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I.

THE IDEA AND AIMS OF THE PRESBYTERIAN
REVIEW.

THERE has been for some time a conviction, constantly widening and deepening, that a Review is needed that will adequately represent the theology and life of the Presbyterian Church. This need has been felt all the more that in former years our Church derived so much strength and advantage from the Reviews so ably conducted by Drs. Charles Hodge, Albert Barnes, Henry B. Smith, and others. Two years ago, the *Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review*, which had gathered up into itself the various older Presbyterian Quarterlies, was sold out by the proprietors and editors, and the *Princeton Review* appeared in its place, devoting itself chiefly to Philosophy, Science, and Belles-Lettres, and presenting an array of scholarship and talent unprecedented in the history of periodical literature. Yet this very fact called the more attention to its defects in those very respects that made the older Reviews so important to the Presbyterian Church; consequently the desire for a representative Presbyterian Review grew to be so strong and irrepressible, that several efforts have been made during the past year, in various parts of the land, culminating in the present enterprise, which seeks to combine all the varied interests and sections of our Presbyterian Church in order to secure a Review that will truly represent it by a strong, hearty, steady, and thorough advocacy of Presbyterian principles. The managing and associate editors have been requested by a large number of theologians,

GALATIANS III. 20.

THE number of varying interpretations which have been offered of this passage might well deter one from presenting another. By evincing the fact that its meaning has not been settled, however, it rather acts as an incitement. We do not hope to settle it now; but we wish to contribute our mite.

The meaning of the words themselves is simple. That they express primarily the simple thought, "But a mediator is not [in the nature of the case, a mediator] of one [person or party], but God is one," most men have quickly seen and frankly expressed. That the *εἷς* must be taken in the same numerical sense as the *ἐνός* seems also plain. But, having got this translation, what does it mean? The following explanation of the contextual flow of argumentation will supply, it is thought, a natural and—may it be hoped?—probably the true account of the matter.

The apostle is arguing that the introduction of the law did not set aside the promise to Abraham. He states that the transaction with Abraham was of the nature of a covenant (v. 17). Now, when men once make a covenant, that covenant is fixed and not liable to alteration or destruction save on consent of both parties (v. 15). The covenant of the promises was made so long ago as Abraham's day (v. 16), and, as it is incidentally stated, with two parties of the second part, Abraham himself, and his seed, who is explained to be Christ. It follows, then, that since made with Abraham at that time, it was not liable to be summarily set aside (by the introduction of a law) by God alone four hundred and fifty years after, in the absence of both the parties of the second part, Abraham being dead and his seed not yet come. That a legal method of salvation would make void the promise is evident (v. 17). For, if the inheritance was given to Abraham by promise, as it certainly was, then, to make it to be of law by a new enactment would be to set aside the promise (v. 18).

But, if the law did not set aside the promise, and if the *κληρονομία* was never meant to be by law—why, it may well be asked, was the law given at all? Verse 19 answers this question. The children of Abraham, provided for in the covenant, had ever since its institution been breaking their covenant engagement—by sinning. Yet, as the covenant could not be disannulled until the coming of the *σπερμά*, who was one of its original parties, God could not cast off those children of Abraham. Therefore, on account of these transgressions,—to bring out and make evident their true character as transgressions,—the law was added—a document temporarily (*ἄχρισ*) put forth by one of the parties to declare what was infringement of the covenant engagements, and therefore to stand as witness or norm of action on the other side until the coming of the *σπερμά*. The temporariness of the document was a matter of course; if the *σπερμα* on his coming fulfilled the terms of the covenant, this would be full satisfaction for all infringements, and the *protest* (as it were), necessarily disappeared. Now, the apostle adds that this law was given *ἐν χειρὶ μεσίτου*. And, notice:—a mediator is not and cannot be a mediator of *one* party—there must be *two* concerned in it; yet God is only *one* party. Therefore, in giving the law by the hand of a mediator God makes an express admission that there were two parties involved, and a consequently implied acknowledgment that a law published only by one of them—so long, there-

fore, as the seed had not come—*could not set aside* the promissory covenant. The conclusion is, that the law in the nature of the case and by the direct implication of the method chosen for its publication, could not do away with the promise. It was not an ἐπιδιασθήκη, therefore not inconsistent with v. 15; but a simple declaratory document set forth by one party as an exhibit of his covenant rights.

Looking back on the whole argument the apostle asks, v. 21, if the law could, then, be against the promises, and answers, μὴ γένοιτο. No law had ever been given, meant to set aside the promise and offer salvation on other conditions. The law included in the Scriptures was designed, rather, to shut up all under sin—to define and make plain what was a violation of the covenant—and thus to bring all to Christ, the σπερμὰ to come, to be according to promise justified through faith in Him. Thus, the law, so far from being κατὰ τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν (v. 21), is seen to be rather παιδαγωγὸς εἰς Χριστόν (v. 24). And its service is over when the σπερμὰ has come (v. 25).

B. B. W.

ROMANS II. 22.—Ἱεροσυλέω.

COMMENTATORS have been divided into three marked classes in the explanation of this word. Following Chrysostom, Fritzsche, De Wette, Meyer, Tholuck, Philippi, Alford, Sanday, etc., understand it of robbing heathen temples, Pelagius, Pareus, Grotius, and among the moderns, Michaelis, Ewald, Reiche, Van Hengel, Hofmann, etc., understand it of robbing the Jewish Temple (by withholding tithes, etc.; Joseph. *Antt.* viii. 3, 6, sq.) On the other hand, taking a broader and higher view, Luther, Calvin, Bengel, Flatt, Köllner, Umbreit, Cremer, Hodge, etc., understand it of any irreverence towards God, or profanation of His name—in a word, of “committing sacrilege.” Dr. Shedd is undecided between the second and third.

Meyer declares that the third view is an unjustifiable deviation from the literal sense which would never have been thought of if proper attention had been directed to the climax, “*theft, adultery, robbery of idols’ temples.*” It may well be asked, however, in what way the climax suffers on the rendering, “*theft, ADULTERY, SACRILEGE.*” Surely, with Paul, sacrilege was a surpassingly horrible transgression, while the robbery of idols’ temples was simple theft and that only. Surely, then, Cremer (2d Ed., p. 295) is right in calling the explanation lame, and referring rather to the progress from the commandments of the first table of the decalogue to those of the second. With the analogy of the substantive in Acts xix. 37 before us, where ἱεροσύλοι are paralleled with those who blasphemed the goddess, we ought to have been kept straight as to the rendering of the verb here. The use of the abstract in 2 Macc. xiii. 6 (cf. verse 8), also seems broader than simple robbery of the temple, although the well-known robberies of Menelaus were doubtless meant to be included in the reference. Considerable light has been thrown on the meaning of this word lately by a passage in one of Mr. Wood’s Ephesian inscriptions (*Ins.* vi. 1, p. 14). There we find the words ἵστῶ ἱεροσυλία καὶ ἀσέβεια, although, unfortunately, the condition of the stone prevents us from reading what is thus to be accounted “as sacrilege and impiety.” Certainly we seem justified, however, in coming to this conclusion: