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ARTICLE I.

PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN ECONOMY.

The history of the Christian world shows that there has been a wide-spread sensibility, in the conscience of Christians, to the sin of indulgence in superfluities. This sensibility has sometimes shown itself in a morbid, and sometimes in a blind, undistinguishing way. Among the mendicant and some of the monastic orders of the Romish communion, poverty and simplicity of life formed a part of the vows and rules, however little part they may have had in their practice. Among the Churches of the Reformation, we find the Mennonites forbidding, not only all luxuries of dress, equipage and furniture, but even the fine arts and liberal education. The denomination of Quakers, as is well known, practised a similar sobriety. A part of the original discipline of the Methodists was to enforce a strict renunciation of all the pomps and vanities of the world. These facts indicate that the conscience of the Christian world has had an extensive feeling of the obligation to moderation and self-denial in the use of wealth, though they may prove that this feeling has not been very well defined nor intelligent.

Several things in the present state of the Church induce the belief that there is a strong demand for the discussion and enforcement of the true principles of Christian economy at this day. These circumstances are the great increase of material wealth, and consequently of luxuries, in

with the thought, "that whatever ties of affection are broken by death, are taken from the enjoyments of time to enrich the prospect of eternity."

ARTICLE III.

THE DOCTRINE OF FUTURE PUNISHMENT.—NO. 1.

The question of the existence of a state of punishment in the world to come, is important beyond all others, whatever theory may be adopted concerning it. If the affirmative be true, and the statements of the Bible are at all reliable, the grandeur of the subject, in its bearings upon the destinies of man, admits of no dispute. If the negative be allowed, and it should be established by irresistible evidence that no such state existed, still the revolutions such a discovery would create in all the relations of society, in the force of the public laws of the great commonwealth of nations, and in the peace and prosperity of society at large, would still give most extraordinary interest to the great truth. Whatever supposition, then, is made about the substance of the great truth, the importance of it is undeniable.

It would seem that a doctrine of such transcendent importance would attract the most eager attention of all men. But it is a dangerous logic to reason from the probabilities of propriety to the actual developments of human experience. So far from this subject attracting the notice of men, there is none within the wide range of the human mind which is met by such an universal and virulent current of prejudice. With the exception of a few bold and speculative men, who approach the subject as a lawyer examines a case, not to discover the truth, but to find a plausible argument on either side, as the case may be, the large majority of men eagerly and laboriously shun even a glimpse of the awful issue. The very mention of it is intolerable, and a hint is sufficient to shut the whole mind against every approach of the question, under the influence of a prejudice stronger by far than any other prejudice upon

any other subject. The essence of every other prejudice against any other feature of the revelation of God, is hatred to this great and terrible disclosure. Men would be willing cheerfully to admit every doctrine of the Bible, if that book contradicted the supposition of future punishment. A thousand objections are raised against this and the other doctrine of the gospel, but every one of them, when resolved into their last analysis, display the doctrine of divine wrath as the seminal principle that produced it. There would be no more objections heard to the doctrine of predestination, if men were taught to believe a universal decree of salvation to all. Men would cheerfully agree to any theory of the Trinity, or any view of human depravity, if taught to allow that all men, however vile, should finally rejoice in the vision of God, however the Godhead might subsist. Aversion to this terrible proclamation of the gospel of Jesus Christ, has produced and given energy to every separate attack upon every distinct feature of the Christian system. On the supposition that the Bible contains the doctrines of universalism, the intense and multiplied opposition it has encountered, is the most mysterious of all mysteries. If men were taught to believe that they should finally be saved any how, whatever might be the moral character of their conduct, it is impossible to conceive a theory more attractive to the heart of all men, in every rank and condition, of every age and every quality. It would allow the amplest indulgence of every desire of the heart, unchecked by the fear of retribution, and it would enliven the loud revel of guilt with the assurance of a happy immortality. If the revelation of God then actually teaches the doctrines of universalism, how is it possible to conceive that it should have excited such intense and protracted opposition? The persecutions of the Church—the flames rising from a thousand stakes, and the groans echoing from a thousand dungeons, are alone sufficient to refute every defence of universalism bottomed on the word of God. It is no answer to the argument to adduce the resistance to universalism, since it has been actually taught, because our opposition has been altogether created on the theory that it was a false system. It has been resisted simply because it was supposed to be a deadly and destructive heresy. But why it should be resisted

when received as true upon the authority of a record admitted to be authoritative, certainly surpasses all human ingenuity to explain.

The sources of this tremendous prejudice against the doctrine of future punishment, are as numerous and inexhaustible, as the force of the hostility itself is powerful and pervading. Among these springs of the evil, we may notice some that are special and limited in their operation; but there is one which universally exists and operates in every individual case. This general source of the evil under discussion is the universal consciousness of *guilt*. The universal dread with which men contemplate the supposition of a future state of punishment, can only be explained by the theory, that if the doctrine is true, each man feels that he is exposed to it. Why should a man dread the fact, unless he felt the consciousness that if it were true, he is in some way in peril? It is absolutely impossible to account for such a dread and opposition to the doctrine, except upon the supposition of a consciousness of guilt pervading the universal conscience of the race of man. This is the grand source of prejudice to the doctrine of the gospel on this awful subject. There is something in man that hints in a mysterious and most significant way that he has sinned; that sin deserves to be punished; and that a just God would be bound to give it its deserts. This is the true explanation which rises from the honest and keen analysis of those blind and indeterminate impulses which spring from the consideration of a future retribution by a carnal understanding.

But there are various minor sources of this prejudice. Narrow and imperfect views of the nature and sanctity of moral law, and the real evil of sin, are fruitful sources of the skeptical prejudice we have just noticed. If such an uneducated or blinded moral sense is joined with a heart and temper of peculiar amiability and sensibility to the pain of physical suffering, it is almost impossible to keep such an individual from rejecting the doctrine of future punishment. There are certain vices which pre-eminently prepare the mind for the reception of universalism, particularly the vices of sensuality. Wherever licentiousness or high living and great gayety and dissipation prevail in a community, there you will find the way prepared for these

deadly heresies. There are certain books that help the result. There is a tendency in fictitious reading, in novels and plays, to produce the same effect. The same principle pervades all these different causes and gives its power for evil to them all. Whatever tends to soften and effeminate the mind—to throw it into a soft and luxurious temper, and at the same time to stupify its moral perceptions, will intensify the natural hostility of the heart to the stern and awful severity of the holy and inexorable law of Jehovah. Men of active and speculative minds, especially when the natural skepticism of their minds, their aversion to receive any thing except on overwhelming evidence, is strengthened by any particular vice or pride of opinion, or some similar stimulant, are all greatly exposed to the rejection of the doctrine of punishment. Of the same general character is the cause why so many of the prominent literary men of modern times are infected with the same destructive error. The modern literature of both England and America, and especially of Germany and France, abounds in the tinctures of this species of infidelity. In almost every composition of the great lights of the modern empire of Britain, we may detect open insinuations or statements directly contradictory to, or inconsistent with, the doctrines of divine revelation. Poetry shudders at the horrors of a hell; criticism hints a defect in the argument to prove it; social reform is indignant in its melting charity for the filthy and ghastly inmates of the dens of a great city, that any should be so brutally barbarous as to consign them to a worse perdition in eternity. While the more ambitious speculators in the deeps of moral science harshly determine all such terrors to be superstitious and absurd. The reason of all this heretical tincture of literature is obvious. The pursuit of letters has a tendency to refine and elevate the mind, to render it sensible to the bitterness of human misery; but it has no accompanying effect of sufficient power to open the eyes of the understanding upon the true nature of sin and the real deserts of human guilt; consequently the mind thus refined and purified in its perceptions by literary pursuits, and yet unblessed by the illuminating grace of the Holy Spirit, can see nothing but such a discrepancy between the idea of divine perfection and the infliction of such terrible and infinite pangs as to

render it impossible to credit both at the same time. One is to be rejected, and as the goodness of God is past dispute, the doctrine of future punishment is promptly rejected as inconsistent with the perfection of the divine benevolence.

But the simple, undeniable truth is this, that from whatever sources this opposition of feeling may arise to the doctrine of retribution, the prejudice is hurtful and ought to be resisted. Admitting the truth of universal salvation, it is certainly discreditable to hold the truth simply on a prejudice. The prejudice necessarily involves a certain degree of reflection upon the candor and honor of the inquirer. But on the supposition of the falsity of this theory and the truth of a coming retribution, the absurdity and danger of a prejudice which deliberately shuts out all approaches of warning and then secures the damnation of the soul by securing its stupid insensibility to what it admits to be true, is perfectly transparent.

The inference from all this is, that we should each one for himself begin firmly to repress every inclination of our dislike to the doctrine to lead us to avoid it. We are bound by an infinitely holy and powerful obligation to seek and receive the truth on this subject, let the consequences be what they may. This obligation springs from the authority of truth, and is measured by the immensity of the interests staked on the issue. We are under an infinite obligation to receive every truth presented to our understandings; and there is a new obligation which is susceptible of indefinite increase, arising from the degree in which our welfare may be concerned in its reception or rejection. The innocence of error is a terrible folly. There are degrees of culpability in its indulgence, it is true; some may be wilfully wrong and others may be wrong by mistake; but in either case the consequences of the error are not avoided. These consequences will be more terrible in case of voluntary and intelligent error; but the mere fact of honesty in a mistake will not stop the awful ruin that it may attract. A man may honestly mistake arsenic for a less hurtful medicine, but the fact of his honestly making a mistake will not stay the ravages of the poison upon his life. Even so it is with the doctrine of a future retribution. If one honestly suffers a delusion to prey upon his

mind in relation to it, and under the influence of this delusion fail to make the necessary preparation to escape it, he will not therefore escape in reality. If the doctrine be false, then it makes but little difference, so far as eternity is concerned, whether a man is deluded or not, or on what side of the question he may be deluded. But if the doctrine be true, then delusion about it will not make it untrue. Nothing but a correct apprehension of it can be at all serviceable in securing a full salvation from its terrors. An error on this awful subject will be productive of inexpressible calamity, on the supposition that the common doctrine is true. If that doctrine be false, then so far as relates to the affairs of eternity, an error in believing it to be true will not make it true, and cannot be productive of any destructive effect. On either supposition then, the advantage is altogether on the side of those who adhere to the affirmative division of the issue. We would therefore solicit a strong effort on the part of our readers to give as candid and impartial a consideration to the evidence on the subject as they can possibly command. Let us remember that error is in no sense innocent, and that it is ruinous precisely in proportion to the importance of the subject about which it is mistaken. If by the innocence of error we mean the moral guilt or the contrary involved in it, the influence of the will determines at once the existence and degree of that guilt: it will be wrong in proportion to the degree of wilfulness involved in it. If it means the hurtfulness of the error on the happiness of man, it is obvious that no amount of honesty, in a mistake about it, will avail to nullify the calamity, and that nothing but an apprehension naturally correct, if not honestly entertained, can possibly give even a chance of escape. Let us then remember the dishonesty and evil of all prejudice and the ease with which hatred to any doctrine will prepare the mind to receive its opposite. Let us also reflect that prejudice in the human mind acts against this doctrine with a force with which it acts on no other subject whatever, in the whole range of human inquiry. Let us remember how dreadfully this striking fact exposes us to a rejection of the testimony of God, and let us make one honest and determined effort to give an impartial hearing to the evidence. It will assist us greatly in suppressing the guilty resistance

of our fears to this proposal, if we will dwell for an instant on the tremendous force with which our happiness is involved. If the doctrine is false, surely it will be no irreparable loss to give a candid and intelligent examination to the evidence that establishes its falsity. But if it be true, no language can describe the real worth of an argument that will demonstrate that truth, and explode those delusions about it, by which so many would have been hopelessly exposed to its penalties.

We begin, then, with an examination of the most distant presumptions that incline towards a settlement of the question, intending to pursue the inquiry through the various ascending grades of analogy by which the truth of this great doctrine is reduced to a moral certainty. But we would premise at the outset that this is a question of *fact* simply, which is only susceptible of absolute determination by the testimony of a competent witness; or, in other words, that the final decision of it will have to be referred to the decision of the word of God. Questions of fact, as distinguished from other forms of truth, are only susceptible of proof by the concurrence of other facts, composing a circumstantial evidence, or by the testimony of a competent witness. For example, we may prove that man is rendered unhappy in this world by certain causes attached to his moral nature, and that these causes will just as surely make him wretched in eternity as they have done in time. This single argument would settle the question, if it were ascertained that *no change* would be effected in the operation of those causes. But *whether these changes will be made then or not*, is a simple question of *fact*, which can only be determined by testimony from within the veil—by a revelation from God, or some other competent witness. But as these changes can only be effected by God, and as none can tell what God *will do* until he declares his *determination*, it follows that God alone can be a competent witness in this great cause. Thus our assertion is proved, that absolute demonstration on the subject is only attainable through a revelation from God.

But while this is true, while an absolute certainty is only attainable by a revelation from God, there is an amount of *significance* in the analogies and presumptions created by

the facts of human character and human life, which places the question on a position just short of absolute demonstration. It places it in such a position that nothing short of a revelation from God could unsettle the tremendous presumption it creates for the reality of such a state in the future. With these preliminary remarks, designed to set forth distinctly the true state of the question, we are now ready to enter upon the inquiry :

1. In the first place, the consciousness of every individual member of the human family creates a presumption of very striking significance. If there is any fact in human experience susceptible of absolute demonstration, it is that there is misery now existing in the world. The same testimony which proves that there is misery at all, proves that it is *universal*—that is, that all men are more or less unhappy, and also that it is *constant*—that is, that it pervades the whole human life from the beginning to the close of it. This fact is absolutely unsusceptible of dispute. Now let us take the widest latitude in its application to the subject—let us extinguish the existence or personality of God—let us admit the truth of the theories of Atheism or Pantheism—let us allow that men are irresponsible to any distinct law or lawgiver. When this admission is made, it does not disturb the unquestioned and unquestionable fact of the existence of misery among all men and in all ages. What is the presumption created in this position of the argument? It is simply this, that as we are miserable now, it is likely we shall be so hereafter, on the supposition of our existence in a future state; and the presumption from our existence now is, that we shall be in existence then. It is likely that the same causes that brought us into existence, and the same that now render us unhappy, will continue us both existent and miserable. Such is the unquestionable presumption created in this aspect of the question—an aspect based on the denial of a God, and therefore the most favorable to the theory of universalism that can possibly be taken from this distant view of the whole subject. But it may be objected that while man is unquestionably unhappy in the present state, it is also undeniable that there is much of pleasure mingled in his cup, and therefore a presumption from this pleasure, that he will be *happy in eternity*, is just as allowable as a

presumption from his misery in time, that he will be *miserable in eternity*. The facts do not conflict with each other, nor do the inferences from the facts destroy each other. If we attempt to combine them and draw a graduated inference from both, we shall reach a conclusion equally fatal to the theories of universalism as the actual demonstration of punishment would be; for the graduated inference alluded to, could only be that man would be partly miserable and partly happy in eternity, as he is here. This conclusion, however, would be only more satisfactory to the heart of man than an actual state of unmitigated misery, inasmuch as it would contain a *less degree* of terror to his fears: but it would by no means give any rational consolation to his hopes. It would only prove that future misery would be *less in degree* than had been anticipated; but it would *admit the existence of some degree* of punishment. Taking, then, the sum of the utterances of nature, we are still forced sternly back on the unquestionable presumption of future misery.

But it is not allowable for us to strike a general conclusion from two inferences, as distinct from each other as any two facts in the universe. It is not allowable for us to *amalgamate* them, because we cannot *reconcile* them. Admitting that the inference from the happiness of man in time to his happiness in eternity, to be perfectly legitimate, this inference does not *disturb the independent inference of his misery hereafter from his misery in time*. Both stand erect in their places. Both are intelligible in the hints which they give. We are not perplexed to know what they say, but only to reconcile the substance of their statements. This inability to combine the utterances of nature into one consistent whole, only proves more clearly the assertion that this question is only susceptible of definite determination by a revelation from God. Let it be remembered that our present argument is merely on the *presumptions* in the case, and that one fact and its legitimate inferences are not disturbed at all by any other fact and its peculiar logical expatiations. Man is miserable now, and the presumption remains undisturbed that he will be miserable hereafter. Combine this inference with the inference from his present pleasures, and we still have a presumption of a *lower degree* of misery than is promised by the

single inference from his present woes. The sum of the *two then adds strength to the presumption* of future misery. Which ever way, then, we take it, the argument is impregnable.*

But let us advance another step and introduce a new element into the question. Let us admit that there is a God, and the distant presumption just brought into view expands rapidly in size and force. On the supposition that there is an individual or personal God, crowned with the perfections that necessarily pertain to every correct idea of the divinity, who is the creator of the world and its inhabitants, it follows inevitably that he must be deeply concerned in the career and conduct of his works; for he must have had some design in creating the world, and it is an offence to all our conceptions of wisdom to imagine the indulgence of a great aim, worthy of God himself, and the arrangement of the means to secure it, and then the indifference of a perfect indifference on the part of the creator as to whether his arrangements worked effectively to the attainment of his end. *All the moral attributes* of God require the supposition that he should be concerned in the fates and fortunes of the works of his hands, and particularly in the career of the intelligent and responsible portion of his creation. If, therefore, God is really concerned in the attainment of his ends and in the welfare of his works, there is at once created a powerful presumption that any departure of those works from the order he has ordained for them, would be followed by some signal expression of his displeasure. The actual facts as we see them displayed, give proportionable force to this presumption. If the sun should refuse to shine, or the rain to fall, or the grain to grow, or the earth to put on her garments of material beauty, it would be absolutely impossible that barrenness, desolation and darkness, should not shroud the world in

*The writer would acknowledge his indebtedness for the hint of the first part of the presumptive argument in the text, to the noble lecture of Dr. Robert Breckinridge, on the Internal Evidences of Christianity, recently published as one of the Virginia University Lectures, on the general subject of the Christian Evidences. He is conscious of indebtedness to no other, or in any other portion of the article, as the general argument from the analogies of nature cannot now be ascribed to any one writer. Particular views of those analogies will necessarily occur to different minds, for which their authors are entitled to be credited; but the general argument has long been the property of every speculator in the metaphysics of natural religion.

terror and despair. But let us again introduce a new element into the materials of our judgment. Let us introduce the idea of human responsibility. That man is responsible, is one of those simple dictates of consciousness that no man who knows what he means can possibly deny with honesty. Even if we deny the existence of a God, to whom man is responsible, that denial would only render the responsibility of man an *anomaly* in his nature, but it would not destroy the *fact* of his responsibility. Now since man is responsible, and since responsibility implies perfect freedom of action, it follows inevitably that God will be as much more concerned in the nullification of his will by the deliberate and voluntary action of those who have intelligence to understand and a conscience to enforce his authority, than he would be concerned in the blind disorder of the mere material creation, by as much as there is more of wickedness and insult in the one rebellion than in the other.

From this view of the subject we ascend to this conclusion, that if God is at all concerned in the conduct of man, the presumption is prodigiously strengthened, that he will give some expression of his displeasure, no matter what or how long that expression may be, whenever the conduct of man is offensive towards him. Here, then, is a separate question, whether God is really concerned in the conduct of men, and if so, to what extent? and just in proportion to the strength with which it can be shown that he is, and that he is *greatly* concerned in it, will be the strength added to the presumption growing out of that doctrine. We may here take the united testimony of reason and scripture to the doctrine of the intimacy of the divine concern in the affairs of men. But this will be done hereafter in its appropriate place. If it can be shown from any source that God does give expression to his hatred of sin in time, it will afford a most powerful presumption that he will do it in eternity. *The discovery of any penal infliction for sin takes the whole controversy from the ground of fact, and makes it simply a question of duration, degree and locality.*

But there is another presumption entirely distinct from the principles on which the presumptions already explained have been deduced. We allude to the overwhelming

uniformity of the creeds of all nations and ages in the inculcation of this great doctrine. Jews, Heathen, Pagans of every type, Christians of every shade of difference in opinions, Mohammedans, Deists, Infidels of various types, and even large majorities of the Universalist body itself, have allowed the doctrine of some kind of punishment to some degrees of duration. For let it be noticed here, that the question is simply as to the *fact* of a future punishment, not as to its *nature* or its *duration*. Even among professed universalists, the absolute denial of all punishment in the future is by no means universal. It was not admitted at all by the earlier adherents of that doctrine, and is at the present time rapidly declining in the opinions of modern Universalists. Now how is it possible to explain this universal and overwhelming admission of a doctrine that all would so eagerly deny if they could, except on the supposition of its truth? It is true, mere numbers do not prove or disprove the truth of any doctrine; but nevertheless it is equally unquestionable that there is a species of presumption that the more minds are employed in the contemplation of a subject and agreed in one uniform representation of it, the more likely it is that their representation is correct. This presumption grows rapidly in strength as you increase the numbers agreeing, and reduce the number of the dissentients, until when we conceive of an agreement so absolutely overwhelming, bearing a proportion of *ten thousand to one* to the dissentients, the presumption becomes so indescribably overwhelming as to amount actually to a moral certainty of the correctness of the views so universally taken in every age of the world, and by every peculiarity of temperament, age, education, degrees of civilization and fundamental differences on other subjects. At all events, the presumption is so powerful for the truth, as to render it unsusceptible of any rational and just explanation on the contrary supposition.

But, again: there is another and distinct ground of presumption in favor of the truth of the affirmative of this great issue. That *truth* is more valuable than *error*; is one of those plain dictates of reason and experience which the most hardy sceptic would hesitate to question. The circumstances in which it would be even temporarily best for an individual, and still more a community at large, to

believe what is false and to do what is wrong, are always adventitious and transitory. Even when a temporary advantage might be gained by the adoption of error, the long run will show that adherence to the truth, even at a temporary loss would have been best in the end. The exceptions to the rule are unfrequent in occurrence and delusive when they occur; the general rule is absolute and unsusceptible of dispute. Let us take this rule and watch the nature of the presumption it will raise on the question under discussion. Let us apply it to *individual interests*. We affirm that upon the admission of the truth of Universalism, the believer in the doctrine of future punishment has the advantage of the Universalist. For allowing the truth of the universalist creed, both are equally safe, while the rejector of the truth has a reversion in his favor, if any discredit should be thrown upon the truth. This is a real advantage. A military commander, on going into action, always counts it a capital advantage to have room for retreat in case of disaster; and the possession of such an advantage is extremely valuable, although victory may never require him to use it. It becomes more and more valuable as you withdraw the admission of the truth of universalism, and allow it to be susceptible of dispute, until on the admission of any doubt of any real force, the advantage of the believer in future punishment is overwhelming. If universalism be true, then both are equally safe; but if it be doubtful, the rejector of it is safest; and if it be false, the universalist has all the disadvantage heaped upon his head. On whatever supposition, then, as to the substance of the doctrine, the advantage is *decisively and permanently with the believer in a future state of punishment*. Now allowing universalism to be true, when before did it happen that *error was more valuable than truth*, and that it was to the true and permanent interest of man to possess his mind with a lie?

The case grows prodigiously in strength when the great principle of the superior value of the truth is applied to *society at large*. There is no principle in politics more clearly established than the necessity of a responsibility to a higher power to give force to human law, and to restrain the excesses of human passions. So completely was the necessity of the existence of a God to the welfare of so-

ciety proven by the event of the first French Revolution, that Robespierre, the great leader in those calamitous events, declared that if there was no God in fact, it would be necessary to invent one. But the existence of God is only valuable to human government on the supposition that he is the *punisher of crime*. If the existence of God be admitted, and he is represented as only a rewarder of all men indiscriminately, irrespective of their character, *his existence* would be a *disadvantage* to all organized society. For so far from being a terror to evil-doers, the prospect of final bliss, under any circumstances, would give a most powerful stimulant to the unrestrained indulgence of every passion and every vice. Let the doctrines of universalism prevail and society is dissolved; all law must be abandoned; the whole civil arrangements of human life would be instantaneously revolutionized. Let the seducer be told that his spirit will wing its flight heavenward from the scene where the hand of human justice avenges the wrongs of an injured family, and who can estimate the multiplication of the shrieks and cries of violated innocence that would ensue? Let a premium of eternal bliss be paid upon cheating and fraud, upon murder and rapacity, and this world would rival hell in the ripeness of its atrocities within the compass of one revolving moon. Now let us admit universalism to be true, and we have the *portentous anomaly of a great truth, not only incompatible* with the interests of society, but the *direct producer* of crimes and calamities of unexampled bitterness and horror. We have the equally unaccountable anomaly of a *tremendous fraud necessary* to the providential government of Jehovah, and of the entire interest of society and of every individual in society, whether rights of person or property; and the whole machinery of civil government indissolubly bound to the largest lie ever imposed upon the credulity of mankind. Nay, more, it will become necessary for the very existence of human society to train the teachers of religion to the most consummate perfection in the arts of fraud, and to form a body guard of religious scoundrels, skilled in every department of the most vigorous and versatile lying to maintain the delusions necessary to the maintenance of every right and comfort of associated life. If there be any presumption of the truth of an idea so absolutely essential

to all the rights and happiness of mankind, or if there be any force in the superiority of the value of truth to error, then the presumption growing out of the great facts just stated, amounts again to a moral certainty of the truth of future punishment.

But this is not all. We now approach to the consideration of strict analogies, the force of which mounts higher than a mere presumption. There can be no doubt of the existence of sin; nor can there be any more doubt that sin is the parent of suffering. The daily events of life are perpetually uttering commentaries on the text, *The way of the transgressor is hard*. Sin is the want of conformity unto, or transgression of, the law of God. This grand principle of connection between a neglect or a violation of the laws of God, pervades every department of human nature. It is as true of sins of omission as it is of sins of commission. If a man overstrain any of his muscular energies, he must suffer pain in consequence of it. If he does what is wrong, he must suffer the tortures of conscience. If he abuse the powers of his mind, he must sink into imbecility or flame into madness. Or if he omit to take food he must starve; or to provide clothing and shelter, he must groan under the fury of the elements. Expand the analogy and behold its application to the physical nature of man and to the physical universe itself. Sin in man is a violation of law. Let us suppose that all the parts of the creation should refuse to discharge the functions imposed upon them by the law of the Creator. Suppose the earth should refuse to grow the grain, or the grain to spring up from the earth; suppose the sun should refuse to shine, and the rain to fall, and the limbs of the human body to perform their functions, what would be the inevitable and necessary result? Why man would stand a motionless statue of flesh, upon a dead and barren earth, all shrouded in midnight darkness, the silent and desolate prison-house of a rebel against God, unvisited by one vernal ray, or one breath of balmy air, where the only sign of life would be the fierce anguish of a living spirit, struggling in its motionless case of blood and bones and shrieking for deliverance. This would be the result; nothing else could be the result; and this would be hell enough to establish forever the great fact that *any departure from the laws ordained by God*

must be productive of *disorder* in the *material* and of *misery* in the *sentient* universe. We may grasp the great analogies of nature on this subject in its broadest extent, or we may search for their most minute application to particular events, and the uniform testimony of all will be the same. It will be found true of the general idea, and true in the particular instance, that a violation of the laws of God will produce sorrow. Every special violation of any particular regulation of the great Ruler will be followed by its peculiar punishment; and the strength of the final inference from all is proportioned to the combined force of the whole series of analogies. Since, therefore, the laws of God extend over every atom, in every department of the universe, both moral and physical, and since the violation of any and all of them in their most minute ramifications is productive of its own peculiar punishment, it follows that the *real strength of the argument for future punishment from the analogies of nature, is as absolutely boundless as the universe of God and the laws which control every part of it.* There is a connection between sin and suffering so clearly established in the very necessities of the case, that *if we admit man to exist at all in a future state, the doctrine of his wretchedness in that state inevitably follows, unless it can be proved that he will undergo a revolution so complete as to prevent the possibility of his sinning.* If man is not miserable in eternity, it must result from one of the following suppositions:— Either he must be annihilated, and thus rendered incapable of either joy or sorrow, a supposition opposed to every presumption and analogy in the case; or his nature must undergo such complete revolution in the character of its passions and desires, as to render their gratification compatible with each other, with themselves, and with the nature of things; a supposition which is incapable of proof, except on the testimony of him who alone can effect such a change; or the nature of things must be so changed as to allow sin to be committed without entailing suffering, which is absurd and impossible.

Here, then, we stand upon the brink of eternity, to inquire what is the actual fact as there existing behind the impenetrable mystery of the grave. We have arrayed presumption after presumption, and analogy after analogy,

and we stand on the borders of the unseen country burdened with a series of presumptions which indicate the realization of our worst fears, with an emphasis only susceptible of refutation by a contradictory revelation from God. We have arrived at the conclusion that man is miserable now; that he is made miserable by laws pertaining to his very nature, and therefore that this nature must be changed, or those laws must be altered, or else his eternal wretchedness is sealed past all possibility of doubt or escape. Whether these changes will be made, depends upon the will of God, which he alone is competent to declare. Our position, then, at this stage of the inquiry, is just outside of the Bible, without one invincible objection to the presumptions warning us of the answer that must come from the gloom of the veiled future, and telling us with an assurance just short of demonstration, what is the great reality. A voice has come from within the veil; the only competent witness has actually spoken; and now we would turn with solemn awe to the records of the revelation from God. Let us see what is the *simple fact* on this most intensely absorbing of all the inquiries of the human mind.

ARTICLE IV.

REV. ROBERT HALL.

At eleven years of age, his extraordinary talent and devotional feeling suggested to his excellent parents the expediency and propriety of devoting him to the sacred office. Mr. Beely Wallis, at whose house young Hall was a visitor, several times requested him to deliver short addresses to a select auditory, invited specially to hear him, so impressed was Mr. Wallis with his precocity of talent. This prominent notice of him, inspired young Hall with vanity, and he lamented it in after life, as a positive injury done him. He was for a short time at Dr. Ryland's school, at Northampton. When about thirteen, he left that school, and studied divinity and some collateral subjects, principally

art, Berridge, Grimshaw, and Thomas Chalmers. We may, if circumstances permit, furnish some sketches of the religious and ministerial life of these and some other divines, with reference to the subject which we have now brought to the notice of our readers, and also resume the subject itself in future numbers of the Review.

ARTICLE III.

THE DOCTRINE OF FUTURE PUNISHMENT.—NO. II.

The close of the investigation, as far as we have pursued it, left us standing before the Word of God, surrounded by facts and analogies of the most striking and terrible significance. It is now our business to examine its report on the solemn question under review. Before proceeding to the direct testimony of the Bible, we shall detain the reader for a moment to examine the effect of its testimony upon the several presumptions afforded to the subject, by certain facts within the knowledge of man.

I. In the first place, it has been seen that there is a strong presumption for the truth of a punishment for sin in the life to come, growing out of the supposition that the Divine Being was concerned in the conduct of men: This presumption will, of course, grow stronger, in proportion to the *degree* in which he is concerned. If he is concerned at all, that the regulations he has seen proper to establish should be observed according to the tenor of his will, there is a presumption amounting to a moral certainty, that any violation of those regulations will excite his displeasure. To suppose the contrary, would be to suppose God to care enough for the establishment of laws to establish them in fact, and yet to be totally indifferent whether they are observed or not. But this supposition is absurd; it would make God equally indifferent to the success or failure of his own arrangements. If there are any reasons why these rules should be established, they are equally good for the observance of them. God then must be concerned in the conduct of men, so far as to be

pleased with their compliance with the order he has established for their government, or offended with their neglect of it. Now, if he is concerned at all, the force of the presumption, growing out of the fact, will gather strength with each accession to the depth and keenness of that concern of the Divine mind. Here, then, the question arises, is God really concerned in the acts of man, and if so, to what extent, and in what degree? Here, then, the testimony of the Bible comes in to affect the issue. We have already seen the answer which natural reason gives to the question of the Divine concern in the acts of men. We have seen that every attribute of God concerned in the erection of the universe, binds him to intense interest in the conduct and destiny of each part of that universe; and that the *responsibility of man so essentially implicated it*, that it becomes an anomalous absurdity in human nature on the contrary supposition. The testimony of the Bible is still more explicit and overwhelming. It not only asserts that God *is* concerned in the conduct of his creature, but that he is *more deeply* concerned in *more* acts, and in *more secret and unnoticed acts*, than natural reason had ever imagined. The Bible teaches that the Divine interest in the affairs of the world, so far as it relates to material and animal nature, extends even to the fall of a sparrow, or the crushing of one solitary blade of grass. It teaches that so far as it relates to the affairs of men, it is something more than the mere interest of a providential supporter, as closely involved in the providential government of man, as of any other important portion of the animate creation. It asserts the existence of a *moral government* over man—it proclaims the existence of *moral faculties* in man answering to the moral obligations established for the regulation of these faculties. It declares man capable of right and wrong, not merely of perceiving such a distinction, but of impressing it upon his own actions. It proclaims the existence of a moral law, extending over every department of human nature, regulating the thoughts and feelings, the purpose and desires of men, not less than their words and their actions. Such is the doctrine of the Bible, as it relates to the *extent* in which God is concerned in the acts of men. But this is not all; it not only describes *the extent*, but *the degree* of that

concern. It tells us that God is concerned in the acts of men to the full degree of his regard for his own honor, as the providential and moral governor of the universe. We are informed that God has an interest in our obedience; and that disobedience involves an attack, not merely upon his *authority*, as a ruler, but upon his *honor, integrity and worthiness of regard* as a person. When the public law of the commonwealth is violated, the great injury done is the dishonor and contempt poured on the high authority of the law-giving power, together with an implied censure upon the makers of the law. In the case of rebellion against a *Divine government*, the injury done is precisely the same. Not only is the *authority* of God set at defiance, but a direct attack is made upon the wisdom, justice and benevolence of his character. When a man transgresses a law of God, he does, by that very act, proclaim that in his view the law prohibited what it was good for him to enjoy, and thus attacks its benevolence; that this prohibition mistook what was best for him, and thus impeaches its wisdom; and that such an unwise and unkind interference with his interests, on the part of God, was unjust, and thus reflects directly upon its justice. But such reflections upon the moral and intellectual qualities of a *law* necessarily convey a reflection upon the moral and intellectual qualities of *the law-giver himself*. Hence the doctrine of the Bible is, that God is concerned in the acts of men, and that he is *not partially* concerned in them; but that his concern reaches not only the whole extent to which his regard for his *official authority* is concerned, but to the full extent of his regard for his *personal honor* as an intellectual and moral being. It is no trifling matter to God that his laws should be set aside by a rational being, for it implies an assault upon his own personal excellency, as well as upon his authority.

Arresting the inquiry for a moment, and examining the influence of this teaching of the Bible upon the presumption of natural reason, we are forced to the conclusion that the original presumption expands into absolute certainty. The presumption is, that if God is interested at all in the acts of men, he must feel and express displeasure when their acts are offensive. But, if this Divine concern actually reaches to the utmost limit of the activity of men,

and to a degree involving the sanctity of both his *personal* and *official* character, the conclusion is resistless, that he must, and will, both *feel and express* his displeasure when the acts of men are wrong. He must *feel* it, for such action could not fail to excite his displeasure; else we must suppose him equally pleased with both good and evil—with what is naturally more pleasing, as with what is naturally less pleasing—a supposition at once blasphemous and absurd. He must also *express* it; for, if it is becoming and necessary that his displeasure should be excited by sin, it is equally becoming and necessary that he should express it in a suitable way; or else we must allow it to be becoming in God to entertain certain views, which it would be an offence to his own moral nature to express. The doctrine of the Bible about the divine concern in the acts of man, not only confirms the presumptions of reason, but renders the inference absolutely inevitable, that he must express his displeasure when men sin against his laws. To express his displeasure is only another name for the infliction of punishment. Unless the offenders are made to *feel* this displeasure, it is to them as if it did not exist; and therefore every reason that calls for its existence in the mind of God, demands its expression upon those who have enkindled it.

2. But again: We have seen a powerful presumption in favor of the doctrine of future punishment, springing from the invariable immediate or ultimate sequence of suffering upon sin. The presumption is that, as sin produces misery in this world, it will *continue* to produce it in the world to come; on the supposition that man continues to sin, and that man will be miserable just as long as he sins. The presumption is equally strong, from the fact, upon *the duration*, as well as *the existence* of future misery: it indicates that if man continues to sin in the future state, he will not only be *miserable*, but, supposing him to sin forever, that his misery will be *eternal*. The doctrine of the Bible adds prodigiously to the force of this presumption. It teaches that sin is invariably, sooner or later, the parent of sorrow; and that this connection between guilt and misery is not only *morally just*, but under certain aspects of the subject *physically inevitable*. The facts of human life demonstrate this inevitable con-

nection between the violation of the laws of nature, as some are zealous to term them, and the occurrence of physical suffering. But the main service which the Bible renders to the presumptive argument, based upon such facts, consists in the annihilation of the inference from a portion of these facts, which is conceived by some to destroy the force of the presumption upon the doctrine of future misery. It is said, it is true that sin produces suffering; but it is also true that there is suffering in the world, where there can be no overt act of sin, as in the case of infants and idiots; and therefore there is no such invariable connection between suffering and sin as would warrant the presumption in dispute; or at any rate that suffering is no infallible index of the prior existence of sin. Before we allude to the testimony of the Bible on this point in the controversy, we will simply call attention to the fact, that while the fact is allowed as stated, that those suffer who cannot sin by overt acts, yet it *does not disprove the other fact, that sin will invariably produce sorrow*, and consequently *cannot affect the logical inferences springing out of it*. It may be admitted that suffering is *no infallible* indication of the prior existence of sin, but it will not follow that sin will not invariably produce suffering. It may be true that there may be suffering where there has been and can be no overt act of sin; but if it be true that where *there is sin* suffering will inevitably follow, it would still hold good that if man sins in eternity he will be miserable in eternity. Although it is allowed, for the sake of the argument, to the full extent of the significancy claimed for it, that man may *suffer without sinning*, yet, if it be admitted that *he cannot sin without suffering*, the argument still presses irresistibly to the inference, that if he *sin* in eternity he will be *unhappy* in eternity. Allowing *the fact* to be all it is claimed to be, it will not disturb the existence of *another fact* or the argument that grows out of it.

But the Bible comes in to the rescue, affirms in its fullest extent that the existence of suffering is an invariable and infallible indication of the prior existence of guilt chargeable upon the individual, and explains that even in the case of those who have done and can do no act involving *moral* wrong, the infliction of pain necessarily sup-

poses the previous existence of a *legal* guilt *justly* chargeable upon them. In other words, it informs us that death, and all other forms of physical evil befall infants, who have not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression, because the great father of the race acted in their individual behalf, and that they are *justly* liable for the acts of their personal representative. *Moral* guilt can only arise under the action of the *moral* or *voluntary* powers of the soul, and necessarily pre-supposes the full responsibility of the agent, arising from the matured powers of physical nature. But *legal* guilt, or the *just liability* of a person for the acts of another acting in his behalf, can be sustained by those who yield no consent to the act of the representative, and thus become *morally* responsible on their own part. *Moral* guilt, then, cannot attach to the persons of infants or idiots, who have not the exercise of the voluntary and rational powers necessary to the creation of this form of responsibility, under the violation of law. But *legal* guilt may as justly and properly attach to them as to any other persons. This great doctrine of revelation annihilates the plea put in bar of the presumption from the connection between sin and suffering. So far from weakening, the plea adds powerfully to the force of the presumption; for it shows that this connection between sin and sorrow is so absolute, that it exists even in those cases where *no* individual act of moral wrong is committed, and where the only guilt that challenges the penalties of law is the imputed guilt of a representative wrong.

But the force of the scripture testimony, on the connection between sin and suffering, is not yet exhausted. The Bible not only states that there is such a connection, and proclaims its justice and inflexibility, but it affirms the *proper penal nature* of the connection; or, in other words, declares that *suffering* follows *sin*, as its *punishment*. Not that the Bible affirms all suffering to be *penal, and nothing else*. It allows the existence of *disciplinary* suffering, as well as *penal* suffering proper. All that it is necessary for us to show is, that the great doctrine of the Bible is the existence of a *penal suffering for sin*. It may be that there are other forms of pain, acting simply for their own specific purposes, or rather, speaking with

more precision, as adjuncts to a *penal infliction proper*; but it is all that is necessary to the argument before us to establish the existence of a *penal infliction* for sin. It is absolutely necessary to the existence of the theories of universalism, to deny the existence of any other species of pain but *disciplinary* suffering. Universalism denies that the sufferings of men are, in any true sense, *punishments* for their sins, but only *disciplinary remedies* for their faults. It dare not allow that any *punishment* is due to any crime, however enormous; because so soon as it is admitted to be *just to inflict punishment* at any time, or for any offence, the whole controversy ceases to be a question of *material justice*, and becomes a *mere question of degree*. If this allowance is made, the only debate that can arise will be on the question, *how much punishment is just*—not on the question whether *any punishment is just*.

The question to be settled is simply whether the suffering produced by sin is ever properly its *punishment*, or not. We preface this inquiry by alluding again to the fact, that no matter whether the affirmative of the question can be established or not, yet if sin always produces suffering sooner or later, in some form or another, the argument still holds that if men sin in eternity they will suffer in eternity. But to the inquiry itself:

There is an instinctive demand by the human soul, when sitting in judgment upon the infliction of pain, that *there should be some good reason for it*. The violence done to the instinctive desire of happiness, by the infliction of pain, immediately sets an inquiry afoot, for reasons to *justify it*. Unless there is some just and sufficient cause for it, the moral sense of the soul refuses to allow it to be anything else than an act of arbitrary power, unsupported by any moral ground. This instinctive demand of the moral constitution of man, is tacitly allowed to be entitled to an answer by every system of religious speculation. If we are asked to explain this demand, we can only say that it is an instinctive requirement of the moral sense of the soul; the mind judges an infliction of pain, *without any reason for it*, to be *wrong*, just as the understanding perceives a relation between two and two making four as the result of a combination. The system of the Univer-

salist just as freely recognises this demand of this intelligence within us, as any other denominational creed on earth. Now, various reasons may be presented in answer to this demand, as justifying the infliction of pain. A *physical necessity*, in order to the remedy or prevention of other and higher ills, is the grand plea of justification urged by the supporters of the notion of *disciplinary* suffering. As for example, a man may have his arm shattered by an accident, and it is absolutely necessary to inflict the additional pain of amputation, to save his life. This *necessity justifies* the infliction—or, in other words, this *disciplinary, or remedial suffering*, proceeds, by the admission of its own advocates, upon the *prior consideration of justice* in its infliction, thus *fully admitting the necessity of a moral ground for the infliction of physical suffering*. If the necessity calls for it, it is *just* to inflict it; but if there is no necessity for it, the infliction is obviously unjust. Now, the plea of the Universalist upon this admitted necessity for a *moral ground* of the infliction is, that *there is such a necessity in the constitution of man*, justifying the infliction of the suffering which he is obliged to admit is actually in existence. He does not allow that there is any such idea as that man *deserves*, in the proper sense of that word, the suffering he feels; but that there is a *necessity* in his constitution—a necessity which he does not condescend to explain—which, however, *justifies* the infliction of physical suffering. It will be observed that this necessity of the physical constitution of man, even when most absolute and most distant from any *moral* character of its own, as composing the force with which it demands the infliction of pain, still implies a *moral idea*; that is, the infliction is said to be *justified* by this absolute physical necessity.

What a singular triumph of the moral instincts of the soul, over those who were striving, in the definition of their creed, to shut out the idea of *moral* responsibility, by establishing an absolute physical necessity in its place! This sublime necessity itself reigning over human nature supremely, demanding all sorts and degrees of physical pain upon it, is itself but the servant of a higher moral idea; it comes forward in all its royal grandeur, to *justify* the infliction of pain, before the bar of the ruling moral

instincts of the soul ! Upon this supposition of a singular and inexplicable physical necessity in the nature of man, the advocate of disciplinary suffering leaves his acceptance of that doctrine.

But the question is by no means at end ; it has a much deeper significance. *Why is the human constitution subjected to such a necessity as that alleged to exist by the advocate of disciplinary suffering ?* Could this *physical necessity itself exist*, without moral reasons to justify its existence. The moral instincts of the soul refuse to be satisfied, without moral reasons for a dispensation so awful. It is a dreadful thing for a man to be laid under an inexorable necessity of enduring agonies of pain, as a remedial or preventive agency against other and greater evils. Now, *why* is man subjected to such a necessity as this ? The advocate of disciplinary suffering is bound to answer. *There must be some just ground* for such a necessity, or *it is unjust*. He says it is just to inflict remedial pain, on the ground of this alleged necessity ; *but why are we subjected to such a necessity ?* Where is the moral ground of this necessity, which affords so happy a location for the establishment of the supremacy of physical pain over the happiness of man ? We demand the *original moral foundation* of this whole astonishing superstructure of human agony ! But there is no answer from the opposers of the doctrine of *punishment for sin* ; the question does not admit of an answer in consistency with their views. In truth there is just as much of a demand for the moral reasons justifying this *necessity for physical suffering*, as there was for the justification of *physical suffering itself*. The advocate of disciplinary suffering merely pushes the difficulty one step back ; and in reply to our demand for an explanation of the difficulty, merely answers with a restatement of the difficulty in another form !

It has been seen that moral instincts of human nature refuse to be satisfied without *some good reason* for the infliction of suffering—making it just. Nothing will satisfy the soul but an ample moral reason. The very necessity alleged to justify suffering, itself needs to be justified ; thus forcing us back upon the instinctive judgment of the moral sense, *that suffering can only be justly inflicted as a*

retribution for sin, as a penal evil. Sin arises from the act of the voluntary powers of the soul making a breach in the laws of God. *Punishment*, or physical suffering, as a *penal evil*, is a relative term, holding relation to sin. A man cannot be said to be *punished*, except in a derived and secondary sense, *except for sin*, with which he may be either charged on moral or legal grounds, according as the evil communicating the guilt was his personal act or the act of his agent, for which he is justly held responsible. The moral instincts of the soul demand a *reason* why suffering should be inflicted; they demand a *moral* reason, and refuse to be satisfied unless it can be shown that some violation of moral law lies at the bottom. But the clear establishment of such a reason does satisfy the moral instincts of the soul; and the soul rests upon the assurance that the mysterious dispensation is just. In other words *the violation* of moral law, the contempt of divine authority, is presented to the soul as an ample reason why suffering should be inflicted. No mere physical necessity for suffering will ever satisfy the soul; that very necessity itself is a calamity of such magnitude, as could only be justified as a penal consequence of some moral wrong. Nothing else will do; but as soon as suffering is inflicted for the violation of law, the soul recognises it as the *natural answer of the moral sense to moral evil*. Pain, when thus inflicted, is *strictly penal*; and whenever a violation of law loses the elements that make it *criminal*, it ceases to be a subject for *penal inflictions*. Or in other terms, the foundation of *penal evil* is laid in the *moral* nature of the acts which occasion it. There is a distinction in things which we call *right* and *wrong*. There is a distinction in things which we call *true* and *false*. The natural answer of the soul, when a distinction between *true* and *false* is presented to its notice, is to *believe* the one and *discredit* the other. The natural answer of the soul, when a distinction of *right* and *wrong* is placed before it, is to *approve* the one and *censure* the other. Now, whenever the soul adjudges the *moral* nature of an act to be so offensive as to find its only natural and equitable answer in physical suffering, such suffering is *penal*; it is the punishment of sin. When man is *punished* he is made to suffer, not for his benefit, but because the malign

nature of his conduct cannot find any other equitable judgment upon its real merits from the moral instincts of the soul. He is made to suffer simply because he has done *wrong*; and this is the only reason which will satisfy the demands of the moral judgment of the soul. He suffers because he *deserves* it—because it is *just*—because his sin has imputed to him a guilt, which demands the infliction of physical suffering, under penalty of a violation of *justice*.

From this whole argument the inference is irresistible that *all suffering is in reality penal*, and that *disciplinary suffering* is nothing more than a *secondary idea* based upon the *penal* nature of pain. Or, in other terms, the *discipline* of the soul, which is admitted to be sometimes sought in the infliction of pain, is only a *secondary and collateral end*; which the *mere grace* of the Judge has determined to attain by means of the suffering which he is justified in inflicting, by reason of the moral delinquencies chargeable upon the sufferer. Why should man need this discipline? There can be only two conceivable reasons for it: either there must have been a physical necessity impressed upon the original constitution of his nature, according to the theory just passed in review, or man must have disturbed the original order of his constitution, and introduced faults into his nature, which require the sharp remedy of pain to remove them. But we have already seen that no such physical necessity could have been incorporated in the human constitution, without a moral reason for it. The establishment of any such necessity in the nature of man, prior to any conception of his voluntary action deserving such a calamity, is a direct reflection upon the integrity of the creator. Man could only have been subjected to a necessity for suffering *as a penal evil*, as an equitable answer to the enormity of his own transgressions. He could only have been exposed to a necessity for *disciplinary* suffering, as a *penal* consequence of his own iniquity. *Disciplinary suffering*, then, necessarily implies the prior existence of *penal* suffering as *the only equitable ground* for its own support. For example: there is a man who has just experienced what is usually termed an accidental injury. It may have been the design of a kind Providence to make it the

means of awakening his mind to a sense of religion and of saving his soul. So far as the pain he endures looks to this end, it is strictly *disciplinary*. But now the question arises, what is the good and valid reason which made it *right* to seek an end so desirable, by a means so terrible? Why was it *necessary* to seek the benefit of individual, at the expense of so much agony and distress? To this question the only satisfactory answer must be, the original infliction of the sorrow was one of a series of penal evils which the providence of God was justified in inflicting; and proceeding upon the sins of the sufferer, as the moral ground of its infliction, this pain is, by the mercy of the Judge, diverted to a collateral end, and made to subserve the benefit of the transgressor. *Disciplinary* suffering is the result of *mere mercy*, using the inflictions of *justice* to accomplish the benefit of the sinner. This is the only ground upon which it can be justified. The moral instincts of human nature refuse to allow the equity of the infliction of pain, except as an appropriate answer to the moral evil of sin. No sorrow can be justly inflicted upon a man, even for his own benefit, except it would have been *originally just*; or that, apart from all idea of personal benefit to the individual, and prior to any such conception, it would have been just to inflict it upon him. It is a contradiction in terms, to speak of doing a man good by violating his rights and outraging the justice which guards him. Disciplinary suffering is really only one item in a great series of penal evils, diverted from its original end, or rather used in the accomplishment of its original end as a penal evil, for the accomplishment of another and collateral end. It is merely an *adjunct* of *penal* evil, and necessarily implies it—from which we learn that the great doctrine of Universalism on the nature of physical evil does itself logically and necessarily imply the *original penal nature* of all kinds of suffering.

The Bible fully recognises this doctrine of physical evil as *originally penal*, and only *incidentally disciplinary*, if disciplinary at all. Men are made to suffer, not merely for their benefit, but because it is *just* to punish. The very term *punishment*, implies that the pain is really punitive, and not merely disciplinary. The Bible perpetual-

ly asserts that God punishes sin because it is wrong,—because it is such an outrage upon ideas higher and more sacred than the comfort of a corrupt creature, that absolute injustice would be done, unless it were visited by a calamity equal to its enormity. Man is punished not for his own benefit, but to vindicate the honor of God which he has set at naught, and meet the eternal claims of justice which proclaims it right that the evil doer should be punished. *I will punish you according to the fruit of your doings, saith the Lord. I will punish you for your iniquities. It is an iniquity to be punished by Judges. Thou hast punished less than iniquities deserved. God layeth the punishment of iniquity for children. The punishment of thine iniquity is accomplished. The punishment of my people is greater than the punishment of the sin of Sodom. They shall bear the punishment of their iniquity. He shall have punishment, in whom is sin.* These passages, selected at random, in different parts of the scriptures, need no commentary. They establish it as the unequivocal doctrine of the Bible, that suffering is inflicted upon man for his sins, not for his benefit—as the natural reply of *justice to the enormity of moral evil.* Indeed, if the principle of all human governments, in the infliction of the penal sanctions of law, is correct; if a criminal is punished, not for his own benefit, but for the benefit of society, in the way of justice for his crime; if there be any manner of justice in the connection between sin and suffering, however inflicted, the theories of Universalism are blown into atoms. Admit this, and the whole question is changed; and we are no longer left to inquire whether it be just to inflict *any punishment*, but *only how much* punishment is just.

3. But the Bible influences the decision of this great question to an absolute degree, by another and a distinct form of evidence. We have already seen that the unhappiness of man is, in an immense degree occasioned by his own depraved and ungovernable passions. These causes of his misery being attached to his own existence, forming a part of his conscious being, must be removed, or they will inevitably secure the wretchedness of man in eternity, as they have done in time. There need be no fiercer or real hell, than to rouse the evil passions of the

soul, strip them of all possibility of gratification, and then turn their savage energies in upon themselves. If, then, man is thus made wretched by causes essentially attached to his own moral nature, it follows that he will be made miserable as long as they continue to operate, and that some tremendous change must pass upon human nature before it can be happy anywhere, or under any circumstances. This change in the moral nature God distinctly offers to effect in this world by the regenerating influences of the Holy Spirit; but he distinctly declares that the determination of this great question must be effected in this world by an acceptance or rejection of the offered intervention of Jesus Christ. Death settles all debate upon the issue; as *the tree falls, so it must lie forever*; and when the soul passes into the new and fearful existence that lies beyond this present life, its fates are fixed. There is a fearful announcement sounding sharply from the last chapter of the revelation from heaven: *He that is filthy, let him be filthy still; he that is unjust, let him be unjust still.* Such is the stern and melancholy enunciation that proclaims the hopelessness of all endeavors after holiness and happiness, when the new era shall have begun, and the countless myriads of human souls have been launched upon its mighty and boundless cycles. If men refuse the sanctifying power of the gospel, kindly pressed upon their acceptance in this life, God tells them plainly, no change shall be wrought in them hereafter; and then the consequences are inevitable. The soul will be enveloped in the fury of all its own unquenchable desires after happiness, turned upon each other, and burning more and more fiercely from one degree of anguish to another, forever and forever.

4. Once more: The Bible doctrine on the nature of sin implies essentially the doctrine of future punishment.—It may be stated with the utmost confidence that one of the great causes of the prevalence of the theories of modern Universalism, may be found in defective views of the evil of sin. It is perfectly certain, unless the mind can see some just proportion between the offence and the penalty, all the moral sensibilities of human nature rise in arms against the equity of the infliction. But when such a proportion is actually discovered—when it is perceived that

there is ample reason for the infliction—when the true nature of the offence is perceived, all the agitations of a rebellious moral judgment are subdued, and the soul reposes on the deep conviction that, terrible as may be the infliction, it is *just*. It would be well, then, for all who are tinctured with a heresy so destructive, to inquire whether it is not caused by an imperfect apprehension of the nature of sin, on their part; by a diseased condition of their moral sense, impairing the accuracy of its perceptions, and not, as they imagine, by its superior depth and delicacy of perception. If they are willing to accept the testimony of God, as to the true nature of sin, the question is susceptible of a speedy and effectual settlement. God has proclaimed in innumerable forms that sin is an infinite evil. The exposition and punishment of the guilt it involves, seem to be one of the grand objects of the word and providence of the Almighty. He has expressed his abhorrence of it by every variety and degree of individual and national suffering. Adam sinned in Eden, and God drove him weeping and groaning from Paradise, and sent death with the whole train of physical evils, to prey upon the remotest generations of the race. The Antediluvians sinned, and their dying shrieks were silenced by the rush of the mighty waters. Sodom sinned, and in a tempest of flame its guilty citizens went down to fiercer and more intolerable agonies, suffering the vengeance of eternal fire. Now, if sin really appears to the mind of God, as presenting a just occasion for such displays of His power, is it becoming in finite intellects, blinded by a participation in its enormities, and made stubborn in their opposition by the most tremendous of all prejudices, to rejudge the judgments of Jehovah, and impugn both their equity and their correctness. The intrinsic evil of sin is a mystery to the natural mind. For the sake of disembarassing the question, let us suppose that it is not true that sin is what the Bible represents it to be, in the malignity of its moral nature. Now, let us make the supposition that there is *a thing* which is an insult to God, an injury to his government, of incalculable magnitude, a thing so malignant in its own nature as actually to merit, as the only possible expression of a *just* judgment on its real elements, the infliction of the most terrible calamities: let it be supposed

that this thing is, in its own nature, utterly incompatible with the peace and purity of the universe—that it tends to the very extinction of the government and life of God himself, and that it embraces all the possible elements of malignity and abomination: now, let the moral judgments of the soul pass upon what is proper to be done in order to let this malign enemy of all good, receive what is justly answerable to its own nature. Is it *just* that any expression of hatred and opposition should be made to it, or is it not? If it *is just*, then the question before us is settled by the admission that it is just that an evil so malignant should receive a corresponding expression of condemnation. If *it is not just*, we are forced upon the absurdity that it is not just to condemn that which in its nature possesses every element upon which the idea of condemnation could be, and ought to be, based. It is an instinctive judgment of the mind, that it is just to condemn that which is *evil*. To deny it, is to assert the absurdity that it is not just to do that which is worthy of being done; or in other words, that it is unjust to form a judgment which answers accurately to the true nature of the thing in judgment.

Now, if sin be an evil at all, it *deserves* condemnation; and any judgment that awards it, only answers to its true nature. If it be an evil of great magnitude, it will *deserve a corresponding degree* of condemnation; so that we learn the only rule by which to measure the real equity of any alleged sentence of condemnation upon sin, is the intrinsic demerit of sin in itself. What, then, is the real demerit of sin? Sin is the violation of law, and its demerit must necessarily be measured by the obligations to obey it. This obligation, in the case of a violation of *divine* law, may be separated into the various elements that compose it, and we might proceed to consider that part of the obligation to obedience in the *excellency* of the law itself, in the *authority* of the law-giver, in its *adaptation* to the nature of man, and its indispensability to his happiness. But this is unnecessary; it would only protract the discussion to a useless extent. Combining all the various elements of the obligation into one, we have presented before us, as the true test of all the demerit of sin, *the obligation not to commit it*. This is the rule by

which all demerit is properly to be judged. In order to make the argument as comprehensive of particulars as possible, let us assume the broadest and most comprehensive ideas of *duty* on the one side, and *sin* upon the other. The summary of the moral law given by Christ, places the whole series of duties obligatory upon man, under the general term *love*. To love God is the sum of the duties of man to his maker and his neighbor. Since the demerit of sin consists in the violation of law, the extent of its demerit will be measured by the force of the obligation to obey it. What, then, is the obligation of man to the law of God, or why is he bound to love his maker? The answer is brief: he is bound to love God, because of the excellencies of his nature. There is an instinctive demand upon the moral judgment of the soul to approve what is worthy of approval. We always feel bound to love a good man, more bound to love a better man, and most bound to love where most moral excellence is displayed. The natural and equitable answer of the moral sense to any degree of excellence presented to its notice, is to approve it; and any refusal to do it indicates a perversion of its office that involves guilt. We always condemn the man who refuses to do justice to excellence. Now, if the excellency of the divine character afford a legitimate ground of obligation upon the affections of man, it follows that the *strength* of the obligation will be measured by the *degree* of that excellency. But the excellency of the divine nature is absolutely infinite; and therefore the obligation it creates, expands with its expansion, and is absolutely *infinite* in force. The conclusion then follows with irresistible power. Since the demerit of an act is to be measured by the obligation that governs it, it follows that the violation of an infinite obligation involves infinite demerit. From this conclusion we are led to another. If the proper nature of punishment, as distinguished from other forms of physical evil, is determined by the demerit of moral and responsible action, we are forced to concede that the equity of the *eternal* punishment threatened in the scriptures is susceptible of the most rigid logical demonstration. If it is just to inflict pain because *wrong* has been done, it is just to inflict a degree of suffering answering to the true demerit of the wrong. If sin, as the

violation of an infinite obligation, is an infinite evil, it deserves an *infinite* punishment; and the threatenings of the Word of God stand justified by the most obvious suggestions of reason.

If may be objected to this doctrine that it necessarily involves all the intelligent creation in sin. It may be said that the accountable creation are bound by an infinite obligation; that finite creatures cannot fulfil infinite obligations; and that therefore every creature of God, subject to his moral government, is, by the necessity of his own nature, a rebel against God, and a defaulter in duty. How can a finite creature fulfil an infinite obligation? How can an angel love God to the extent of his loveliness, and of course to the extent of the obligation to love him? *If he can*, then the absurdity is proclaimed, that a creature of only a *finite capacity of affection* can, and does, exert an *infinite affection*. *If he cannot*, then does he not fail of his duty, and become guilty of sin, inasmuch as he meets an infinite obligation with a finite payment? for if *infinitely bound* and only *finitely capable*, does not the surplus of obligation over actual duty performed remain unmet and dishonored? This is the only plausible objection which we have ever conceived to be applicable to the clear and convincing logic of the common argument in defence of the equity of an infinite punishment for sin. But it is easy to display the fallacy of the position. It is true that the creatures of God are bound by an infinite obligation; and it is true that creatures of finite capacities of affection cannot exert infinite affections; but the conclusion does not follow that all his creatures are defaulters in duty by a necessity of nature. There is a broad distinction between an *infinite obligation* of affection, and an obligation to an *infinite affection*. A creature may be *infinitely bound* to do a *finite thing*. The *force* of the obligation is not the necessary measure of the *quantity* of obedience. God may impose an infinite obligation upon a man not to eat an apple, and the guilt of a violation of the order would be measured by the obligation to obey, not by the intrinsic evil of the act forbidden—simply because it has no intrinsic evil, and can only become evil by being the occasion of violating a moral condition attached to it. This is a great mistake men generally make in es-

timating the true demerit of their acts before God; they look merely to the act itself, and never dream of considering the true measure of its iniquity—the obligation not to do it. It may be that the act itself may involve no guilt; it may possess no intrinsic evil communicating guilt to the actor; but if prohibited by the command of God, its commission involves all the guilt measured by a contempt of divine authority. The demerit of any act must be measured by the obligation that controls it; it makes no difference whether that obligation may spring from the intrinsic nature of the act itself, or from the arbitrary authority of God, or its relations to the welfare of man, or from all these together. From *whatever source* the obligation may spring, or how many separate elements may compose it, it is the natural and proper measurement of all moral evil. The conclusion from the whole of this protracted view of the subject is two-fold: first that *some* punishment is just, and second, that an *infinite* punishment can only answer to the just and natural demerit of sin.

5. In immediate connection with this argument, we present another consideration of equally commanding import. The doctrine of the Bible, about the nature and requirements of the *justice* of God, necessarily implies a *future* state of punishment. "Truth," says the celebrated John Milton, "truth is but justice in our knowledge, as justice is but truth in our practice." This is only another mode of saying that the judgments of impartial justice must answer to the nature of the case in view, and that the justice of God absolutely binds him to measure his decision according to the true import of the facts before him. To deny this proposition is to assert the blasphemy that it would be lawful for God to express judgments *not* answering to the facts in the case, a supposition which involves a direct attack upon the integrity of his character, and as such is wholly inadmissible. In other words, the honor of God, the integrity of his nature, the inflexible claims of his own eternal and essential attributes, absolutely demand that all his decisions should be fitted to the exact nature of the fact that solicits the judgments of his mind. He is left no option; he is bound by the essential elements of his divinity to be true to the

facts in the formation of his judgments. If the thing be good, he is bound by his justice to approve it. If it is invested with any *degrees* of excellence, his decision must be fitted to the precise claim of each successive development of the excellency, and he must approve that most in which there is most to be approved, and approve that least in which there is the least to be approved. If the thing be *evil*, he is equally bound to condemn it; and he is bound to measure the degree of this condemnation by the *degree* of evil in the thing condemned. If the thing be an object of pity, the natural answer of the eternal mind towards it will be the indulgence of comparison. If the thing be a natural object of complacency and delight, he will indulge towards it the sentiments it naturally demands. But, if the nature of the thing in judgment be such as to naturally demand the condemnation of his mind, he will condemn it, and condemn it by just that peculiar expression of his disapproval which naturally answers to the true nature of the thing itself. Now, let us return again to the supposition, that there is a thing in the universe to which the only natural answer, fitting equitably to the true elements of its nature, is the *infliction of suffering*. Let us suppose that there is no room for the indulgence of pity towards it; but that to the malignant elements of the object, the only possible equitable answer could be the infliction of an awful *degree* of physical pain. Let us suppose that the attachment of this evil to man did not make him an object of *pity*, but *blame*; that it imputed guilt; that its fatal touch rendered every object of its contact justly the subject of odium, and justly the object of the inflictions of physical suffering. When the supposition is complete, we at once perceive that God is absolutely bound to base his judgments upon the true nature of the evil, and to inflict that physical suffering which the supposition makes the only natural and equitable answer to its true demerits. He would be just as much bound, and for the same general reasons, to visit such an evil with its natural answer, as he would be to render a judgment of approval upon that which deserved to be approved, or of blessing upon that which deserves to be blessed. Now, we have just seen that there is a distinction between right and wrong, which the mind receives

and maintains with absolute authority. We have seen that the natural answer of the mind, to that which is *right*, is to *approve* it; and that the natural answer to that which is wrong, is to condemn it. We have seen that *when the expression of this condemnatory sentence, upon the true nature of wrong, took the form of physical suffering, that this suffering was penal*, as distinguished from other actual and conceivable forms of which physical pain was susceptible in a secondary and collateral sense. We have also seen that the only natural and equitable answer of the moral judgments of the mind to the true evil of sin, is the *infliction of pain*. The conclusion from the whole is inevitable. If the justice of God binds him to be true to the nature of the facts before him for adjudication, and if the only equitable answer to the intrinsic evil of sin is the expression of a condemnatory sentence, in the form of physical suffering, it is an irresistible inference that *He must punish men for their sins*—that He has no option left him—and that He is bound by His own immutable attributes to visit sin with that which answers equitably to the true malignity of its nature. If sin were no evil, God could not condemn it. If it were only a physical toil, rendering man properly the object of pity, God would fit his judgments to the facts, and indulge a fully answerable degree of compassion towards it. But let it be remembered that the Bible represents sin as a *moral evil*—as a thing *naturally odious, and deserving of condemnation*—as imputing *guilt*—as rendering man *not properly* the subject of *pity*, in a primary sense, but *the object of moral aversion* and the infliction of physical suffering. If this be the true nature of sin, God is bound to punish it. He is just as much bound to do justice to sin, as to do justice to virtue, and for the same high and inexorable reason. So far as man is unhappy, God will pity him; so far as he is possessed of any degree of excellence, God will regard him; but the fact that man is miserable, and the fact that he has certain degrees of excellence in the composition of his being, do not disturb the independent and equally unquestionable fact that *he is guilty; and as such God must punish him*.

6. But the testimony of the Bible on this great subject is not yet exhausted. There are certain facts in the histo-

ry of man, which bear with strong significancy on the two doctrines of the immortality of the soul, and a state of rewards and punishments in the coming dispensation of the soul. These facts are fully recognised by the Bible, and are explained in their moral bearings upon its pages. We allude to the afflictions of the righteous and the prosperity of the wicked, in the present life—facts which are so common in occurrence, and so singular in their nature, as to have attracted universal attention from observant men in every age. The bearing of these facts upon the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and the existence of a future state of punishments and rewards, is perfectly obvious. In spite of all the attempts of a corrupt philosophy, to discredit the existence or obscure the dictates of a moral element in human nature, there is a power in the human soul which refuses to admit that there is no distinction between *right* and *wrong*. There is an involuntary and necessary perception of a quality in *wrong* which calls for condemnation, and a quality in *right* which calls for approval. The moral instincts of the human soul utterly rebel against the attempt to erase this distinction, and place both upon the same platform. If there is a distinction between them at all, it is a violation of justice and truth to award the same sentence upon both, and upon those who are severally concerned in them. There is a flash of intuitive perception bursting through all the mists and mazes of skeptical metaphysics, which proclaims it as the deepest and most resistless judgment of the moral sense of the soul, that a difference should be made between the righteous and the wicked, and that the one should be rewarded, and the other should suffer. *This great fact is fully admitted* by the opposers of the doctrine of future punishment, whenever the exigencies of controversy force them to show that the *wicked suffer more in this life than the righteous are ever made to endure*. Allowing the fact, the admission on their part involves the further admission *that it is just and right* that the wicked should suffer more. This admission is fatal to their theories, for it changes the whole aspect of the question, from a question of material justice to a mere question of degree. *Why should the wicked suffer more in this life than the righteous? Why is it just* that such

an arrangement should have been ordained? It is simply because the soul recognises a *difference in the moral character* of the two classes, which forms the ground for this *just* difference, in allotting the arrangements of Providence towards them. This fully allows that a *moral distinction* is a legitimate ground for a difference in these allotments, that *moral evil* deserves to be punished, and that moral excellence deserves to be rewarded. If, therefore, moral evil deserves to be punished at all, it deserves to be punished to any degree answering to the degree of that element in it that justifies punishment at all. If moral evil is a legitimate ground of distinction between the allotments of men, it will justify a *degree of difference* in these allotments, answerable to its own nature. The admissions of the Universalist himself logically involve the whole doctrine of future punishment in the *essential equity* of its infliction.

If this great and involuntary decision of the moral instincts of the soul, upon the essential justice of making a difference between the righteous and the wicked, is correct, the fact bears powerfully upon the question of the existence of the soul in a future state of punishment or rewards. It is certain the wicked are often prosperous in this world, and that the righteous are often overwhelmed with affliction. This state of affairs the soul refuses to allow to be just; and if ever justice is to be done at all, those distinctions which fail to be drawn in time must be drawn in eternity. It is vain to argue that men always suffer in proportion to their wickedness in this life; for it is notorious that constant repetition of crime renders the mind less and less sensitive to its guilt, and consequently less sensitive to the retributive pains of conscience. There is no one fact in the moral experience of mankind, more certain than that—and it settles the question; it proves beyond a doubt that the distinctions in suffering, demanded by the moral instincts of human nature, are not drawn in time, and if drawn at all must be drawn in eternity.

The Bible fully accepts this instinctive recognition of a distinction between right and wrong, as justifying a difference in the allotments of those respectively tinctured with these opposite elements of morality. It not only accepts the recognition, but restates it in stronger and broad-

er terms. It admits that the difficulty created by the moral bearing of the difference in the allotments of the good and bad man, in their life, is a difficulty which can only be explained by the expectation of a future state of existence, where the real distinction between virtue and vice shall be fully admitted and sustained as equitable and eternal. *The brutish man knoweth not, neither doth the fool understand this: when the wicked spring as the grass, and when all the workers of iniquity do flourish, it is that they shall be destroyed forever. But as for me, my feet were almost gone; my steps had well nigh slipped. For I was envious at the foolish, when I saw the prosperity of the wicked. For there are no bands in their death; but their strength is firm. They are not in trouble, as other men; neither are they plagued like other men. Behold these are the ungodly, who prosper in the world; they increase in riches. Verily, I have cleansed mine heart in vain, and washed mine hands in innocency. For all the day long have I been plagued, and chastened every morning. If I say I will speak thus, behold I should offend against the generation of thy children. When I thought to know this, it was too painful for me, until I went into the sanctuary of God; then understood I their end. Surely thou didst set them in slippery places; thou castedst them down into destruction. How are they brought into desolation as in a moment? they are utterly consumed with terrors. As a dream when one awaketh, so, O Lord, when thou awakest, thou shalt despise their image.** The stern and melancholy music of that inimitable paragraph sounds a startling discord to the dreamy hallelujahs of modern Universalism. The passage implies, as its logical foundation, the essential difference between right and wrong; affirms that this distinction is a just ground for establishing a distinction in the allotments of the moral government of God; admits that this distinction is not fully drawn in this life, and deliberately asserts that it ought to be, and will be, displayed in the time when God shall awake to judgment.

7. But the testimony of the Bible assumes another distinct and striking form, in affirming the truth of the doctrine of future punishment. *All its principal doctrines*

* Selected from 73 and 92 Psalms.

either take this doctrine for granted, or are essentially connected with it after a manner which makes the discredit of this doctrine involve the discredit of some, and the absolute absurdity of others, of its remaining peculiarities. Thus the Bible asserts the moral government of God; but *government* implies *law*; and the *essential* element of law, or at least *one* of its essential element, consists in its *penalty*; for without a *penalty* it sinks into mere *advice*, and ceases to be coercive. It asserts the existence of sin; but sin, as the violation of law, necessarily implies the existence and obligation of *law*, and necessarily its *penalty*. The Bible asserts the reality of an *atonement*; but an atonement implies *guilt*; guilt implies sin; sin implies *law*, and consequently its *penalty*. The Bible asserts a doctrine of the moral nature of man; but a renewal of the moral nature of man implies its corruption; its corruption implies the existence of actual violations of law, and so all the necessary elements of law. The whole scheme of the gospel, as a scheme of salvation, necessarily and essentially implies some calamity from which man is to be saved; and any exposure to impending calamity involves the infraction of the laws of God, as the only just ground for such an exposure. Unless man is exposed to perdition, the whole system of the gospel is false, as a whole, and false in every particular. The sacrificial offering of the son of God is not merely inexplicable, but inexplicable from the excess of its folly, unless it were an offering for sin. His advent, and the events which succeeded it, are inexpressible and cruel absurdities, unless he came to seek and to save that which was lost. It is an abuse of terms to say that he came to save men from the various forms of their temporal distress, by gaining for them an entrance into glory after they have passed through these calamities. It is an abuse of terms to speak of man's being saved from evils through which he passes, and they cease by the natural limitation of their power to injure. If this be all the salvation he came to bring, it is no more of a salvation than would have been obtained without his advent, and his advent becomes an absurdity. Salvation implies, in its full sense, deliverance from an evil—not the cessation of an evil by the exhaustion of its own energies. The sim-

ple truth is, that the doctrine of future punishment, and the moral ideas to which it is related, underlie the entire system of the Christian religion; and if they are denied, the denial logically involves a rejection of the whole of that system itself.

8. But the Bible presents other and most conclusive testimonies to the truth of the doctrine of future punishment. Indeed, the general evidence of the scriptures on this subject is so varied, so multiplied, so interwoven with every part of their teachings on the religious relations of man, that it is impossible to exhaust it by the widest and most complete generalization of its particular testimony. One of these striking features of the sacred volume, is the perpetual distinction which is drawn between the righteous and the wicked, in almost every point in which a contrast could be exhibited. Sometimes the contrast is drawn between the *characters* of the two, in their minute, not less than in their general, peculiarities. Sometimes the antithesis is displayed in reference to the *state*, or the *contentment*, or the *worldly respectability*, or the *conduct* and *comfort* of the classes in affliction. At one time the contrast has relation to life, and at another to death; now to the general peace and enjoyment of existence, and then to the solid profits which result to the parties from their respective peculiarities of moral conduct and character. The writers of the Word of God accord universally in the declaration: *say ye to the righteous, it shall be well with him; but woe unto the wicked—it shall be ill with him.* There is scarcely a chapter in the Bible which does not contain some direct or implied contrast between the righteous and the wicked, in some point or another. *The ways of wisdom are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace; but the way of the transgressor is hard. There is no peace, saith my God, unto the wicked; but great peace have they which keep thy commands. The righteous shall inherit the earth; but the seed of evil doers shall be cut off.* It would be easy to multiply similar passages indefinitely, all stating points of contrast, which, however different in themselves, all rest upon the essential, necessary, eternal difference between right and wrong, the evil and the good. This perpetual recognition of the differences in moral character and moral deserts, as the

foundation for all these manifold differences, establish the *essential* nature of the connection between the cause and the effects. The inference then moves with rigid precision from the *moral and essential* nature of this connection, to the conclusion that *it must exist in the world to come, as well as in the world that now is*. This inference would seem to be conclusive; but we are not left to rest upon it alone. There are explicit statements of fact in the scriptures, in which the difference alleged to run through all the points of contrast between the righteous and the wicked, is carried forward into the future, and established as eternal. The plea of the theorist, who opposes the truth we are arguing, is that all distinctions of character and condition either cease at death, or at some limited period in the duration that succeeds it. But the Bible states with perfect clearness, *it is appointed unto man once to die, and after death, the judgment*. Nothing can be more definite, and unsusceptible of misconstruction, than the assertion that the *judgment is after death*. Now, in all those awful pictures of the judgment day, which Christ drew for his disciples, he declares that *after the judgment is completed*, he will say to those upon the right hand: *come ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from before the foundation of the world*. *But unto those upon the left, he will say: depart ye cursed into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels*. This surely is enough to settle the question forever, with all candid believers in the divine authority of the Bible. Here is a scene *after* the judgment, which is expressly said to be itself *after* death, in which the difference between the righteous and the wicked is still maintained; and in the reasons assigned by the judge, in both cases, is still based upon the differences in the moral conduct of the classes. The distinction is not only carried beyond the grave, but it is explicitly declared to be eternal and unalterable.

9. But again: the Word of God speaks distinctly of a *place of torment*, and gives a *local habitation and a name to hell*. The usual mode of evading this fact is to attempt to establish that the original Hebrew term, translated *hell*, means nothing but the *grave*. It is admitted that the word sometimes means the grave; but it is not

admitted that it never means anything else. Such an interpretation would render many passages of scripture unintelligible and absurd. When the *wicked are said to be turned into hell with all the nations that forget God*, if it only means that they are to be buried, it follows that the passage is logically defective—for this is equally true of the righteous, and the nations that *do not* forget God. One legitimate mode of refuting this quibble, would be an exegesis of the term, and a particular examination of the passages in which it occurs. But a single statement of fact will explode it forever; it is *after* death, and *after the resurrection* of all men *from the grave*, that the sentence of the Judge drives the guilty from the left hand into everlasting punishment, and leads the saints from the right hand to the rest which remains for the people of God. If this clear and positively undeniable statement of fact is not allowed to settle a distinction between *the grave* and the perdition into which the wicked are driven, *after their resurrection from the grave*, it is useless to appeal to the scriptures as authority on this, or on any other subject.

10. Finally, we may condense the remaining features of the testimony of the Bible, which now occur to us, into the general statement that the Word of God gives examples of future misery: that it describes dimly the *nature*, and more clearly the *duration*, of the torments of the damned; and that it makes one explicit and pointed affirmation of the fact after another, until it seems absolutely astonishing how any one could question whether the Bible taught the doctrine of a future retribution. Once the great Teacher lifted the veil, and from the dim regions beyond there issued a mournful voice: *father Abraham, send Lazarus, that he may dip the tip of his finger in water, and cool my tongue—for I am tormented in this flame*. Again he sketches a picture for our view, and through the lofty imagery of inspiration, a wide lake of fire gleams fearfully upon the vision, heaving its glittering and agitated surges in thunder upon a shore of eternal adamant, beneath a sky wreathed with portentous clouds, while on the rolling flood toss the huge shapes of damned angel and cherubim, blaspheming and cursing in the sublime frenzy of their despair. If descriptions of the *nature, duration, reasons, conditions, warnings, expostulations,*

and all other relative ideas of a punishment in the future, are not sufficient to establish the *reality* of such a punishment, it would seem to be useless to attempt to make language the vehicle of any species of idea. The explicit assertion, *these shall go away into everlasting punishment, but the righteous into life eternal*, is but one instance of a great class of similar declarations, which cannot be made to assume more clearness of affirmation by any art of interpretation. If any one is candid enough to accept disagreeable truth, when clearly presented to the mind, he can demand no more testimony to establish the reality of a retributive suffering in the world to come.

In conclusion, we have only to say to all such of our readers as hesitate to accept the doctrine advocated in these articles, *be not deceived; God is not mocked: for what a man soweth, that shall he also reap*. This awful doctrine is true; receive it as true, and escape for your life. There is a prodigious tendency to the rejection of this doctrine, in that period of the maturing of the mind when men begin to think of *things* instead of *ideas*, and really recognise the great doctrines of religion as nothing more nor less than descriptions of existing facts. It is difficult, and it is fearful, to look upon the splendid landscape before us—the green and undulating campaign, bounded by the granite battlements of the mountains, the bending arch of the sky filled with rosy and golden clouds, and the sunlight bathing the trees and house-tops of this rugged city with the last rays of its splendor—and realise the grand and awful doctrine of the Bible! Yet it is true; God says so, and it must be true. Where that dread world may be, he has not said, and we cannot know. But let us remember, while there is time to profit by the recollection, that while we walk this green earth, or gaze upon the stars, or mingle in the thousand claims of life upon our attention, there is in some undiscovered quarter of the universe, the *hell* of the Bible, the prison-house of the damned. Remember also, *he that believeth shall be saved; he that believeth not shall be damned*; and remembering these, be reconciled to God. *The night comes when no man can labor.*