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GEORGE BUCHANAN, THE SCOTTISH HUMANIST.

BY PROFESSOR STALKER, Aberdeen, Scotland.

Last year the quater-centenary of John Knox was celebrated amidst demonstrations of interest which not only extended to the remotest parishes of Scotland, but found answering echoes in every corner of the globe. This year is the quater-centenary of another famous Scot—George Buchanan; and the University of St. Andrews, of which he was an alumnus in his youth, and in which he held the distinguished office of Principal of St. Leonard's College in his maturity, issued to the country and the learned world in the beginning of the year an invitation to celebrate the event there in the month of July. The occasion was an interesting one, and speeches were delivered by men of eminence, well able to do justice to the subject; but the echoes from other countries, and even in this country, have been few and faint in comparison with those which replied to the summons to commemorate John Knox.

This contrast is not only an illustration of how in the course of centuries reputations may wax or wane, but is also a sign of the times. Once the name of Buchanan stood at least as high as that of Knox in the land of their birth, and was far better known in foreign parts. Indeed, for two centuries after the deaths of both, Buchanan was the more outstanding figure, Dr. Johnson declaring him to be the only man of European reputation whom Scotland had ever produced. But Buchanan's name may be said to have steadily waned from the time when the Latin language ceased to be the medium through which academic instruction was communicated, while John Knox, on the contrary, has, since about the same date, continued to rise

EUREKA, AN ESSAY ON THE MATERIAL
AND SPIRITUAL UNIVERSE, BY
EDGAR ALLEN POE.

BY REV. C. R. VAUGHAN, D. D.

"What I here propound is true; therefore it cannot die; or if by any means it be now trodden down so that it die, it will rise again to the Life Everlasting."

"Nevertheless, it is as a poem only that I wish this work to be judged after I am dead."

By many of the contemporary and subsequent admirers of Mr. Poe, this singular speculation has been construed as the highest product of his genius. It is certainly distinguished by the display of his extraordinary powers of analysis—by remarkable exhibitions of his scientific attainments—by the boldness of his departures from the recognized doctrines of mankind—by the subtlety and ingenuity of his reasonings—by the simplicity and energy of his style—by the vast sweep of his imaginative grasp upon the most remote and extended phenomena of the universe—and by the unflinching boldness with which he asserts his ultimate conclusion—the final indentification of every conscious being with Jehovah, without loss of consciousness. The conclusion finally affirmed is Pantheism, although, for a time, he seems to waver between Pantheism and Polytheism; but a Pantheism differing from that of the German Pantheists, who postulates the burial of all individual consciousness by the evolution into deity. With a humility, which he protests is unassumed, and is eminently becoming in an adventurer into a region so high, difficult and mysterious, the gifted author proceeds to develop his views, with an independence not deformed by a censurable insolence of assertion, and not conspicuously wanting in the humility with which he professes to set out. In the interest of a true religion and a sound philosophy—a religion adapted to the conscious nature and wants of the human race as it actually exists—a philosophy based upon the facts of the status and history of the present scene of human life, we propose to analyze and test the positions assumed in this remarkable speculation.

With the highest appreciation of this extraordinary genius, and a wondering admiration for this unique and Gothic structure—we shall apply the testing tap of investigation to its main positions and endeavor to give an impartial account of its remarkable features—the brilliancy of its imaginative qualities, the boldness of its speculative theories, the ingenuity of its reasoning, and the fatal error of its final conclusions.

“I design to speak,” says the author, “of the physical, metaphysical, mathematical—of the material and spiritual universe—of its essence, its origin, its creation, its present condition, and its destiny. I shall be so rash, moreover, as to challenge the conclusions, and thus, in effect, to question the sagacity of many of the greatest and most justly revered of men.” “In the beginning, let us as distinctly as possible, announce—not the theorem which I hope to demonstrate—for whatever the mathematicians may assert, there is, in this world at least, no such thing as demonstration—but the ruling idea which, throughout this volume, I shall be continually endeavoring to suggest.”

“My general proposition, then, is this: In the original unity of the first thing lies the secondary cause of all things, with the germ of their inevitable annihilation.”

1. The author starts on his adventurous expedition, by making more than one definition, although he expresses a somewhat discreditable opinion of “definitions.” He pronounces definitions, both in mathematics and in metaphysics, as pure “assumptions;” but is compelled to begin his speculation with a similar “assumption”—claiming that his assumption will be vindicated hereafter by the consistency of its content. He defines the universe to be: “The utmost conceivable expanse of space, with all things, spiritual and material, that can be imagined to exist within the compass of that expanse.” He discriminates the material creation as distinguished from “the utmost conceivable expanse of space” beyond it—including all worlds—as “the universe of stars.” This definition is faulty, inasmuch as it limits the universe to the “expanse” as “conceivable.” In point of fact, the universe of space as distinguished from the “universe of stars” is “inconceivable” because it is literally “infinite.” It extends far beyond the point where the power of conception

breaks down under the weight of the notion with which it is struggling. Space is necessarily without bounds; but the content of space—excluding the one concept of God—is necessarily limited. Embrace the very uttermost of space—by whatever successive aggregations of extension the mind is capable of forming—it is impossible to annihilate the conception of yet other space beyond the line where the mind has been compelled to pause. It stretches around, above, beneath—with ever-expanding reach into absolute infinity! The Infinite God only can fill immensity. The universe of stars is necessarily limited. Matter in all its forms and varieties is necessarily limited; form or figure is one of its essential characteristics; it cannot exist under bounds. Whether it exists as embodied in formed worlds, as star dust, as chaos, or under whatever attenuation it may be thought, matter cannot escape its essential qualities. Figure or form is one of them. In a subsequent part of his treatise, Mr. Poe asserts: "We are fully justified in assuming that matter exists only as attraction and repulsion—that attraction and repulsion are matter, there being no conceivable case in which we may not employ the term "matter," and the terms "attraction and repulsion" taken together as equivalent, and therefore convertible expressions in logic." But, with all deference, it is assuredly true that the great bulk of the students of these mysteries of nature are fully convinced that attraction and repulsion are qualities resident in matter and distinguishable from the substratum in which they reside. Mr. Poe himself distinctly and repeatedly recognizes the existence of "atoms" in matter; what is the relation of these atoms to attraction and repulsion? If attraction and repulsion are all that is in matter, is not the postulation of the atoms superfluous? But if the atoms are a part of the constitution of matter, it is obviously a mistake to make attraction and repulsion alone the constituents of matter. Moreover, attraction and repulsion are invisible forces; no one has ever seen gravity; and the fact that electricity is sometimes visible seems to intimate that repulsion which is as invisible as attraction is rather an effect than a constituent of electricity. Moreover, attraction and repulsion are in themselves invisible forces; but matter is cognizable by the senses in vast multitudes of the forms in which it appears. Yet, further, attraction exists

in two forms in the loadstone; it exists as gravity, producing weight, which it possesses in common with all matter; it also exists as a peculiar attraction with a limited adjustment which is not possessed by all matter. Attraction, then, is not the same thing in all matter; it is therefore more justly described as a quality of matter and a variable quality of matter, than as matter itself when associated with repulsion. It seems, then, too, that matter has a number of qualities besides attraction and repulsion, some of which may be due to the two qualities claimed to be the exclusive constituents of matter, but others which have no assignable relation to them. Figure, size, density, tenuity, impenetrability, variety of composition, color and chemical qualities are all qualities of matter—several of which may be due to the action of attraction and repulsion, and some which are due to other causations. It is clearly impossible to limit the conception of matter merely to the single or dual postulate of attraction and repulsion. The atoms must be allowed for at least; and it is hard to discredit other qualities of the mysterious entity called matter.

It is then, an inevitable inference from the essential quality of form or figure in matter, that beyond the necessarily limited sphere and range of the material creation, there is an infinity of space, in which the immensity and omnipresence of God finds its habitat, and where no other existence or being can ever be found. In the after part of his wonderful speculation, Mr. Poe seems to limit God to the "manifestations of the universe"—each universe being adjusted to its own particular God. He thus appears to impeach the immensity of a necessitated being, as not extending beyond these manifestations. In this he seems to coincide with certain theologians, who, distinguishing between the immensity and the omnipresence of God, limit his presence to the actual material and visible creation. But this notion is plainly contradictory. Wherever the immensity of God carries him, he is present. There is no possible divorce between the immensity and the omnipresence of the infinite God. It is equally futile—it is only a scientific expression of the same error—to limit him to the manifestations of the universe, and to exclude him from the infinite of space beyond. God is a necessary being; he is not a caused existence; "he only hath im-

mortality!" Whatever cannot but be, in this naked sense of an absolute necessity, cannot be in one space more than another. He exists along with the manifested universe or universes, if you please to postulate them in myriads; but he exists far—far beyond them—filling all those realms of the infinite in space, where no wing of adventurous angel has ever or will ever beat the dusky and awful void—where no impertinence of a creation will ever disturb the holy silences of God's infinite and self-sufficing repose.

2. He then proceeds to explain the method of his proposed investigation. He first discounts the value and discards the use of both the inductive and deductive methods, under the odd names of hog and ram, by which he designates Bacon and Aristotle. He also denies the validity of any reasoning and any conclusion based upon axioms. In the place of these three discarded modes of investigation, he deliberately postulates "imagination" as a trustworthy organ of discovery. Inasmuch as it has occasionally happened that a happy hypothesis has led the way to results, the imagination is accepted as a more reliable mode of discovery and progress in knowledge than the "crawling" and slow advances of induction," or the uncertified content of the undemonstrated general propositions of the deductive method. "Science advances by leaps." The infirmity of this view is that the leaps which accomplish so much are generally, if not invariably, suggested in the course or by the outcome of previous processes of investigation under either or both of the discredited Baconian and Aristotelian methods. In a subsequent part of his treatise, intuition instead of being accepted according to the usual view, both of the masses of mankind and the philosophers also, as a direct perceptive energy of the human understanding, is held to be the outcome of forgotten processes of induction or deduction. If so, these discredited methods do have something to do with the leaps which are so effective in the advancement of science. The appeal for the unriddling of the mystery of the universe is then made to the "imagination," which it is supposed has been sufficiently vindicated as an "organ of discovery." The author, by his appeal to imagination, develops as his point of departure, what he calls an "assumption;" but an assumption which he proposes to transmute into a demonstrated proposition,

(although there is no such thing as demonstration in this world in spite of the mathematicians) "by the consistency of its content." (Eureka p. 135.) His own words are: "This will be found the sole absolute assumption of my discourse. I use the words 'assumption' in its ordinary sense; yet I maintain that even this, my primary proposition, is very, very far indeed from being really a mere assumption. Nothing was ever more certainly—no human conclusion was ever in fact, more regularly, more rigorously deduced; but alas! the processes lie out of the human analysis—at all events are beyond the utterance of the human tongue." Now certainly this reveals a most unreliable basis for a grand speculation, ending in the most astounding practical conclusion! An avowed assumption—dictated by the imagination of a most superior imaginative genius, strictly deduced, yet all the processes of the deduction lying out of human analysis, and impossible of delineation in human words! Is it possible to conceive that any enterprise of philosophical speculation could present more unmanageable conditions surrounding its fundamental postulate? But the gifted author is not discouraged; he relies with heroic confidence upon the demonstrative force which resides in the content and consistency of the thought expressed in the "sole assumption" which is laid down as the basis of the grand theory which is to explain the secret of the universe. This confidence, in a basal "assumption," is in accordance with the modern doctrine of an *a priori* argument—the logic involved in developing the content of a notion. In this way the trustworthiness of an axiom which is not demonstrable by any external process may be illustrated. The notion that a whole is equal to the sum of all its parts, and that things which are equal to the same thing, are equal to each other, are samples of the trustworthiness of an argument from the analysis of the content of the notion. But is not this method of sustaining his "sole assumption" an appeal to that axiomatic method which the author has discredited? There is nothing exceptionable in the logical method of the writer simply considered. But the application of this method to the large and infinitely complicated problem of the universe may be questioned. The consistency of developments on such a scale will be difficult, if not impossible, to trace out to the satisfaction of an inquirer. Available with

a simple primary axiom, it does not commend itself as competent to the larger enterprise. History informs us that Mrs. Partington was honorably equal to a puddle; but that she overtaxed herself when she meddled with the Atlantic in a tempest. As a final objection, a "deduced axiom" is altogether abnormal. His impeachment of the axiom follows his impeachment of hog and ram, but with no more success. He has found himself obliged to appeal to both. Imagination has not been able to dispense with the necessary implements of the reason. The attack on the authority of the axiom pronounces them to be "mere assumptions." Their discredit proceeds on the fact that some former aphorisms which once had the authority of axioms, have been found to be untrue. But it is unsound reasoning to infer that because some recognized axioms have justly lost that character, all axioms have lost it, and all axiomatic truth has been discredited. Some formal conclusions from inductive and deductive reasoning have also been subsequently discredited; but this fact does not discredit all such conclusions. It is indisputable that some truths are seen to be true, not through an induction of facts, or a deduction of reasoning, but simply by the native power to "see" which belongs to the mind by its original endowment as a "seeing" instrument. That a whole is greater than any one of its parts is seen to be true, and universally true, as soon as the terms of the proposition are understood. Although Mr. Poe pronounces axioms to be unwarranted "assumptions," and as such, unreliable bases for trustworthy reasoning—in another place he uses this language: "To demand why they are true, would be to demand why the axioms are true upon which their demonstration is based." It seems, then, that demonstration is possible in this world, and that the axiom needs no proof beyond the apprehension of the axiom itself. Glancing backward at his previous discredit of "demonstration and axioms" Mr. Poe says: "Nothing is demonstrable, strictly speaking; but if anything be, then the properties—the laws in question—are demonstrated." It seems as if Mr. Poe could not entirely emancipate himself from the delusion or the prejudice of mankind in general, that axioms are something more than "unwarranted assumptions." It is not possible to escape the conviction that they are what has been called "primitive truths," not more capable of

demonstration by a process of logic than the color or the perfume of a rose, yet as hopeless of rejection by any sane intellect from its faith.

3. Another preliminary exposition of "infinity" is then made, or rather discloses the confusion with which the notion lies in his mind. He pronounces it "the merest of words;" it is not the expression of an idea, but of an effort at one. He evidently confounds the impossibility of a formal and distinct conception of "infinity" with the bare thought or intuitive apprehension of it. The comprehensive conception of it is impossible to finite or limited faculties; the intuition of the notion or the fact of "infinity" is plain enough. How else did the notion of it ever enter the human mind and become the subject of its reasonings? The intuition that there is such a thing as "life" in its manifold forms and varieties is level to the apprehension of a child; the formal conception of what "life" is, in any of its varieties, is beyond all human faculty. Life can only be defined as the condition of strength, beauty, action, suffering, growth, fruitfulness and enjoyment. In itself it is an impenetrable mystery. It is one of those primitive truths or notions which are apprehensible by a native power of intuition, not a notion comprehended under other forms of truth, and deducible from them. This class of truths is what is called by Sir William Hamilton "incomprehensible"—not because they are not apprehensible by the human understanding, but because they are not comprehended under any other form of truth, and as such, deducible from them. As "primitive" they are not susceptible of deduction; they are seen only by intuition. Yet no human being who is not fatuous ever fails to see them. The notion of "infinity" is disclosed by the necessary contrast with the finity or limitation of things, and apprehended by intuition as necessarily true. The notion does not rise as Mr. Poe supposes and as expressed by some mistaken speculators, as rising from the "difficulty" in framing a conception of "a limit." The distinguished author shrewdly comments on this solution of the origin of the notion of "infinity," and seriously impairs its credit. But his impeachment of the solution amounts to nothing because the solution itself is incompetent. The barrier is not a difficulty, but an impossibility; no limit or want of limit can be fixed by any power

of definitive conception. It is to be thought—not conceived. The notion of infinity is enforced by the necessary logical opposition or contrast with the familiar notion of the finite, just as the notion of the less enforces the notion of the greater; they are intrinsic correlates. In a manner equally incompetent, Mr. Poe discredits the notion of infinity by an equally incompetent notion of first cause. He so defines “first cause” as to make it equally demonstrative of finity as of infinity. He asks: “What is first cause?” He answers: “An ultimate termination of causes.”

By this definition he asserts the notion of limitation in the terms of the definition, and then proceeds to work out the absurdity with which he set out to discredit the plea for an infinite first cause. He then goes on to ask: “And what is an ultimate termination of causes?” Finity—the finite. Thus the one quibble in two processes, by God knows how many philosophers, is made to support now finity, and now infinity. He scornfully asks: “Could it not be brought to support something besides?” As for the quibbles, they at least are insupportable. But to dismiss them; what they prove in the one case is the identical nothing which they demonstrate in the other. Thus the notion of infinity is supposed to be fatally dis severed from the conception of first cause. Very shrewdly inferred indeed, if Mr. Poe is allowed to frame his definition of first cause just to suit his purpose. But when he defines first cause with an intrinsic limitation in the bosom of the definition, there can be no wonder he brings out a finity from the definition which is intended to warrant the opposite inference; and as the argument is made to prove both finity and infinity, it is discredited as worthless. But, unfortunately, first cause is not the “termination of causes;” it is the beginning of causes; it is proved to be the beginning, and not the termination, of causes by its very nature as *first*. His notion of first cause is the datum of the monstrous absurdity of an infinite series of finite causes. A finite cause necessarily determines a limit, no matter how often repeated. A three-foot rule will determine just the limit of three feet every time it is laid down. It can never reach infinity. Consequently, to avoid the logical absurdity of an endless regressus without the possibility of any result, the human mind is compelled to recognize a first cause which, as such, is itself

uncaused. Thus the notion of an eternal first cause is a compulsion of the reason, carrying with it the notion of an infinite, and excluding the notion of a finite.

The notion of the first cause does not spring from the difficulty of conceiving either a limit or its opposite notion. It springs from the compulsion of the law of cause and effect—from the necessity of finding a beginning of causes; and as the beginning of causes must itself exist without a beginning, the notion of an eternal first cause is compulsory—a compulsion of the reason, and not the bastard product of the “difficulty of conceiving the opposite notion of an absolute finite.” The mathematical doctrine of infinity, produced by an infinite reduplication of finites is only hypothetically true. If finites could be infinitely repeated, possibly infinity might be reached. But no number of repetitions of things finite, could ever make them anything but what they are—that is, things with an intrinsic limitation. Every repetition of a finite would still yield a finite in time as well as in space. As already suggested, a yardstick laid down ever so often would always develop the limitation of just three feet; and as just so much time would be occupied in laying it down, it defines a limit of time which would forever forbid the realization of infinity in time, not less than in space. The finite in time or space can never reach the infinite. Mr. Poe’s ingenious argument proves a contradiction—finitude and infinity as both the attributes of first cause—which is a fair match for the “identical nothing” which he so amusingly accepts as the outcome of his definition of first cause.

4. Then the next step preparatory to the introduction of the theory is taken—what he calls the “irrelativity” of the particle; or perhaps, more accurately, the opening of the theory with an account of the extraordinary character which is attached to it—which he terms its “irrelativity.” The sole assumption which Mr. Poe asserts that he makes in the whole development of his discourse, is that the original production of matter was the creation by God—“by dint of his volition”—“out of himself or nihility.” This primary creation “or first theory,” was in the shape of an absolute unity in the strictest sense of the term. Matter appeared in its uttermost “simplicity.” Language is used with the utmost care to express the notion of a single par-

ticle—an absolute unity—a particle at all points. His object is to explain the genesis of the universe, and develop the rationale of its fundamental laws—gravity and electricity. He begins with an effort to conceive “what matter must be when or if in its absolute extreme of simplicity.” “Here,” he goes on to say, “the reason flies at once to imparticularity—to a particle—to one particle—a particle of one kind—a particle, therefore, without form and void—of one character—a particle positively—a particle at all points—a particle absolutely unique, individual, undivided. and not indivisible only because he who created it by dint of his will, can by an infinitely less energetic exercise of the same will, as a matter of course, divide it.” Eureka, p. 26. “Oneness, then, is all that I predicate of the originally created matter; but I propose to show that this oneness is a principle abundantly sufficient to account for the constitution, the existing phenomena, and the plainly inevitable annihilation of at least the material universe.” pp. 26-27. This oneness of the particle is distinguished by the ascription to it of “absolute irrelativity.” It is spoken of as “the emphatically irrelative one.” The laborious description given above, as an absolute unit—the very expression of simplicity of constitution—the very perfection of a monad constituent, “indivisible” only because it had not escaped from the control of the infinite God. When this monad particle had been brought into being, it defined the universe in a concentrated form. But the constitution of the universe was to be effected by forcing this original unit particle into the abnormal plurality which actually appears. Then as the divine counsel passes on to its next process, the unity of the particle is broken up; and its constituent atoms—which are singular predicates of the strict simplicity of a monad constitution—are driven by irradiation to the utmost bounds of the mighty sphere marked out as the predestined limit of the universe. Two grand forces are ascribed to the particle—gravity and electricity—which are afterwards broadened into the more accurate and perfectly descriptive terms, attraction and repulsion. These forces, which are essential opposites, are in equilibrio in the particle at the time of its creation; but when the time comes, the fiat of the almighty opens a struggle between them—the one to accomplish the distribution of the atoms—the other to restore them to the

original unity of the primordial creation. This is done by the fiat of the Almighty, which relaxes the restraints of the attractive force and lets loose the repulsive energy to separate the particle into its constituent atoms, and drive them to the utmost limits of the appointed sphere. These atoms are determined into different sizes, shapes, weights, and as the outward movement goes on, into unequal distances from each other. The power of the attractive energy, relatively weakened, or at least controlled by the divine will, still, however, exerts a powerful influence over the flying atoms; and the combined effect of the two forces sets up a rotary motion, which is greatly aided by the differences in the atoms themselves. This rotary action, increasing in its mighty movement, finally begins to throw off particular masses of the coalescent atoms, until the original nucleus of the formed worlds, expands into the glorious star which it was designed to establish. This revolution, set up by the contending powers of attraction and repulsion, or gravity and electricity, is allowed to work out its sublime result in the formation of the universe of stars; and then, when the time comes in the counsel of God, the outward movement is arrested, and the return to the original unity of the particle is begun and carried onward until the restoration is completed, preparatory to its final annihilation, and return into the Godhood itself. All this suggestion of the genesis of the universe is described by the genius of a great poet in terms striking in the extreme! Little justice can be done to it in a brief analysis; but the general theory propounded in Eureka can be seen in a mere outline.

5. A singular attribute is ascribed to the particle, in its preparation for its final uses, which is styled its "irrelativity." This "irrelativity" is made fundamental to the whole theory of the distinguished writer, for a reason which will appear when this extraordinary attribute is defined. In what sense is this "irrelativity" to be taken? The phrases which are connected with it are somewhat mixed. The particle is spoken of as "created." If created in the usual sense of the term, it is impossible to extinguish its relation to its creator; or denying a creator, it must be related to the force—whatever that may be—which produced it. If, in the primordial monad unity, atoms are supposed to reside—which seems to be contradictory—the

particle is also relative to its component parts; for the removal of any one or more of these atoms from the particle will necessarily establish a relation between these translated atoms and the particle itself.

The "irrelativity" is probably predicated on the fact that the particle is supposed to be the only being then in existence, or because it is a simple monad. In what sense can the particle be construed as the only being in existence? If created, its creator must exist. If produced, the force that produced it is distinguishable from it. But, perhaps, irrelativity is predicated on the fact which is asserted in the end—that the particle is a development of the deity, who is credited with its creation or production. Even on this supposition, the new garment in which the deity appears, is something different from his previous conditions; and if so, a relation is not extinguished. The development of deity cannot escape the imputation of the production of a new phenomenon; and the ascription of an absolute "irrelativity" is still faulty. A similar plea would make the entire visible universe "irrelative." The ascription of an atomic constitution to a monad of absolute simplicity also appears to be a contradiction. Irrelation appears to imply something absolutely out of relation to any other entity whatever. Mr. Poe pronounces it a far better postulate for the origin and development of the universe than any axiom or axiomatic truth, or than any inductive or deductive process of reasoning from those heavens which declare the glory of God. It would seem to be superfluous to discredit either the axiom or the methods of induction or deduction, since Mr. Poe has accredited at least all axioms which are the result of forgotten processes of those methods which have never disclosed themselves to human apprehension. It would seem that a better basis than this vague and discredited "irrelation" might be found in the intuitive law of cause and effect, which demands that the universe should show some cause of its existence, and not rest the solution on the bare fact which is supposed to underlie its "irrelativity" that it was a unit in itself, and the only thing in existence. Certainly this latter claim is doubtful at least, or rather not doubtfully false as long as a creator was at the back of it. The denial that anything was at the back of it, begins to reveal the urgency with which "irrelat-

tivity" is asserted. It is also shrewdly suggested that Mr. Poe felt this difficulty in the explanation of the genesis of the particle, by the elaborate pains which he takes to make it appear that irrelativity revealed "a beginning"—an "absolute beginning"—a "beginning that had nothing behind it or before it"—a beginning in fact—"a beginning and nothing different from a beginning"—in short, a beginning that was what it was—"a true beginning." This laborious effort is designed to show that the particle had no beginning except what it found in itself.

That which has nothing behind it or before it, is, of course, an original or "first thing." In other words, we have here that "first thing" mentioned in the "general proposition" with which Mr. Poe sets out in the beginning of *Eureka*, and states with such oracular profundity: "In the original unity of the first thing lies the secondary cause of all things, with the germ of their inevitable annihilation." That is to say, "the irrelativity" on which such emphasis is laid is simply the assertion of a thing which is asserted to exist without a cause. It is not merely the equivalent, but very nearly an identity with Hume's "Singular Effect," by which he means an effect without a cause. It is intended to pave the way for the Pantheistic conclusion; and it is fundamental for that purpose. But even on that supposition, the law of cause and effect cannot be balked, for the visible material particle is due to the evolution of a deity affirmed to be spiritual; and the evolution into matter is the effect of a cause found in the deity. The intense exertion to make out the origin of the particle to be an "absolute beginning," without any cause—with nothing behind it or before it, is an effort to establish an absurdity. It could only come from a verbal delusion. To define a beginning in the agonistic terms, which the acute writer employs, is to define an "absolute beginning" which is absurd—an intrinsic absurdity. The law of cause and effect is imperious. That which begins must have a cause of its beginning. Nothing which exists absolutely can have a beginning. God is the only absolute and uncaused being. He has no beginning, and is therefore eternal; and as such, must be the beginning of all that exists. Whatever begins must have something before or behind it. The postulate "an absolute beginning," or its equivalent, "a beginning from eternity," is

absurd and contradictory. The assumption of a created, or developed, or produced particle—with nothing behind it or before it—nothing behind it in power or before it in time—is an assumption which will not support the daring and presumptuous structure built upon it, just because it has no standing of its own. There is no necessary connection between Mr. Poe's theory of matter and its distribution and return to unity on the one hand; and his theory of the "irrelativity" of the material particle and "an absolute beginning" on the other. The theory of the distribution and return of the atoms is very beautiful; and it is within the range of possibility that it may be true. But there is no reason why it might not be true of a particle with a cause behind it, as of a particle without one. The theory of "irrelativity" is false and absurd. The first theory has God behind it, and may possibly describe his method of creation. The second theory postulates a beginning which has nothing behind it or before it—which cannot possibly be true.

6. It will be recalled that Mr. Poe's definition of matter is that matter is attraction and repulsion, gravity and electricity. Atoms are also recognized and affirmed. Gravity or attraction is commonly construed as holding the atoms together, and thus creating certain qualities of matter, such as weight and impenetrability. But if matter is wholly composed of attraction and repulsion, what function is discharged by the atoms? Does gravity compose the atoms themselves; or is the atom a separate entity on which gravity has no functional action? If it is a separate and independent entity, in the structure of which gravity has no concern, and over which it has no jurisdiction except to attract and repel them, is it not more accurate and scientific to postulate attraction and repulsion—gravity and electricity as qualities of matter, than to construe them as matter itself? It would certainly be more rational to construe them as qualities of matter, because a function would then be found for the atom, which is excluded by making attraction and repulsion the whole of matter. The old definition of matter so far as an impenetrable mystery is capable of definition, regarded attraction and repulsion as variable qualities of matter, and the attributes of a substance or substratum of qualities. Moreover, Mr. Poe predicates attraction as the force called gravity, and repulsion as

electricity. But it is an accepted scientific fact that electricity exerts an attractive, as well as a repulsive force, according as it is positive or negative. Does not this fact intimate that the fundamental definition of gravity and electricity is not properly discriminated, and as such is faulty? Is not the definition of matter by Mr. Poe really an assumption? If so, it looks as if the grand conclusion of a Pantheistic constitution of the universe based upon this definition of matter—exceptionable on more than one account—was also discredited. We are instructed by Eureka that when the reaction, produced by gravity—in order to the return of the atoms to the unity of the particle—is completed by the reconstruction of the one original sphere, that, then, attraction and repulsion cease—that matter ceases—that its reason of being ceasing, matter itself comes to an end—and that all becomes spirit—all becomes God. But if attraction and repulsion are not all of matter—if they are merely attributes of a substratum, the final consolidation must include the substratum; attraction and repulsion do not cease; they merely become latent; matter remains matter; and the basis of the transformation into deity is abolished.

(To be continued.)

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BY REV. SAMUEL SPAHR LAWS, A. M., M. D., D. D., LL. D.

Why should this be looked on as one of the most mysterious, unintelligible, and least practical doctrines of the Christian religion? This is a mistake. On the contrary, it is one of the most obviously intelligible, and intensely practical.

This paper, brief as it must be, proposes to make that appear, allowing for the limitation, with reasonable certainty; and that, too, by a strictly scientific method.

All the laws of nature, which are its doctrines, rest on inductions upon the facts of nature. All the doctrines of the Bible, wrought into the creeds of christendom, are presumed to be inductions on the facts—the verbal utterances—of the Bible. As Nature is and must be recognized as of ultimate and unquestioned authority in the one case, so the Bible must be in the other. Without this, neither secular science, nor Christian Theology can attain creditable standing. No one acquainted with the half-dozen radically distinct systems of philosophy which have gone to record, would dare assert that the objective validity of the so-called facts of nature has not been and is not now denied as stoutly as the most rampant infidelity, has ever repudiated the truthfulness and validity of the so-called facts of the Bible. The nihilism of philosophy is, in the domain of nature, the analogue of atheism in the domain of religion.

But induction, in all cases, leads only to inferential and contingent knowledge; and all inferential knowledge is faith knowledge. This is true even of the universality of the law of gravitation. Hence, unquestionably, the laws of nature as really

EUREKA, AN ESSAY ON THE MATERIAL AND SPIRITUAL UNIVERSE, BY EDGAR ALLEN POE.

BY REV. C. R. VAUGHAN, D. D.

(Continued from last issue.)

7. Another strange postulate of Eureka which embarrasses its conclusion, is not merely the difficulties of the particle itself, but the incompetent method of its discovery. The discovery of the particle is attributed to "intuition." "The reason flies at once to impartiality." That means that the reason at once perceives that the original character of matter was a "simplicity" in its extremest form. "Intuition," as commonly understood—the direct unmediated "seeing" of a thing would probably justify this statement. But Mr. Poe's definition of "intuition" would hardly vindicate its application to the discovery of the particle. He says, "We have attained a point where only intuition can aid us; but now let me recur to the idea which I have already suggested, as that alone which we can properly entertain of "intuition." It is but the conviction arising from those inductions and deductions, of which the processes are so shadowy as to escape our consciousness, elude our reason, or defy our capacity of expression. With this understanding, I now assert that an intuition altogether irresistible, although inexpressible, forces me to the conclusion that what God originally created—that that matter which, by dint of his volition, he first made from his Spirit, or from nihility, could have been nothing but matter in its utmost conceivable state of what?—of simplicity." Here again the discredited methods of hog and ram are employed to create the "intuition," which discovers the particle. Intuition, as well as the axiom, is a product of "inductions and deductions," which are, unfortunately, altogether hidden from consciousness. Hog and ram are vindicated again. Now this species of "intuition" is not competent to ascertain and certify the particle: it rests on methods already discredited and hidden from all investigation. Would it not be safer to return to the old common-sense construction of "intuition"? The human mind is a "seeing" instrument; it was made for the purpose of "seeing," and

endowed with this intuitive capacity. It is useless to attempt to pass back of this original fact in the constitution of the human intellect. When anything is discerned by this faculty, power, capability, or whatever you may call it, it certifies the knowledge gained. It is absurd to go back of the direct perception of an odor or a sound, and attempt to certify it by any induction or deduction. Intuition is yielded by the perception of the senses, and by the perception of the mind itself. This direct energy of intuitive perception is a native endowment of the human understanding, with its own function assigned to it, which cannot be substituted by any other instrument of discovery. It is by no means a dependency of an inductive or deductive process. On the contrary, intuition has to judge and certify every step in an induction, and every assertion in the propositions of a deductive syllogism before the conclusion can be drawn, as well as the conclusion when it is drawn. The relation between intuition and the inductive and deductive processes determines the precedent action of the former, in order to the possible action of the latter. It is absurd to make intuition the effect of a precedent induction or deduction. It is still more absurd to make intuition the datum of inductions or deductions, which are "so shadowy as to escape our consciousness, elude our reason, and defy our power of expression." It is clear that the basis for the formidable ultimate conclusion of Mr. Poe's speculation—the establishment of a Pantheistic constitution of the universe—is placed upon a foundation of clouds and mere emptiness. The theory breaks down at the outset. The particle is not discovered by any such impossible "intuition" as Mr. Poe predicates: The particle is discredited, not merely by a contradictory simplicity of structure—a monad with an atomic constitution—but by a method of verification which involves absolute absurdity. It is somewhat curious to find "intuition" based upon "inductions and deductions," however hidden from human discernment, after the elaborate repudiation of hog and ram in the earlier part of the speculation. Since the intuition, which discovers the particle, is based upon inductions and deductions, though hidden from human discovery, it would seem as if the repudiated methods of Bacon and Aristotle were profoundly concerned in the discovery of the particle after all. Since these two highways of human investigation are discarded as incompetent to the enter-

prise of solving the secret of the universe, and imagination set up in their place as an organ of discovery, it is not to be wondered at that the absolute necessities of the search should reinstate the discarded methods, as all-important at least, to the development of the "intuition," which alone could discover the particle. Imagination as an organ of discovery does not seem to be a success in this enterprise at least.

8. The development of the process of the diffusion and the return of the atoms is described in "Eureka" in the most impressive way, and vindicates the desire of the author, that his speculation should be regarded as a poem. The writer goes into an elaborate account of the enormous sizes and distances of the stellar creation, revealing the force of the diffusive influence in terms which soon begin to weary the human faculties in trying to keep up with the billions and trillions, and sextillions of miles, over which the distributing force carries the atoms of the broken-up particle. The rotary motion which is set up by the restricting power of gravitation, and, aided in the accomplishment of its purposes by the variations in the shape, size, and unequal distances between the atoms, soon begins the formation of the formed stars; and the most amazing pictures of the sublime scenery of the starry sphere are sketched by the imaginative artist. All that part of Eureka is well worthy of the attention of every lover of the beautiful and the sublime. It constitutes a poem of great merit. But it is only as a poem that it is entitled to praise. Its defects both as a consistent and trustworthy piece of reasoning, and especially in the moral conceptions which are developed by it, no such judgment of "Eureka" is possible. The following quotation will give some idea of the impressive delineation; although its full effect depends too completely on the full aggregation of its parts to be justified by a mere selection from them.

"Recurring, then, to a previous suggestion, let us understand the systems—let us understand each star with its attendant planets—as but a Titanic atom existing in space with precisely the same inclination for unity which characterized, in the beginning, the actual atoms after their irradiation throughout the universal sphere. As these original atoms rushed towards each other in generally straight lines, so let us conceive as at least generally rectilinear, the paths of the system-atoms toward

their respective centres of aggregation; and in this direct drawing together of the clusters themselves while undergoing consolidation, we have at length attained the great Now—the awful Present—the existing condition of the universe!” Of the still more awful future a not irrational analogy may guide us in framing an hypothesis. The equilibrium between the centripetal and centrifugal forces of each system being necessarily destroyed upon attainment of a certain proximity to the nucleus of the cluster to which it belongs, there must occur at once a chaotic, or seemingly chaotic precipitation of the moons upon the planets, of the planets upon the suns, and of the suns upon the nuclei; and the general result of this precipitation must be the gathering of the myriad now existing stars of the firmament into an almost infinitely less number of almost infinitely superior spheres. In being immeasurably fewer, the worlds of that day will be immeasurably greater than our own. Then, indeed, amid unfathomable abysses, will be glaring unimaginal suns. But all this will be merely a climatic magnificence foreboding the great end. Of this end the new genesis described can be but a very partial postponement. While undergoing consolidation the clusters themselves, with a speed prodigiously accumulative, have been rushing toward their own general center, and now, with a thousand-fold electric velocity, commensurate only with their material grandeur and with the spiritual passion of their appetite for oneness, the majestic remnant of stars flash at length into a common embrace. The inevitable catastrophe is at hand. “Eureka,” pages 141, 142.

What is that catastrophe? “In this view we are enabled to perceive matter as a means not as an end. Its purposes are thus seen to have been comprehended in its diffusion, and with the return into unity, these purposes cease. The absolutely consolidated globe of globes would be objectless. Therefore not for a moment could it continue to exist. Matter created for an end would unquestionably, on fulfilment of that end, be matter no longer.” The reversion into Godhood is now plainly in sight. So it is plainly said in “Eureka” itself: “Let us endeavor to comprehend that the final globe of globes will instantaneously disappear, and that God will remain all in all.” Mr. Poe’s anticipation of the future eternity is that a process of a creation of matter, its diffusion and return into unity, will be renewed

over and over again for all eternity—"a novel universe swelling into existence, and then subsiding into nothingness, at every throb of the heart divine." "And now this heart divine, what is it? It is our own!" "Eureka," pages 143, 145, 146. This last declaration caps the theory with inexpressible horrors.

9. Now what are the evidences, direct and collateral, on which this amazing result is predicated? The direct proofs are probably as completely presented in the description of the great forces at work, as they probably can be. All the proof stops short of certainty—the utmost of its reach is a probable conclusion. Certainly this conclusion is not only warrantable, but necessary, if the radical notion of Pantheism is conceded—the development of deity into the universe. The return of the particle into pure Godhood is the legitimate issue of such a postulate. But to present this theory as *per se* proof of Pantheism is another matter. The return to unity may possibly be true. That the return to unity is a return to Godhood is not proved by the return to unity. That the direct proof offered needs corroboration is confessed in the appeal of the theorist to certain merely collateral considerations.

10. It may be remarked that Mr. Poe's conclusion touching the evolution of the material universe into the Deity is fatally interrupted by the fact that the material universe, no matter how widely it may be conceived to extend, does not overtake or fix a limit on the immensity of God. The conclusion under review implies that the extension of God—so to speak—is co-ordinated with, and limited by the material universe, inasmuch as the "material and spiritual God" announced in the treatise, cannot consistently be supposed to overpass the material part of his constitution. Compared with infinite space, the material universe, no matter how widely extended, is but a point. The two dimensions are incommensurable. It has already been shown the finite is no measure of the infinite. It is plain, that in spite of the really powerful imagination of Mr. Poe, he felt the pressure of this difficulty; for he endeavors to meet it by the suggestion that many, nay! myriads of universes similar to the one which he has endeavored to analyze with such striking ability, each with its own special deity, are found within the great containing sphere. But it is vain to escape the notion of limitation involved in the finite, by multiplying the number

of universes, and returning to the old idea of Polytheism. Matter carries limitation. Many gods imply limitation on each particular god. The notion of the "infinite" spurns the fetters of any limitation, conceivable or inconceivable! The habitat of the One Only God—the dwelling-place of his immensity—extends infinitely beyond the manifestations of the universe, which as material, advance their limitations with every extension of their being. It is a vain attempt to fill the infinite of space by the indefinite multiplication of finite systems. It is vain to accomplish—it is vain to conceive that the immeasurable can be measured—that the illimitable can be overtaken by the limited, or filled by a substance *per se* finite. "Let me declare," says the author of "Eureka," "only that as an individual I myself feel impelled to fancy, without caring to call it more, that there does exist a limitless succession of universes, more or less similar to that of which we have cognizance—at the very least until the return of our own particular universe into unity. If such clusters of clusters exist, however—and they do—it is abundantly clear that having no part in our origin, they have no part in our laws. They neither attract us, nor we them. Their material—their spirit is not ours—is not that which obtains in any part of our universe. They could not impress our senses or our souls. Among them and us—considering all for the moment collectively—there are no influences in common. Each exists apart and independently, in the bosom of its proper and particular god." From this statement, it would seem that the views of Mr. Poe waver between Pantheism and Polytheism. No relation, however, between the two is stated; and the reader who is less gifted with the new organ of discovery than Mr. Poe is left hopelessly perplexed to determine whether the Pantheism which is to spring out of the evolution of one of these innumerable universes, is to be confined, by its own period to the development of its own particular god, leaving the rest of the myriads still under the administration of their own local divinities; or whether an ultimate coalition of all these universes will be followed by the merger of all these divinities into one supreme deity. Certainly the difficulty of evolving Pantheism is seriously increased by this establishment of many universes and many gods. The only way in which it can even be formulated in thought is to conceive the myriad

of universes precipitated or slowly drawn into a one vast aggregate of all the systems, and the separate absorption of the deities into one. The conception of the agglomeration of the systems is thinkable at least; the merger of the myriads of separate living infinite beings into one is wholly beyond possibility or belief. The theory of "Eureka," which was pronounced to be "true" seems to be very much mixed, to say the least of it.

11. Another collateral consideration is brought forward to sustain the Pantheistic theory, which is very strange. "No thinking being," says the author of "Eureka," "lives who at some luminous point of his life of thought has not felt himself lost amid the surges of futile efforts at understanding or believing, that anything exists greater than his own soul. The utter impossibility of any one's soul feeling itself inferior to another—the intense overwhelming dissatisfaction and rebellion at the thought—those, with the omniprevalent aspirations at perfection, are but the spiritual, coincident with the material struggles toward the original unity—are to my mind, at least, a species of proof far surpassing what man terms demonstration, that no one soul is inferior to another—that nothing is or can be superior to any one soul; that each soul is in part its own god—its own Creator—in a word, that God—the natural and spiritual God—now exists solely in the diffused matter and spirit of the universe; and that the regathering of this diffused matter and spirit will but be the re-construction of the purely spiritual and individual God."—"Eureka," pages 147-148. That is to say, human vanity grown morbid well-nigh to the degree of lunacy is proposed as a real but significant proof of Pantheism? The distinguished writer affirms that this feeling is universal among men; that it is characteristic of youth and as such appears in every young human being. We do not believe this to be true. On the contrary, it is seen in the experience of but very, very few; and those generally the more ambitious and aspiring of the race. Mr. Poe probably drew his conclusion from the recollection of the struggles of his own early and unsettled impulses, of his own extraordinary genius. This impatience to admit of any superiority is apt to grow morbid, and to become positively extravagant, where not brought under the restraints of good sense. That there are natural gradations in the mental furniture of men reaching over a vast scale of degrees, is too obvious

to be disputed. A prudent youth, looking to the likelihoods—nay! the certainties that he will have to establish and prove his place in the vast ascending and descending scale of human endowments—will soon see the prudence, to say nothing of the moral propriety, of not thinking of himself more highly than he ought to think. But when he interprets those unchastened impulses to mean that they point to a conclusion that he is a god, it is time his friends were looking after him. It may be very comfortable to a morbid sense of superiority for the half-crazed victim of his own vanity to construe himself the equal of Shakespeare, but the illimitable scale of inferiors to that supreme intellect of the race ought to bridle the notion that he is as much superior to Shakespeare as a veritable divinity is superior to a mere man. In this argument to prove Pantheism, there is a good deal more force to prove the dreamer to be a fool than to prove him to be a god.

12. A similar extraordinary testimony in favor of the thesis of "Eureka" is found in the supposed memories which have, at least since the time of the old Greek speculators, been laboriously construed as proofs of a pre-existent state. Occasionally some abnormal condition of the mind has led an individual here and there to indulge the same fancy. A distinguished judge of the Irish bench has been known to commit himself, not to a positive belief in this extraordinary notion, but to a respectful mention of the mental suggestion of what are called "reminiscences," which are unwarrantably so denominated. These "reminiscences" are rationally accounted for, not as evidences of a pre-existent state of personal being, but as fragments of waking or sleeping dreams, or as singular suggestions of past reveries which have left broken parts of a forgotten train of musing, or as the incoherent remnants of processes of fancies in morbid, or diseased, or half-crazed, or hysterical, or overstrained minds. They are the flotsam and jetsam of intellects in some abnormal condition. The number of those in whose experience such phenomena appear are relatively to the vast preponderance of minds in which no such developments are ever seen—very few. Very, very few men have ever had any serious or abiding convictions of having pre-existed before they appeared in the present life. Plato's theory was merely that of a professional philosopher, contrived to make his philosophy

seem to be equal to any demand of the inquisitive student. Such visionary fancies are only existent in minds disturbed by abnormal conditions, or in the daring imaginations of poets, who delight in excursions into the regions of fancy; but can command no serious consideration, except, it may be, to the poetical beauty which may possibly have been mingled with them. Assuredly there is nothing definite in these so-called memories or reminiscences which entitle them to be employed in any attempt to unriddle the secret of the "sorrowful star," and its fellows of the stellar expanses. These whimsical so-called memories of a past which have left no traces, pass, even within the narrow limits which they occupy, in a broken procession, leaving mere fragments of shadowy forms in reach of consciousness. They are utterly useless in the investigation of the noble subject which has engaged the splendid genius of the author of "Eureka." They are unworthy to be placed among the data of the inquiring intellect as reliable evidence. Is no reliance to be placed on the laws of belief impressed upon the human understanding? Is none to be placed on the attributes of God, the being who is conceived by the human faculties under the teaching of the Holy Scriptures, in order to realize the very highest conception of all that is excellent? Pantheism in its morbid implications is positively horrible! It is worse than Atheism—intellectually as foolish—morally, a thousandfold worse.

13. Yet another implied, and altogether mistaken consideration is cited as confirmatory of the Pantheistic theory. The identification of ourselves with God is used to explain and justify the existence of evil. "In this view," says the writer, "and in this view alone, we comprehend the riddles of Divine injustice, of inexorable fate. In this view alone the existence of evil becomes intelligible; but in this view it becomes more—it becomes endurable. Our souls no longer rebel at a sorrow which we ourselves have imposed upon ourselves, in furtherance of our own purposes, with a view—if even with a futile view—to the extension of our own joy." From this statement, the evil spoken of seems to be limited to physical or natural evil—to suffering and sorrow. Moral evil is ignored! This is one of the most remarkable deficiencies of this astonishing speculation. What right has any adventurer in this awful field of thought to

eliminate the most obtrusive and appalling fact in the phenomena of human life—of actual and universal human history? All men are breakers of moral law! All men who ever lived in this world have been transgressors of that law! Injustice, unkindness, selfishness, lawlessness in ten thousand forms—cruelty, violence, murder, uncleanness, disregard of rights, vice in countless forms, war, tyranny, oppression, utter ungodliness—have and do everywhere prevail! Rape, savage brutality, fraud, lies, lechery, stealing, slander and deceitfulness are spread immeasurably! Civil government with its stern repressions, the gallows and its penitentiaries, its chain-gangs and its police, is everywhere indispensable in order even to that imperfect security which it is alone capable of accomplishing! Moral evil! The hearts and minds of the human race, over all the planet, have been straining and breaking over the awful mystery ever since the evil began its career! It is absolutely appalling, even when men alone are considered as the actors in the scene! But, “the heart divine is our own,” and the converse of the proposition is not to be evaded. Our own is the heart divine! The soul shudders at the thought! The human heart, judged by its issues, is a fountain of wickedness, and Pantheism assures us that “the heart divine is our own!” Nay, more! Pantheism makes all things God; it makes God an active agent in all the unimaginable wickedness of human history! Nay, as all that is, is God—as he is the only actor—as man is but the particular development of God, he, the sinless and Holy One, is charged with the whole inconceivable record of moral evil in the progress of the world from its beginning! God is often sent to the penitentiary! He is often hanged for his crimes! He is guilty of every brutality and of every crime ever committed in the long history of a planet, not more conspicuously the “sorrowful star” than it is the “criminal star!” Yet all its abominations are charged by Pantheism upon God! Was there ever a more desperate outcome of any so-called philosophy than that carried by the theories of Pantheism, and discharged upon the venerable name of the most Venerable Being in the universe! The horrible notion is not only a moral, but a logical and intrinsic “Impossibility”! The existence of physical evil is mistakenly construed as the voluntary imposition of the submerged and undeveloped Deity who is the constitutive substance or substratum

of the human soul. Moral evil is the breach of the eternal law of right! All sin is the violation of law. It is logically incompetent to any being who is not under law. It is therefore impossible to God, in the nature of things. The moral law is the transcript of the nature of God. The relation between the moral law and the nature of God is the relation between a type and its impression on the paper. The only regulating rule conceivable, as applied to the Supreme Lord, is framed by the qualities of his own nature. There is no higher authority to impose a law upon him. He is therefore not under law. He is therefore not only morally, but logically and intrinsically incapable of sin. His nature makes it impossible for him to do wrong. As a breach of law, sin is only possible to a creature who is under law. Moral law is necessarily the expression of moral excellence in its supreme and perfect degree. The moral evil which has disgraced and cursed the world, is the sole datum of the energies of a moral and responsible creature: it can originate in no other way. Physical evil in all its multiplied varieties is the determination of the penalties of that high moral law. Those penalties are intrinsic in the law; they are not mere conventional appointments by a sovereign authority. Obedience to moral law will *per se* determine good results; breach of moral law will necessarily determine evil results, both in moral deterioration and in suffering. It is therefore an incompetent explanation to assert that physical evil is the voluntary infliction of self-torture by the incorporate Deity of the universe, with a view to the increase of his—which is also our own joy." Nothing is more certain than that the particular embodiments of the Godhood, called "men," would promptly banish all traces of physical evil, if they could! "Eureka" contributes nothing to the solution of the pathetic problem of human suffering and sorrow. Nor does the poetic or sentimental side of Pantheism in any, even the least degree, relieve the horrors of its moral implications. It talks in many a sweet and beautiful phrase of the loveliness of nature as the expression of the beauty of the underlying Deity. It avows its sentimental worship of the boulder covered with the trumpet-flower and the fern, the sun-tinted landscapes and sea views, the blue vaulted sky radiant with sunlight, and sparkling at night with the splendor of the moon and the stellar fires, as the true and the

only true worship of the incorporate Deity. But all this sentiment fades into the pallor of something more terrible than death, when the moral aspects of the doctrine are brought into view. All the asserted profundity of the philosophical and poetic disquisitions which are paraded as the highest expressions of the spirit of religion and noble worship, are discounted as mere folly and self-delusion, offered to a being so utterly scandalous and disreputable on the moral side! No poetic or sentimental expressions can hide the horror of the God of the Pantheist!

14. Mr. Poe closes his remarkable speculation in the following words: "I have spoken of memories that haunt us during our youth. They sometimes pursue us even in our manhood; assume gradually less and less indefinite shapes: now and then speak to us with low voices, saying, 'There was an epoch in the night of time, when a still-existent Being existed—one of an absolutely infinite number of similar beings that people the absolutely infinite domains of the absolutely infinite space. It was not, and is not, in the power of this Being, any more than it is in your own, to extend by actual increase the joy of his existence; but just as it is in your power to expand or to concentrate your pleasures (the absolute amount of happiness remaining always the same), so did and does a similar capability appertain to this Divine Being, who thus passes his eternity in perpetual variation of concentrated self, and almost infinite self-diffusion. What you call the universe is but his present expansive existence. He now feels his life through an infinity of imperfect pleasures, the partial and pain—entangled pleasures of those inconceivably numerous things which you designate as his creatures, but which are really but infinite individualizations of himself. All these creatures—all—those which you term animate as well as those to whom you deny life, for no better reason than that you do not behold it in operation; all these creatures have in a greater or less degree, a capacity for pleasure and for pain; but the general sum of their sensations is precisely that amount of happiness which appertains by right to the Divine Being when concentrated within himself. These creatures are all, too, more or less conscious intelligences: conscious, first, of a proper identity; conscious, secondly, and by faint indeterminate glimpses, of an identity with the Divine Being of whom we

speak; of an identity with God. Of the two classes of consciousness, fancy that the former will grow weaker, the latter stronger during the long succession of ages which elapse before these myriads of individual intelligences become blended, when the bright stars become blended into one. Think that the sense of individual identity will be gradually merged in the general consciousness—that man, for example, ceasing imperceptibly to feel himself man, will at length attain that awfully triumphant epoch when he shall recognize his existence as that of Jehovah. In the mean time, bear in mind that all is life—life—life within life, the less within the greater, and all within the Spirit Divine.’”—“Eureka,” pages 148-150.

Thus this strange struggle with the mysteries of this strange world comes to its close. It is a failure—not such a failure as it anticipates of itself in the outset. “What I here propound is true; therefore it cannot die.” But a failure so pathetic amid its splendid displays of misguided genius, as to awaken infinite pity for the Great, not less than for the Small of the lost race of the “Sorrowful Star.” Pantheism wraps the mystery in a deeper gloom. It makes the repetition of the scenes of earth to be eternal! It involves God as well as his particular developments in the creature in a sad mixture of imperfect pleasures and pains. It dooms God and man alike to the dull monotony of incessant and unsatisfactory changes. It spreads the pathetic woe of the sorrowful star over all possible being without hope of relief! What a contrast with the prospects of glory, honour, and a blest immortality to which the finger of the Nazarene pointed!