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I.

AUTHORITY IN RELIGION.

AT the very beginning of the discussion of the question of Authority in Religion, it is necessary to observe with some care that there is really no essential difference between religious knowledge and any other kind of knowledge. The conditions of knowledge, the laws of cognition, are not contingent upon the nature of the truth apprehended or upon the region of thought involved. The variable elements in the problem pertain rather to the accessibility or inaccessibility of the truth in contemplation, the mediateness or immediateness with which it presents itself to the mind, the readiness or inability of the perceiving faculty to respond, and the rational consequences that follow the perceiving act.

At the bottom of our inquiry lies the question whether we can properly be said to believe more than we know. To the question, thus put, no unqualified answer can be given. Everything must wait upon our definition of terms. And we no sooner attempt to define these well-worn words than we find that we are assuming certain whole systems of philosophy to be true and rejecting certain others as false. This being so, we must content ourselves with what we find to be the best prevailing usage and with adhering as far as possible to that. Augustine says, "Credere nihil aliud est quam cum assensione cogitare." It will be noted that this conception is entirely general, and not merely theological. Kant makes belief to occupy a sort of middle ground between guessing, on the one side, in which we are conscious that the evidence is not convincing either to ourselves or to others, and

II.

“THE ORACLES OF GOD.”

THE purpose of this paper is to bring together somewhat more fully than can be easily found in one place elsewhere, the material for forming a judgment as to the sense borne by the term [τὰ] λόγια, as it appears in the pages of the New Testament. This term occurs only four times in the New Testament. The passages, as translated by the English revisers of 1881, are as follows: “Moses . . . who received living *oracles* to give unto us” (Acts vii. 38); “They [the Jews] were intrusted with *the oracles* of God” (Rom. iii. 2); “When by reason of the time ye ought to be teachers, ye have need again that some one teach you the rudiments of the first principles of *the oracles* of God” (Heb. v. 12); “If any man speaketh let him speak as it were *oracles* of God” (1 Peter iv. 11). The general sense of the term is obvious on the face of things: and the commentators certainly do not go wholly wrong in explaining it. But the minor differences that emerge in their explanations are numerous, and seem frequently to evince an insufficient examination of the usage of the word: and the references by which they support their several views are not always accessible to readers who would fain test them, so that the varying explanations stand, in the eyes of many, as only so many *obiter dicta* between which choice must be made, if choice is made at all, purely arbitrarily. It has seemed, therefore, as if it would not be without its value if the usage of the word were exhibited in sufficient fullness to serve as some sort of a touchstone of the explanations that have been offered of it. We are sure, at any rate, that students of the New Testament remote from libraries will not be sorry to have at hand a tolerably full account of the usage of the word: and we are not without hope that a comprehensive view of it may help to correct some long-standing errors concerning its exact meaning, and may, indeed, point not obscurely to its true connotation—which is not without interesting implications. Upheld by this hope we shall essay to pass in rapid review the usage of the term in Classic, Hellenistic and Patristic Greek, and then to ask what, in the light of this usage, the word is likely to have meant to the writers of the New Testament.

1. It may be just as well at the outset to disabuse our minds of any presumption that a diminutive sense is inherent in the term *λόγιον*, as a result of its very form.* Whether we explain it with Meyer-Weiss† as the neuter of *λόγιος* and point to *λογίδιον*‡ as the proper diminutive of this stem; or look upon it with Sanday-Headlam§ as originally the diminutive of *λόγος*, whose place as such was subsequently, viz., when it acquired the special sense of “oracle.” taken by the strengthened diminutive *λογίδιον*—it remains true that no trace of a diminutive sense attaches to it as we meet it on the pages of Greek literature.||

We are pointed, to be sure, to a scholium on the *Frogs* of Aristophanes (line 942) as indicating the contrary. The passage is the well-known one in which Euripides is made to respond to Æschylus' inquiry as to what things he manufactured. “Not winged horses,” is the reply (as Wheelwright translates it), “By Jupiter, nor goat-stags, such as thou, Like paintings on the Median tapestry, But as from thee I first received the art, Swelling with boastful pomp and heavy words, I paréd it straight and took away its substance, *With little words*, and walking dialogues,¶ And white beet mingled, straining from the books A juice of pleasant sayings,—then I fed him With monodies, mixing Ctesiphon.” It is upon the word here translated “with little words,” but really meaning “verselets” (Blaydes: *versiculis*)—*ἐπολλίους*—that the scholium occurs. It runs: Ἄντὶ τοῦ λόγιους μικροῖς· ὡς δὲ βρέφος βρεφύλλιον, καὶ εἶδος εἰδύλλιον· οὕτω καὶ ἔπος ἐπόλλιον.** That is to say, *ἐπόλλιον* is a diminutive of

* So very commonly: as, e. g., by GRIMM (*Lexicon in N. T.*, s. v.), BLEEK (*Der Brief an die Hebräer*, ii, 2, 114, on Heb. v. 12), PHILIPPI (*Com. on Romans*, E. T., i, 105, on Rom. iii. 2), MORRISON (*Expos. of 3d Chap. of Rom.*, p. 14).

† *Com. on Romans*, on Rom. iii. 2, (E. T., i, 140, note 1).

‡ PLATO, *Eryx.*, 401, E.: ἐπαρτέ γε αὐτὸν . . . τὸ λογίδιον; ISOCRATES, *Contra Sophistas*, 295 B. (Didot, 191): τοσοῦτω δὲ χείρους ἐγένοντο τῶν περὶ τὰς ἐρίδας καλινδομένων, ὅσον οἴτοι μὲν τοιαῦτα λογίδια διεξιόντες . . .; ARISTOPHANES, *Vesp.*, 64: ἀλλ' ἔστω ἡμῖν λογίδιον γνώμην ἔχον | ἡμῶν μὲν αὐτῶν οὐχὶ δεξιώτερον. Cf. BLAYDES on the passage in Aristophanes.

§ *Com. on Rom.*, on Rom. iii. 2: “The old account of *λόγιον* as a diminutive of *λόγος* is probably correct, though Mey.-W. make it neuter of *λόγιος* on the ground that *λογίδιον* is the proper diminutive. The form *λογίδιον* is rather a strengthened diminutive which, by a process common in language, took the place of *λόγιον* when it acquired the sense of ‘oracle.’” When they add that it was as “a brief condensed saying” that the oracle was called *λόγιον*, they have no support in the literature.

|| JELF, who looks upon it as a diminutive, cites it as an extreme example of the fact that many simple diminutives in *-ιον* have lost their diminutive force—such as *θηρίον*, *βελίον*: *λόγιον*, he says, “has assumed a peculiar meaning.” In any event, thus, no diminutive meaning clings to *λόγιον*.

¶ *ἐπόλλιους καὶ περιπάτους καὶ τευτλοῖσι λευκοῖς.*

** DINDORF, iv, ii, p. 113, on line 973.

the same class as βρεφύλλιον and ειδύλλιον,* and means λόγιον μικρόν. Since the idea of smallness is explicit in the adjective attached to λόγιον here, surely it is not necessary to discover it also in the noun,† especially when what the scholiast is obviously striving to say is not that ἐπολλίσις means “little wordlets,” but “little verses.” The presence of μικροῖς here, rather is conclusive evidence that λογίσις by itself did not convey a diminutive meaning to the scholiast. If we are to give λόγιον an unexampled sense here, we might be tempted to take it, therefore, as intended to express the idea “verses” rather than the tautological one of “little words” or even “little maxims” or “little sayings.” And it might fairly be pleaded in favor of so doing that λόγιον in its current sense of “oracle” not only lies close to one of the ordinary meanings of ἔπος (*Od.*, 12, 266; *Herod.*, 1, 13, and often in the Tragedians), but also, because oracles were commonly couched in verse, might easily come to suggest in popular speech the idea of “verse,” so that a λόγιον μικρόν would easily obtrude itself as the exact synonym of ἐπόλλιον, in Euripides’ sense, i. e., in the sense of short broken verses. There is no reason apparent on the other hand why we should find a diminutive implication in the word as here used, and in any case, if this is intended, it is a sense unillustrated by a single instance of usage.

And the unquestionable learning of Eustathius seems to assure us that to Greek ears λόγιον did not suggest a diminutive sense at all. He is commenting on line 339 of the Second Book of the *Iliad*, which runs,

πῆ δὴ συνθεσῖαι τε καὶ ὄρκια βήσεται ἡμῖν,

and he tells us that ὄρκιον in Homer is not a diminutive, but is a formation similar to λόγιον, which means “an oracle:” ὄρχ ὑποκοριστικὸν δὲ παρ’ Ὀμήρω οὐδὲ τὸ ἴχτιον. Ὡς περ δὲ τὰ ὄρκια παρωνόμασται ἐκ τοῦ ὄρκου, οὕτω καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὰ λόγια ἤγουν οἱ χρησμοί.‡ There is no direct statement here, to be sure, that λόγιον is not a diminutive; that statement is made—with entire accuracy—only of ὄρκιον and ἴχτιον:§ nor is the derivation suggested for λόγιον, as if it came directly from λόγος, perhaps scientifically accu-

* BLAYDES adds some other instances: “Ejusdem formæ diminutiva sunt ειδύλλιον, βρεφύλλιον, μειρακύλλιον, ζωύλλιον, κρεύλλιον, ξενύλλιον.”

† With this λόγιον μικρόν compare the βραχεία λόγια of JUSTIN MARTYR, *Contra Tryph.*, c. 18. When the idea of *brevity* needed to be conveyed, it would seem that an adjective expressive of this idea was required to be added.

‡ Ed. Bas., i, 233; Rom. i. 177: Weigel’s Leipzig ed. (here used), i, 189.

§ LIDDELL and SCOTT say, s. v.: “ὄρκιον is not with BUTTM., *Lexil.*, s. v., to be regarded as a dim. of ὄρκος, but rather as neuter of ὄρκιος, with which ἱερόν or ἱερά may be supplied;” “Dim. of ἴχνος only in form (v. CHANDLER, *Accent.*, § 340).” Cf. in general JELF, *Grammar*, §§ 56, 2, and 335, c (Vol. i, pp. 53 and 337).

rate. But there is every indication of clearness of perception in the statement: and it could scarcely be given the form it has, had *λόγιον* stood in Eustathius' mind as the diminutive of *λόγος*. It obviously represented to him not a diminutive synonym of *λόγος*, but an equal synonym of *χρησμός*. What *λόγιον* stood for, in his mind, is very clearly exhibited, further, in a comment which he makes on the 416th line of the First Book of the *Odyssey*, where Telemachus declares that he does not "care for divinations such as my mother seeks, summoning a diviner to the hall:"

οὔτε θεοπροπίης ἐμπάζομαι, ἦντινα μήτηρ
ἐς μέγαρον καλέσασα θεοπρόπον ἐξέρηται.

Eustathius wishes us to note that *θεοπρόπος* means the *μάντις*, *θεοπροπία* his art, and *θεοπρόπιον* the message he delivers, which Eustathius calls the *χρησμώδημα*, and informs us is denominated by the Attics also *λόγιον*. He says: Ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι θεοπρόπος μὲν ἄλλως, δ μίντις. θεοπροπία δὲ, ἡ τέχνη αὐτοῦ. θεοπρόπιον δὲ, τὸ χρησμώδημα, δ καὶ λόγιον ἔλεγρον οἱ Ἀττικοί.* To Eustathius, thus *λόγιον* was simply the exact synonym of the highest words in use to express a divine communication to men—*θεοπρόπιον*, † *χρησμώδημα*, *χρησμός*. Similarly Hesychius' definition runs: Λόγια: θέσφατα, μαντεύματα, (προ)φητεύματα, φῆμαι, χρησμοί. In a word, *λόγιον* differs from *λόγος* not as expressing something smaller than it, but as expressing something more sacred.

The Greek synonymy of the notion "oracle" is at once extraordinarily full and very obscure. It is easy to draw up a long list of terms—*μαντεία*, *μαντεύματα*, *πρόφανα*, *θεοπρόπια*, *ἐπιθεσπισμοί* *θέσφατα*, *θεσπίσματα*, *λόγια*, and the like; but exceedingly difficult, we do not say to lay down hard and fast lines between them, but even to establish any shades of difference among them which are consistently reflected in usage. M. Bouché-Leclercq, after commenting on the poverty of the Latin nomenclature, continues as to the Greek: ‡

* Ed. Bas., pp. 1426, 1427; ed. Rom., p. 69; ed. Leipzig, i, p. 72.

† A scholium on the passage in the *Odyssey* brings out the meaning of *θεοπρόπιον*, to wit: τὸ ἐκ θεοῦ λεγομένον, ἐξ οὗ καὶ θεοπρόπος ὁ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ λέγων. Cf. also the Homeric Lexicons on the word: *e. g.*, EBELING, *s. v.* *θεοπροπία* et *θεοπρόπιον*: "Sententia deorum, iudicium quod dii (Jupiter potissimum et Apollo) cum vate (vel cum deo) communicant, vates cum aliis, oraculum. Cf. NÆGELSB., *II* [omerische] *Th[eologie]*, 187. Ap. 8, 7, 4 *μάντευμα* τὸ ἐκ θεοῦ προλεγομένον. Cf. SUID, i, 2, 1144 Hes.;" and CAPELLE under same heading: "Alles was von den Göttern (bes[onders] Apollon und Zeus) angezeigt und durch den *θεοπρόπος* gedeutet wird, 'die von den Göttern eingegebenen Offenbarungen' (Nægelsb. zu A. 385. Cf. *Hom. Th.*, S. 187), also *Weissagung*, *Göttergebot*, *Götterbescheid*, *Orakel*."

‡ *Histoire de la Divination dans l'Antiquité* (Paris, Leroux, 1879), Vol. ii, pp. 229, 230.

“The Greek terminology is richer and allows analysis of the different senses, but it is even more confused than abundant. The Greeks, possessors of a flexible tongue, capable of rendering all the shades of thought, often squandered their treasures, broadening the meaning of words at pleasure, multiplying synonyms without distinguishing between them, and thus disdaining the precision to which they could attain without effort. We shall seek in vain for terms especially appropriated to divination by oracles. From the verb *χρησθαι*, which signifies in Homer ‘to reveal’ in a general way, come the derivatives *χρησμός* and *χρηστήριον*. The latter, which dates from Hesiod and the Homerides, designates the place where prophecies are dispensed and, later, the responses themselves, or the instrument by which they are obtained. *Χρησμός*, which comes into current usage from the time of Solon, is applied without ambiguity to inspired and versified prophecies, but belongs equally to the responses of the oracles and those of free prophets. The word *μαντεῖον* in the singular designates ordinarily the place of consultation; but in the plural it is applied to the prophecies themselves of whatever origin. In the last sense it has a crowd of synonyms of indeterminate and changeable shades of meaning. The grammarians themselves have been obliged to renounce imposing rules on the capricious usage and seeking recognition for their artificial distinctions. We learn once more the impossibility of erecting precise definitions for terms which lack precision.”

Among the distinctions which have been proposed but which usage will not sustain is the discrimination erected by the scholiast on Euripides, *Phæniss.*, 907,* which would reserve *θέσφατα*, *θεσπίσματα*, *χρησμοί* for oracles directly from the gods, and assign *μαντεύδαι* and *μαντεύματα* to the responses of the diviners. The grain of truth in this is that in *μάντις*, *μαντεύεσθαι*, *μαντεία*, etymologically, what is most prominent is the idea of a special unwonted capacity, attention being directed by these words to the strong spiritual elevation which begets new powers in us. While, on the other hand, in *θεσπίζειν* the reference is directly to the divine inspiration, which, because it is normally delivered in song, is referred to by such forms as *θεσπιωδός*, *θεσπιώδην*. *Χρησμός*, on the other hand, seems an expression which in itself has little direct reference either to the source whence or the form in which the oracle comes, but describes the oracle from the point of view of what it is in itself—viz., a “communication”—going back, as it does, to *χρηῖν*, the original sense of which seems to be “to bestow,” “to communicate.”† *Λόγιον* doubtless may be classed with *χρησμός* in this respect—it is *par excellence* the “utterance,” the “saying.” It would

* The scholium runs: *θέσφατα*, *θεσπίσματα*, *χρησμοί* τὸ αὐτὸ, ἐλέγοντο δὲ ἐπὶ θεῶν *μαντεύδαι* δὲ καὶ *μαντεύματα* ἐπὶ μάντεων ἀνθρώπων.

† The above is abstracted from J. H. HEINR. SCHMIDT in his *Handbuch der Lateinischen und Griechischen Synonymik* (1889), § 21, pp. 77-82. The original meaning assigned to *χρηῖν* (“darreichen,” “ertheilen”) is supported by a reference to Vaníček, p. 250. Surely it is a much more reasonable determination than that of BOUCHÉ-LECLERCQ (*Hist. de la Divination*, i, 192), who would derive it from a cleromantic idea, as if *χρᾶω* signified first of all “entailler.” So he conceives *ἀναρπείν* to refer to the lot, as we say to “draw lots,” as if the Pythoness “drew her revelations as we draw lots.” Schmidt refers the use of this word to the early idea that the words came up out of the depths of the earth.

seem to be distinguished from *χρησμός* by having even less reference than it to the source whence—something as “a declaration” is distinguished from “a message.” If we suppose a herald coming with the cry, “A communication from the Lord,” and then, after delivering the message, adding: “This is His utterance,” it might fairly be contended that in strict precision the former should be *χρησμός* and the latter *λόγιον*, in so far as the former term may keep faintly before the mind the *source* of the message as a thing given, while the latter may direct the attention to its *content* as *the very thing* received, doubtless with a further connotation of its fitness to its high origin. Such subtlety of distinction, however, is not sure to stamp itself on current use, so that by such etymological considerations we are not much advanced in determining the ordinary connotation of the words in usage.

A much more famous discrimination, and one which much more nearly concerns us at present, has been erected on what seems to be a misapprehension of a construction in Thucydides. In a passage which has received the compliment of imitation by a number of his successors,* the historian is describing the agitation caused by the outbreak of the Peloponesian war, one symptom of which was the passion for oracles which was developed. “All Hellas,” he says,† “was excited by the coming conflict between the two cities. Many were the prophecies circulated, and many the oracles chanted by diviners (*καὶ πολλὰ μὲν λόγια ἐλέγοντο, πολλὰ δὲ χρησμολόγοι ᾄδον*), not only in the cities about to engage in the struggle, but throughout Hellas.” And again, as the Lacedæmonians approached the city, one of the marks he, at a later point, notes of the increasing excitement is that “soothsayers (*χρησμολόγοι*) were repeating oracles (*ᾄδον χρησμούς*) of the most different kinds, which all found in some one or other enthusiastic listeners.”‡ On a casual glance the distinction appears to lie on the surface of the former passage that *λόγια* are oracles in prose and *χρησμοί* oracles in verse: and so the scholiast§ on the passage, followed by Suidas||

* *e. g.*, POLYBIUS, 3, 112, 8: “All the oracles preserved in Rome were in everybody’s mouth (*πάντα δ’ ἦν τὰ παρ’ αὐτοῖς λόγια πᾶσι τότε διὰ στόματος*) and every temple and house was full of prodigies and miracles: in consequence of which the city was one scene of vows, sacrifices, supplicatory processions and prayers” (Schuchburgh’s translation). APPIAN, 2, 115, *δείματα τὰ γὰρ ἄλογα πολλοὶς ἐπέειπε περὶ ὄλην Ἰταλίαν. Καὶ μαντευμάτων παλαιῶν ἐπιφοβωτέρων ἐμνημόνεον*. DIONYS. HAL., *Ant.*, vii, 68: *χρησμοὶ τ’ ᾄδοντο ἐν πολλοῖς χωρίοις κτλ.* DIO CASSIUS, 431, 66 and 273, 64, where we read of *λόγια παντοῖα ἤδετο*.

† *ii*, 8. JOWETT’S translation (i, p. 99).

‡ *ii*, 21, JOWETT’S translation (i, 109).

§ In DIDOT’S appendix, p. 416: *Λογία ἔστι τὰ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ λεγόμενα καταλογάδην· χρησμοὶ δὲ οἵτινες ἐμμέτρως λέγονται, θεοφορομένων τῶν λεγόντων.*

|| Ed. BEKKER, p. 666: *λόγια τὰ παρὰ θεοῦ λεγόμενα καταλογάδην, χρησμοὶ δὲ οἵτινες ἐμμέτρως λέγονται· θεοφορομένων λεγόντων.*

defines. But it is immediately obvious on the most cursory glance into Greek literature that the distinction thus suggested will not hold. The *χρησμοί* are, to be sure, commonly spoken of as sung; and the group of words *χρησμοφδός*, *χρησμοφδέω*, *χρησμοφδία*, *χρησμοφδήμα*, *χρησμοφδης*, *χρησμοφδικός*, witnesses to the intimate connection of the two ideas. But this arises out of the nature of the case, rather than out of any special sense attached to the word *χρησμός*: and accordingly, by the side of this group of words, we have others which, on the one hand, compound *χρησμός* with terms not implicative of singing (*χρησμηγορέω*, *χρησμαγόρης*—*χρησμοδοτέω*, *χρησμοδότης*, *χρησμοδότημα*—*χρησμολογέω*, *χρησμολόγος*, *χρησμολογία*, *χρησμολόγιον*, *χρησμολογική*, *χρησμολέσχης*—*χρησμοποιός*), and, on the other hand, compound other words for oracles with words denoting singing (*θεσπιφδέω*, *θεσπιφδήμα*, *θεσπιφδός*). The fact is that, as J. H. Heinr. Schmidt* points out in an interesting discussion, the natural expression of elevated feeling was originally in song: so that the singer comes before the poet and the poet before the speaker. It was thus as natural for the ancients to say *vaticinium* as it is for moderns to say *Weis-sagung* or *sooth-saying*: but as the custom of written literature gradually transformed the consciousness of men, their thought became more logical and less pictorial until even the Pythia ceased at last to speak in verse. Meanwhile, old custom dominated the oracles. They were chanted: they were couched in verse: and the terms which had been framed to describe them continued to bear this implication. Even when called *λόγια*, they prove to be ordinarily† in verse; and these also are said to be sung, as we read, for example, in Dion Cassius (431, 66 and 273, 64): *λόγια παντοία ἤδετο*. What appears to be a pretty constant equivalence in usage of the two terms *χρησμός* and *λόγιον*, spread broadly over the face of Greek literature, seems in any event to negative the proposed distinction. Nor does the passage in Thucydides when more closely examined afford any real ground for it. After all, *λόγια* and *χρησμοί* are not contrasted in this passage: the word *χρησμοί* does not even occur in it. The stress of the distinction falls, indeed, not on the nouns, but on the verbs, the point of the remark being that oracles were scattered among the people by every possible method.‡ If we add that the second

* In his *Handbuch der Lateinischen und Griechischen Synonymik* (Leipzig, 1889), § 21 (pp. 77–82).

† So for example in ARISTOPHANES' *Knights passim* (see below) and in PORPHYRY'S collection of Oracles.

‡ This is the explanation of CROiset in the very sensible brief note he gives on the passage in his attractive edition of Thucydides (Paris, Hachette & Cie., 1886): He says: “*λόγια*, oracles: according to the scholiast, oracles in prose in contrast with *χρησμοί* or oracles in verse; but it may be seen in Aristophanes (*Knights*,

πολλά is probably not to be resolved into πολλοὺς χρησμούς,* the χρησμούς being derived from the χρησμφλόγοι, but is to have λόγια supplied with it from the preceding elause, the assumed distinction between λόγια and χρησμοί goes up at once in smoke. Λόγια alone are spoken of: and these λόγια are said to be both spoken and sung.†

So easy and frequent is the interchange between the two terms that it seems difficult to allow even the more wary attempts of modern commentators to discriminate between them. These ordinarily turn on the idea that λόγια is the more general and χρησμός the more specific word, and go back to the careful study of the Baron de Locella,‡ in his comment on a passage in (the later) Xenophon's *Ephesiaca*. Locella's note does indeed practically cover the ground. He begins by noting the interchange of the two words in the text before him. Then he offers the definition that *oraculorum responsa* are generically λόγια, whether in prose or verse, adducing the λόγια παλαιά of Eurip., *Heracl.*, 406, and the λόγων παθόχρηστον of Plutarch, *Thes.*, i, 55, as instances of λόγια undoubtedly couched in verse; while versified oracles, originally in hexameters and later in iambic trimeters are, specifically, χρησμοί

999-1002), that the two expressions were synonyms: the distinction bears here only on the manner in which these oracles were spread among the people; ἐλέγοντο signifies: they were hawked about from mouth to mouth, without the intervention of the diviners (ἐλέγοντο in the plural, despite the neuter subject, because it is the idea of *diversity* that dominates, rather than an idea of *collectivity*; cf. CURTIUS, *Gr. gr.*, § 363, Rem. 1); ἤδον is the appropriate word in speaking of χρησμολόγοι or oracle-deliverers whose business was to *recite* the prophecies in verse."

* So still FRANZ MÜLLER in his handy edition of this second book (Paderborn, 1886).

† So STEUP-CLASSEN in the fourth edition of Classen's Second Book of Thucydides, brought out by Steup (Berlin, 1889). They say: "ἐλέγοντο: the unusual plural doubtless on account of the variety and diffusion of the λόγια: cf. 5, 26, 2; 6, 62, 4. Λόγια, according to the usage of the anaphora, is to be understood with πολλά in both instances (B. supposes the anaphora would require the prepositing of the noun, as i. 3; but there νεότης is emphasized by και, which is not the case here with λόγια). Ἐλέγοντο: circulated by the mouth of the people, without fixed or metrical form, which would be given them or preserved for them by the χρησμολόγοι who were occupied professionally in the collection (hence—λόγοι) and interpretation of transmitted prophecies (cf. Herod. 7, 6, 142; Schömann, *Gr. Alt.*, 23, 304). The distinction is between ἐλέγοντο and ἤδον, not the object of the λόγια."

‡ pp. 152, 153 of his edition of the piece (Vienna, 1796). It is reprinted entire in PEERLKAMP'S edition (Haarlem, 1818) with this addition by the later editor: "λόγια Latinis interdum *dictiones, dicta, sermones, et logia*; cf. HEINS. ad *Ovid.*, Her. v. 33 et *Observ. Misc. V. I. T. L.*, p. 276. *Apollodorus* in *Biblioth. saepe permittat λόγια et χρησμούς, qui quum scribit I, vi, § 1, τοῖς δὲ θεοῖς λόγων ἦν mīreris interpretem reddentem rumor erat inter deos. De discrimine λόγια inter et χρησμούς eadem jam ex *Aristophane ejusque Schol.* notarat *Tresling*. Adv. pag. 46, 47, addens *L. Bos* ad *Rom. iii. 2* et *Alberti Obs. Phil.* pag. 298 sq."*

—whence *χρησμοδέω* is *vaticinor*, *χρησμοδία*, *vaticinium*, and *χρησμοφδός*, *vates*. As thus the difference between the two words is that of genus and species, they may be used promiscuously for the same oracle. It is worth the trouble, he then remarks, to inspect how often *λόγιον* and *χρησμός* are interchanged in the *Knights* of Aristophanes between verses 109 and 1224, from which the error of the scholiast on Thucid., ii, 8, is clear and of Suidas following him, in making *λόγιον* specifically an oracle in prose, and *χρησμός* one in verse. He then quotes Eustathius on the *Iliad*, ii, ver. 235, and on the *Odyssey*, i, ver. 1426; adduces the gloss, *λόγιον, ὁ χρησμός*; and asks his readers to note what Stephens adduces from Camerarius against this distinction.* The continued designation by Greek writers of the prose Pythian oracles as *χρησμοί* is adverted to, Plutarch's testimony being dwelt on: and relevant scholia on Aristophanes' *Av.*, 960, and *Nub.*, 144, are referred to. It is not strange that Locella's finding, based on so exhaustive a survey of the relevant facts, should have dominated later commentators, who differ from it ordinarily more by way of slight modification than of any real revision—suggesting that *λόγια*, being the more general word, is somewhat less sacred; † or somewhat less precise; ‡ or somewhat less ancient.§ The common difficulty with all these efforts to distinguish the two words is that there is no usage to sustain them. When the two words occur together it is not in contrast but in apparently complete equivalence, and when *λόγιον* appears apart from *χρησμός* it is in a sense which seems in no way to be distinguishable from it. The only qualification to which this statement seems liable, arises from a faintly-felt suspicion that, in accordance with their etymological implications already suggested, *χρησμός* has a tendency to appear when the mind of the speaker is more upon the source of the “oracle” and *λόγιον* when his mind is more upon its substance.

Even in such a rare passage as Eurip., *Heracl.*, 406, where the two words occur in quasi-contrast, we find no further ground for an intelligible distinction between them :

* Stephens (ed. Dindorf-Hase) merely adduces Camerarius' testimony: “So Cam., adding that the discrimination of the grammarians is a false one, although the passage in Thucidides, i (*sic.*) [8] seems to agree with it.”

† This seems to be what HAACK (on Thucid., ii, 8) means when he defines *λόγια* as *αυγυρία, πρᾶξια νatum*, and *χρησμοί* as *oracula deorum*.

‡ This seems the gist of BREDOW'S view (on Thucid., ii, 8): “*χρησμός* cum verbis *χρᾶν* et *χρεῖσθαι* oraculorum propriis cohaerens definite oraculum divinum vocatur; *λόγιον* autem aperte generalius vocabulorum est, sermo ominosus, verbum fatididum quod non interrogatus vel deus, vel vates elocutus est. POPPO and GELLER ad loc. quote these views but add nothing of value to them.

§ Bouché-Leclercq seems almost inclined to revert to Eustathius' statement and look upon *λόγιον* as “an expression peculiar to the Attic dialect, as *πρόφανα* (Herod., v, 63; ix, 93) is an Ionic expression” (*op. cit.*, ii, 130, Note 4).

“ Yet all my preparations well are laid :
 Athens is all in arms, the victims ready
 Stand for the gods for whom they must be slain.
 By seers the city is filled with sacrifice
 For the foes' rout and saving of the state.
 All prophecy-chanters have I caused to meet,
 Into old public oracles have searched,
 And secret, for salvation of this land.*
 And mid their manifest diversities,
 In one thing glares the sense of all the same—
 They bid me to Demeter's daughter slay,
 A maiden of a high-born father sprung.”†

And ordinarily they display an interchangeability which seems almost studied, it is so complete and, as it were, iterant. Certainly, at all events, it is good advice to follow, to go to Aristophanes' *Knights* to learn their usage. In that biting play Demos—the Athenian people—is pictured as “ a Sibyllianizing old man ” with whom Cleon carries favor by plying him with oracles,

ἄδει δὲ χρησμούς· ὁ δὲ γέρων σιβυλλίζᾳ.‡

Nicias steals τὸς χρησμούς from Cleon, and brings τὸν ἱερὸν χρησμόν to Demosthenes, who immediately on reading it exclaims, ὦ λόγια ! §
 “ DEM.: ὦ λόγια. Give me quick the cup! NIC.: Behold, what says the χρησμός? DEM.: Pour on! NIC.: Is it so stated in the λογίσις? DEM.: O Bacis!” To cap the climax, the scholiast remarks on ὦ λόγια: “ (μαντεύματα): he wonders when he reads τὸν χρησμόν.” Only a little later, || Demosthenes is counseling the Sausage Vender not to “ slight what the gods by τοῖς λογίσισι have given ” him and receives the answer: “ What then says ὁ χρησμός?” and after the contents of it are explained the declaration, “ I am flattered by τὰ λόγια.” As the denouement approaches, Cleon and the Sausage Vender plead that their oracles may at least be heard (lines 960–961: οἱ χρησμοί). They are brought, and this absurd scene is the result: “ CLEON: Behold, look here—and yet I've not got all. S. V.: Ah, me! I burst—and yet I've not got all!” DEM.: What are these? CLEON: Oracles (λόγια). DEM.: All! CLEON: Do you wonder? By Jupiter, I've still a chestful left. S. V.: And I an upper with two dwelling rooms. DEM.: Come, let us see whose oracles (οἱ χρησμοί) are these? CLEON: Mine are of Bacis. DEM.: Whose are thine?

* χρησμών δ' ἑσθλοῦς πάντας εἰς ἐν ἀλίσας | ἤλεγε καὶ βέβηλα καὶ κεκρυμμένα | λόγια παλαιὰ τῆ δὲ γῆ σωτηρία.

† WAY'S translation, 398 sq.

‡ Line 61. BLAYDES says: “sensus est, *sensus enim oracula amat.*”

§ Line 120. Wheelwright's translation is used throughout.

|| Line 194.

S. V.: Of Glamis, his elder brother.” And when they are read they are all alike in heroic measure.

It is not in Aristophanes alone, however, that this equivalence meets us: the easy interchange of the two words is, we may say, constant throughout Greek literature. Thus, for example, in the *Corinthiaca* of Pausanias (ii, 20, 10) an oracle is introduced as τὸ λόγιον, and commented on as ὁ χρησμός.* In Diodorus Siculus, ii, 14,† Semiramis is said to have gone to Ammon χρῆσομένη τῷ θεῷ περὶ τῆς ἰδίας τελευτῆς, and, the narrative continues, λέγεται αὐτῇ γενέσθαι λόγιον. Similarly in Plutarch’s *De Defectu Orac.*, v,‡ we have the three terms τὸ χρηστηρίον, τὸ λόγιον and τὰ μαντεῖα ταῦτα equated: in *De Mul. Virt.*, viii,§ the λόγια are explained by what was ἐχρησθη: in *Quæstiones Romanæ*, xxi,|| λόγια came by way of a χρῆσιμωδεῖν. In the *Ephesiaca* of the later Xenophon metrical μαντεύματα are received, the recipients of which are in doubt what τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγια can mean, until, on consideration, they discover a likely interpretation for the χρῆσιμόν that seems to meet the wish of the God who ἐμαντεύσατο.¶

How little anything can be derived from the separate use of λόγιον to throw doubt on its equivalence with χρῆσιμός as thus exhibited, may be observed from the following instances of its usage, gathered together somewhat at random: **

Herodotus, i, 64: “He purified the island of Delos, according to the injunctions of an oracle (ἐκ τῶν λογίων);” i, 120: “We have found even oracles sometimes fulfilled in unimportant ways (τῶν λογίων ἐνια);” iv, 178: “Here in this lake is an island called Phla, which it is said the Lacedæmonians were to have colonized according to an oracle (τὴν νῆσον Λακεδαιμονίοισι φασὶ λόγιον εἶναι κτίσαι);” viii, 60: “Where an oracle has said that we are to overcome our enemies (καὶ λόγιον ἐστὶ τῶν ἐχθρῶν κατὸνέριθε);” viii, 62: “which the prophecies declare we are to colonize (τὰ λόγια λέγει).” Aristophanes, *Vesp.*, 799: ὄρα τὸ χρῆμα, τὰ λόγι’ ὡς περαίνεται; *Knights*, 1050, ταυτὲ τελείσθαι τὰ λόγ’ ἤδη μοι δοκεῖ. Polybius, viii, 30, 6: “For the eastern quarter of Tarentum is full of monuments, because those who

* πρότερον δὲ ἔτι τὸν ἀγῶνα τοῦτον προεσήμηνεν ἡ Πυθία, καὶ τὸ λόγιον εἴτε ἀλλῶς εἴτε καὶ εἰς συνεῖς ἐδήλωσεν Ἡρόδοτος.

Ἄλλ’ ὅταν ἡ θῆλεια τὸν ἄρσενα νικήσασα
ἐξελάσῃ καὶ κῦδος ἐν Ἀργείοισιν ἄρηται
πολλὰς Ἀργείων ἀμφιδρυφέας τότε θῆσει.

Τὰ μὲν ἐς τὸ ἔργον τῶν γυναικῶν ἔχοντα τοῦ χρησμοῦ ταῦτα ἦν. In. v. 3, 1; iv. 9, 4; ix. 37, 4 in like manner χρῆσιμός is identified with μάντευμα.

† BEKKER, i, 150.

‡ ii, 412 D.

§ ii, 247 D. ἀποπειρώμενοι τῶν λογίων. Ἐχρήσθη γὰρ αὐτοῖς. . . .

|| ii, 268 E. ἀποφθέγγεσθαι λόγια, καὶ χρῆσιμωδεῖν τοῖς ἐρωτῶσιν. . . .

¶ i, 6.

** The word, as will be seen, is as old as Herodotus: on the other hand—if we may trust the indices—it does not seem to occur in Homer (DUNBAR’S *Concordance* [to *Odyssey*], GEHRING’S *Index*), Hesiod (PAULSEN’S *Index*), Plato (AST’S *Lexicon*) or Aristotle, Xenophon or Sophocles.

die there are to this day all buried within the walls, in obedience to an ancient oracle (κατά τι λόγιον ἀρχαῖον). Diodorus Siculus ap. Geog. Sync., p. 194 D (*Corpus Scriptorum Historiæ Byzantinæ*, i, 366), "Fabius says an oracle came to Æneas (Αἰνεΐα γενέσθαι λόγιον), that a quadruped should direct him to the founding of a city." Ælian, V. H., ii, 41: "Moreover Mycerinus the Egyptian, when there was brought to him the prophecy from Budo (τὸ ἐκ Βουτιοῦς μαντεῖον), predicting a short life, and he wished to escape the oracle (τὸ λόγιον)" Arrian, *Expediit. Alex.*, ii, 3, 14 (Ellendt., i, 151): ὡς τοῦ λογιῶν τοῦ ἐπὶ τῇ λύσει τοῦ δεσμοῦ ξυμβεβηκότος; vii, 16, 7 (Ellendt., ii, 419), "But when Alexander had crossed the river Tigris with his army, pushing on to Babylon, the wise men of the Chaldeans (Χαλδαίων οἱ λόγοι) met him and separating him from his companions asked him to check the march to Babylon. For they had an oracle from their God Belus (λόγιον ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ Βήλου) that entrance into Babylon at that time would not be for his good. But he answered them with a verse (ἔσπος) of the poet Euripides, which runs thus: 'The best μάντις is he whose conclusion is good.'" Plutarch, *Non posse suaviter vivi*, etc., 24 (1103 F.): "What of that? (quoth Zeuxippus). Shall the present discourse be left imperfect and unfinished because of it? and feare we to alledge the oracle of the gods (τὸ λόγιον πρὸς Ἐπίκουρον λέγοντες) when we dispute against the Epicureans? No (quoth I againe) in any wise, for according to the sentence of Empedocles, 'A good tale twice a man may tell, and heare it told as oft full well;'" *Life of Theseus*, § 26 (p. 12 C, Didot, p. 14), "He applied to himself a certain oracle of Apollo's (λόγιον τι πνυθόχρηστον)" § 27 (p. 12 E, Didot, p. 14): "At length Theseus, having sacrificed to Fear, according to the oracle (κατά τι λόγιον);" *Life of Fabius*, § 4 (Didot, p. 210), Ἐκνήθησαν δὲ τότε πολλαὶ καὶ τῶν ἀπορρήτων καὶ χρησίμων αἰτοῖς βίβλων, ἅς Συβύλλειος καλοῦσι: καὶ λέγεται συνδραμεῖν ἕνια τῶν ἀποκειμένων ἐν αὐταῖς λογιῶν πρὸς τὰς τύχας καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐκείνας. Pausanias, *Attica* [I. 44, 9] (taken unverified from Wetstein): Θύσαντος Διακοῦ κατὰ δὴ τι λόγιον τῷ Πανελληνίῳ Διά. Polyænus, p. 37 (Wetstein) [I, 18]: ὁ θεὸς ἔχρησε—οἱ πολέμοι τὸ λόγιον εἰδότες—τοῦ λογιῶν πεπληρωμένου; p. 347 [IV, 3, 27], ἦν δὲ λόγιον Ἀπόλλωνος. Aristeas, p. 119 (Wetstein): εὐχαριστῶ μὲν. ἄνδρες, ὑμῖν, τῷ δὲ ἀποστείλαντι μάλλον μέγιστον δὲ τῷ θεῷ, οὐκ ἰσχύει εἶσι τὰ λόγια ταῦτα.

A survey of this somewhat miscellaneous collection of passages will certainly only strengthen the impression we derived from those in which *λόγιον* and *χρησμός* occur together—that in *λόγιον* we have a term expressive, in common usage at least, of the simple notion of a divine revelation, an oracle, and that independently of any accompanying implication of length or brevity, poetical or prose form, directness or indirectness of delivery. This is the meaning of *λόγιον* in the mass of profane Greek literature. As we have already suggested, the matter of the derivation of the word is of no great importance to our inquiry: * but we may be permitted to add that the usage seems distinctly favorable to the view that it is to be regarded rather as in origin the neuter of *λόγιος* used substantively, than the diminutive of *λόγος*. No implication of brevity seems to attach to the word in usage; and its exclusive application to "oracles" may perhaps be most easily explained on the supposition that it connotes fundamentally "a wise saying," and implies at all times something above the ordinary run of "words." †

* See above, p. 218.

† Dr. ADDISON ALEXANDER, with his usual clearness, posits the alternative

II. It was with this fixed significance, therefore, that the word presented itself to the Jews of the later centuries before Christ, when the changed conditions were forcing them to give a clothing in Greek speech to their conceptions, derived from the revelation of the old covenant; and thus to prepare the way for the language of the new covenant. The oldest monument of Hellenistic Greek—the Septuagint Version of the Sacred Books, made probably in the century that stretched between 250 and 150 B.C.—is, however, peculiarly ill-adapted to witness to the Hellenistic usage of this word. As lay in the nature of the case, and, as we shall see later, was the actual fact, to these Jewish writers there were no “oracles” except what stood written in these sacred books themselves, and all that stood written in them were “oracles of God.” In a translation of the books themselves, naturally this, the most significant Hellenistic application of the word “oracles,” could find little place. And though the term might be employed within the sacred books to translate such a phrase as, say, “the word of God,” in one form or another not infrequently met with in their pages, the way even here was clogged by the fact that the Hebrew words used in these phrases only imperfectly corresponded to the Greek word *λόγιον*, and were not very naturally represented by it. Though the ordinary Hebrew verb for “saying”—אָמַר*—to which etymologically certain high implications might be thought to be natural, had substantival derivatives, yet these were pretty effectually set aside by a term of lower origin—דְּבַר†—which absorbed very much the

admirably (on Acts vii. 38): “The Greek word (*λόγια*) has been variously explained as a diminutive of (*λόγος*) *word*, meaning a brief, condensed and frequent utterance; or as the neuter of an adjective (*λόγιος*) meaning rational, profound, wise, and as a substantive, a wise saying.” It would seem difficult to rise from a survey of the classical usage without an impression that it justifies the latter derivation. This usage is stated with perfect accuracy by DEMOOR (*Com. in Marekii Compend.*, i, 13): τὸ *λόγιον* “when used substantively may be considered as more emphatic than τὸ *ῥῆμα* or even ὁ *λόγος*: for this term means with the Greeks not any kind of word, but specifically an *oracle*, a *divine response*.”

* It occurs, according to the BROWN-GESENIUS *Lexicon*, no less than 5287 times; according to GIRDLESTONE (*Synonyms of the O. T.*, ed. 2, p. 205), it “is generally rendered in the LXX. *ἔπω* and *λέγω*.” There seems to be inherent in the word an undertone of loftiness or authoritativeness due possibly to its etymological implication of “prominence.” Its derivations are accordingly mostly poetical words designating a lofty speech or authoritative speech.

† The verb, of doubtful origin, occurs according to BROWN-GESENIUS, 1142 times, and is generally rendered in the LXX. (GIRDLESTONE, *loc. cit.*) *λαλέω*. The noun occurs 1439 times and is rendered “generally *λόγος*, sometimes *ῥῆμα*, and in 35 passages, *πράγμα*.”

whole field of the conception "word."* The derivatives of אָמַר—אָמַר, אָמַרָה, אָמַרְהָ, אָמַרְתָּ—in accordance with their etymological impress of loftiness or authority, are relegated to poetic speech (except אָמַרְתָּ, which occurs only in Esther i. 15, ii. 20, ix. 32, and has the sense of *commandment*) and are used comparatively seldom.† Nevertheless, it was to one of these that the Septuagint translators fitted the word λόγιον. To אָמַרְתָּ they naturally consecrated the general terms λόγος, ῥῆμα, πᾶγμα: while they adjusted λόγιον as well as might be to אָמַרָה, and left to one side meanwhile its classical synonyms‡—except μαντεία and its cognates, which they assigned, chiefly, of course, in a bad sense, to the Hebrew קסם in the sense of "divination."

אָמַרָה is, to be sure, in no sense an exact synonym of λόγιον. It is simply a poetical word of high implications, prevaillingly, though not exclusively, used of the "utterances" of God, and apparently felt by the Septuagint translators to bear in its bosom a special hint of the authoritativeness or awesomeness of the "word" it designates. It is used only some thirty-six times in the entire Old Testament (of which no less than nineteen are in Ps. cxix), and designates the solemn words of men (Gen. iv. 23, cf. Isa. xxix. 4 *bis.*, xxviii. 23, xxxii. 9; Ps. xvii. 6; Deut. xxxii. 2) as well as, more prevaillingly, those of God. In adjusting λόγιον to it the instances of its application to human words are, of course, passed by and translated either by λόγος (Gen. iv. 23; Isa. xxix. 4 *bis.*; Isa. xxviii. 23, xxxii. 9), or ῥῆμα (Deut. xxxii. 2;

* There is also the poetic word קָלַל and its derivative noun קְלָה—a word "used in 30 passages, 19 of which are in Job and 7 in Daniel," and rendered in the LXX. λόγος and ῥῆμα (GIRDLESTONE).

† אָמַר, "except in Josh. xxiv. 27 (E) used exclusively in poetry, 48 times, of which 22 are in Proverbs and 11 in Job" (DRIVER on Deut. xxxii. 1). אָמַרָה "only found in poetry (36 times, of which 19 are in Ps. cxix)" (DRIVER on Deut. xxxii. 2). אָמַרְתָּ, Lam. ii. 17 only. אָמַרְתָּ, Esth. i. 15, ii. 20, ix. 32 only. On the general subject of their poetic usage see GREEN, *General Introduction to the O. T.*: *The Text*, p. 19; BLEEK, *Introduction to the O. T.*, E. T., i, 98; HÄVERNICK, *Einleitung*, i. 172; GESENIUS, *Geschichte der hebräischen Sprache*, p. 22, and *Lehrgebäude*, Register, p. 892; VOGEL, *De Dialecto Poetica*.

‡ χρησμός, for example, which we have found the constant accompaniment of λόγιον in the classics and shall find always by its side in Philo, does not occur in the LXX. at all. The cognates χρηματίζω (Jer. xxxii. (28) 30, xxxiii. (26) 2, xxxvi. (29) 23, xxxvii. (30) 2, xliii. (36) 24), χρηματισμός (Prov. xxiv. 69 (xxx. 1), 2 Macc. ii. 4), χρηματιστηρί (2 Kgs. viii. 6), are, however, found, and in their high sense. It is somewhat overstrained for DELITZSCH (on Heb. viii. 5, E. T., Vol. ii, 32) to say: "The Septuagint word for the deliverance of a divine oracle or injunction is χρηματίζειν (τοῖς λόγοις) τινί or πρὸς τινα:" χρηματίζειν is found in this sense only in the LXX. Jeremiah. A very rich body of illustrations for the New Testament usages (Luke ii. 26. Acts x. 22, Heb. viii. 5) might, however, be culled from Philo.

Ps. xvii. 6). In a few other instances, although the term is applied to “words of God,” it is translated by Greek words other than *λόγιον* (2 Sam. xxii. 31, LXX. *βήμα*, and its close parallel, Prov. xxx. 5, LXX. *λόγοι*, though in the other parallels, Ps. xii. 7, xviii. 31, the LXX. has *λόγια*; Ps. cxix. 41, 154, where the LXX. has *λόγος*; in Ps. cxxxviii. 2, the LXX. reads τὸ ἄγιον σου, on which Bæthgen remarks, *in loc.*, that “ἄγιον seems to be a corruption for *λόγιον*,” which is read here by Aquila and the Quinta). In the remaining instances of its occurrences, however—and that is in the large majority of its occurrences—the word is uniformly rendered by *λόγιον* (Deut. xxxiii. 9; Ps. xii. 7 *bis.*, xviii. 31, cv. 19, cxix. 11, 38 [41],* 50, 58, 67, 76, 82, 103, 115, 123, 133, 140, 148, 158, 162, 170, 172, cxlvii. 15; Isa. v. 24). If there is a fringe of usage of אִמְרָה thus standing outside of the use made of *λόγιον*, there is, on the other side, a corresponding stretching of the use made of *λόγιον* beyond the range of אִמְרָה—to cover a few passages judged by the translators of similar import. Thus it translates אִמְרָה in Num. xxiv. 4, 16; Ps. xviii. 15 [xix. 14], cvi. [cvii.] 11, and דְּבַר in Ps. cxviii. [cxix.] 25, 65, 107, 109 [cxlvii. 8]; Isa. xxviii. 13; and it is inserted in a few passages without warrant from the Hebrew, viz., Ps. cxviii. [cxix.] 124, 149; Isa. xxx. 11, 27 *bis.* In twenty-five instances of its thirty-nine occurrences, however, it is the rendering of אִמְרָה.† It is also used twice in the Greek apocrypha (Wis. xvi. 11; Sir. xxxvi. 19 [16]), in quite the same sense. In all the forty-one instances of its usage, it is needless to say, it is employed in its native and only current sense, of “oracle,” a sacred utterance of the Divine Being, the only apparent exception to this uniformity of usage (Ps. xviii. 15 [xix. 14]) being really no exception, but, in truth, significant of the attitude of the translators to the text they were translating—as we shall see presently.

What led the LXX. translators to fix upon אִמְרָה as the nearest Hebrew equivalent to *λόγιον*,‡ we have scanty material for judging. Certainly, in Psalm cxix, where the word most frequently

* In some codd. but in the edd. we read, κατὰ τὸ ἐλεός σου.

† The passages are already enumerated just above.

‡ The other versions add nothing of importance. At Ps. cxix. 41 the אִמְרָה rendered *ἐλεός* by LXX. is rendered *λόγιον* by Aq. and Tb. In Ps. cxxxvii. (cxxxviii). 2 the אִמְרָה rendered by LXX. ἄγιον (though Bæthgen remarks that this seems merely a corruption of *λόγιον*) is rendered *λόγιον* by Aq. and Quinta. In Isa. xxxii. 9, the אִמְרָה rendered in LXX. by *λόγοι* is given as *λόγιον* by Aq., a case quite parallel with Ps. xviii. 15 (xix. 14) in LXX. In Jer. viii. 9 the phrase בְּדִבְרֵי-יְהוָה is rendered in Aq. by *λόγιον*.

occurs, it is difficult to erect a distinction between its implications and those of **דָּבַר** with which it seems to be freely interchanged, but which the LXX. translators keep reasonably distinct from it by rendering it prevailingly by *λόγος*,* while equally prevailingly reserving *λόγιον* for **אֲמָרָה**.† Perhaps the reader may faintly feel even in this Psalm, that **אֲמָרָה** was to the writer the more sacred and solemn word, and was used, in his rhetorical variation of his terms, especially whenever the sense of the awesomeness of God's words or the unity of the whole revelation of God ‡ more prominently occupied his mind; and this impression is slightly increased, perhaps, in the case of the interchange of *λόγιον* and *λόγος* in the Greek translation. When we look beyond this Psalm we certainly feel that something more requires to be said of **אֲמָרָה** than merely that it is poetic. § It is very seldom applied to human words and then only to the most solemn forms of human speech — Gen. xxiv. 23 (LXX., *λόγοι*); Deut. xxxii. 2 (LXX., *ῥήμα*); Ps. xxvii. (LXX., *ῥήμα*); cf. Isa. xxix. 4 *bis* (LXX., *λόγοι*) where the speaker is Jerusalem whose speech is compared to the murmuring of familiar spirits or of the dead, || and Isa. xxviii. 23, xxxii. 9, where the prophet's word is in question. It appears to suggest itself naturally when God's word is to receive its highest praises (2 Sam. xxii. 31; Ps. xii. 7, xviii. 31; Prov. xxx. 5; Ps. cxxxviii. 2), or when the word of Jehovah is conceived as power

* The statistics of this Psalm are: **אֲמָרָה** is used 19 times: being translated by *λόγιον* 17 times, viz., at verses 11, 38, 50, 58, 67, 76, 82, 103, 115, 123, 133, 140, 148, 158, 162, 170, 172; at v. 41 it is translated τὸ ἔλεος, though some codices read τὸν λόγον and some τὸ λόγιον; at v. 154 it is translated by *λόγος*. **דָּבַר** is used 23 times: being translated by *λόγος* 15 times, viz., at verses 9, 16, 17, 28, 42, 43, 49, 74, 81, 89, 101, 130, 147, 160, 161; by *λόγιον* 4 times, viz., at verses 25, 65, 107, 109; by *ἔντολή* twice, viz., at verses 57, 139; by *νόμος* at v. 105, and by *λαός* at v. 114 (though some cod. read *λόγοι* or *λόγος*). *Λόγιον* is used 23 times: being the translation of **אֲמָרָה** 17 times, viz., at verses 11, 38, 50, 58, 67, 76, 82, 103, 115, 123, 133, 140, 148, 158, 162, 170, 172; of **דָּבַר** four times (25, 65, 107, 169); of **הִכָּר** once (124) and of **כִּשְׁפָּט** once (149). *Λόγος* is used 17 times: being the translation of **דָּבַר** fifteen times, viz., at verses 9, 16, 17, 28, 42, 43, 49, 74, 81, 89, 101, 130, 147, 160, 161 and of **אֲמָרָה** once (154, cf. 41), while once (42a) it is inserted without warrant from the Hebrew.

† DELITZSCH on v. 9 *sq.*: "The old classic (*e. g.*, xviii. 31), **אֲמָרָה** alternates throughout with **דָּבַר**; both are intended collectively." PEROWNE on v. 11: "WORD, or rather 'saying,' 'speech,' distinct from the word employed, for instance, in v. 9. Both words are constantly interchanged throughout the Psalm."

‡ DELITZSCH on v. 145-152: "**אֲמָרָה** is here as in verses 140, 158, the whole Word of God, whether in its requirements or its promises."

§ DRIVER on Deut. xxxii. 2: "Only found in poetry (36 times, of which 19 are in Ps. 119); cf. I-a xxviii. 23, xxxii. 9."

|| On this passage cf. KÖNIG, *Offenbarungsbegriff*, ii. 149, 150.

or adduced in a peculiarly solemn way (Ps. cxlvii. 18* ; Isa. v. 24). Perhaps the most significant passage is that in Psalm cv. 19, where the writer would appear to contrast man's word with God's word, using for the former **דָּבָר** (LXX., *λόγος*) and for the latter **אִמְרָה** (LXX., *λόγιον*): Joseph was tried by the word of the Lord until his own words came to pass.† Whatever implications of superior solemnity attached to the Hebrew word **אִמְרָה**, however, were not only preserved, but emphasized by the employment of the Greek term *λόγιον* to translate it—a term which was inapplicable, in the nature of the case, to human words, and designated whatever it was applied to as the utterance of God. We may see its lofty implications in the application given to it outside the usage of **אִמְרָה**—in Num. xxiv. 4, for example, where the very solemn description of Balaam's deliverances—“oracle of the hearer of the words of God” (**אִמְרֵי-אֵל**)—is rendered most naturally *φησὶν ἀκούων λόγια ἰσχυροῦ*. Here, one would say, we have the very essence of the word, as developed in its classical usage, applied to Biblical conceptions: and it is essentially this conception of the “unspeakable oracles of God” (Sir., xxxvi. 19, [16]) that is conveyed by the word in every instance of its occurrence.

An exception has been sometimes found, to be sure, in Ps. xviii. 15 (xix. 14), inasmuch as in this passage we have the words of the Psalmist designated as *τὰ λόγια*: “And the words (*τὰ λόγια*) of my mouth and the meditation of my heart shall be continually before thee for approval, O Lord, my help and my redeemer.” In this passage, however—and in Isa. xxxii. 9 as rendered by Aquila, which is similar—we would seem to have not so much an exception to the usage of *τὰ λόγια* as otherwise known, as an extension of it. The translators have by no means used it here of the words of a human speaker, but of words deemed by them to be the words of God, and called *τὰ λόγια* just because considered the “tried words of God.” This has always been perceived by the more careful expositors. Thus Philippi‡ writes:

“Psalm xix. 14 supplies only an apparent exception, since *τὰ λόγια τοῦ στόματός*

* “The God of Israel is the Almighty Governor of nature. It is He who sends His fiat (אִמְרָתוֹ) after the manner of the **דְּבַר** of the history of creation, cf. xxxiii. 9), earthward. . . . The word is His messenger (cf. in cvii, 20), etc.” DELITZSCH, *in loc.*

† It seems certainly inadequate to render **אִמְרָה** by “saying,” as is very frequently done, *e. g.*, by Dr. JOHN DEWITT in his *Praise Songs of Israel* (we have only the first edition at hand), by Dr. MACLAREN in the cxix Psalm (*Expositor's Bible*) and by Dr. DRIVER at Ps. cv. 19; cf. cxlvii. 15 *seq.* This English word suggests nothing of the lofty implications which seem to have attached to the Hebrew term.

‡ On Rom. iii. 2.

μου there, as spoken through the Holy Spirit, may be regarded as at the same time, *λόγια θεοῦ.*”

And Morrison : *

“ In Psalm xix. 15 (14) the term thus occurs : ‘ let the words of my mouth (*τὰ λόγια τοῦ στόματός μου* = פִּי־רִבְּוֹ, from רִבְּוֹ), and the meditation of my heart, be acceptable in thy sight, O Lord, my strength and my redeemer.’ But even here the term may be fitly regarded as having its otherwise invariable reference. The Septuagint translator looked upon the sacred writer as giving utterance in his Psalm—the words of his mouth—to diviner thoughts than his own, to the thoughts of God Himself. He regarded him as ‘ moved ’ in what he said, ‘ by the Holy Ghost.’ ” †

In a word, we have here an early instance of what proves to be the standing application of *τὰ λόγια* on Hellenistic lips—its application to the Scripture word as such, as the special word of God that had come to them. The only ground of surprise that can emerge with reference to its use here, therefore, is that in this instance it occurs within the limits of the Scriptures themselves : and this is only significant of the customary employment of the term in this application—for, we may well argue, it was only in sequence to such a customary employment of it that this usage could intrude itself thus, unobserved as it were, into the Biblical text itself.

It is scarcely necessary to do more than incidentally advert to the occasional occurrence of *λόγιον* = *λογεῖον* in the Septuagint narrative, as the rendering of the Hebrew *יָצִיחַ*, that is, to designate the breastplate of the high priest, which he wore when he consulted Jehovah. ‡ Bleek writes, to be sure, as follows : §

“ How fully the notion of an utterance of God attended the word according to the usage of the Alexandrians too is shown by the circumstance that the LXX. employed it for the oracular breastplate of the High Priest (*יָצִיחַ*), Ex. xxviii. 15, 22 sq., xxix. 5, xxxix. 8 sq ; Lev. viii. 8 ; Sir. xlv. 12, for which *λογεῖον*, although found in Codd. Vat. and Alex., is apparently a later reading ; *λόγιον*, to which the Latin translation *rationalis* goes back, has also Josephus, *Ant.*, iii, 7, 5, for it : *ἐσθήνης* (*יָצִיחַ*) *μὲν καλεῖται, σημαίνει δὲ τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλήνων γλώτταν λόγιον ;* c. 8, 9 : *ὅθεν Ἕλληνες . . . τὸν ἐσθήνην λόγιον καλοῦσιν ;* viii. 3, 8. And similarly Philo, as may be inferred from his expositions, in that he brings it into connection with *λόγος*, *reason*, although with him too the reading varies between the two forms : see *Legg. Allegor.*, iii, 40, p. 83, A. B. ; § 83, p. 8, C. *Vit. Mos.*, ii, p. 670 C. ; § 12, p. 672 B. ; § 13, p. 673 A. *De Monarch.*, i, ii, 5, p. 824 A.”

* On Rom. iii. 2 (pp. 14, 15).

† Possibly BLEEK in loc. *Heb.* v. 12 means the same thing when he says the word stands here of “ the inspired religious song of the poet.”

‡ Ex. xxviii. 15, 22, 23, 24, 24, 26, xxix. 5, 5 A. R., xxxv. 27, xxxvi. 15, 16, 22, 24, 25, 27, 29, 29 ; Lev. viii. 8, 8 ; Sir. xlv. 10. Also in Aq. : Ex. xxv. 6 (7), xxviii. 4, xxxv. 9. In Sm. : Ex. xxviii. 4, 28. In Th. : Ex. xxv. 6 (7), xxviii. 4, 23, 23, xxviii. 24, 26, 28, xxxv. 9.

§ *Hebrews*, pp. 115, 116, note.

It is much more probable, however, that we have here an itacistic confusion by the copyists, than an application by the Septuagint translators of *λόγιον* to a new meaning. This confusion may have had its influence on the readers of the LXX., and may have affected in some degree their usage of the word: but it can have no significance for the study of the use of the word by the LXX. itself.

III. Among the readers of the Septuagint it is naturally to Philo that we will turn with the highest expectations of light on the Hellenistic usage of the word: and we have already seen Bleek pointing out the influence upon him of the LXX. use of *λόγιον* = *λογεῖον*. Whatever minor influence of this kind the usage of the Septuagint may have had on him, however, Philo's own general employment of the word carries on distinctly that of the profane authors. In him, too, the two words *χρησμός* and *λόγιον* appear as exact synonyms, interchanging repeatedly with each other, to express what is in the highest sense the word of God, an oracle from heaven. The only real distinction between his usage of these words and that of profane authors arises from the fact that to Philo nothing is an oracle from heaven, a direct word of God, except what he found within the sacred books of Israel.* And

* It is not intended to deny that Philo recognized a certain divine influence working beyond the limits of Scripture: but he does this without prejudice to his supreme regard for the Scriptures as the only proper oracles of God. At the opening of the tractate *Quod Omn. Prob. Lib.* (§ 1, M. 444, 445), he gives expression in the most exalted terms to his appreciation of the value of Greek thought: the Pythagoreans are a most sacred brotherhood (*ιερώτατος θίασος*) whose teachings are *κάλαι*, and all men who have genuinely embraced philosophy (*φιλοσοφίαν γνησίως ἠσπάσαντο*) have found one of their *λόγοι* a *θεσμὸν ἰσοῦμενον χρησμῷ*. Elsewhere he speaks of Parmenides, Empedocles, Zenon and Cleanthes and their like as "divi homines" constituting a "sacer coetus" (*De Prov.*, § 48), who did not cast their teachings in verse only because it was fitting that they should not be quite gods (*De Prov.*, § 42). But even here the *χρησμός* is the standard to which their teaching is only likened: with all their wisdom they fall short of deity; and it is the utterance of deity alone which is "oracular"—and this utterance is discernible only in the Scriptures of the Jews. We venture to quote here the statements of Prof. JAMES DRUMMOND (*Philo Judæus*, i, pp. 13 sq): The Scriptures "were the 'oracles,' the 'sacred' or 'divine word,' whose inspiration extended to the most minute particulars. Philo distinguishes indeed different kinds of inspiration, but the distinction did not affect its divine authority. . . . Communion between God and man is among the permanent possibilities of our race; and Philo goes so far as to say that every good and wise man has the gift of prophecy, while it is impossible for the wicked man to become an interpreter of God (*Quis rer. div. heres.* 52 [i, 510]). It is true that he is referring here primarily to the good men in the Scriptures, but he seems to regard them as representatives of a general law. He did not look upon himself as a stranger to this blessed influence, but sometimes 'a more solemn word' spoke from his own soul, and he ventured to write down what it said to him (*Cherubim*, 9 [i, 143]). In one passage he fully records his

the only confusing element in his usage springs from the fact that the whole contents of the Jewish sacred books are to him "oracles," the word of God; so that he has no nomenclature by which the oracles recorded in the Scriptures may be distinguished from the oracles which the Scriptures as such are. He has no higher words than *λόγιον* and *χρησμός* by which to designate the words of God which are recorded in the course of the Biblical narrative: he can use no lower words than these to designate the several passages of Scripture he adduces, each one of which is to him a direct word of God. Both of these uses of the words may be illustrated from his writings almost without limit. A few instances will suffice.

In the following, the "oracle" is a "word of God" recorded in the Scriptures*:

"For he inquires whether the man is still coming hither, and the sacred oracle answers (*ἀποκρίνεται τὸ λόγιον*), 'He is hidden among the stuff' (1 Sam. x. 22)" (*De Migrat. Abrah.*, § 36, pp. 418 E). "For after the wise man heard the oracle which being divinely given said (*θεσπισθέντος λόγιον τοιούτου*) 'Thy reward is exceeding great' (Gen. xv. 1), he inquired, saying. . . . And yet who would not have been amazed at the dignity and greatness of him who delivered this oracle (*τοῦ χρησμῶ ἑόντος*)?" (*Quis rer. div. her.*, § 1, pp. 481 D). "And he (God) mentions the ministrations and services by which Abraham displayed his love to his master in the last sentence of the divine oracle given to his son (*ἀκροτελεύτιον λόγιον τοῦ χρησθέντος αὐτοῦ τῷ υἱεῖ*)" (*Quis rer. div. her.* § 2, pp. 482 E). "To him (Abraham), then, being conscious of such a disposition, an oracular command suddenly comes (*θεσπίζεται λόγιον*), which was never expected (Gen. xxii. 1) . . . and without mentioning the oracular command (*τὸ λόγιον*) to anyone . . ."

(*De Abrah.*, § 32, P., p. 373 E). "[Moses] had appointed his brother high-priest in accordance with the will of God that had been declared unto him (*κατὰ τὰ χρησθέντα λόγια*)" (*De Vita Moysis*, iii, 21, P., p. 569 D). "Moses . . . being perplexed . . . besought God to decide the question and to announce his decision to him by an oracular command (*χρησμῶ*). And God listened to his entreaty and gave him an oracle (*λόγιον θεσπίζει*). . . . We must proceed to relate the oracular commands (*λόγια χρησθέντα*). He says . . . (Num. ix. 10)" (*De Vita Moysis*, iii, 30, P., p. 687 D). "And Balaam replied, All that I have hitherto uttered have been oracles and words of God (*λόγια καὶ χρησμοί*), but what I am going to say are merely the suggestions of my own mind. . . . Why do you give counsel suggesting things contrary to the oracles of God (*τοῖς χρησμοῖς*)

experience (*Migrat. Abrah.*, 7 [i, 441]). . . . Elsewhere he refers to the suggestions of the Spirit which was accustomed to commune with him unseen (*De Somniis*, ii, 38 [i, 692]). . . . But he ascribed to the Biblical writers a fullness of this divine enthusiasm, and consequent infallibility of utterance, which he claimed for no others."

* YONGE'S translation (in Bohn's Ecclesiastical Library) is made use of in these citations. The paging of Mangey is often given and sometimes that of the Paris edition: but the edition of Richter is the one that has been actually used. The shortcomings of Yonge's translation (cf. EDERSHEIM'S article, *Philo*, in Smith and Wace's *Dictionary of Christian Biography*, iv, 367 A, Note o), will be evident to the reader; but when important for our purpose will be correctable from the Greek clauses inserted.

unless indeed that your counsels are more powerful than his decrees (λόγιον)?” (*De Vita Moysis*, i, 53, P., p. 647 D). “Was it not on this account that when Cain fancied he had offered up a lameless sacrifice an oracle (λόγιον) came to him? . . . And the oracle is as follows (τὸ δὲ λόγιόν ἐστι τοιόνδε) (Gen. iv. 7)” (*De Agricult.*, § 29, M. i, 319). “And a proof of this may be found in the oracular answer given by God (τὸ θεοπισθὲν λόγιον) to the person who asked what name he had: ‘I am that I am’” (*De Somniis*, § 40, M. 1, 655). “But when he became improved and was about to have his name changed, he then became a man born of God (ἄνθρωπος θεοῦ) according to the oracle that was delivered to him (κατὰ τὸ χρησθὲν αὐτῷ λόγιον), ‘I am thy God’” (*De Gigant.*, § 14, M. 1, 271). “For which reason, a sacred injunction to the following purport (διὸ καὶ λόγιον ἐχρήσθη τῷ σοφῷ τοιόνδε) ‘Go thou up to the Lord, thou and Aaron,’ etc. (Gen. xxiv. i). And the meaning of this injunction is as follows: ‘Go thou up, O soul’” (*De Migrat. Abrah.*, § 31, M. 1, 462). “For which account an oracle of the all-merciful God has been given (λόγιον τοῦ Ἰλω θεοῦ μεστὸν ἡμερότητος) full of gentleness, which shadows forth good hopes to those who love instruction in these times, ‘I will never leave thee nor forsake thee’ (Jos i. 5)” (*De Confus. Ling.*, § 32, M. i, 430). “Do you not recollect the case of the soothsayer Balaam? He is represented as hearing the oracles of God (λόγια θεοῦ) and as having received knowledge from the Most High, hut what advantage did he reap from such hearing, and what good accrued to him from such knowledge?” (*De Mutat. Nominum*, § 37). “There are then a countless number of things well worthy of being displayed and demonstrated; and among them one which was mentioned a little while ago; for the oracle (τὸ λόγιον) calls the person who was really his grandfather, the father of the practiser of virtue, and to him who was really his father it has not given any such title; for it says, ‘I am the Lord God of Abraham, thy Father’ (Gen. xxviii. 41), and in reality he was his grandfather, and, again, ‘the God of Isaac,’ not adding this time, ‘thy Father’ (Gen. xxviii. 13) (*De Somniis*, i, § 27). “And there is something closely resembling this in the passage of Scripture (*lit.* the oracle: τὸ χρησθὲν λόγιον) concerning the High Priest (Lev. xvi. 17)” (*De Somniis*, ii, § 34).

On the other hand, in the following instances, the reference is distinctly to Scripture as such:

“And the following oracle given with respect to Enoch (τὸ χρησθὲν ἐπὶ Ἐνώχ λόγιον) proves this: ‘Enoch pleased God and he was not found’ (Gen. v. 24)” (*De Mutat. Nom.*, § 4).

It is a portion of the narrative Scriptures which is thus adduced.

“But let us stick to the subject before us and follow the Scripture (ἀκολουθήσαυτες τῷ λογίῳ) and say that there is such a thing as wisdom existing, and that he who loves wisdom is wise” (*do.*).

Here τὸ λόγιον is either Scripture in general, or, perhaps more probably, the passage previously under discussion and still in mind (Gen. v. 24).

“Μαρτυρεῖ δέ μοι λόγιον τὸ χρησθὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἀβραάμ τόδε, ‘He came into the place of which the Lord God had told him; and having looked up with his eyes, he saw the place afar off (Gen. xxii. 4)’” (*De Somniis*, i, 11).

This narrative passage of Scripture is here cited as λόγιον τὸ χρησθὲν.

“This is a boast of a great and magnanimous soul, to rise above all creation, and

to overleap its boundaries and to cling to the great uncreated God above, according to his sacred commands (*κατὰ τὰς ἱεράς ἐψηγήσεις*) in which we are expressly enjoined 'to cleave unto him' (Dent. xxx. 20). Therefore he in requital bestows himself as their inheritance upon those who do cleave unto him and who serve him without intermission; and the sacred Scripture (*ῥόγιον*) bears its testimony in behalf of these, when it says, 'The Lord himself is his inheritance' (Dent. x. 9)" (*De Congressu crud. grat.*, § 24, p. 443).

Here the anarthrous *ῥόγιον* is probably to be understood of "a passage of Scripture"—viz., that about to be cited.

"Moreover she (Consideration) confirmed this opinion of hers by the sacred scriptures (*χρησιμαίς*), one of which ran in this form (*ἐνὶ μὲν τοιῶδε*—without verb) (Dent. iv. 4). . . . She also confirmed her statement by another passage in scripture of the following purport (*ἐτέρω τοιῶδε χρησιμῶ*) (Dent. xxx. 15) . . . and in another passage we read (*καὶ ἐν ἑτέροις*) (Dent. xxx. 20). And again this is what the Lord himself hath said . . . (Lev. x. 3) . . . as it is also said in the Psalms (Ps. cxiii. 25) . . . but Cain, that shameless man, that parricide, is nowhere spoken of in the Law (*οὐδαμῶ τῆς νομοθεσίας*) as dying: but there is an oracle delivered respecting him in such words as these (*ἀλλὰ καὶ ῥόγιόν ἐστιν ἐπ' αὐτῷ χρῆσθ' ἐν τοιοῦτο*): 'The Lord God put a mark upon Cain' (Gen. iv. 16)" (*De Profug.*, § 11, M. i, 555).

Here it is questionable whether "the Law" (*ἡ νομοθεσία*) is not broad enough to include all the passages mentioned—from Genesis, Leviticus and the Psalms—as it is elsewhere made to include Joshua (*De Migrat. Abrah.*, § 32, M. i, 464. See Ryle: p. xix). At all events, whatever is in this *νομοθεσία* is a *χρησθ' ἐν ῥόγιον*: the passage more particularly adduced being a narrative one.

"After the person who loves virtue seeks a goat by reason of his sins, but does not find one; for already as the sacred scripture tells us (*ὡς δηλοῖ τὸ ῥόγιον*), 'It hath been burnt' (Lev. x. 16) . . . Accordingly the scripture says (*ρησιν οὖν ὁ χρησμὸς*) that Moses 'sought and sought again,' a reason for repentance for his sins in mortal life . . . on which account it is said in the scripture (*διὸ λέγεται*) (Lev. xvi. 20)" (*De Profug.*, § 28, M. i, 569).

Here τὸ ῥόγιον seems to mean not so much a passage in Scripture as "Scripture" in the abstract: Lev. x. 16 not being previously quoted in this context. The same may be said of the reference of ὁ χρησμὸς in the next clause and of the simple *λέγεται* lower down—the interest of the passage turning on the entire equivalence of the three modes of adducing Scripture.

"This then is the beginning and preface of the prophecies of Moses under the influence of inspiration (*τῆς ἐνθουσιασμοῦ προφητείας Μωϋσεώς*). After this he prophesied (*θεσπίζει*) . . . about food . . . being full of inspiration (*ἐπιθειάσας*) . . . Some thinking, perhaps, that what was said to them was not an oracle (*οὐ χρησμοίς*). . . . But the father established the oracle by his prophet (*τὸ ῥόγιον τοῦ προφήτου*). . . . He gave a second instance of his prophetic inspiration in the oracle (*ῥόγιον*, anarthrous) which he delivered about the seventh day" (*De Vit. Moysis*, iii, 35 and 36).

"And the holy oracle that has been given (*τὸ χρῆσθ' ἐν ῥόγιον* = "the delivered oracle;" Ryle, "the utterance of the oracle") will bear witness, which expressly says that he cried out loudly and betrayed clearly by his cries what he had suf-

ferred from the concrete evil, that is from the body” (*Quod det. pot. insid.*, § 14, M. I., 200).

Here the narrative in Gen. iv, somewhat broadly taken, including vers. 8 and 10, is called τὸ χρησθὲν λόγιον.

“There is also something like this in the sacred scriptures where the account of the creation of the universe is given and it is expressed more distinctly (τὸ παραπλήσιον καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεως χρησθεῖσι λόγοις περιέχεται σημειωδέσπερον). For it is said to the wicked man, ‘O thou man, that hast sinned; cease to sin’ (Gen. iv. 7)” (*De Sobriet.*, § 10, M. I., 400).

Here there is a formal citation of a portion of Scripture, viz., the portion “concerning the creation of the universe,” which means, probably, the Book of Genesis (see Ryle’s *Philo and Holy Scripture*, p. xx); and this is cited as made up of “declared oracles,” ἐν τοῖς χρησθεῖσι λόγοις. The Book of Genesis is thus to Philo a body of χρησθέντα λόγια.

“And this is the meaning of the oracle recorded in Deuteronomy (παρ’ ὃ καὶ λόγιόν ἐστι τοιοῦτον ἀναγεγραμμένον ἐν Δευτερονομίῳ), ‘Behold I have put before thy face life and death, good and evil’” (*Quod Deus Immut.*, § 10, M. i., 280).

Here the “oracle” is a “written” thing; and it is written in a well-known book of oracles, viz., in “Deuteronomy,” the second book of the Law. This book, and of course the others like it, consists of written oracles.

“And the words of scripture show this, in which (δηλοῖ δὲ τὸ λόγιον ἐν εἴ) it is distinctly stated that ‘they both of them went together, and came to the plain which God had mentioned to them (Gen. xxii. 3)’” (*De Migrat. Abrah.*, § 39, M. i., 462).

“And for this reason the following Scripture has been given to men (διὸ λόγιον ἐχρήσθη τοιάνθε), ‘Return to the land of thy father and to thy family, and I will be with thee’ (Gen. xxxi. 3)” (*De Migrat. Abrah.*, § 6, M. i., 440).

Here, though the words are spoken in the person of God, the generalized use of them seems to point to their Scriptural expression as the main point.

“Moses chose to deliver each of the ten commandments (ἐκάστον θεσπίζειν τῶν δέκα λόγιων) in such a form as if they were addressed not to many persons but to one” (*De Decem Oracul.*, περὶ τῶν Δέκα Λογιῶν, § 10).

“And the sacred scripture (λόγιον, anarthrous) bears its testimony in behalf of this assertion, when it says: ‘The Lord himself is his inheritance’ (Deut. x. 9)” (*De Congr. Erud. Grat.*, § 24, M. i., 553).

“For there is a passage in the word of God (λόγιον γὰρ ἔστω) that . . . (Lev. xxvi. 3)” (*De praem. et poen.*, § 17, M. ii., 424).

Both classes of passages thus exist in Philo’s text in the greatest abundance—no more those which speak of words of God recorded in Scripture as λόγια than those which speak of the words of Scripture as such as equally λόγια. Nor are we left to accord the two classes of passages for ourselves. Philo himself, in what we may call an even overstrained attempt at systematization, elabo-

rately explains how he distinguishes the several kinds of matter which confront him in Scripture. The fullest statement is probably that in the *De Vita Moysis*, iii, 23 (Mangey, ii, 163). Here he somewhat artificially separates three classes of "oracles," all having equal right to the name. It is worth while to transcribe enough of the passage to set its essential contents clearly before us. He is naturally in this place speaking directly of Moses —as indeed commonly in his tracts, which are confined, generally speaking, to an exposition of the Pentateuch: but his words will apply also to the rest of the "sacred books," which he uniformly treats as the oracles of God alike with the Pentateuch.* He writes:

"Having shown that Moses was a most excellent king and lawgiver and high priest, I come in the last place to show that he was also the most illustrious of the prophets (προφήτων). I am not unaware, then, that all the things that are written in the sacred books are oracles delivered by him (ὡς πάντα εἰσι χρησμοὶ ὅσα ἐν ταῖς ἱεραῖς βίβλοις ἀναγέγραπται δι' αὐτοῦ); and I will set forth what more particularly concerns him, when I have first mentioned this one point, namely, that of the sacred oracles (τῶν λογίων) some are represented as delivered in the person of God by His interpreter, the divine prophet (ἐκ προσώπου τῶν θεοῦ δι' ἐρμηνείας τοῦ θεοῦ προφήτου), while others are put in the form of question and answer (ἐκ πείσεως καὶ ἀποκρίσεως ἐνθεσπίσθη), and others are delivered by Moses in his own character, as a divinely prompted lawgiver possessed by divine inspiration (ἐκ προσώπου Μωυσέως ἐπιθευιάσαντος καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ κατασχεθέντος).

"Therefore all the earliest [Gr. πρῶτα = the first of the three classes enumerated] oracles are manifestations of the whole of the divine virtues and especially of that merciful and boundless character by means of which He trains all men to virtue, and especially the race which is devoted to His service, to which He lays open the road leading to happiness. The second class have a sort of mixture and communion (μίξιν καὶ κοινωνίαν) in them, the prophet asking informa-

* Cf. on this matter EDERSHEIM in Smith and Wace's *Dictionary of Christian Biography*, art. "Philo" (Vol. iv, pp. 386, 387): The only books "of which it may with certainty be said that they are not referred to by Philo, are *Esther* and the *Song of Solomon*. The reference to *Ecclesiastes* is very doubtful, much more so than that to *Daniel* (p. 387 a)." Cf. also RYLE, *Philo and Holy Scripture*, pp. xvi-xxv: "It is abundantly clear that to Philo the Pentateuch was a Bible within a Bible, and that he only occasionally referred to other books, whose sanctity he acknowledged, as opportunity chanced to present itself" (p. xxvii). Cf. also EWALD, *History of Israel*, E. T., vii, 204, 205: "Although he uses, and generally in the order in which they are now found in the Hebrew Canon, the other books much less *gradatim* than the Pentateuch, their authors are, nevertheless, considered by him as of equal holiness and divinity with Moses, and inasmuch as from his whole view and treatment of the Scriptures, he can attribute but little importance to their authors as authors, or to their names and temporal circumstances, he likes to call them all simply friends, or associates, or disciples of Moses, or prefers still more to quote the passage to which he refers simply as a sacred song, sacred word, etc." "It is only the books which we now find collected in the Hebrew Canon which he regarded as holy, and he was both sufficiently learned and careful not to rank all the others which were at that time gradually appended to the Greek Bible upon an equality with them." Cf. also LEE, *The Inspiration of Holy Scripture*, pp. 69, 70.

tion on the subjects as to which he is in difficulty and God answering him and instructing him. The third sort are attributed to the lawgiver, God having given him a share in His prescient power by means of which he is enabled to foretell the future.

“Therefore we must for the present pass by the first; for they are too great to be adequately praised by any man, as indeed they could scarcely be panegyriized worthily by the heaven itself and the nature of the universe; and they are also uttered by the mouth, as it were, of an interpreter (καὶ ἄλλως λέγεται ὡσανεὶ δι’ ἐρμηνέως). But (δὲ) interpretation and prophecy differ from one another. And concerning the second kind I will at once endeavor to explain the truth, connecting with them the third species also, in which the inspired character (ἐνθουσιώδεις) of the speaker is shown, according to which he is most especially and appropriately looked upon as a prophet.”*

A somewhat different distribution of material—now from the point of view, not of mode of oracular delivery, but of nature of contents—is given at the opening of the tract *De præm. et poen.* (§ 1, init.):

“We find then that in the sacred oracles delivered by the prophet Moses (τῶν διὰ τοῦ προφήτου Μωϋσέως λογίων) there are three separate characters: for a portion of them relates to the creation of the world, a portion is historical, and the third portion is legislative.”

Accordingly in the tract *De Legat. ad Caium*, § 31 (Mangey, ii, 577), we are told of the high esteem the Jews put on their laws:

“For looking upon their laws as oracles directly given to them by God Himself (θεόχρηστα γὰρ λόγια τοῖς νόμοις εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνοντες) and having been instructed in this doctrine from their earliest infancy, they bear in their souls the images of the commandments contained in these laws as sacred.”

By the side of this passage should be placed doubtless another

* Compare EWALD, *The History of Israel*, E. T., vii, 203, 204: “The sacred Scriptures are to Philo so immediately divine and holy, that he consistently finds in them simply the divine word rather than Scripture, and therefore really everywhere speaks less of the *Sacred Scriptures* than of divine oracles [χρησμοί, λόγια] of which they were wholly composed, or, when he desires to designate them briefly as a whole, of *the sacred and divine Word*, as if the same Logos, of whom he speaks so much elsewhere, were symbolized and incorporated in them for all time, as far as that is possible in a book [ὁ ἱερὸς, more rarely ὁ θεϊκὸς λόγος, likewise ὁ ὁρθὸς λόγος (e. g., i, 308, 27; 681, 17; comp. esp., ii, 163, 41) is the expression which he constantly uses in this case; comp. esp. i, 676, 37 sq.; 677, 12]. It is true that in the case of the general subject matter, of the Pentateuch for instance, he makes a certain distinction, inasmuch as some of the oracles came to the prophet, as a mere interpreter directly as from the presence and voice of God alone, while others are revealed to him by God in answer to his interrogations, and again others have their origin in himself when in an inspired state of mind. But he makes this threefold distinction simply because he found it in reading particular passages of the Bible, and not with a view of further reflecting upon it and drawing inferences from it. On the contrary, he regards and treats all the sentences and words of the Scripture as on a perfect equality and teaches expressly that sacred Scripture must be interpreted and applied, as forming even to its smallest particles, one inseparable whole [cf. esp. *Auch.*, ii, 170, 212 sq.; in other respects, cf. i, 554, 14, and many other passages of a similar character].”

from the *De Vita Contemplativa*, § 3, since it appears that we may still look on this tract as Philo's :

"And in every house there is a sacred shrine Studying in that place the laws and sacred oracles of God enunciated by the holy prophets (*νόμους καὶ λόγια θεοπισθέντα διὰ προφητῶν*) and hymns and psalms and all kinds of other things by reason of which knowledge and piety are increased and brought to perfection."

It is not strange that out of such a view of Scripture Philo should adduce every part of it alike as a *λόγιον*. Sometimes, to be sure, his discrimination of its contents into classes shows itself in the formulæ of citation: and we should guard ourselves from being misled by this. Thus, for example, he occasionally quotes a *λόγιον* "from the mouth (or 'person') of God"—which does not mean that Scriptures other than these portions thus directly ascribed to God as speaking, are less oracular than these, but only that these are oracles of his first class—those that "are represented as delivered from the person of God (*ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ θεοῦ*) by his interpreter, the divine prophet." A single instance or two will suffice for examples :

"And the sacred oracle which is delivered as" [dele "as"] "from the mouth" [or "person"] "of the ruler of the universe (*λόγιον ἐκ προσώπου θεοπισθέν τοῦ τῶ ὄλων ἡγεμόνος*) speaks of the proper name of God as never having been revealed to anyone* when God is represented as saying, 'For I have not shown them my name' (Gen. vi. 3)" (*De Mutat. Nom.*, § 2). "And the oracles" (*οἱ χρησμοί* which is a standing term for 'the Scriptures' in Philo) "bear testimony, in which it is said to Abraham *ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ θεοῦ* (Gen. xvii. 1)" (*ditto*, § 5). "And he (Jeremiah the prophet) like a man very much under the influence of inspiration (*ἄτε τα πολλὰ ἐνθουσιῶν*) uttered an oracle in the character of God (*χρησμὸν τινα ἐξείπε ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ θεοῦ*) speaking in this manner to most peaceful virtue: 'Hast thou not called me as thy house' etc. (Jer. iii. 4)" (*De Cherub.*, § 14, M. i, 148).

The other oracles, delivered not *ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ θεοῦ* but in dialogue or in the person of the prophet, are, however, no less oracular or authoritative. To Philo all that is in Scripture is oracular, every passage is a *λόγιον*, of whatever character or length; and the whole, as constituted of these oracles, is *τὰ λόγια*, or perhaps even *τὸ λόγιον*—the mass of logia or one continuous logion.

It is not said, be it observed, that Philo's sole mode of designating Scripture, or even his most customary mode, is as *τὰ λόγια*. As has already been stated, he used *χρησμός* equally freely with *λόγιον* for passages of Scripture, and *οἱ χρησμοί* apparently even more frequently than *τὰ λόγια* for the body of Scripture. Instances of the use of the two terms interchangeably in the same passage have already been incidentally given.† A very few passages will

* The translation here is unusually expanded: the Greek runs *Δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ λ. ε. π. θ. τ. τ. δ. ἡ. περὶ τοῦ μηδὲν δεδηλωσθαι ὄνομά τι αὐτοῦ κέρτιον, κτλ.*

† *De Profug.*, §§ 11 and 28; *De Vita Moysis*, i, 53; iii, 23, 30, 35, 36.

suffice to illustrate his constant use of *χρησμός* and *οἱ χρησμοί* separately.

In the following instances he adduces passages of Scripture, each as a *χρησμός*:

“On this account also the oracle (*ὁ χρησμός*) which bears testimony against the pretended simplicity of Cain says, ‘You do not think as you say’ (Gen. iv. 15)” (*Quod det. potiori insid.*, § 45, M. i, 223). “And of the supreme authority of the living God, the sacred scripture is a true witness (*ὁ χρησμός ἀληθὴς μάρτυρ*) which speaks thus (Lev. xxv. 23)” (*De Cherub.*, § 31, M. i, 158). “For a man will come forth, says the word of God (*φησὶν ὁ χρησμός*) leading a host and warring furiously, etc. (Num. xxiv. 7)” (*De Proem. et Poen.*, § 16, M. ii, 423). “And the sacred scripture bears witness to this fact (*μαρτυρεῖ δὲ ὁ περὶ τούτων χρησμός*) : for it says (Num. xxiii. 19)” (*De Migrat. Abrah.*, § 20, M. i, 454). “For though there was a sacred scripture (*χρησμοῦ γὰρ ὄντος*) that ‘There should be no harlot among the daughters of the seer, Israel’ (Gen. xxxiv. 1, Deut. xxiii. 15)” (*De Migrat. Abrah.*, § 39, M. i, 472). “And witness is borne to this assertion by the scripture (*μάρτυρ δὲ καὶ χρησμός*) in which it is said : ‘I will cause to live,’ etc. (Deut. xxxii. 39)” (*De Somniis*, ii, 45, M. i, 698). “The oracle (*ὁ χρησμός*) given to the all-wise Moses, in which these words are contained” (*Quod det. pot. insid.*, § 34, M. i, 215). “Which also the oracle (*ὁ χρησμός*) said to Cain” (do., § 21). “And I know that this illustrious oracle was formerly delivered from the mouth of the prophet (*στόματι δ’ οἶδα ποτε προφητικῷ θεσπισθέντα διάπτρον τοιδένδε χρησμόν*), ‘Thy fruit,’ etc., (Hos. xiv. 9)” (*De Mutat. Nom.*, § 24, M. ii, 599). In this last case it is to be noticed that the “oracle” is taken from Hosea : the corresponding passage in *De Plant. Noe.*, § 33, M. i, 350, should be compared : “And with this assertion, this oracle delivered by one of the prophets is consistent, etc. (Hos. xiv. 11) (*τούτω καὶ παρὰ τινι τῶν προφητῶν χρησθὲν συνάδει τοδε*).”

Two other passages may be adduced for their inherent interest. The first from *De Profug.*, § 32 (M. i, 573), where we read :

“There are passages written in the sacred scriptures (*οἱ ἀναγραφέντες χρησμοί*) which give proof of these things. What they are we must now consider. Now in the very beginning of the history of the law there is a passage to the following effect (Gen. ii. 6) (*αἰδεταί τις ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς νομοθεσίας μετὰ τὴν κοσμοποιίαν εὐθὺς τοῖσδε*).”

Here there is a precise designation where, among “*the written χρησμοί*,” a certain one (*τις*) of them may be found, viz., in the beginning of “The Legislation” immediately after “The Creation” (cf. Ryle, p. xxi, note 1). The other is from the first book of the *De Somniis*, § 27 (M. i, 646) :

“These things are not my myth, but an oracle (*χρησμός*) written on the sacred tables (*ἐν ταῖς ἱεραῖς ἀναγεγραμμένους στήλαις*), For it says (Gen. xli. 1).”

This passage in Genesis is thus an oracle “*written in the sacred tablets*”—and thus this phrase emerges as one of Philo’s names for the Scriptures. Elsewhere we read somewhat more precisely :

“Now these are those men who have lived irreproachably and admirably, whose virtues are durably and permanently recorded as on pillars in the sacred scriptures (*ὡν τὰς ἀρετὰς ἐν ταῖς ἱερωπάταις ἐστηλιτεῦσθαι γραφαῖς συμβέβηκεν*)” (*De Abrah.*, 1, M. ii, 2). “There is also in another place the following sentence (*γράμμα*) deeply engraven (*ἐστηλιτεμένον*), (Deut. xxxii. 8)” (*De Congr. Erud. Grat.*, § 12, M. i. 527).

The "Scriptures" thus bear to Philo a monumental character: they are a body of oracles written, and more—a body of oracles permanently engraved to be a lasting testimony forever.

The designations for Scripture in Philo are, indeed, somewhat various—such as *ἱεραὶ γραφαί* (*Quis rerum div. heres*, § 32 M. i, 495); *ἱεραὶ βιβλοὶ* (*Quod det. pot. insid.*, § 44, i, 222); *τὰ ἱερά γράμματα* (*Legat. ad Caium.*, § 29, ii, 574). But probably none are used so frequently as, on the one hand, *λόγος*, with various adjectival enhancements—such as *ὁ προσηγητικὸς λόγος* (*De Plantat. Noe*, § 28, M. i 137), *ὁ θεῖος λόγος* (*Legg. Alleg.*, iii, § 3, M. i, 89; *De Mutat. Nom.*, § 20; *De Somniis*, i, 33, ii, 37), and *ὁ ἱερὸς λόγος* (*De Ebriet.*, § 36, M. i, 380; *De Mut. Nominum*, § 38; *De Somniis*, i, 14, 22, 33, 35, 37, 39, 42; ii, 4, 9, 37, etc.); and especially, on the other hand, *οἱ χρησμοί*, occurring at times with extraordinary frequency.* Some passages illustrative of this last usage are the following:

"For the sacred Scriptures (*οἱ χρησμοί*) say that he entered into the darkness" (*De Mutat. Nom.*, § 2). "But the sacred oracles (*οἱ χρησμοί*) are witnesses of that in which Abraham is addressed (the words being put in the mouth of God), (*ἐν οἷς λέγεται τῷ Ἀβραάμ ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ θεοῦ*) (Gen. xvii. 1)" (*do.* § 5). "And these are not my words only but those of the most holy scriptures (*χρησμῶν τῶν ἱερατάτων*,—anarthrous to bring out the quality in contrast to *ἐμὸς μῦθος*), in which certain persons are introduced as saying . . ." (*do.* § 23). Of Isaiah xlviii. 22 it is said in *do.* § 31: *λόγος γὰρ ὄντως καὶ χρησμός ἐστι θεῖος*. "Accordingly the Holy scriptures (*οἱ χρησμοί*) tell us that . . ." (*do.* § 36). "Therefore the sacred scriptures (*οἱ χρησμοί*) represent Leah as hated" (*do.* § 44) "For she is represented by the sacred oracles (*διὰ τῶν χρησμῶν*) as having left off all womanly ways (Gen. xviii. 12)" (*De Ebrietat.* § 14, M. i, 365). "On which account the holy scripture (*οἱ χρησμοί*) very beautifully represent it as 'a little city and yet not a little one'" (*De Abrah.*, § 31, M. ii, 25). "Therefore the sacred scriptures (*οἱ χρησμοί*) say (Gen. xxiv. 6)" (*De Sobriet.*, § 4, M. i, 395). "According as the sacred scriptures (*οἱ χρησμοί*) testify, in which it is said (Ex. viii. 1)" (*De Confus. Ling.*, § 20, M. i, 419). "On which account it is said in the sacred scriptures (*ἐν χρησμοῖς*) (Deut. vii. 7)" (*De Migrat. Abrah.*, § 11, M. i, 445). "God having drawn up and confirmed the proposition, as the Scriptures (*οἱ χρησμοί*) show, in which it is expressly stated that (Deut. xxx. 4)" (*De Confus. Ling.*, § 38 M. i, 435).

When we combine these passages with those in which *λόγιον* occurs it will probably not seem too much to say that the dominant method of conceiving the Bible in Philo's mind was as a book of oracles. Whether he uses the word *λόγιον* or *χρησμός*, it is, of course, all one to him. Indeed, that nothing should be lacking he occasionally uses also other synonyms. For example, here is an instance of the Homeric word *θεοπροπίον* cropping out:

* Philo's designations of Scripture have been collected by CL. FREES HORNEMANN, in his *Observationes ad illustr. doctr. de Can. V. T. ex. Philone* (1775); more briefly by EICHORN in his *Einl. in d. A. Test.*; and in a not altogether complete or exact list by RYLE, *Philo and Holy Scripture*.

“For there is extant an oracle delivered to the wise man in which it is said (Lev. xxvi. 12), (*καὶ ἔστι χρησθὲν τῷ σοφῷ θεοπρόπιον ἐν ᾧ λέγεται*)” (*De Somniis*, i, § 23). And this oracular conception of Scripture is doubtless the reason why it is so frequently quoted in Philo by the subjectless *φησί, λέγει, λέγεται* (instead of, say, *γέγραπται*). There are in general, speaking broadly, three ways in which one fully accepting the divine origin and direct divine authority of Scripture may habitually look upon it. He may think of it as a library of volumes and then each volume is likely to be spoken of by him as a *γραφή* and the whole, because the collection of volumes, as *αἱ γραφαί*, or, when the idea of its unity is prominently in mind, as itself *ἡ γραφή*. On the other hand, the sense of its composite character may be somewhat lost out of habitual thought, swallowed up in the idea of its divine unity, and then its several sentences or passages are apt to be thought and spoken of as each a *γράμμα*, and the whole, because made up of these sentences or passages, as *τὰ γράμματα*. Or, finally, the sense of the direct divine utterance of the whole to the soul, and of its immediate divine authority, may overshadow all else and the several sentences or passages of the book be each conceived as an unmediated divine word coming directly to the soul—and then each passage is likely to be called a *λόγιον* or *χρησμός*, and the whole volume, because the sum of these passages, *τὰ λόγια* or *οἱ χρησμοί*—or occasionally, when its unity is prominently in mind, one great *τὸ λόγιον* or *ὁ χρησμός*. Each of these three ways of looking at the Scriptures of the Old Testament finds expression in Philo,* in Josephus and in the New Testament. But it is the last that is most characteristic of the thought of Philo, and the first possibly of the writers of the New Testament: † while perhaps we may suspect that the intermediate

* As to *γραφαί*, see *Quis rerum div. heres*, § 32 (Mangey, i, 495), *παρ' ὃ καὶ ἐν ἱεραῖς γοαφαῖς λέγεται*; *De Abrah.*, § 1 (M. ii, 2), “Now these are those men who have lived irreproachably . . . whose virtues are durably and permanently recorded as on pillars, *ἐν ταῖς ἱερωτάταις γραφαῖς*.” As to *γράμμα, γράμματα*, see *Dē Congr. Erud. Grat.*, § 12 (M. i, 527), “Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐτέρωθε τὸ γράμμα τοῦτο ἐσηληπτενέρον (Deut. xxxiii. 8);” *Quod Deus Immut.*, § 2 (M. i, 273), “For in the first book of Kings (= 1 Sam. i. 20), she (Hannah) speaks in this manner: ‘I give him (Samuel) unto thee freely,’ the expression here used being equivalent to ‘I give him unto thee whom thou hast given unto me,’ *κατὰ τὸ ἱερώτατον Μωυσέως γράμμα τοῦτο*, ‘My gifts and my offerings, and my firstfruits, ye shall observe to offer unto me;’” *Legat. ad Caium*, § 29 (M. ii, 574), “You have never been trained in the knowledge of the sacred Scriptures (*τοῖς ἱεροῖς γράμμασιν*);” *De Vita M.* iii, 39; etc.

† In the New Testament *γράμμα* does not occur in the sense of a passage of Scripture—as indeed *τὰ γράμματα* occurs of Scripture only in 2 Tim. iii. 15, cf. John v. 47. The place of *γράμμα* in this sense is taken in the New Testament by *γραφή*, though it is extreme to say with LIGHTFOOT on Gal. iii. 22 (cf. WESTCOTT on John ii. 22) that *γραφή* always in the New Testament refers to a particular passage. On the other hand this use of *γραφή* is far from peculiar to the New Testament as seems to be

one was most congenial to the thought of Josephus, who, as a man of affairs and letters rather than of religion, would naturally envisage the writings of the Old Testament rather as documents than as oracles.

From this survey we may be able to apprehend with some accuracy Philo's place in the development of the usage of the word *λόγιον*. He has received it directly from profane Greek as one of a series of synonyms—*λόγιον*, *χρησμός*, *θεοπρόπιον*, etc.—denoting a direct word from God, an "oracle." He has in no way modified its meaning except in so far as a heightening of its connotation was inseparable from the transference of it from the frivolous and ambiguous oracles of heathendom to the revelations of the God of Israel, a heightening which was, no doubt, aided by the constant use of the word in the Septuagint—Philo's Bible—to translate the Hebrew אִמְרָה with all its high suggestions. But in this transference he has nevertheless given it a wholly new significance, in so far as he has applied it to a fixed written revelation and thus impressed on it entirely new implications. In his hands, *λόγιον* becomes, by this means, a synonym of *γράμμα*, and imports "a passage of Scripture"—conceived, of course, as a direct oracle from God. And the plural becomes a synonym of *τὰ γράμματα*, *αἱ γραφαί*, *οἱ βιβλοὶ*, *ὁ λόγος*—or whatever other terms are used to express the idea of "the Holy Scriptures"—and imports what we call "the Bible," of course with the implication that this Bible is but a congeries of "oracles," or direct utterances of God, or even in its whole extent one great "oracle" or utterance of God—that it is, in a word, the pure and absolute "Word of God." But when we say that *λόγιον* is in Philo's hands the equivalent of "a passage of Scripture," we must guard against supposing that there is any implication of brevity attaching to it: its implication is that of direct divine utterance, not of brevity; and

implied by STEPHENS (*Theos. sub. voc.*). Not only does it occur familiarly in the Fathers, as *e.g.* (from SOPHOCLES): Clems. Rom., ii, 2; Justin Mart., *Adv. Tryph.*, cc. 56, 65 (a very instructive case), 69, 71 (cf. OTRO's note here) and elsewhere; Clems. Alex., *Cohort ad Gentes*, ix, ad init.: but also in Philo, as *e.g.*, *De Praem. et Poen.*, § 11 near the end (M. ii, 418): "Being continually devoted to the study of the Holy Scriptures both in their literal sense and also in the allegories figuratively contained in them (*ἐν ταῖς ῥηταῖς γραφαῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς ὑπόνοιαν ἀλληγορίας*)," and *Quis rerum div. her.*, § 53 (M. i. 511): "And the historian connects with his preceding account what follows in consistency with it, saying . . . (*τὸ δὲ ἀκλόνητον προσσφάιναι τῆς γραφῆς φύσκων*)." Of course Philo sometimes uses *ἡ γραφή* in the non-technical sense also, of a human treatise: thus at the opening of *De Somniis* he refers to what was contained in the preceding treatise (*ἡ μὲν οὖν πρὸ ταύτης γραφῆς περιεῖχε*). What is said in the text is not intended to traverse such facts as these, indicating other usages; but is meant only to suggest in a broad way what seems to be the primary distinction between the three usages; the subsequent development undergone by them is another story.

“the passage” in mind and designated by *λόγιον* may be of any length, conceived for the time and the purpose in hand as a unitary deliverance from God, up to the whole body of Scripture itself.* Similarly τὰ λόγια in Philo has not yet hardened into a simple synonym of “Scripture,” but designates any body of the “oracles” of which the whole Scripture is composed—now the “ten commandments,” now the Book of Genesis, now the Pentateuch, now the Jewish Law in general.†

There is little trace in Philo of the application made in the LXX. of *λόγιον* to the high priestly breastplate, by which it came to mean, not only the oracular deliverance, but the place or instrument of divination—though, quoting the LXX. as freely as he does, Philo could not help occasionally incorporating such a passage in his writings. We read, for example, in the *Legg. Allegor.*, iii, § 40 (M. i, 111):

“At all events the Holy Scripture (ὁ ἱερός λόγος), being well aware how great is the power of the impetuosity of each passion, anger and appetite, puts a bridle in the mouth of each, having appointed reason (τὸν λόγον) as their charioteer and pilot. And first of all it speaks thus of anger, in the hope of pacifying and curing it, ‘And you shall put manifestation and truth’ [the Urim and Thummim] ‘in the oracle of judgment (ἐπὶ τὸ λόγιον τοῦ κρίσεως) and it shall be on the breast of Aaron, when he comes into the Holy Place before the Lord’ (Ex. xxviii. 30). Nor by the oracle (*λόγιον*) is here meant the organs of speech which exist in us. . . . For Moses here speaks not of a random, spurious oracle (*λόγιον*) but of the oracle of judgment, which is equivalent to saying a well-judged and carefully examined oracle.”

Thus Philo gradually transmutes the *λόγιον* = *λογεῖον* of his text into the *λόγιον* = *χρησμός* of his exposition: and it is a little remarkable how little influence this LXX. usage has on his own use of the word. With him *λόγιον* is distinctively a passage of Scripture, and the congeries of these passages make τὰ λόγια.

That this usage is not, however, a *peculium* of Philo’s merely, is evidenced by a striking passage from Josephus, in which it appears in full development. For example, we read:

“The Jews, by demolishing the tower of Antonia, had made their temple square, though they had it written in their sacred oracles (ἀναγεγραμμένον ἐν τοῖς λογίοις) that their city and sanctuary should be taken when their temple should become square. But what most stirred them up was an ambiguous oracle (χρησμός) that was found also in their sacred writings (ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς εἰρημένος γράμμασιν) that about that time one from their country should become ruler of the world. The Jews took this prediction to belong to themselves, and many wise men were there-

* Thus of the passage cited above: in *Quod det. pot. insid.*, § 14, the reference is to the narrative of Gen. iv; in *De Vita Moysis*, iii, 35, to the whole legislation concerning food; in *De Profug.*, § 28, and *De Mutat. Nom.*, § 4, apparently to the whole Bible.

† *De Decem Oraculis*, title and § 10; *De Sobrietate*, § 10; *De Praem. et Poen.*, § 1; *De Vita Moysis*, iii, § 23; *De Legat. ad Caium*, § 31; *De Vita Contemplativa*, § 3.

by deceived in their judgment. Now this oracle (τὸ λόγιον) certainly denoted the rule of Vespasian" (*De Bello Jud.*, vi, 5, 4).

In this short passage we have most of the characteristics of the Philonean usage repeated: here is the interchangeable usage of *λόγιον* and *χρησιμὸς*, on the one hand, and of τὰ λόγια and τὰ γράμματα, on the other: the sacred writings of the Jews are made up of "oracles," so that each portion of them is a *λόγιον* and the whole τὰ λόγια.*

IV. That this employment of τὰ λόγια as a synonym of αἱ γραφαί was carried over from the Jewish writers to the early Fathers, Dr. Lightfoot has sufficiently shown in a brief but effective passage in his brilliant papers in reply to the author of *Supernatural Religion*.† It is not necessary to go over the ground afresh which Dr. Lightfoot has covered. But, for the sake of a general completeness in the presentation of the history of the word, it may be proper to set down here some of the instances of its usage in this sense among the earlier Fathers. Clement of Rome, after having quoted examples from the Scriptures at length, sums up the lesson thus: "The humility, therefore, and the submissiveness of so many great men, who have thus obtained a good report, hath through obedience made better not only us, but also the generations which were before us, even them that received his oracles in fear and truth" (c. 19); again (c. 53), "For ye know, and know well the sacred Scriptures (τὰς ἱερὰς γραφάς), dearly beloved, and ye have searched into the oracles of God (τὰ λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ);" and still again (c. 62), "And we have put you in mind of these things the more gladly, since we knew well that we were writing to men who are faithful and highly accounted and have diligently searched into the oracles of the teaching of God (τὰ λόγια τῆς παιδείας τοῦ θεοῦ)." The same phenomenon obviously meets us here as in Philo: and Harnack‡ and Lightfoot§ both naturally comment to this effect on the middle instance—the former calling especially attention to the equation drawn between the two phrases for Scripture, and the latter to the fact, as shown by the Scriptures immediately adduced, that the mind of the writer in so designating Scripture was not on "any divine precept or prediction, but the example of Moses." Equally strikingly, we read in 2 Clem., xiii, "For the Gentiles when they hear from our mouth the oracles of God, marvel at them for their beauty and greatness. . . . For when they hear from us that God saith, 'It

* Cf. the echo of Josephus' language in TACITUS, *Hist.*, v, 13: "Pluribus persuasio inerat, antiquis sacerdotum literis (= ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς γράμμασι) contineri, eo ipso tempore fore ut volereset orieus profectique Judæa rerum potirentur. Quae ambages (= χρησιμὸς ἀμφίβολος = τὸ λόγιον) Vespasianum et Titum praedixerat."

† *The Contemporary Review*, August, 1875, p. 400; *Essays on the Work entitled Supernatural Religion* (1889), p. 173.

‡ *In loc.*

§ *loc. cit.*

is no thank unto you, if ye love them that love you, but this is thank unto you, if you love your enemies and them that hate you [Luke vi. 32]—when they hear these things, I say, they marvel at their exceeding goodness.” “The point to be observed,” says Lightfoot,* “is that the expression here refers to an *evangelical* record.” Similarly Polycarp, c. vii, writes: “For every one ‘who will not confess that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is antichrist’ (1 John iv. 2, 3); and whosoever shall not confess the testimony of the cross is of the devil; and whosoever shall pervert the oracles of the Lord (τὰ λόγια τοῦ κυρίου) to his own lusts and say there is neither resurrection nor judgment, that man is the firstborn of Satan.” On this passage Zahn, followed by Lightfoot, very appropriately adduces the parallel in the Preface to Irenæus’ great work, *Against Heresies*, where he complains of the Gnostics “falsifying the oracles of the Lord (τὰ λόγια Κυρίου), becoming bad exegetes of what is well said:” while later (*Hær.*, i, 8, 1) the same writer speaks of the Gnostics’ art in adapting the dominical oracles (τὰ κυριακά λόγια) to their opinions, a phrase he equates with “the oracles of God,” and uses in a context which shows that he has the whole complex of Scripture in mind. In precisely similar wise, Clement of Alexandria is found calling the Scriptures the “oracles of truth” (*Coh. ad Gent.*, p. 84), the “oracles of God” (*Quis Div. Sal.*, 3) and the “inspired oracles” (*Strom.*, i, 392); and Origen, “the oracles,” “the oracles of God” (*De Prin.*, iv, 11; *in Matt.*, x, § 6): and Basil, the “sacred oracles,” “the oracles of the Spirit” (*Hom.*, xi, 5; xii, 1). The Pseudo-Ignatius (*ad Smyr.*, iii) writes: “For the oracles (τὰ λόγια) say: ‘This Jesus who was taken up from you into heaven,’ etc. [Acts i. 11]”—where the term certainly is just the equivalent of ἡ γραφή.† And Photius tells us (*Bibl.*, 228) that the Scriptures recognized by Ephraem, Patriarch of Antioch (circa 525–545 A.D.), consisted of the Old Testament, the Dominical Oracles (τὰ κυριακά λόγια) and the Preaching of the Apostles”—where the adjective κυριακά is obviously intended to limit the broad τὰ λόγια, so that the phrase means just “the Gospels.”

Dr. Lightfoot’s object in bringing together such passages, it will be remembered, was to fix the sense of λόγια in the description which Eusebius gives of the work of Papias and in his quotations from Papias’ remarks about the Gospels of Matthew and Mark. Papias’ book, we are told by Eusebius (*H. E.*, iii, 39), was entitled *Λογιῶν κυριακῶν ἐξηγήσεις*—that is, obviously, from the usage of the

* *In loc.*

† Cf. what Prof. Ropes says of this passage in *The American Journal of Theology*, October, 1899 (iii, 698) and his strictures on Resch’s use of it.

words, it was a commentary on the Gospels, or less likely, on the New Testament: and he is quoted as explaining that Matthew wrote τὰ λόγια in the Hebrew language and that Mark made no attempt to frame a σύνταξις τῶν κυριακῶν λογίων,* or, as is explained in the previous clause, of τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἢ λεχθέντα ἢ πραχθέντα—that is, as would seem again to be obvious, each wrote his section of the “Scriptures” in the manner described. The temptation to adjust these Papiian phrases to current theories of the origin of the Gospels has proved too strong, however, to be withstood even by the demonstration of the more natural meaning of the words provided by Dr. Lightfoot’s trenchant treatment: and we still hear of Papias’s treatise on the “Discourses of the Lord,” and of the “Book of Discourses” which Papias ascribes to Matthew and which may well be identified (we are told) with the “Collection of Sayings of Jesus,” which criticism has unearthed as lying behind our present Gospels.† Indeed, as time has run on, there seems in some quarters even a growing disposition to neglect altogether the hard facts of usage marshaled by Dr. Lightfoot, and to give such rein to speculation as to the meaning of the term λόγια as employed by Papias, that the last end of the matter would appear to threaten to be worse than the first. We are led to use this language by a recent construction of Alfred Resch’s, published in the *Theologische Studien* dedicated to Bernard Weiss on his seventieth birthday. Let us, however, permit Resch to speak for himself. He is remarking on the identification of the assumed fundamental gospel (*Urevangelium*) with the work of Matthew mentioned by Papias. He says:

“Thus the name—λόγια—and the author—Matthew—seemed to be found for this *Quellenschrift*. In the way of this assumption there stood only the circum-

* Or *λόγων*, as is read by both Schwegler and Heinichen: contra Routh, Lightfoot and Gebhardt-Harnack.

† If there ever was such a “Collection of Sayings of Jesus,” the natural title of it would certainly not be τὰ κυριακὰ λόγια, but something like the ἡ σύνταξις τῶν κυριακῶν λόγων which Papias says (if we adopt the reading *λόγων*) Mark did not write. We observe with astonishment, the venerable Prof. Godet saying, in his recent volume on the Gospels, that the existence of such collections of λόγια is now put beyond doubt by the discovery of the Oxyrhynchus fragment. The last word has doubtless not been said as to the nature and origin of this fragment: but that it was a collection of ΛΟΓΙΑ rests solely on the ascription of that title to it by its editors—a proceeding which in turn rests solely on their traditional misunderstanding of the Papiian phrase. And that Matthew’s “Logia” were “Logia” like these is scarcely a supposable case to a critic of Prof. Godet’s views. Meanwhile we cannot but account it unfortunate that Messrs. Grenfell and Hunt should have attached so misleading a title to their valuable discovery: to which it is suitable only in one aspect, viz., as describing these “sayings” of Jesus as (in the conception of the compiler, as the constant λέγει shows) “oracular utterances” of present and continuous authority.

stance that the name ‘λόγια’ did not seem to fit the *Quellenschrift* as it had been drawn out by study of the Gospels, made wholly independently of the notice of Papias—since it yielded a treatise of mixed narrative and discourses. This circumstance led some to characterize the *Quellenschrift*, in correspondence with the name *λόγια*, as a mere collection of discourses; while others found in it a reason for sharply opposing the identification of the Logia of Matthew and the fundamental gospel (*Urevangelium*), or even for discrediting the whole notice of Papias as worthless and of no use to scholars. No one, however, thought of looking behind the *λόγια* for the hidden Hebrew name, although it was certainly obvious that a treatise written in Hebrew could not fail to have a Hebrew title. And I must myself confess that only in 1895, while the third volume of my *Aussercanonischen Paralleltexzte* was passing through the press, did it occur to me to ask after the Hebrew name of the *λόγια*. But with the question the answer was self-evidently at once given: דְּבָרִים, * therefore דְּבָרֵי יִשְׁעַי. To this answer attached itself at once, however, the reminiscence of titles ascribed in the Old Testament to a whole series of *Quellenschriften*: דְּבָרֵי יְתֵן הַנְּבִיא, דְּבָרֵי דָוִד תְּפִלָּה, דְּבָרֵי שְׁמוּאֵל; דְּבָרֵי יְרֵמְיָהוּ (cf. 1 Chron. xxix. 29, 30); כְּפָר דְּבָרֵי שְׁלֹמֹה (1 Kings xi. 41); דְּבָרֵי מְלֶכֶת יִשְׂרָאֵל, דְּבָרֵי מְנַשֶּׁה (2 Chron. xxxiii. 18). As, then, there in the Old Testament, it is just historical *Quellenschriften* of biographical contents that bear the name of דְּבָרִים, so this New Testament *Quellenschrift*, the title דְּבָרֵי יִשְׁעַי. It contained therefore the history of Him of whom the prophets had prophesied, Who was greater than Solomon, David’s Son and David’s Lord and the King of Israel. And as the LXX. had translated the title דְּבָרֵי, certainly unskillfully enough by *λόγοι*, so Papias or his sponsor (*Gewährsmann*) by *λόγια*. The sense, however, of the Hebrew דְּבָרִים is, as Luther very correctly renders it—‘Histories.’ Cf. Heft iii, 312. By this discovery of the original title, the New Testament *Quellenschrift* which from an unknown had already become a known thing, has now become from an unnamed a named thing. The desiderated *x* has been completely found.†

Criticism like this certainly scorns all facts. The Hebrew word דְּבָר, meaning a “word,” passed by a very readily understood process into the sense of “thing.” In defining the term as used in the titles which Resch adduces, Dr. Driver says: ‡ “words: hence affairs, things—in so far as they are done, ‘acts;’ in so far as they are narrated, ‘history.’” The word דְּבָר thus readily lent itself, in combinations like those adduced by Resch, to a double meaning: and it is apparently found in both these senses. In instances like דְּבָרֵי קֹהֵלֶת (Ecc. i. 1, cf. Prov. xxx. 1, xxxi. 5; Jer. i. 1; Am. i. 1; Neh. i. 1) it doubtless means “words of Koheleth,” and the like. In the instances adduced by Resch, it is doubtless used in the secondary sense of “history.” The Greek word *λόγος*, by which דְּבָר was ordinarily translated in the LXX., while naturally not running through a development of meaning exactly parallel to that of דְּבָר, yet oddly enough presented a fair Greek equivalent for both of these senses of דְּבָר, used in titles: and why Resch should speak of *λόγοι* as unskillfully used in the titles he adduces, does not appear on the

* Why should Resch, we may ask, think of דְּבָר instead of אִמְרָה as the Hebrew original of *λόγισον*? Cf. above p. 231.

† *Op. cit.*, p. 121 sq.

‡ *Introduction*, last ed., 527, note 1.

surface of things. Certainly, from Herodotus down, *οἱ λόγοι* bore the specific meaning of just "Histories," as afterwards it bore the sense of "prose writings:" and the early Greek historians were called accordingly *οἱ λογογράφοι*.* The LXX. translators, in a word, could scarcely have found a happier Greek rendering for the titles of the *Quellenschriften* enumerated in 1 Chron. xxix. 29, 30, etc. Who, however, could estimate the unskillfulness of translating *כְּבָר* in such titles by *λόγια*—a word which had no such usage and indeed did not readily lend itself to an application to human "words?" Papias (or his sponsor) must have been (as Eusebius calls him) a man of mean capacity indeed, so to have garbled Matthew's Hebrew. It should be noted, further, that Papias does not declare, as Resch seems to think, that Matthew wrote *τὰ λόγια τοῦ Ἰησοῦ*, or even *τὰ κυριακὰ λόγια*—it is Papias's own book whose title contains this phrase; and it will be hard to suppose that Papias (or his sponsor) was a man of such mean capacity as to fancy the simple *τὰ λόγια* a fair equivalent for the Hebrew *כְּבָר יְשׁוּעַ* in the sense of "The History of Jesus." If he did so, one does not wonder that he has had to wait two thousand years for a reader to catch his meaning. Such speculations, in truth, serve no other good purpose than to exhibit how far a-sea one must drift who, leaving the moorings of actual usage, seeks an unnatural meaning for these phrases. Their obvious meaning is that Papias wrote an *Exposition of the Gospels*, and that he speaks of Matthew's and Mark's books as themselves sections of those "Scriptures" which he was expounding. Under the guidance of the usage of the word, this would seem the only tenable opinion.†

* See LIDDELL and SCOTT, sub. voc., iv and v.

† We must account it, then, as only another instance of that excess of caution which characterizes his application of the "apologetical" results of investigation, when Dr. Sanday still holds back from this conclusion and writes thus: "The word *λόγια*, indeed, means 'oracles' and not 'discourses.' But while the term 'the oracles' might well from the first have been applied to our Lord's words it is hardly likely that it should so early have been applied to a writing of the New Testament as such. Moreover even when the inspiration of the New Testament had come to be as clearly recognized as that of the Old Testament, the term 'the oracles' would not have been a fitting one for a single work, simply on the ground that it formed part of the collection" (HASTINGS' *Bible Dictionary*, ii, p. 235 a). Apart altogether from the fact that these caveats are founded on a demonstrably mistaken conception of the origin of the New Testament Canon, they are in themselves invalid. The term *λόγια* was contemporaneously applied to writings of the New Testament as such—as a glance at 2 Clem. xiii and Polycarp vii will show—and as Lightfoot's note on the former passage, correcting his less careful earlier note on the latter passage, points out. And that *τὰ λόγια* could easily refer to any definite portion of the congeries of "oracles" known also as "Scripture," Philo's usage as indicated above (p. 247) sufficiently exhibits. For the rest, it cannot be doubted that Papias was understood by all his early readers to mean by his *τὰ*

It is not intended, of course, to imply that there is no trace among the Fathers of any other sense attaching to the words τὸ λόγιον, τὰ λόγια, than “the Scriptures” as a whole. Other applications of the words were found standing side by side with this in Philo, and they are found also among the Fathers. Τὸ λόγιον, used of a specific text of Scripture, for example, is not uncommon in the Fathers. It is found, for instance, in Justin Martyr, *Apol.*, i, 32: “And Jesse was his forefather κατὰ τὸ λόγιον”—to wit, Isa. xi. 1, just quoted. It is found in Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.*, ii: Migne, i, p. 949a), where Isa. vii. 9 is quoted and it is added: “It was this λόγιον that Heraclitus of Ephesus paraphrased when he said . . .” It is found repeatedly in Eusebius’ *Ecclesiastical History*, in which the Papiian passages are preserved, as, *e. g.*, ix, 7, *ad fin.*, “So that, according to that divine (θεῖον) λόγιον,” viz., Matt. xxiv. 24; x. 1, 4, “the λόγιον thus enjoining us,” viz., Ps. xcvi (xcviii); x. 4, 7, “concerning which a certain other divine λόγιον thus proclaims,” viz., Ps. lxxxvi. (lxxxvii.) 5. Τὰ λόγια is also used in the Fathers, as in Philo, for any body of these Scriptural λόγια, however small or large (*i. e.*, for any given section of Scripture)—as, *e. g.*, for the Ten Commandments. It is so used, for instance, in the Apostolical Constitutions, ii. 26: “Keep the fear of God before your eyes, always remembering τῶν δέκα τῶν θεοῦ λόγιων;” and also in Eusebius (*H. E.*, ii, 18, 5). So, again, we have seen it, modified by qualifying adjectives, used for the Gospels—and indeed it seems to be employed without qualifications in this sense in Pseudo-Justin’s *Epistola ad Zeram et Serenum* (Otto, i, 70b). It is further sometimes used apparently not of the Scripture text as such, but of certain oracular utterances recorded in it—as, for example, when Justin says to Trypho (c. 18): “For since you have read, O Trypho, as you yourself admitted, the doctrines taught by our Saviour, I do not think that I have done foolishly in adding some short utterances of his (βραχέα τοῦ ἐκείνου λόγια) to the prophetic statements”—to wit, words of Jesus recorded in Matt. xxi, xxiii and Luke xi, here put on a level with the oracles of the prophets, but apparently envisaged as spoken. All these are usages that have met us before.

But there are lower usages also discoverable in the later Patristic writers at least. There is an appearance now and then indeed as if the word was, in popular speech, losing something of its high implication of “solemn oracular utterances of God,” and coming

λόγια of Matthew, just Matthew’s Gospel. This has been sufficiently shown (*Einführung*, ii, 265) by ZAHN, who in his rich and fundamentally right remarks on the subject both here and elsewhere (*e. g.*, pp. 254 sq. and *Geschichte d. Kanons*, i, 857 sq., ii, 790 sq.) supplies another instance of how near a great scholar can come to the truth of a matter without precisely adopting it.

to be applied as well to the words of mere men*—possibly in sequence to its application to the words of prophets and apostles as such and the gradual wearing down, in the careless popular consciousness, of the distinction between their words as prophets and apostles and their words as men; possibly, on the other hand, in sequence to the freer use of the word in profane speech and the wearing away of its high import with the loss of reverence for the thing designated. Thus we read as early as in the *Acts of Xanthippe and Polyxena*, edited by Prof. James for the *Cambridge Texts and Studies*, and assigned by him to the middle of the third century (c. 28, p. 78), the following dialogue, in the course of a conversation between Polyxena and Andrew, “the apostle of the Lord:” “Andrew saith: ‘Draw not near me, child, but tell me who thou art and whence.’ Then saith Polyxena: ‘I am a great friend of these here (ξένη τῶν ἐνταῦθα), but I see thy gracious countenance and thy logia are as the logia of Paul and I presume thee too to belong to his God.’” If we may assume this to mark a transition stage in the usage, we may look upon a curious passage in John of Damascus as marking almost the completion of the sinking of the word to an equivalence to ῥήματα. It occurs in his *Disput. Christiani et Saraceni* (Migne, i, 1588, iii, 1344). The Saracenic disputant is represented as eager to obtain an acknowledgment that the Word of God, that is Christ, is a mere creature, and as plying the Christian with a juggle on the word λόγια. He asks whether the λόγια of God are create or increate. If the reply is “create,” the rejoinder is to be: “Then they are not Gods, and you have confessed that Christ, who is the Word (λόγος) of God is not God.” If, on the other hand, the reply is “increate,” the rejoinder

* In the thirty-fifth chapter of the fourth book of Origen’s *Against Celsus*, there is a passage which is given this appearance in Dr. Crombie’s excellent English translation, printed in the *Ante-Nicene Library* (Am. Ed., iv, 512): “And yet if Celsus had wished honestly to overturn the genealogy which he deemed the Jews to have so shamelessly arrogated, in boasting of Abraham and his descendants (as their progenitors), he ought to have quoted all the passages bearing on the subject; and, in the first place, to have advocated his cause with such arguments as he thought likely to be convincing, and in the next to have bravely refuted, by means of what appeared to him to be the true meaning, and by arguments in its favor, the errors existing on the subject (καὶ τοῖς ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς λόγοις τὰ κατὰ τὸν τόπον).” The rendering of λόγοις here by “arguments,” however, is certainly wrong. The whole context is speaking of Celsus’ misrepresentation of the teaching of the Hebrew Scriptures; and what Origen would have him do is to point out the passages in them which will bear out his allegations. According to Koetschau’s index the word occurs but twice elsewhere in the treatise *Against Celsus*, viz., V, xxix, *ad fin.*, and VI, lxxvii near the end (inserted by Koetschau from Philoc. 85, 16): and in both of these cases the high meaning of the word is unmistakable.

der apparently is to be that the *λόγια* of God nevertheless are not properly Gods, and so again Christ the *λόγος* is not God. Accordingly John instructs the Christian disputant to refuse to say either that they are create or that they are increate, but declining the dilemma, to reply merely: “I confess one only *Λόγος* of God that is increate, but my whole Scripture (*γραφή*) I do not call *λόγια*, but *ῥήματα θεοῦ*.” On the Saracen retorting that David certainly says τὰ *λόγια* (not *ῥήματα*) of the Lord are pure *λόγια*, the Christian is to reply that the prophet speaks here *τροπολογικῶς*, and not *χωριολογικῶς*, that is to say, not by way of a direct declaration, but by way of an indirect characterization. It is a remarkable logomachy that we are thus treated to: and it seems to imply that in John’s day *λόγια* had sunk to a mere synonym of *ῥήματα*. That men had then ceased to speak of the whole *γραφή* as τὰ *θεία λόγια* we know not to have been the case: but apparently this language was now made use of with no more pregnancy of meaning than if they had said τὰ *θεία ῥήματα*.* This process seems to have continued, and in the following passage from a work of the opening of the eleventh century—the *Life of Nilus the Younger*, published in the 120th volume of Migne’s *Pat. Græc.* (p. 97 D),—we have an instance of the extreme extension of the application of the word: “Then saith the Father to him: ‘It is not fitting that thou, a man of wisdom and high-learning, should think or speak τὰ τῶν κοινῶν ἀνθρώπων *λόγια*.’”† And accordingly we cannot be surprised to find that in modern Greek the word is employed quite freely of human speech. Jannaris tells us that it is used in the sense of “maxim,” and that in colloquial usage τὰ *λόγια* may mean “prom-

* Dr. F. W. Farrar, with his fatal facility for quoting phrases in senses far other than those attached to them by their authors (other instances meet us in his dealing with the formula “*Scriptura complectitur Verbum Dei*” and with the word “Inspiration” in the same context,—see pp. 369, 370 of work cited) makes a thoroughly wrong use of this passage (*Hist. of Interpretation*, p. 374, note 2). He says: “But as far back as the eighth century the eminently orthodox Father, St. John of Damascus, had said, ‘We apply not to the written word of Scripture the title due to the Incarnate Word of God.’ He says that when the Scriptures are called *λόγια θεοῦ* the phrase is only figurative, *Disput Christiani et Saraceni* (see Lupton, St. John of Damascus, p. 95).” But John says the Scriptures are called without figure *ῥήματα τοῦ θεοῦ*: he only means to say they are not God’s Word in the same sense that the Logos is: in comparison with Him who is the only incarnate Word of God, they are only figuratively words of God, but they are real words of God, nevertheless, His *ῥήματα*, by which designation, rather than *λόγια*, John would have them called, not to avoid confessing them to be God’s utterances, but to escape a Moslem jibe.

† An instance of the secular use of the word in this lowered meaning, is found doubtless in the Scholium on the *Frogs* of Aristophanes adduced above, p. 218. The date of this Scholium is uncertain, but it seems to belong to the later strata of the Scholia. It is not found in the *Ravenna MS.*, which RUTHERFORD is publishing; nor in the *Venetus* (Marc. 474), cf. BLAYDES, *Ranae*, p. 391; nor indeed in four out of the six MSS. used by DINDORF (iv. 2, p. 113).

ise"—in both of which employments there may remain a trace of its original higher import.* While Kontopoulos gives as the English equivalents of *λόγιον*, the following list: "A saying, a word; a maxim; a motto, an oracle; τὰ θεῖα λόγια, the divine oracles, the sacred Scriptures."†

Thus not only all the usages of the word found, say, in Philo, are continued in the Fathers, but there is an obvious development to be traced. But this development itself is founded on and is a witness to the characteristic usage of the word among the Fathers—that, to wit, in which it is applied to the inspired words of prophets and apostles. And by far the most frequent use of the word in the Patristic writings seems to be that in which it designates just the Holy Scriptures. Their prevailing usage is very well illustrated by that of Eusebius. We have already quoted a number of passages from his *Ecclesiastical History* in which he seems to adduce special passages of Scripture, each as a *λόγιον*. More common is it for him to refer to the whole Scriptures as τὰ λόγια, or rather (for this is his favorite formula) τὰ θεῖα λόγια—and that whether he means the Old Testament (which in the *Præp. Evanğ.*, ii, 6 [Migne, iii, 140 A], he calls τὰ Ἑβραίων λόγια), or the New Testament, or refers to the prophetic or the narrative portions. Instances may be found in H. E., 5, 17, 5, where we are told that Miltiades left monuments of his study of the θεῖα λόγια; 6, 23, 2, where the zeal of Origen's friend Ambrose for the study of the θεῖα λόγια is mentioned as enabling Origen to write his commentaries on the θεῖαι γραφαί; 9, 9, 8, where a sentence from Ex. xv. 1 is quoted as from the θεῖα λόγια; x, 4, 28, where Ps. lvii. (lviii.), 7 is quoted from the θεῖα λόγια; *Palestinian Martyrs*, xi, 2, where the devotion of the Palestinian martyrs to the θεῖα λόγια is adverted to. Even the singular—τὸ λόγιον—seems occasionally used by Eusebius (as by Philo) as a designation of the whole Scripture fabric. We may suspect this to be the case in H. E., x, 4, 43, when we read of "the costly cedar of Lebanon of which τὸ θεῖον λόγιον has not been unmindful, saying, 'The forests of the Lord shall rejoice and the cedars of Lebanon which he planted' (Ps. cv. [civ.] 16)." And we cannot doubt it at H. E., ii, 10, 1, where we read concerning Herod Agrippa, that "as ἡ τῶν πράξεων γραφή relates, he proceeded to Cæsarea and . . . τὸ λόγιον relates 'that the angel of the Lord smote him'"—in which account it is worth while to observe the coincidence of Josephus' narrative with τῆν θεῖαν γραφήν. Here, of course, τὸ λόγιον

* In his *Concise Dictionary of English and Modern Greek*, sub. voc. "word" and "saying."

† In his *New Lexicon of Modern Greek and English*, sub voc.

is primarily the Book of Acts—but as the subsequent context shows, it represents that book only as part of the sacred Scriptures, so that τὸ λόγιον emerges as a complete synonym of ἡ θεῖα γραφή. Whatever other usage may from time to time emerge in the pages of the Fathers, the Patristic usage of the term, κατ’ ἐξοχήν, is as a designation of the “Scriptures” conceived as the Word of God.*

In the light of these broad facts of usage, certain lines may very reasonably be laid down within which our interpretation of [τὰ] λόγια in the New Testament instances of its occurrence should move. It would seem quite certain, for example, that no lower sense can be attached to it in these instances, than that which it bears uniformly in its classical and Hellenistic usage: it means, not “words” barely, simple “utterances,” but distinctively “oracular utterances,” divinely authoritative communications, before which men stand in awe and to which they bow in humility: and this high meaning is not merely implicit, but is explicit in the term. It would seem clear again that there are no implications of brevity in the term: it means not short, pithy, pregnant sayings, but high, authoritative, sacred utterances; and it may be applied equally well to long as to short utterances—even though they extend to pages and books and treatises. It would seem to be clear once more that there are no implications in the term of what may be called the literary nature of the utterances to which it is applied: it characterizes the utterances to which it is applied as emanations from God, but whether they be prophetic or narrative or legal, parenetic or promissory in character, is entirely indifferent: its whole function is exhausted in declaring them to be God’s own utterances.† And still further, it would seem to be clear that it is equally indifferent to the term whether the utterances so designated be oral or written communications: whether oral or written it declares them to be God’s own Word, and it had become customary to designate the written Word of God by this term as one that was felt fitly to describe the Scriptures as an oracular book—either a body of oracles, or one continuous oracular deliverance from God’s own lips.

* Sophocles, in his *Lexicon*, gives also the following references for this sense: Titus of Bostra (Migne, xviii, 1253 B); Serapion of Egypt (Migne, xl, 908 C, 909 B). References might be added, apparently, indefinitely.

† It is therefore a perfectly blind comment that we meet with in GERHARD HEINE’S recent *Synonymik des N. T. Griechisch* (1898), p. 157—when in contrast to λόγος as the “reasonable expression” of the νοῦς, τὸ λόγιον is said to be “more the separate utterance, with the (occasional?) accessory notion of promise (Rom. iii. 2).”

This last usage is so strikingly characteristic of the Hellenistic adaptation of the term that a certain presumption lies in favor of so understanding it in Hellenistic writings, when the Scriptural revelation is in question: though this presumption is, of course, liable to correction by the obvious implications of the passages as wholes. In such a passage as Rom. iii. 2 this presumption rises very high indeed, and it would seem as if the word here must be read as a designation of the "Scriptures" as such, unless very compelling reasons to the contrary may be adduced from the context. That the mind of the writer may seem to some to be particularly dwelling upon this or that element in the contents of the Scriptures cannot be taken as such a compelling reason to the contrary: for nothing is more common than for a writer to be thinking more particularly of one portion of what he is formally adducing as a whole. The paraphrase of Wetstein appears in this aspect, therefore, very judicious: "They have the Sacred Books, in which are contained the oracles and especially the prophecies of the advent of the Messiah and the calling of the Gentiles; and by these their minds should be prepared:" though, so far as this paraphrase may seem to separate between the Sacred Books and the Oracles they contain, it is unfortunate. The very point of this use of the word is that it *identifies* the Sacred Books with the Oracles; and in this aspect of it Dr. David Brown's comment is more satisfactory: "That remarkable expression, denoting 'Divine Communications' in general, is transferred to the sacred Scriptures to express their oracular, divinely authoritative character." The case is not quite so simple in Heb. v. 12: but here, too, the well-balanced comment of Dr. Westcott appears to us to carry conviction with it: "The phrase might refer to the new revelation given by Christ to His apostles (comp. c. i. 2); but it seems more natural to refer it to the collective writings of the Old Testament which the Hebrew Christians failed to understand." In Acts vii. 38 the absence of the article introduces no real complication: it merely emphasizes the qualitative aspect of the matter; what Moses received was emphatically *oracles*—which is further enhanced by calling them "lively," *i. e.*, they were not merely dead, but living, effective, operative oracles. The speaker's eye is obviously on Moses as the recipient of these oracles, and on the oracles as given by God to Moses, as is recorded in the Pentateuch: but the oracles his eye is on are those recorded in the Pentateuch, and that came to Moses, not for himself, but for the Church of all ages—"to give to us." Here we may hesitate to say, indeed, that *λόγια* means just the "Scriptures;" but what it means stands in a very express relation to the Scrip-

tures, and possibly was not very sharply distinguished from the Scriptures by the speaker. With the analogies in Philo clearly in our mind, we should scarcely go far wrong if we conceived of *λόγια* here as meaning to the speaker those portions of Scripture in which Moses recorded the revelations vouchsafed to him by God—conceived as themselves these revelations recorded. In 1 Peter iv. 11 the interpretation is complicated by the question that arises concerning the charisma that is intended, as well as by the casting of the phrase into the form of a comparison: “let him speak *as it were* oracles of God.” It is not clear that the Divine Scriptures as such are meant here; but the term, in any case, retains all its force as a designation of sacred, solemn divine utterances: the speaker is to speak as becomes one whose words are not his own, but the very words of God—oracles proclaimed through his mouth. Whether it is the exercise of the prophetic gift in the strict sense that is adverted to, so that Peter’s exhortation is that the prophet should comport himself in his prophesying as becomes one made the vehicle of the awful words of revelation; or only the gift of teaching that is in question, so that Peter’s exhortation is that he who proclaims the word of God, even in this lower sense, shall bear himself as befits one to whom are committed the Divine oracles for explanation and enforcement—must be left here without investigation. In either case the term is obviously used in its highest sense and implies that the *λόγια* of God are His own words, His awesome utterances.

What has thus been said in reference to these New Testament passages is intended to go no further in their explanation than to throw the light of the usage of the word upon their interpretation. Into their detailed exegesis we cannot now enter. We cannot pass by the general subject, however, without emphasizing the bearing these passages have on the New Testament doctrine of Holy Scripture. It will probably seem reasonable to most to interpret Rom. iii. 2 as certainly, Heb. v. 12 as probably, and Acts vii. 38 as very likely making reference to the written Scriptures; and as bearing witness to the conception of them on the part of the New Testament writers as “the oracles of God.” That is to say, we have unobtrusive and convincing evidence here that the Old Testament Scriptures, as such, were esteemed by the writers of the New Testament as an oracular book, which in itself not merely contains, but is the “utterance,” the very Word of God; and is to be appealed to as such and as such deferred to, because nothing other than the crystallized speech of God. We merely advert to this fact here without stopping to develop its implications or to show how consonant this designation of the

Scriptures as the "Oracles of God" is with the conception of the Holy Scriptures entertained by the New Testament writers as otherwise made known to us. We have lately had occasion to point out in this REVIEW some of the other ways in which this conception expresses itself in the New Testament writings.* He who cares to look for it will find it in many ways written largely and clearly and indelibly on the pages of the New Testament. We content ourselves at this time, however, with merely pointing out that the designation of the Scriptures as *τὰ λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ* fairly shouts to us out of the pages of the New Testament, that to its writers the Scriptures of the Old Testament were the very Word of God in the highest and strictest sense that term can bear—the express utterance, in all their parts and each and every of their words, of the Most High—the "oracles of God." Let him that thinks them something other and less than this, reckon, then, with the apostles and prophets of the New Covenant—to whose trustworthiness as witnesses to doctrinal truth he owes all he knows about the New Covenant itself, and therefore all he hopes for through this New Covenant.

PRINCETON.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

* See article entitled, "It Says ; Scripture Says ; God Says," in the number of this REVIEW for July, 1899, and also article entitled, "God-Inspired Scripture," in the number for January, 1900.