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I.

THE FUTURE OF HUMANITY ON EARTH.

HE would be a bold thinker who should undertake to foretell the fortunes and the state of an American Republic five or ten centuries hence:—who should attempt not only to describe the type or types of government which may then exist here, but also to delineate the personal characteristics of the men and women of that distant era, the social life of the period, the grade of development and of civilization which our humanity will then have attained on this broad and elect continent. How much bolder would he be who, in full view of the present medley of antagonistic elements, religious, political, social, in European society and life, should propose to tell us what Europe will have become, after the agitations and the mutations of the next thousand years! Bolder still would he be deemed who should attempt to prognosticate the future at that distant period, not of any single nation or continent, but of all the continents and all the races of mankind: who should assume to say what this world, in its controlling elements and tendencies, its prevailing spirit and principles and life, will be at the end of five or ten more centuries of activity and of growth. But would not he be boldest of all—daring beyond all comparison—who should venture to prophesy concerning the career and development of our humanity, not for any such given period however prolonged, but down to the last century and the last hour of recorded time: unfolding before our vision that ultimate issue in which the whole of human life on earth shall be consummated, in the decisive day

VIII.

NOTES AND NOTICES.

Πνευματικός AND ITS OPPOSITES,

IN THE GREEK OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

Πνευματικός, belonging to that class of adjectival derivatives which “signifies especially the essential quality—the body or class to which a person belongs,” expresses, primarily, determined by, or belonging to the *πνεῦμα*. It might reflect each and every one of the various senses through which its primitive runs, and thus might express belonging to, or determined by, the wind, the breath, the breath as sign of life, the purely physical life, the human spirit, superhuman spirit, or the Holy Spirit. In its classical usage—which is not a very frequent one, and which begins with Aristotle—it seems to be derived from *πνεῦμα*, only in the three senses of wind, breath, and soul,—in this last sense appearing as the contrast of *σωματικός*. But when adopted into Christian Greek, it felt that ennobling breath that transfigured and glorified so many of the words of the old language. *Πνεῦμα*, to the Christian ear, suggested something far higher than even the highest element of man’s composition; and *πνευματικός* passed immediately, not only out of that lower sphere wherein it might deal with the forces of material nature, but also out of the higher sphere in which it dealt with the height of human nature, into something still higher and beyond. Thus, of the twenty-five instances in which the word occurs in the New Testament, in no single case does it sink even as low in its reference as the human spirit; and in twenty-four of them is derived from *πνεῦμα*, the Holy Ghost. In this sense of *belonging to, or determined by, the Holy Spirit*, the New Testament usage is uniform with the one single exception of Eph. vi. 12, where it seems to refer to the higher though fallen superhuman intelligences. The appropriate translation for it in each case is spirit-given, or spirit-led, or spirit-determined. Occupying so noble a position it appears as the constant contrast to a family of vocables which, as the biblical terms descriptive of humanity, must be of abounding interest for all. Thus we find it in Rom. xv. 27 and 1 Cor. ix. 11, in contrast with *σαρικός*, in Rom. vii. 14, and 1 Cor. iii. 1 with *σάρκινος*, and in 1 Cor. ii. 15, xv. 44 and 46, with *ψυχικός*. Let us inquire into the meaning of these synonyms.

Σαρικός, though not invented for, yet first comes into common use in, the New Testament. It is found only once in the classics (Aristotle, *Hist. Anim.* x. 2), and only once, and then not undisputed, in the LXX (2 Chron. xxxii. 8). In the New Testament, on the other hand, it seems to be the true reading in eight cases, Rom. xv. 27; 1 Cor. iii. 3 *bis*, 4; ix. 11; 2 Cor. i. 12, x. 4; 1 Peter ii. 11. It belongs to the same class of adjectival derivatives with *πνευματικός*, and hence denotes either belonging to or determined by *σάρξ*;

i. e., *fleshish*, or *fleshy*. Seeing that *σάρξ* is the standing New Testament designation of what is human, especially when the implication of weakness, either physical or moral, is present, its derivative *σαρκικός* quite naturally subtends the senses "human," "weak," "impure." Thus, in Rom. xv. 27, and 1 Cor. ix. 11, the word seems used without implication of any kind, expressing simply that which is "human," needed for men as men are at present constituted. In 2 Cor. i. 12, x. 4, the accessory idea of weakness is made prominent. And in 1 Peter ii. 11, 1 Cor. iii. 3, 4, the still further idea of impurity is forced to the front. The word is thus seen to be equivalent to the common phrase *κατὰ σαρκά*, and to pass through under the same variety of meaning.

Its cognate, *σάρκινος*, is very different both in origin and history. While *σαρκικός* is found only once in the Greek classics, *σάρκινος* is an exceedingly common word among the early Greek writers; but to offset this, it occurs but once in the received text of the New Testament (2 Cor. iii. 3). MS. authority, however, forces us to restore it in three other passages, Rom. vii. 14; 1 Cor. iii. 1, and Heb. vii. 16. Like other adjectives of its class (proparoxytones in—*ινος*), this word denotes, primarily, the material out of which anything is made, describing it as flesh. And, as this is its primary sense, so it is the most common sense which it bears in the classics. Thus, to give a single example, we find in Theocrit. *Id.* 21, 66, a *σάρκινος ἰχθύς* contrasted with one made of gold, upon which, therefore, hunger may not be satisfied. From this primary sense, two secondary ones sprung, by which the word came to mean (1) "fleshy," in the sense of abounding in flesh (Polyb. 29. 2, 7; Hasdrubal was *φύσει σάρκινος*), and (2) "bodily," (as the adverb in Orig. *Selecta e Psalmis* ii. 548).

It seems that the word bears only these three senses in Greek writers, and it is contended by a large number of commentators, that these are the only ones which can be assumed for it in the New Testament. The sense "made of flesh" fits exceedingly well in 2 Cor. iii. 3. But it is evident that no one of the three is possible in the other passages. Fritzsche, followed by Winer, assumes a clerical error in these passages, and reads *σαρκικός* in them all. But this is exceedingly high-handed. The MS. authority in each of the three is simply overwhelming, and cannot be set aside. And if *σάρκινος* be genuine in them, we must seek a meaning for it. On a consideration of the class of derivatives to which the word belongs, we find at least two analogies by which a sense of "weak" or "impure" may be vindicated for it. (1) The analogy of such words as *ἀδαμάντινος*, which from signifying "made of iron," came to mean simply "hard." In the same way *σάρκινος*, from signifying "made of flesh," could come to mean "weak," "impure." Fritzsche objects to this (Rom. Vol. II., 46, 47), that iron is necessarily hard, but flesh is not necessarily weak. And this would be a valid objection if such a sense was claimed for the word when used by classical authors. In the Pauline usage, however, *σάρξ* does denote, ethically, just what is weak and impure, so that in the New Testament this analogy will certainly hold. (2) The analogy of certain proparoxytones in—*ινος*, which differ scarcely at all in usage from oxytones in—*ικός*, such a *ἀνδρώπινος*, *αἱμάτινος*, *γαλάτινος*, etc. Fritzsche admits that by analogy with these nothing prevents *σάρκινος* passing through the three classical senses it bears to a fourth: *imbecillum et impurum*. The only thing needed

to vindicate this, is a usage requiring it. It is claimed then that in these New Testament passages we have the usage.

It being thus shown that *σάρκινος* can bear the senses of "weak" and "impure," the question arises, what distinction exists between it and *σαρμικός*. Three opinions are held: (1) There is no distinction (*e. g.*, Dr. Shedd); (2) *σάρκινος* is the stronger word (Meyer, Cremer); and (3) *σάρκινος* is the weaker word (Delitzsch, Lange, Trench, etc.). That the words do lie very close to one another is beyond doubt, but that a slight distinction can be traced by which *σάρκινος* may be recognized as slightly weaker in force than *σαρμικός* seems also clear. The opposite opinion is chiefly grounded on the *a priori* supposition that *σάρκινος*, as the expression of the substance, must be the stronger. Turning to the New Testament passages in which it occurs, however, it is plain that it is not a strong word. In Heb. vii. 16, as designating a part of a law which was wholly divine, it cannot mean impure, but only humanly weak; the writer, contrasting by this term a law which entrusted propitiation to fleshly (*i. e.*, weak) men, with that which provided an eternal high-priest. In 1 Cor. iii. 1, *σάρκινοι* is explained by *ὡς νήπιοι*, which points more to a lack than an active opposition. In Rom. vii. 14, again, unless violence is to be done to the whole context, which evidently describes the *σάρκινος* as a regenerate man, a weak sense is most natural. Archbishop Trench seems, therefore, to have touched the heart of the matter when he translates *σάρκινος* "unspiritual," and *σαρμικός* "anti-spiritual;" and Delitzsch, when he explains *σάρκινος* as "one who has in himself the bodily nature and the sinful tendency inherited with it," and *σαρμικός* as "one whose personal fundamental tendency is this sinful impulse of the flesh."

On turning now to *ψυχικός* we note that it belongs to the same class of adjectival derivatives with *σαρμικός*, and therefore, like it, denotes the essential quality, describing a man, therefore, primarily as being essentially "psychic" or "soulsh," as *σαρμικός* described him as "fleshish" or "fleshly." Like that word, also, it first occurs in Aristotle; but unlike it, it became a very common word in the later classics. Its usage in the classics reflects the two main senses of its primitive, *ψυχή*, and thus parts into two streams, expressing what pertains to life and what pertains to the soul. The latter of these, however, as the most proper, is, also, far the most frequent sense in which it occurs, and thus it is found used in constant antithesis to *σωματικός*, as expressing that which pertains to the highest element in the twofold constitution of man. So, frequently in Plutarch, Polybius, and Aristotle; so, also, wherever it occurs in LXX (Apoc.). Its use thus coincided with, and was interchangeable with, the highest classical sense of *πνευματικός*.

Thus the word came to the New Testament writers as the constant contrast to *σωματικός*, and the designation of that which pertained to the highest, that is, spiritual part of man; a word, therefore, of the highest honor. It occurs in the New Testament six times: 1 Cor. xv. 44 *bis*, 46; 1 Cor. ii. 14; Jas. iii. 15; Jude 15; and a mere glance at the passages evinces the fact that in its passage from profane into sacred Greek, the word has fallen from its proud position. In every one of these passages a very strong implication of dishonor clings to it. Nor is the cause of this far to seek. In the classics the word appears as the constant contrast of *σωματικός*, a word lower than itself; in the

New Testament it is in every instance either expressly or impliedly contrasted with *πνευματικός*, a word infinitely higher than itself. The highest that heathen philosophy knew was the soul of man; but revelation had to set over against that the Spirit of God. A *ψυχικός* thing, then, in the classics was the very most noble; when contrasted in the New Testament, however, with that which was *πνευματικός*, informed, led, or given by the infinite God, it shrank to nothing, and hid its face in shame. The whole kernel of the distinction between the classical and New Testament use of the word, lies in this fact.

But we are not left to our reasonings to exhibit it; the New Testament writers themselves define for us the sense in which they use the word. Thus Jude 19 explains the *ψυχικοὶ* as *πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες*,—a phrase which can have but one meaning; and 1 Cor. ii. 14, as those who cannot know the things of the Spirit of God, *because they are πνευματικῶς* (in a spirit-led way) discerned. The word means, then, that which pertains to, or is led or determined by, simple humanity, that is, usually unregenerate humanity; and the *ψυχικοὶ* are, shortly, the natural men, that is, the unregenerate. Thus the three cases of the use of the word in 1 Cor. xv. express what is human-led, as distinguished from bodies framed by, and filled with, the Holy Ghost, and point to Paul's teaching as to the incomplete sanctification of believers in this life given in Rom. vii. 14—viii. 11. In the other three passages where the word occurs it has its strongest sense and expresses briefly and clearly the idea of "unregenerate." The sense in which it is used is, as we have said, directly explained by the writer himself in 1 Cor. ii. 14, and Jude 19, and is hardly less clear, we may add, in Jas. iii. 15, a very instructive passage in its climax of predicates; *ἐπίγειος* drawing the contrast with what is *ἄνωθεν*, *ψυχικός* adding, "therefore, destitute of the Spirit," and *δαιμονιώδης*, "therefore, opposed to the Spirit" (cf. Cremer, p. 587).

If now we seek the relation of *ψυχικός* to its two synonyms *σαρκικός* and *σάρκινος*, it seems plain that it is the strongest word of the three. As it expresses the highest part of pure humanity and expresses it as alien from God, it points to the lowest depth to which man has sunk. The first, here, also, has become the last; and thus has dust and ashes been shown to be the one and only constituent of human pride. Whether a man be *σάρκινος*, *σαρκικός* or *ψυχικός*; however he be under human guidance and on whatsoever human faculty resting—he is alike weak and sinful and worthless. Thus, all that is in man, his highest and his lowest, is alike opposed to what is divine in its origin and action. Yet there are degrees. One cannot be in any sense *πνευματικός*, under the influence and guidance of the Holy Ghost, and yet at the same time *ψυχικός*. If his soul has not been prevalently moved upon, he is opposite to all good; he is in the gall of bitterness and the bonds of iniquity. But his soul may be regenerated and yet be not yet wholly cleansed from sin; he may be *νοῖ* the servant of God's law while still *σαρκί* the slave of the law of sin (Rom. vii. 25). Hence he may still be even *σαρκικός* and yet not *wholly* estranged from the Holy Ghost. So were the Corinthian Christians of 1 Cor. iii. 3 and 4. But how terrible was their condition and in what words of power does Paul rebuke them for daring to remain in it! Even he, himself, however, was *σάρκινος* (Rom. vii. 14). Even he, the great apostle in Christ Jesus (viii. 1), and having the

Spirit (viii. 1 *sq.*), was still of the flesh, fleshy; and so long as the imperfectly sanctified *σάρξ* clung to him was he groaning in spirit, awaiting the redemption of the body. Because human (*σάρξ*) and so long as he carried his unglorified body, so long he continued to bear "remainders of sin" clinging to him, and hence was *σάρκινος*. *Ψυχικός* no Christian can be; *σαρκικός* scarcely; but *σάρκινος*, all must be until they, with renewed soul and body, enter into God's glory.

Drawing just two conclusions from what has been said, it is plain, (1) that no argument can be drawn from the use of *σάρκινος* in Rom. vii. 14 against the *prima facie* evidence of the passage that Paul is there detailing the experience of a regenerate man; and (2) that no standing ground is left for any trichotomistic theories based on the opposition throughout the New Testament of the words *ψυχικός* and *πνευματικός*. Since one is derived from *πνεῦμα*, the Divine Spirit, and the other from *ψυχή*, the human soul, they are, of course, in as violent opposition as are God and unregenerate man. We believe that to be vast.

B. B. W.

AN EXEGESIS OF EXODUS xxxiv. 29-35.

THE passage in the Authorized Version gives an entirely false impression as to the facts in the case, and the Vulgate version entirely misses the sense. Accordingly the use made of it by Paul, in 2 Corinthians iii., is not very clear.

The passage should be rendered as follows:

Verse 29. "And it came to pass when Moses descended from Mount Sinai,—the two tables of the testimony being in the hands of Moses,—when he descended from the mount,—Moses not knowing that the skin of his face shone when he spake with Him,—(30) Aaron and all the children of Israel saw Moses and behold the skin of his face shone and they feared to approach him. (31) But when Moses called unto them, Aaron and all the princes in the congregation returned unto him and Moses spake unto them; (32) and afterwards all the children of Israel approached and he gave them in commandment all that Jehovah had spoken unto him in Mount Sinai. (33) And when Moses had finished speaking with them, he put upon his face a vail. (34) And whenever Moses entered in before Jehovah to speak with Him, he used to remove the vail until he came forth; and whenever he came forth and spake unto the children of Israel that which was commanded, (35) the children of Israel used to see the face of Moses that the skin of the face of Moses shone, and Moses used to return the vail upon his face until he entered in to speak with Him."

In verse 29 the clauses beginning with *וַיֵּשְׁבֵהוּ* and *וַיִּשְׂבֵהוּ*, are circumstantial clauses, indicated in the latter case by the insertion of the subject before the verb, in accordance with the law of such clauses. *קַרְנֵי* is a denom. from *קָרַן*. = horn. Hence the Vulgate version renders, *cornuta esset*; and accordingly Moses is represented in Christian art as having horns springing out of his forehead. But *קַרְנֵי* means not only horn, but also like the corresponding word in other languages, peak of a mountain, as Matterhorn (see Isaiah v. 1); and also as the symbol of strength, honor and dignity, as in Ps. xviii. 3; lxxxix. 25. In