascertainment of their obligation is wholly a personal matter. The simple fact is, it is impossible for a man to aid in every good thing; for there are so many enterprises for good, that there must be a division of labour. Any Christian is at liberty to join such a Society if he pleases, having of course, a wise reference to his other obligations and to the doctrines and policy to which he will become committed by so doing. It may be the duty of *individual Christians* to join a Temperance Society; but the ascertainment of that duty is their own individual concern: the obligation itself, is individual in its extent, and circumstantial in its grounds, and it is folly to expand into a general obligation coincident with the extent of the church, and requiring a church member *de facto* to become a member of a Temperance Society. In simple truth, as a general rule, it is purely a matter of *liberty*, and if an individual does not choose to relinquish his liberty, no one has any right to complain of it. If it had not been right to give this liberty, God would not have done it: to require it to be given up, as a permanent thing, is to impeach both the grant and the grantor of the privilege. The member of the church of God is a member of a great and divinely organized society for the suppression, not merely of one vice, but of all vices. To say he is bound to join another is, in effect, to say his obligations cannot be fully met in the other. No member of the Sons of Temperance would admit there was any *imperative general* obligation resting upon him to join an old Washingtonian Society-created alongside of his order: he would feel at liberty to do it if he pleased;

but he would at once see that an obligation of a general form to do it would be not binding, because it would be superfluous and unnecessary. These are the general maxims of Christian duty on this great subject. The *ends* which these societies have principally in view, are the same, so far as they go, with those of the church of God. They differ *in the means* of attaining them: the societies lay down the rigid maxim of total abstinence: the church lays down the general principles of the Scriptures. To say that the other is the best mode of reaching the evils of intemperance, is to beg an important question. We say that the advantages of this principle, in resisting the tide of intemperance, are absolutely dependant upon its being kept in the position in which it is placed by the Scriptures,—the position of a temporary, circumstantial and local, or individual principle. The very moment it is elevated into a permanent and universal principle, it is shorn of its power: the history of the Temperance reform proves it. Although it may sound strangely in the ears of the modern reformers, it is nevertheless *true*, that the doctrine of total abstinence, as an universal law, is not the most effective principle on which to resist the evils of intemperance. It is best for certain cases, nay, indispensable to them, and it is the Bible principle for meeting them: it is indispensable to the reform of the drunkard, and to the maintenance of the reformed inebriate in the ways of sobriety, but not to the virtue of all others without exception. But God's wisdom is superior to man's, and he has promulged no truth which is not better suited to its ends than any fancied improvements which man may endeavor to make upon it; and we hold that the free and unequivocal teaching of the general principles which the Bible enunciates on the duties of temperance, is far better calculated to arrest the terrible vice of drunkenness, than the advocacy of the one rigid and universal maxim of total abstinence. The history of the Temperance movement, in our judgment, proves the truth of this inference. No one feature in this great movement has been more strikingly developed than the singular want of stability which has marked its progress. The celebrated and eloquent champion of the reform, John B. Gough, is said to have stated re-

cently, in a speech in England, that of five hundred thousand persons who had taken the pledge in the last fifteen years, four hundred and fifty thousand had broken it! The various modes of action in carrying forward the scheme have shifted with remarkable rapidity. The original pledge of partial abstinence gave way to the pledge of total abstinence; the old society yielded to the Washingtonian; the Washingtonian to the order of Sons, and the existence of the order in a given locality, is, of all things, the most precarious! What is the reason of this: a question often earnestly canvassed by the noble-hearted advocates of the enterprise? The reason is this, among others, without a doubt: their doctrines have been strung up too high; they have gone on extravagant grounds; they have assumed extreme positions, and the re-action of the sober second thought of the people has carried away the misplaced foundations of their creed and policy. The sober judgment of man will not suffer him to condemn the limited and conditional right to use wine granted in the Scriptures. That sober, second thought, will infallibly settle down as its final results on the conclusions of the word of God. *Every plant which our Heavenly Father hath not planted shall be rooted up.* If it is not in the place in which he planted it, he will transfer it. Human reason, in its calmest and deepest judgment, will invariably return, like the needle to the pole, and rest on the teachings of God in his word. The sooner we learn this, as a practical rule of universal conduct, accepting at first, the lessons of revelation, the sooner we shall find our action guided by the broadest of all intellects, the most perfect of all reasons. Let the principle of total abstinence be put into its true Scriptural position, and it becomes instinct with power over the judgments and consciences of men, and is endowed with immortality. Remove it from this position, it excites suspicion of its soundness; it loses power over the intellect and conscience; it becomes a minister of evil as well as of good, and is doomed to expire in the wreck of its influence. *The weakness of God is stronger than men, and the foolishness of God is mightier by far than the wisdom of man.* It is indispensably necessary in the great agitations and conflicts

of men, that there should be a constant recurrence to original principles. If no allowance is thus practically made for the weakness and infirmities of human nature, qualities which insensibly and inevitably will urge him into some false position, particularly on a point of controversy, and in the heat of debate,—if no recurrence is made to original principles it will be impossible to ascertain the existence or degree of the deflection from the line of truth. In the vehemence of their conflict with the evils of intemperance, when their hearts are full of a realizing sense of the wretchedness it entails on the life of man, there is a powerful tendency operating on the minds of the advocates of total abstinence as an universal law, to take extreme ground, and to forget the moderation of truth and the principles of the word of God. It is so much easier to advocate the application of a single maxim which seems to reach the whole case, than to draw the distinctions and define the *principles* which are set forth in the Scriptures, there is a powerful temptation to choose the first of these as the policy to be pursued. This is greatly aided by the fear that the people cannot be made to comprehend these principles and distinctions, that the single maxim will be more effective, and that it will soonest accomplish the end. But these views are too partial: we are still satisfied that the word of God has enunciated the grounds which are best and safest in the end. It may take more labour to expound them; they may be more susceptible of perversion; but they are the only principles upon which the sober and deliberate judgment of men will ultimately rest. What the maxim of total and universal abstinence gains by cutting off the necessity for the discrimination of principles, and in its immediate effect, it loses by not meeting the real demands of the reason of man, and of the revelation of God. In the long run, at the close of the immense experiments which are now going on, it will be seen clearly on this as well as on other great topics of social welfare, that the lessons of the Bible, taken in the simplest and most direct teachings of that wonderful book, are the lessons of the deepest philosophy, the purest wisdom, the most extensive benevolence, and the most permanent application.

We would say in conclusion, we do hope that none will pervert the teachings of this review. If they do, they will do it at their peril; for they are the teachings of the word of God. If any harm comes from them, it can only be because they are perverted from their true implications, and for this, he who perverts them is alone responsible. Indeed, so great is the fear of many persons of wisdom and excellence, that such perversions would be made, that they cannot agree to the propriety of a perfectly direct and unequivocal statement of the real teachings of the Bible on this subject. But, this only reminds us that human wisdom and virtue are not infallible. The conditions under which the voice of God is not to be heard on questions like this, are excessively rare in occurrence, and of very brief duration when they occur. We have no apology to make for an unequivocal and complete statement of what He has been pleased to state on this issue. He has made it the duty of his ministers to declare his counsel fearlessly, and we dare not suppress it. We had infinitely rather encounter the responsibility of being an *occasion* of evil by reason of the infirmity or wickedness of man in perverting the truth, than the responsibility of violating the first duty of the ministerial office, and either silencing, or incompletely re-echoing the voice of God on the issues on which he has chosen to speak in his word. If he has seen fit to enunciate these principles, we can see no reason why we should impeach the propriety of his doctrine,—why we should be either ashamed to receive, or afraid to avow them.

ARTICLE VI.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

Discourses on Truth, by Dr. Thornwell, President of the South Carolina College.

These discourses, seven in number, form a neat little volume of 328 pages. They were "preached in the or-
VOL. IX.—No. 1. 8