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I.—LITERARY.

MISSIONARY PASTORS.

[The annual address before the Society of Missionary Inquiry of Union Theological Seminary, by Rev. R. C. Reed, D. D.]

When I was invited to deliver the address on this occasion, I asked myself the question what, just now, in view of the present condition of our missionary work, and in view of the attitude of the church toward that work, most needs to be said? How can I use this one auspicious hour to the very best advantage? It did not take me long to answer the question. It is my deliberate conviction that the most urgent need of the church just now in prosecuting its mission work is missionary pastors. The urgent need is for men to stand in our pulpits who are saturated through and through with the missionary spirit, and who are glowing with missionary fervor. We need foreign missionaries to remain at home, to direct the religious thought and mould the religious life of God's people.

Such being my conviction, I am not here to plead for men to go abroad; I am not here to give information about foreign fields; I am here to make a plea in behalf of our Divine Master by laying on the hearts and consciences of those who are to be the pastors of our home churches the urgent and abiding duty of training Christ's disciples into sympathy with Him in the matter of evangelizing the world. Evidently the church will never occupy the right attitude towards this work until the pastors who minister to its spiritual life and who develop and direct its spiritual energies shall themselves occupy the

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THE TITHE LAW.

In determining the question of the obligation of a law of tithes, it is first necessary to settle what is fully meant by a tithe law. Some of its features are plain enough: among these are the proportion to be paid, one-*tenth*—the nature of the requisition—a demand of positive law—and the extent of its application—every one engaged in production or in possession of an income. This also makes plain the nature of the act of rendering tithes: it is a payment, not a gift—obedience to law settling the measure of what is to be paid, not a proportion determinable by the prospering hand of the great Giver. These features are plain enough, but there are others not so plain. A tithe is a tenth, but a tenth of what? It is answered a tenth of the annual increase, or the product of labor and capital. Does that include the increase of value in real estate? That is often the result of labor and capital. But discounting this element of annual increase, and limiting titheables to the annual product of grain, fruits, and cattle, and the products of mercantile and professional business, the question arises whether the annual increase is to be tithed as a whole, and if not, what deductions are to be made before the tithe is levied. Business expenses or the cost of production, it is admitted, should be taken out, but nothing else. Family expenses are not to be deducted. But it is not always easy to separate family expenses from the cost of production; the support of the producing members of the family, and that of the housekeeping members whose labor is concerned in enabling the producing members to do their work seem to be justly a part of the business expenses. These are specimen instances of the thousand issues which bristle round this question of tithing, but these only open the difficulties. How is the tithe to be paid? It must be paid either in kind or in money. The genuine theory of the tithe requires it to be paid in kind. If this mode be adopted, the deacons of the church will be overwhelmed with business; the tithe cattle and grain will have to be cared for, then marketed and the proceeds distributed. If it is paid in either kind or money, yet another difficulty springs up in the nature of the law. There are two classes of law in the spiritual

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sphere of the church: one class embracing laws morally obligatory, but which cannot be enforced in a church court; the other, laws morally obligatory which are also enforceable by administration. The obligation to courtesy in manners is a specimen of one, the obligation to observe the communion is a specimen of the other. Now to which of these classes does the tithe law belong? Is the tithe enforceable in a court of any kind? If the law is only moral, what assurance can the officers of the church have that tithe, whether paid in kind or in money, has been truly made? In either case the tithe-payer is himself to judge his own titheable and report. The only guarantee is in the character of the man, and no one who tenders his own reputation in matters of business likes to dispense with substantial evidence to prove his clear quittal of obligations, and fall back upon character. Character is valuable as a defence against calumny in absence of proof, but no wise man will dispense with proof when it may be available. Every man of business will prefer a receipt when he makes a payment, and will not be satisfied to fall back upon character as a proof he has paid, and in making out his tithe would prefer to show he has made it out fairly. This proceeds on the supposition that the tithe law belongs to the class of laws only morally obligatory. But now suppose it to be an administrative law capable of enforcement in a church court. To this class it evidently does belong: the evident business character of the transaction—the assumption of the obligation to pay the contracts made by the church and its officers on the faith of the tithe, clearly place it in the class of administrative laws. Under such a law, no matter whether the tithe is paid in money or in kind, evidence is demandable on one side and obligatory on the other, to prove that the tithe-payer has justly rated his titheables. This renders an examination of a man's books and business a right of the church, or else any real administration of the law is impossible. If it should be said that a similar dependence upon character and conscience is involved in the voluntary system, the reply is obvious. The church has no claim under the voluntary system on any monies however justly due under a man's moral obligation to support the work of the church until he places it in the hand of her officers. The only exception is when a voluntary contract is made by pew-rent or subscription for a definite amount. But under the tithe system, the church and the individual member are both under

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law—a law with positive and definite prescriptions—a law to be administered by the one and obeyed by the other. Proof of compliance with the law is demandable on one side and obligatory on the other, or any real administration of the law is impossible. Here then is another perplexing question about the tithe: the construction of the law as administrative or merely moral, and the difficulty of any administration of it either just to the law or consistent with the peace and prosperity of the church. There is yet another difficulty: the obvious injustice of a tithe indiscriminately levied will compel the adoption of a subsidiary law of exemptions. The only admitted exemption of the cost of production will not meet the justice of every case. To refuse a law of exemptions will make the Christian tithe system far more oppressive than the Levitical system. According to the Talmud, "only the cattle born during the year, and not those that were bought, or those that were received as presents were to be tithed, and that unless ten animals were born there should be no offering. It is perfectly obvious that the system of tithes is overweighted with difficulties—difficulties of construction—administration and equity—cumbersome in working and dangerous to the peace of the church, and is therefore unadvisable as a practical policy.

2. A second objection to a tithe law is that it is essentially unjust, and in its practical operation cannot fail to do injustice. A tithe cannot express the notion of justice, either as between persons with the same income and different responsibilities, or as between men with great differences of income and similar responsibilities. The exaction of a tenth of increase will necessarily work with different degrees of severity on persons whose income is the same, but whose responsibilities are different. Two men may have the same salary or net income of one thousand dollars, but one may have a wife and eight or ten children to support, and the other nobody but himself or an old mother or a single sister. The latter is obviously bound by the moral law—by the law of essential justice to give a larger portion of his income for religious objects than the other. But the tithe law would exact the same from both. This proves that there is in all such cases a conflict between the law of morals and the law of tithe, the one requiring more than the other demands. It is said the tithe was exacted among the Jews, and if essentially unjust now, it was unjust then. The

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overwhelming answer to this is that the Levitical tithe was a demand of civil justice to Levi, because that tribe received this tithe in lieu of an inheritance in the land. All the land which would have been equitably allotted to Levi was allotted to the other tribes and he received the tithe in place of land, and therefore his claim to the tithe was as just as the claim of any tribe or individual member of any tribe was to the land allotted by the tribal or family distribution. It was a debt due to Levi under the bond of justice, and a just debt is equally just in claim upon one who can pay it with ease, and one who can only pay it with difficulty. But a voluntary levy by a superior power must adjust it with a view to the differences in property either in the terms of the exaction or by a series of exemptions. A debt and a tax levied at will stand on a different footing: the one may be justly claimed without reference to the ease or difficulty of payment, the other must have regard to the ability of the tax-paying classes, or do injustice. The Levitical tithe was absolutely just, and could be exacted without injustice. But where no previous claim of civil justice backs the claim of tithe, and it is exacted of all without discrimination, it is unjust in itself and in many cases will work oppression.

The tithe is an equally defective expression of justice in its bearing on another class. As it exacts too much in some cases, it exacts too little in others. It is admitted by its advocates to be unjust in so far as it does not exact enough from some, and they propose to make up this defect by demanding free-will offerings from them. But this is seriously objectionable in formulating a law for universal application. It is to convict the law of injustice at the outset. The complication implies an essential difference between moral and tithe law in certain cases. A law which prescribes for all ought to be suitable to all. To make up an acknowledged deficiency in the law by an appeal to free-will, is not only to condemn the law, but to attempt to make it up by an expedient which may or may not meet the deficiency. As free it is self-determining. This proposed resort to free-will offerings is a resort to the real law of the Christian kingdom to secure against the defects of the tithe law, If free-will offerings are sufficient to secure the discharge of a portion of duty, why may they not be trusted to secure the whole of it? This acknowledged necessity to go beyond the tithe law to secure what justice requires in some cases is a confession of defect in the law itself—a defect equally

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towards those who are tithed for too little or too much. If the tithe law is just it will be coincident with the demands of justice to all, and the confessed necessity to go beyond the law is a condemnation of the law itself. It is admitted by some of the advocates of the tithe, that if it is essentially defective in justice, it is unfit to be adopted; they themselves acknowledge its defect in the one particular of the class of large incomes, and this condemns their own policy.

Another moral objection will grow out of the operation of the tithe on the class of whom it exacts too much. The example of the Levitical tithe law, if its exemptions are truly reported by the Talmudic writers is proof that no purely religious tithe law ought to oppress the poor, and there are thousands of instances in which the levy of a tenth of net income would be an oppression. The only mode of relief under a tithe law would be either a total exemption or the establishment of a rate which would be less than a tenth. But either of these expedients would involve a breach of Christian obligation. To exempt altogether is a breach of Christian law; none are exempt under it; the poorest are required to give something, but this is absolutely just because *the proportion* to be given is to be regulated by what has been given to each one. To exempt altogether then under a tithe law would bring the legislation of the church in conflict with the legislation of her Head. To establish a twentieth or a fiftieth instead of a tenth, for those on whom a tenth would be oppressive, is not only to abandon the proportion which is the vital feature in a tithe law, but it is still to exercise the dangerous and unwarranted authority of assuming to judge in cases where no reliable judgment is possible, and to establish rates which for all the church can know, may still in some cases be oppressive. Far better to leave the matter where Christian law requires it to be left, and to permit every one to give as he purposeth in his own heart, and under his own responsibility, rather than to undertake to fix proportions by law which may be the instruments of injustice and oppression. This the second grand objection to the tithe: it is unjust in itself, demanding too much in some cases and too little in others. From this essential injustice, it is a shrewd but resistless presumption that the tithe is not the divinely appointed law for raising the revenues of the Christian kingdom. If this admitted fatal preliminary objection is true, it settles the question. The truth of it is so obtrusively

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obvious we do not see how any one can doubt it. If some are morally bound to give more than a tenth, it is clear some may be morally bound to give less, and if so no tithe law has any right to exact more of them.

3. It is a third and fatal objection to the tithe law for the Christian Church it has no standing in the Word of God. As a Christian tithe law it is designed as law, as the law of an institute exclusively religious, as a law for purposes exclusively religious. As such it has no standing in the Word of God. It is not required by the example of Melchisedek; for that established a mystical symbol, but not a law: it was designed to teach, not to command. It is not required by the Levitical institute, either as a continuance of *the law* or *a model* for universal imitation; for the Levitical system was designed for an institution not purely religious, and for purposes not exclusively religious. It is not required by our Lord's commendation of tithe-paying in the Pharisees. It is positively set aside by the introduction of a revenue law in the New Testament in exact contrast with a system of tithes. It was positively repealed by a decree of the Assembly of Jerusalem which set aside the whole Levitical system with four specified exceptions. These discriminations cut away the ground from every Scripture citation in favor of the tithe. Let us test this assertion.

1. The mysterious example of Melchisedek is cited as giving strong support to the theory of the tithe law. It is cited as a proof that the tithe was then recognized as the established due of the priestly (?) office, and is construed as warranting the inference that the tithe was the law and usage before the flood. It is ingenuously confessed that these conceptions are "read between the lines," in the account given. Reading between the lines is often an exceedingly risky business; but it is the very height of temerity to evoke from spaces confessedly blank, the permanent and universal financial law of an institution designed to be permanent and universal in the whole world. It is said that "every point in this transaction has a meaning": that "it is a photograph of gospel times": that "everything here affirmed of Melchisedek must be affirmed of Christ, and everything affirmed of Abraham must be affirmed of the Church, otherwise the representation is faulty, and whole incident loses its significance." The inference is then drawn: "if therefore in anticipation, the Church paid and Christ received tithes,

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now that Christ has come, we cannot withhold them." This argument is employed in every advocacy of the tithe, and is evidently considered as having great force in it. Let us test it.

1. It is said that the tithe paid by Abraham to Melchisedek proves that previous to this act of Abraham the tithe was recognized as the established due of the priestly office, and even warrants the inference that the usage of the tithe prevailed as the vail of the priesthood before the flood. Not one word is said in the Scriptures as to either of these points: no intimation is given elsewhere that either was true: both are drawn by an inference from this act of Abraham. Now it is manifest that this inference can only hold on the supposition that no other reasonable cause of Abraham's act can be assigned than this supposed general practice of the existing and previous ages. If any other cause can be more reasonably assigned the inference fails ignominiously. Now what are the facts? This act of Abraham, stated in the original record without any explanation of its significance whatever, is only explained many centuries later by a New Testament writer. But for this explanation the incident would have remained barren of all instruction. The prophetic allusion of the Psalmist to "a priest after the order of Melchisedek would have only the effect to awaken curiosity without satisfying it—showing that some significance was involved in it without explaining what it was. The exposition of the New Testament writer alone gave it its full effect. Now this writer tells us that the object of this ancient transaction between Abraham and Melchisedek was to create a type of the promised Messiah and the priesthood which he was to execute. This act of Abraham, intended to have so remarkable an effect, was most likely to have originated in a special divine command, rather than in a compliance with a customary practice. This is by far the most reasonable supposition, and it ruins the use of the incident made by the friends of the tithe. On the lowest supposition it may have been so originated; but if the act may have been ordered of God, it is not a warrantable inference to ascribe it merely to a previous general custom. On the contrary, it is altogether probable that the foundation of the subsequent system of tithes was now laid in the model now given. The vow of Jacob which is also cited in support of the antiquity of the tithe, may have been and most likely was guided by this act of his own

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not remote ancestor, and assuredly is not proof unexceptionable of a custom before Abraham. What necessity is there to go back of Abraham for Jacob's model, or to appeal to a custom not at all known to exist for Jacob's precedent, when an example likely to be authoritative with a grandson was on the record of his own family history? Jacob's vow is wretched proof of the antiquity of the tithe back of Abraham. In this act of Abraham, God was framing an acted type of the grand priesthood of his Son, and the very nature of his object indicates it was directly ordered, and not left to be inferred from a prevailing custom. He may also have had an incidental and subordinate design, although this is not certain enough to warrant any positive assertion. He did afterwards establish a great priestly system which was to exist for centuries among the descendants of Abraham. He may have designed to foreshadow a model of that system. But this is not certain. With these two objects in view of this transaction with Melchisedek, the one certainly in view—the other possibly in view—the Priesthood of Christ and the Priesthood of Levi—the inference as to the previous custom of tithing, and the act of Abraham as merely a compliance with established custom, assuredly fails. That act was far more probably the result of a divine command, and not of a customary practice; and instead of being a mere current compliance with a recognized previous law of tithes, it more probably then and there laid the foundation for all the subsequent uses of the tithe.

2. But the most important employment of this mystic incident in the interest of the tithe theory, is in ascribing to every part of the transaction, an exact parallel and an authoritative significance. The type is construed as the exact photograph of the anti-type in every point, and as carrying in every point the full weight of an authoritative legislation. It is said to be exact, significant and obligatory. To this we reply, the parallel is not exact in every point: it is not significant except in those points which are authoritatively expounded; and therefore not obligatory except as to those points. Undoubtedly the type is authoritative in some of its bearings: we are bound to accept all the teaching it was designed to convey. What the teaching is which carries this obligatory force, is clearly revealed in the inspired expositions of the type. But whether we are to go beyond these expositions, and accept as equally binding mere inferences of human reason from a feature of the

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type which is not certified as having any authoritative significance beyond that which is ascribed to it, is another and a very different matter. This conclusion is thoroughly borne out by the following considerations:

First the parallel is not exact. This is proved by the nature of all types and by the facts in the case. The nature of all types warns us against any and all unlicensed interpretation of them. They are mere shadows of good things to come and not the very image of the things. They are not photographs. The contrast is between a shadow thrown upon the ground by the sunlight, and the more exact reflection created by a mirror. A shadow created by the sun has only a broad and undiscriminating resemblance to the thing represented; it a natural silhouette picture without detail or exact delineation. An image in a mirror or a photograph catches every point and line in the object, reproduces the form completely, and is exact in the delineation, not merely of the general likeness, but of the minute particulars. All types are shadows, not the very image of the things typified; and it follows resistlessly that in the interpretation of types, a watchful restraint on the imagination and on the liberty of construction is absolutely indispensable. The only safety lies in adhering strictly to the authoritative interpretations given by the authority which made the type. If this rule is followed, the tithe is no more rendered authoritative law, than that the spoils of war are still to be tithed for the benefit of the church. The type is beautifully significant in the points which are explained by the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews. But the parallel is neither exact nor authoritative except in its doctrinal teaching. It is obligatory in its teachings, for it was intended to teach; it is not obligatory in its commands, for it makes no command. It tells us what to believe; it prescribes nothing for us to do. It was designed to make a symbol, but not a law. This is clear from the authoritative expositions of the type.

Not only the general nature of all types as shadows, but the facts in the case show that the parallel between the type and the antitype is not exact, and therefore not to be taken as binding in all points. Melchisedec's father and mother are unknown; the mother of Christ was the virgin Mary, and it is known he was created by the power of the Holy Ghost. Levi was in the loins of Abraham where he paid the tithe to Mel-

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chisedec; so was Jesus as a man; but the type which ascribed inferiority to Levi did not ascribe it to Christ. The spoils of war were tithed to Melchisedec; they are not even claimed to be titheable for Christ represented by his church. If the thing tithed is not made authoritative by the type, what right has anyone to suppose the tithe itself is authoritative? If the type warrants either it warrants both. But the inspired exposition of the type makes neither authoritative. These three differences prove that the parallel is not exact, nor designed to be taken as obligatory in all points. This is still more clearly shown by the fact that the purpose of the tithe is explained. The point made by the apostle in Hebrews was the superiority of the Priesthood of Christ. He proves this by showing the superiority of the priesthood of Melchisedec—the type of Christ—to the priesthood of Levi. He proves this superiority of Melchisedec by the payment of the tithe. The use of the tithe in the symbol is thus explained; it proved the point and served the purpose for which it was used; but who has any right to say it was intended to serve another purpose not imputed to it in the record? It is construed in this discussion to show that beside this explained and authoritative purpose, it was also designed to establish the permanent financial law of the Kingdom of Christ. The whole action was mystical, yielding no significance until expounded by authority. Is it credible that in such a mystic symbol the permanent financial law of the kingdom was ordained, and that too by a merely human inference from a feature of the type which served a purpose divinely certified, but which received no other interpretation of its significance whatever! The presumption against such a supposition is absolutely overwhelming. A mystical type can yield no meaning beyond its authorized expositions. The logic is licentious which essays to infer anything more from it, especially so great an issue as the permanent financial law of the universal kingdom of God on the earth. The inference of a Law of Tithe from this isolated and mystic act, limited too by authoritative expositions is monstrous in its pretentious feebleness. Its true significance is wonderfully expressive; the meaning imported into it is without a shadow of foundation.

But it is said in more general terms, that inasmuch as the type was entitled to the tithe, the antitype is also and much more entitled to it. It can be said with equal propriety that

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if the type was entitled to *the matter* tithed as well as to *the proportion* levied, the antitype is also and much more entitled to it, and all spoils of war are subject to the levy of Christ in his church. The argument is defective in stating only a part of the truth, and in misconstruing that part of it which is stated. It is true our Lord is entitled to a tenth and much more than a tenth: we ourselves and all that we have and are, are his; he is owner of all; and he alone has the right to determine what proportion of his gifts shall be allotted to the uses of his kingdom, and to all other lawful uses of man. *But his own will must determine that proportion*; and if that will expressed in his law refers that proportion to the law of morals, the law of essential justice, interpreted by every man as he purposeth in his own heart, judging the prosperity which God has given him, and on his own responsibility, it is a contravention of his will, to infer a tithe law from the supposed proprieties involved in the relation between a mystical type and its antitype. To do this is to trespass on the King's right to legislate. No fixed proportion uniformly obligatory can be laid down from any such comparison. From this discussion it is plain that the example of Melchisedec fails to certify any *law* whatever; it creates a symbol, but not a law. It creates no law for any institute purely religious, or for any institution of any sort; it teaches a doctrine for the church of God, but it makes no law determining obedience, and it therefore fails to establish the tithe law as now advocated.

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THE TITHE LAW.

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2. In seeking for a basis for the tithe in the Word of God the Levitical tithe law is cited in the interest of a Christian tithe system. It is claimed that the tithe was appointed by divine authority for the support of religion and has never been repealed. It is said the system prevailed before Moses, and therefore he was not competent to abolish it. It is said if the tithe is carried away by the fall of the Levitical institutions so also is the Sabbath. It is denied that the Levitical system was the creation of Jewish civil law, or the result of Jewish ceremonialism. It is asserted that it antedated Jewish ritualism and was not designed for that dispensation merely. It is argued that being once confessedly on the divine statute book, and never repealed, it is still binding. To these assertions we reply by the denial of every point essential to the argument.

First. It is claimed that the tithe was appointed for the support of religion, and has never been repealed. The first part of this allegation is strongly sophistical inasmuch as it states a part of the truth and not the whole of it, and the second part of it is entirely untrue. The Levitical tithe was appointed for the support of religion in one peculiar social state, but not for any other state, and not solely for the support of religion where it was appointed. Moreover it has been repealed. It was in its essence and its primary cause a creation of civil law to meet the demands of civil justice, as well as the support of religion. Moreover, while the design to support the religious institutions of Israel, though secondary to a demand of civil justice, was a great leading object of the tithe of Levi, yet this was not its only purpose; for the Levites for whose benefit the law was principally enacted, were entrusted with public duties other than religions. It is amazing that the primary cause of the Levitical tithe legislation is so obscured in the construction of it by the present advocates of the tithe. Tithes were granted to Levi in lieu of his part of the land inheritance of Israel. All the land was exhaustively divided among the eleven other tribes. Levi had no tribal distribution of land alloted

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to him. If the grants of land to the other tribes was a civil matter and an order of civil justice, that which was granted to a single tribe as a substitute for this civil endowment must have been intrinsically of the same nature. It was in its essence a civil provision, to meet the claims of civil justice. No one questions that it was a matter of justice to Levi; he was as much entitled to a civil provision for support as any other tribe. Nor does it qualify this original and mandatory character of civil justice one iota, that this arrangement was made in the religious interests of all the tribes, to set Levi free from the embarrassments of secular pursuits, for the more perfect discharge of his religious appointments. *But the reason* why this civil arrangement was made, the service of religion, cannot destroy the nature of the arrangement itself as *civil.* Looked at in its entirety, it was a civil arrangement for religious purposes so far as such purposes were sought, just as the legislation of the English Parliament for the support of the established Church of England is civil legislation for religious purposes. In every state where the union of church and state prevails, the laws enacted by the legislature for the support of the church do not lose their character as civil laws because they relate to the religious establishment: they are civil laws for religious purposes. The case of Levi was much stronger than these illustrative instances, for an original demand of civil justice preceded the consideration of religions end. It is just that the ministers of an established church should receive a support for their labor—as an equitable return for their labor alone; but much more would they be entitled to it if they were previously dispossessed of all property. Then a demand of civil justice would lie back of the equitable demand of labor and add prodigiously to its force. This claim of civil justice back of the demand for remunerated labor would be made still stronger if the civil disability was wrought directly in the interests of religion. Such was the Levitical tithe law—not merely because it was made by the civil authorities of Israel—by the power which made all the laws, civil and religious, but mainly because it was a substitute for the civil loss imposed upon Levi, and as such possessed in its primary essence the same civil nature of the grant which it substituted. Suppose a Christian father has six sons: five of them intend to devote their lives to secular pursuits, and one to the ministry of the gospel. In order to set this son free from secular

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embarrassments in his sacred work, the father gives the whole of his property to the five sons, subject to a tithe or some annual sum for the benefit of the one son. Would this provision have no civil character? To say that it was a devise for religious purposes would in one sense be true; but it would not and could not alter the essential nature of the devise as in its essence *civil*—as much civil as the grant of the whole estate to the five was a civil provision for them. The one son might say his sacred calling was his inheritance, but only because it was connected with a real civil inheritance. Even so might Levi say the priesthood is my inheritance, but if the priesthood had not been connected with a civil arrangement for its revenues, the inheritance would have been scanty support. This was the true nature of the Levitical tithe law—in its essence and primary cause an arrangement to secure civil justice; in its secondary interest, a support for the religious institutions of Israel. Such a law gives no precedent for a tithe law in the church, and the footing of such a law in the scriptures discloses no footing there for a Christian tithe law.

To say that the Levitical tithe was no creation of Jewish civil law—was not enacted by a civil law giver—was not operated to produce a civil revenue—but solely for religious purposes is not borne out by the facts. It was as much a civil arrangement as the grant of the land to the other tribes. It did yield a civil revenue for religious purposes, but not for religious purposes only, it sought to do civil justice also. It was enacted by the same authority and for the same original purpose as that which provided an inheritance for the other tribes: this was the provision for Levi. Nor does the *reason* of the arrangement—the service of religion—at all affect the arrangement itself as *civil.*

The other allegations touching the Levitical tithe are equally without basis. To say that it was not the result of Jewish ceremonialism is to use a word a little vaguely. If not the result—an expression not very precise—it was a part of Jewish ceremonialism—introduced by the civil arrangement—for religious purposes. To say that it antedated Jewish ritualism, prevailed before Moses, and could not be swept away in the fall of the Mosaic institutions has been already disproved. No proof can be given that the tithe prevailed before Abraham as *authoritative law*, or even as *prevailing custom*; and even if the latter could be proved, it would not prove the for-

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mer. The tithe was made an authoritative law only by Moses —only for the use of a most unique society, in which the civil and religious characters of the community were inextricably interwoven. If the tithe of Levi was not a result of Jewish ceremonialism, it was the result of Jewish civil justice, and only passed away when the rights of all Israel in the land of promise were swept away by the dissolution of the Israelite nationality. The tithe law *as such* was the creation of the Mosaic legislation alone: it was designed for that dispensation and that dispensation only, and passed away with it. To cite the law of a mixed state like ancient Israel, as the law of an institute purely religious is unwarranted by law or logic.

The allegation that if the tithe is carried away by the fall of the Mosaic institutions, so is the Sabbath is an assertion both rash and dangerous. It implies that the tithe and the Sabbath stand on the same basis and possess equal authority. If this assertion is true the authority of the Sabbath is overthrown. But there is not a shadow of truth in the assertion. The two things were enacted in different laws. The Sabbath was made obligatory in the moral law of the tables which is by its very nature unsusceptible of alteration. The tithe was enacted in the Levitical law and was a part of a system to regulate the nationality and religion of a single nation, and the whole code was as capable of change as the civil and religious laws of any other nation. The Levitical laws for the enforcement of the moral law of the Sabbath were of the same nature with the Levitical laws about murder or the reverence of children to their parents; they were special regulations of moral offences such as are made in the laws of every state, which were capable of change without affecting the bonds of the moral law in reference to them. These special regulations were abolished by the abolition of the Levitical system; but this could not affect the obligations of the moral law which they were intended to enforce. To confound these special regulations with the moral law is absurd. The Sabbath of the moral law was not affected by the abolition of the regulations of the Levitical code to enforce it. But the tithe having no other footing except in the Levitical law, perished with the system of which it was a part.

Equally empty of force is the assertion that being once on the divine statute book, and never repealed, it is still binding. To pass by the repeal of the tithe which can be irresistibly

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proved, it is sufficient to say in reply that a law on the divine statute book designed for one nation is not to be construed as universally binding on all other nations unless its jurisdiction is unequivocally extended by the only authority which can do it. A law made for the Jews only, whether repealed or not repealed as to them is obligatory on no other people, whatever. It is an intrinsic absurdity to talk of a law to secure civil justice, to establish a peculiar religious ceremonial, or even the statutory provisions for moral offences for a single people, as thereby binding on all other people. To complete the refutation of this position in favor of the tithe it has been repealed. It was repealed by the action of the Assembly of Apostles and Elders at Jerusalem. It has been superseded by another law, and is thereby repealed, and to speak of the tithe law as once on the divine statute book and never repealed is to make an assertion demonstrably without foundation. Our position therefore is made good that there is no standing for the tithe in the Word of God based on the Levitical tithe law. That was the law of an unique society in which the civil and religious characters were incorporated together. It yields neither law nor model for an institution purely religious.

3. The search for a Scripture foundation for the tithe is carried into the New Testament with an effect even more fatal to the theory. It is said the tithe is endorsed by Christ and his apostles. Let us follow up the proof of this position.

First: The endorsation of our Lord is made to rest on his commendation of tithe-paying by the Pharisees. While condemning the excess of their construction of the law, and the spirit in which they obeyed it, he expressly says: "These ought ye to have done, and not to leave the others—that is the weightier matters of the law—undone." The rabbis broke the moral law and were justly condemned for it. They obeyed the tithe law and were justly commended for it. The Levitical system was not then repealed; and as a matter of course our Lord approved obedience to it. But to infer from this that the tithe is equally obligatory on all as it was on the Jews, and equally obligatory on Jew and Gentile, after the system of which it was a part was abolished is a very different matter. This is to make the tithe moral, not Levitical—an obligation universal and not merely civil justice to Levi, and the authorized support of the religious institutions of a single people. To assert this is to beg the question in dispute. Christ like-

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wise approved circumcision and the sacrifices, feasts and parts of the Levitical system and for the same reason; they were still binding under an unrepealed law. Did that approval make them binding for all time? If not why should a similar approval of tithe-paying make that universally obligatory? To compare the obligation of the Sabbath with the obligation of the tithe on the ground that one takes a seventh of time for the same reason that the tithe takes a tenth of income is certainly a surprising mode of reasoning. It ignores the fact that the one requirement is in one law universally obligatory and the other in a different law only partially obligatory. To call both positive moral precepts with a view to bringing both on the same level as to authority will not work in the face of the fact just stated. It also entirely overlooks the essential difference between *time*, an element which is supplied without labor or cost and given equally to all, and *income* which is only supplied by labor and cost and given unequally to all. Time may be exacted without regard to cost: production is the fruit of labor, and any levy upon it to be just must have an equitable regard both to *the results, the cost, and the demands upon labor*. An equal period of rest which is equally needed by every class, and essential to the discharge of the most commanding duties resting upon every man may be justly demanded. Time equally given to all may be equally demanded of all. Such a requirement affords no comparison with the exaction of a proportion of increase which may and will involve unequal effects. To construe the Sabbath proportion of time as a just analogue of the tithe is confused discrimition. To call the tithe, a fixed measure in the grant of our substance, a positive moral precept universally binding, shows the same confusion of thought. The tithe is advocated as *obligatory proportion, moral per se*, and *obligatory on all*. But a *tenth* is no more moral than a *ninth* or a *fifteenth* per se: either becomes obligatory as the law makes it: and neither is universally obligatory under the moral law of essential justice. Giving of our substance is moral and obligatory on all; but to confound this stable bond of duty with the proportion to be given which is morally variable—greater than a tenth in some cases—less in others—is to invert the moral point involved in the case. The *tithe* is positive, not moral—the creature of statute, not of moral law, and when it is asserted to be law, the positive law making it obligatory must be shown.

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Second: Authority for the tithe is sought in the New Testament from what is called its statute for the support of the ministry. Paul is quoted as saying: "Do ye not know that they which minister about holy things live of the things of the temple, and they which wait at the altar are partakers of the altar." Even so hath the Lord ordained that they which preach the gospel should live of the gospel. "It is inferred from these words that the very same provisions for the support of gospel ministers are made, as those which were made for the servants of the temple—that is that the tithe law is carried forward into the Christian church. Here again is the same vice of confused thought. The *support* of the ministry is confounded with *the particular provisions* to be made for it; and *the same authority* which ordained the support of the Christian ministry, as well as that of the Priests and Levites of the Temple is confounded with making *the same provisions* for meeting the claim in both cases. The answer to this is decisive. The question to what the words "*even so*," or "*in like manner*," refer is vital in this issue. The advocates of the tithe say they refer to the *matter* of the provisions made for support of the temple—that is mainly the tithe, and thus the tithe is made the law of the church. On the other hand the opponents of the tithe insist upon it that the words "*even so*" are confined to the points of comparison which are distinctly stated by the apostle and cannot be made to include anything else. Not a word is said about the law and the particular provisions made for the support of the temple. Attention is confined explicity to three points in which the analogy is traced and to which it must be confined. To drag in any connected idea supposed to be *implied* is illegitimate. The comparison is authoritatively made, and is as binding in its limits as in its positive points. Paul brings three things in the temple service to bear on his illustration of the support of the ministry. He quotes the temple service as a parallel case—an illustrative instance. He settles *first*, that the Christian ministry are entitled to support, just as the servants of the altar were. He determines *second*, that this support should come of the gospel they preached, just as the support of the servants of the Temple came of the temple. He determines as his *third* point, that both of these requirements were ordained by the same authority, and as God had decreed the one, He had decreed the other. No other comparison is made between the gospel

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and the temple. By every principle of just interpretation the comparison is to be limited to these points. If a man expresses his opinion of the resemblance of two subjects of comparison and limits his statement to three or any certain number of points, no one has a right to imagine other points of resemblance and impute them to him. We are bound to accept the authoritative comparison between the gospel and the temple just as the record makes it—with its limits as well as its affirmations. No one has the right *to infer* that the specific provisions for the support of the temple are embraced in the comparison and are expressed by the words *even so*. The comparison is limited by its own explicit expressions. Consequently no authority for the tithe appears here because the specific provisions for the support of the temple were not embraced in the comparison.

The tithe is not admissible, not only because it is not explicitly expressed, but because if it is *inferred*, it proves too much, for this conclusive reason, that the revenue of the Levitical priesthood embraced a great deal more than the tithe. If, therefore, the words *even so* warrant the tithe, they warrant a great deal more than the tithe. It is explicitly admitted by the friends of the tithe that "the altar had a large revenue," and that "tithes and *other offerings belonged to it*." It might seem superfluous in the face of an admission so damaging to the tithe policy as now advocated to dwell on the fact conceded. But the argument against their construction of Paul's comparison will be so powerfully enforced by a detail of the sources of Levitical and Priestly revenue, over and above the tithe, fidelity to the truth requires it should not be neglected.

The legal provision for the support of the Levites was not exactly the same in all points with that for the support of the Priests. In addition to the tithe the Levites were provided with homes in thirty-five cities scattered through the country and in the finest section of it. They had garden and pasture privileges extending for three thousand cubits—more than a mile outside of the walls and on every side of the cities allotted to their use. This was as handsome an addition to the tithe as a good manse and glebe would be now to the salary of a minister. Then came the tithe, or one-tenth of all the grain, fruit and cattle raised by the whole Iraelitish nation. They also had a share in the perquisites of the Temple, and Maimonides is said to enumerate about twenty sources of revenue to the

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Levitical ministry besides the tithe.* But these extra sources of support are probably more particularly assigned to the Priests as distinguished from the Levites. The tithe of the Levite proper were first tithed for the use of the Priests, and only nine-tenths of the full tithe was allotted to the Levite. The First Fruits were taken out befere the general tithe was levied. These first fruits were allotted to the Priests. Thirteen cities with the same garden and pasture privileges were allotted them as homes. They also received a large portion of the offerings of all sorts not provided for by the tithe—such as all Free-will and Thank offerings and all offerings for ceremonial uncleanness. They received all the money paid for the redemption of the first-born. They also received a tenth of all the spoils of war. Now if Paul is to be construed as referring to the provisions for the Temple service the argument will prove a great deal more than it is used to prove. The Christian ministry will be entitled to far more than the tithe. The argument proves too much, and therefore proves nothing. The truth is the tithe is not enjoined in Paul's comparison between the gospel and the temple service: no allusion is made to it. The comparison relates to the three specified points and to nothing else. The tithe law has no footing in this part of the New Testament.

[TO BE CONCLUDED.]

*Dr. Davies in Presby. Quarterly April, 1890, p. 244.

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THE

UNION SEMINARY MAGAZINE

NO. 3—JAN.-FEB., 1896.

I.—LITERARY.

A SKETCH OF THE MISSIONS OF THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH.

In the last issue of the MAGAZINE we gave sketches of the Missions in the Indian Territory, in China, in Italy, in the United States of Columbia and in Brazil; in the order of their establishment. In the present paper we propose to sketch in a similar way the other missions of our Church. We shall present these, also, in the chronological order of their founding; and accordingly begin with

THE MEXICO MISSION.

This mission was opened in 1874. During the preceding year the Rev. A. T. Graybill had, with the approval of the Executive Committee, explored Northern Mexico with reference to the establishment of a mission somewhere along the borders of the Rio Grande. Matamoras was fixed upon as the site of the mission. And in 1874 Mr. Graybill accompanied by Mrs. Graybill, returned to this point to initiate what has since turned out to be a very fruitful work. Linares was opened in 1887, and Victoria in 1892. Hence there are now three main branches of the Mexico Mission.

The following laborers have been employed in the Mexico Mission, viz.: The Rev. A. T. Graybill, 1874–, Mrs. Graybill, 1874–1876; Rev. J. G. Hall and Mrs. Hall, 1877–1895; Miss Hattie Loughridge, 1879, who became the second Mrs. A. T. Graybill, 1880–1889;* Rev. L. Walton Graybill and Mrs. Graybill, 1881–1882; Miss Janet Houston, 1881–; Miss Anne Dysart, 1882–; Miss S. E. Bedinger, 1886–; Miss C. V. Lee, 1890–; Miss Minnie Gunn, 1892–; Miss Ella Cummins, 1894–: Mrs. A. T. Graybill, 1895–.

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* She died in the field.

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THE TITHE LAW.

[Continued from page 123 of THE UNION SEMINARY MAGAZINE for November-December, 1805.]

Third. But this footing is sought by assailing the real revenue law as laid down by Paul in the two epistles to the church of Corinth. But just here the opponents of the tithe are entitled to quit the defensive and assume the aggressive position. They assert that the law of the tithe is definitely set aside by the positive establishment of a law directly contrasted to a law of any fixed proportion whatever—a law different in spirit and variable in proportion and which therefore discards the tithe both as a law to be obeyed or a model to be followed.

The real revenue law of the Christian kingdom is laid down in two distinct announcements; one in the First Epistle to the Corinthians,* the other in the Second.† In the first announcement of the law, it is commanded "upon the first day of the week let every one of you lay by him in store as God has prospered him, that there might be no gathering when I come." In the second announcement, it is commanded that "every man according as he purposeth in his heart, so let him give; not grudgingly, or of necessity: for God loveth a cheerful giver." The first announcement formulates *five points* in the law, and then asserts the object to be gained by obedience to them. It prescribes *the time* when the revenue is to be raised—"the first day of the week." It determines the *scope* of the law or the *extent* of its *application*—"every one of you." It settles the rule of *proportion* regulating *the amount* to be given—"as God hath prospered you." It declares *the nature* of the *act of giving* as an *act of worship*. It determines the *spirit* in which the gift is given to be the spirit of worship. The object to be gained is a ready treasury, a constant supply of available revenue. In the second announcement of the law *the general nature of the law* is determined as a law of *free-will offerings*, not a law of definite and fixed proportions; the nature of the act of obedience as *a gift* and not *a payment*; *the motive and spirit* of the grant; the *source* in which the proportion to be given is to be fixed—and

*I Cor. 16:2. †II Cor. 9:7.

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the person by whom it is to be determined. No words could more sharply contrast the nature of two laws. The tithe fixes by law the proportion to be given. The law of the apostle requires that proportion to be determined by the feelings of the heart in each individual interpreting his own prosperity as God has given it. The tithe prescribes the nature of the offerings as a payment due in justice, to be cheerfully paid, but still a payment prescribed by law. The true law defines the offering as *a gift*, not *a payment*, and the offerer as *a giver*—not *a payer*. It is to be given heartily, not grudgingly; as *a free will offering*—not as *the yield of any compulsion whether of force or positive prescription*. The inducements to a bountiful measure of obedience are stated: first, that a sparing obedience would produce sparing returns of benefit to the giver, and a bountiful obedience bountiful returns; and second, that God was able to make all grace abound toward his servants so that instead of impoverishing themselves by the bounty of their gifts, they might expect to have all-sufficiency in all things, and be able to abound in all good works. To pursue the contrast between the laws still further. The tithe law fixes a definite and permanent proportion equally binding in the terms of the law upon all men, *which is essentially unjust.* The true law makes the proportion determinable by the prosperity providentially bestowed upon the giver, *which is essentially just.* The tithe is a law with a compulsory force—compulsory at the very least, in a positive and specified demand of a specified proportion; and if the tithe law is a law of administration as we saw to be probable, it is compulsory in a court of the church if not in a civil court. The real law has no compulsion except that which lodged in the hands of God enforces all other duties whether enforceable or unenforceable by man. The tithe law is necessarily defective in defining the duty—the real moral obligation of some who are bound to give more than a tenth, and equally faulty in defining the duty of others who are only bound to give less. The real law adjusts itself with exact fairness to "every one"—to "each man." The tithe law alters the very nature of the offering, making it *a payment prescribed* by law, not a gift prescribed by affection. The reflex moral influences springing out of the offering for the benefit of the offerer are necessarily different—a consideration of much importance. Real obedience to the true law necessarily springs from an ungrudging heart,

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and unveils the real state of the affections: it thus exerts a higher reflex influence on the heart than a mere compliance with the demand of law. A real and substantial obedience to a tithe law *may* be nothing more than a compliance with the law; or in other words the spirit of worship and grateful sensibility is a separable element—possible indeed to be united with it, but not necessarily attached to the payment of tithe under law. The true law may be apparently obeyed without the true spirit of obedience, but in such cases the law is really violated: for while a fair payment ought to be made with just feeling, it may be grudgingly made, and yet be a full and just payment; but no true gift can be given without the spirit of a gift. When the definite demand of a positive law is fully met, the law is satisfied: God may not be satisfied with the spirit in which the payment is made, but the law is content and must be content. The difference in the two laws is absolute in justice, in unembarrassed application to persons—in official administration—and in the moral and spiritual influences growing out of them. The one is identical with the prescriptions of all positive law: the other with the free-will offerings of all grateful hearts. The new law of the Christian kingdom is superior in every respect to a law of tithe.

If now it has been proven that this new law has been established, the conclusion is resistless that no obligation of tithe now rests upon the church or the conscience of her members. According to all the admitted principles of legislation, the introduction of a new law repeals the old. The tithe is now in no sense obligatory, except in those cases where a tenth may fairly represent the prosperity which God has given. But in those cases the proportion is not determined by tithe law, but by the new and existing law which has superseded it. This also proves that the tithe no more yields a binding *model* to be followed than a binding law to be obeyed. No model for free-will offerings binding on all men can be found in a law of civil justice to Levi, created by the peculiar inter-relation of the tribes of Israel during their national existence. No fixed model can bind when a law determines variable proportion. No model of a tenth can exempt those who are bound to give more, nor create an obligation on those who are only bound to give less. No model can reinstate obligation when law has declared freedom from it. Any particular model may be a guide for some: it never can be for all, and for all times. To

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make the tithe obligatory as a model is to reinstate an abrogated law.

But our vindication of the new law is not yet complete. It is admitted to be a special prescription at the time Paul wrote, but its permanency and general obligation as law is assailed. Appeal is made to the canon of interpretation that every passage of Scripture is to be interpreted in the light of its own context, and then it is asserted of the law of giving as laid down in the first letter to Corinth, that the apostle was only providing for a special free-will offering, and was not inaugurating an universal system of finance in the church. Thus the new law is supposed to be set aside, and that the tithe is established in the church as it was in Israel. The canon of interpretation quoted is no doubt generally correct, but it is very certain that unless it is applied with sound judgment, it will sometimes produce startling and even ridiculous effects. The context shows that deacons were appointed on an occasion of trouble in the church: does that prove that deacons ought never to be appointed except when there is trouble in the church? Peter is shown by the context to have baptized a centurion who had been specially favored of God: does that prove that none but centurions and those of that order specially favored of God are entitled to baptism? It is true that the occasion on which Paul laid down the law of giving was a special occasion, though in point of fact a particular instance of a class of claims which was constantly occurring. But what if it was an isolated instance never to return again? Cannot a law be given on a special occasion, no matter how limited, without the occasion operating a limit on the law? The General Assembly of the Apostles and Elders in Jerusalem was called on an occasion of trouble at Antioch to settle a particular point—the obligation of circumcision on Gentile converts. Though called for a special object, they interpreted the issue brought before them, and as circumcision involved the obligation to keep the whole law, they extended their decree so as to embrace not merely circumcision, but the whole Levitical law, and loosened its bond on the whole Christian church for all time. Did the specialty of the occasion limit the law they passed? The truth is that it is the custom of the New Testament writers to establish law in this way. Deacons were made financial officers in general by being made financial officers in one particular. Ministers are authorized

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to preach the gospel: under that authority they are authorized to exhibit the sacraments, to teach morals, to expound prophecy and to teach the principles of church organization —in short the whole Word of God. The apostolic commission is expressly so interpreted to Timothy, who is ordered to "preach the Word." The speciality of the occasion on which Paul determined the law of giving does by no means limit the law.

But there are some decisive considerations which prove positively that the law laid down in the first Epistle to the Corinthians was designed for law, and not as the mere requisition of a special occasion. In the *first* place the law given in the first is repeated in the second epistle without any limitations inferable from a special occasion or any other consideration in the context whatever. If the requisition in the first epistle had been limited to the occasion of its demand, it would not have been repeated in the second when the occasion had passed by. It is not only repeated, but the duty of bountiful giving and the spirit, method, and universal obligation of the duty are affirmed in the most universal and in every way unqualified terms. The bond of a permanent and universal obligation could not be more perfectly enunciated. In the *second* place in the very passage in the first epistle criticized as limited by the occasion, considerations plainly appear which demonstrate that the apostle was aiming to lay down an universal law. He makes five points in the law, one of which defines the relation of the act of giving toward God, and *its nature* as an act of *worship*. Now the worship of God is of permanent obligation, and giving as one of the ordinances by which it is to be offered, must also be permanent. Moreover giving is a means of grace, and all the means of grace are permanent. The utility of all ordinances of worship and all means of grace is conditioned on frequency and system in employing them—on right use, in a right method as well as in a right spirit. The *time* allotted to the use of means and ordinances must admit of this kind of use. Now is it the doctrine of Paul that giving is a means of grace and an ordinance of worship? Such is the testimony of our Standard: is it borne out by the testimony of the Word? Touching the first point *as a means of grace*, giving as a *disposition* of the heart is called a grace, and it is the teaching of the Scriptures that all inward graces are to be developed *by an ordinance* for

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that purpose. The spirit of prayer by an ordinance of prayer—the spirit of praise by an ordinance of praise—the love of truth by ordinances of instruction, and by parity of reason the grace of giving by an ordinance of giving: Touching the second point, giving *an ordinance of worship,* this passage now under investigation is full of significance. The *mode* in which the Apostle orders this special offering on this special occasion to be made, plainly shows that he aimed at something more than the contribution itself, something more than the special object of the contribution, something more than his own convenience in getting it placed in his own hands. Two general distinctions are made in the order given: first, the contribution itself; and second, the *mode* of raising it. Under the mode of raising it several specifications regulating it are given. The *time,* the *proportion,* the *contribution* are all specified. Why say anything about the mode of raising the money, and especially anything about the *special features* of the mode of raising it, if nothing more was sought than the contribution itself, and the convenience of the apostle in receiving it? The contribution might have been raised *in any mode* and *on any day* of the week, and been equally ready for the convenience of the apostle. But he requires it to be raised *on a specified day* of the week, the first or Sabbath day, and in *a certain manner,* by a deliberate estimate and calculation of a proportion between the amount of the gift and the prosperity given to the giver. Why is this careful specification made if no special object was in view? Some object was to be gained by these requirements beyond the contribution and the convenience of the apostle: What was it? Why is the preparation of this money to be made on the Sabbath day and as a part of Sabbath work? No mere secular work was allowable on the Sabbath. The whole of that day was to be taken up in the public and private exercises of *God's worship,* except what was necessary in the works of necessity and mercy? Why is the amount to be so carefully compared with a certain personal standard known only to the calculator himself? Evidently the object was to identify giving with Sabbath worship, to open up the relation between giving and the service of the holy day, *to establish giving as an ordinance of worship,* and thus to prescribe *a permanent law for the Kingdom of God.*

Fourth: finally, the footing sought for the tithe in the New Testament is utterly swept away by the decree of the apostles

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and elders in the Assembly at Jerusalem. It has been shown that the tithe in the Christian Church was repealed by the introduction of a new revenue law. It was also repealed by this decree in Jerusalem. This First General Assembly of the Church and its action has already been alluded to for another purpose; but that action was conclusive on the repeal of the tithe. They pronounced the whole Levitical Law abolished with *four specified exceptions.* It is a recognized principle in the interpretation of law, that the repeal of a body of laws with specified exceptions, sweeps away all that is in the body of the laws, and not in the exceptions. The tithe law of the Levitical system was not among the exemptions made when that system was abolished, and therefore it is clearly and definitively repealed. All that belonged to the eternal Moral law remained in force; for the removal of the Levitical code had no effect on a different law. But all the ceremonial prescriptions of the religion of Judaism, and all the special regulations of moral offences were swept away from the Kingdom of Christ, visible in the world, by the decree of the Assemby at Jerusalem, except the four "necessary things," specifically exempted.

4. An independent argument in favor of the tithe is sought in the example of the early Christian Church. They assert that the tithe was in use there. We are not careful to answer in this matter. We are not profoundly impressed with the character of the early church during the time of the apostles, and perhaps a short period after. Nor do we allow any authority even to its demonstrated practices, if not supported by the Word of God. The terms "early church" are very broad, extending for several centuries from the age of the apostles. Even in their day the mystery of iniquity had begun to work, and it is very evident from their own inspired record, that they had many a hard-fought and unsuccessful battle to fight to keep error out of the church they founded. There was even then a strong tendency to fall back upon Jewish practices; and even if it could be proved that, the tithe was in some measure of use, its introduction could only be accounted for as the issue of that tendency, and would carry no weight. But the allegation of titheing in the early church, using the term to cover the whole period from the apostles to the sixth century, is not proved as a custom, universal or even common, and the testimony as to its practice on any noticeable scale is

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divided. The earliest advocacy of it is imputed to Irenaeus A. D. 115. But that does not prove practice in the church at all, much less general practice. It rather indicates the contrary: for why should Irenaeus advocate what was already established? Established things are vindicated rather than advocated. The next advocacy of it is seventy years later, by Origen A. D. 185. This also implies no general or established use. The real question touching all practices of the early church as yielding a binding obligation on the after ages is, do they found on the Word of God? If not, they are perfectly indifferent to us. On the other hand, many authorities deny the footing of the tithe in the early church: they assert it as historical fact, that the tithe was growing for many centuries in the church before it was established. The second Council of Tours A. D. 567 appears to be the first which recommended a tithe law. The second Council of Macon A. D. 585, established it under penalty of excommunication. The law was fully established by the close of the seventh century in many parts of the church, but not even then in all. The domination of the tithe was completed by Charlemagne, near the close of the eighth century. It was followed by scenes of oppression on the people and of corruption in the church, which have small weight in recommending the tithe law to any later age. It belongs to the hybrid systems produced by the union of Church and State, and has no affinities which give it an honorable and workable standing in any free and spiritual commonwealth. In its later and unauthorized christian forms, it is the creature of the apotate Church of Rome, and is well seated in a system of such merciless greed and tyranny. Let it stay there: at least let it have no place in the free commonwealth of our Southern Presbyterian Church. Let us stand by the new law of free-will offerings as laid down by that master of assemblies, Paul, the apostle of Christ to the Gentile nations. To sum up the argument, and emphasize the conclusion to which it leads. The tithe is now advocated in these three distinct aspects: it is proposed as a permanent and authoritative *law:* as the law of an *institution purely religious:* and as a law for purely *religious purposes.* In none of these particulars has it any authority in the Christian Church. It is not *a law,* because a new law has superseded it. It is not and never was the law of an *institution purely religious;* for the only instance in which the tithe was

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authoritatively established as law, was in the case of an unique society is which Church and State were not only united, but intermixed and incorporated. It is not and never was appointed for *purely religious purposes;* for in the only instance in which it was law, it was primarily a regulation to secure civil justice, and its religious uses were secondary in order, if not in importance to this secular end. That it was not established for purely religious purposes is also proved by the fact that the parties for whose personal benefit the law was enacted, served other purposes in the commonwealth of Israel besides the offices of religion. This only law ever sanctioned by divine authority was abolished on the dissolution of the Mosaic system and the introduction of Christianity. Every other foothold sought for the tithe in the Old and New Testament Scriptures fails to support it, and the conclusion is absolutely resistless, that the church has no right to establish it as the law of the Christian Kingdom.

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