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I.

THE ADAMIC PRINCIPLE IN THEOLOGY.

THE origin of our race is Adamic; its probation and apostasy were Adamic; its guilt and depravity are Adamic; its redemption, as far as it is redeemed, is Adamic. This word *Adamic* is the italic word in our language, having more meaning and distinction than any other. Without it, human history would be an enigma, mental philosophy a puzzle, and theology but a vain logomachy. Anthropology and soteriology both turn upon it as a pivotal word.

What, then, is its import in theology—what underlying, informing, and shaping principle does it symbolize as it stands in the vocabulary of the science of religion?

To this question three typical answers have been proposed, giving three fundamental hypotheses as to the nature of the union between Adam and his posterity, and as to the nature of our participation in his guilt and depravity; and the constructive influence of these theories reaches into soteriology. One class of theologians translates the word *Adamic* by the word *parental*; another, by the word *realistic*; and the third, by the word *federal*.

I. According to parentalists, Adam sustained no other relation to his posterity than that of a father to his children; and this relation ruled the whole Edenic probation, and all the consequences of the fall, as they flowed down to the race. This is the key to all the arrangements and consequences of the covenant of works. As a race-father, Adam sinned; as children, all mankind heir his misery and the defects of his character. The Adamic principle, then, to them is precisely and definitely the law of genetic transmission.

This is exactly the position of semi-Pelagians and Arminians. It is admitted that many Wesleyans use language that is apparently contradictory to this statement, but they are exceptions to the prevailing type of Arminian theology, and it is not our duty to harmonize them with their system. Dr. Miley, a distinguished Methodist, in his *Systematic Theology*, says upon this point: "Arminianism has not the exact and comprehensive formulations of doctrine which we find in some other systems, as, for instance, the Lutheran and the Reformed or Calvinistic. No general synod or council has ever taken this work in hand; yet in other modes the leading doctrines of the system are set forth with satisfactory clearness and fullness. Respecting the genetic transmission of depravity, there is full accordance with other systems of theology. Expressions are frequently met, particularly in the older Arminianism, and in the Wesleyan, which, at least, imply a judicial ground of the common depravity, but never in contradiction of its genetic mode. The tendency is towards the recognition of this law as the sufficient and whole account of it. This is definitely and explicitly the view of Dr. Whedon." This author also refers to Raymond and Summers as holding with Whedon.

Richard Watson, an Arminian of wide influence, does characterize Adam as "the head and representative of the race"; but he qualifies that representation so as to identify it, in fact, with the parental theory. Watson endorses Isaac Watts; and Watts held that the results of Adam's sin flowed down to posterity because he was the universal father of all mankind. But if we are forcing Watson into a position which he does not hold in reality, the seventh, of the twenty-nine articles of religion of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, will sustain the assignation which we have made. "Original sin standeth not in the following of Adam (as the Pelagians do vainly talk), but it is the corruption of the nature of every man, that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil, and that continually." The antecedent of "that" is "original sin" or the "corruption of the nature"; the verb indicating the mode by which this corruption appears in every man is "engen-

dered"; and the source from which this corruption is *engendered* in every man is "Adam"; all men are further characterized as his "offspring." The emphasis is clearly upon the law of propagation from Adam down through the whole race. On any consistent interpretation, this article accounts the common native depravity simply a genetic transmission—a propagation according to a law of nature which is generic to all orders of propagated life—"like begets like."

But what is this law of genetic transmission by which this school would rule our union with Adam and all the consequences of his paternal conduct upon his children? Its advocates shall be permitted to state it in their own language, as follows: "It is a law of organic life that everything produces its own kind. This law was divinely instituted at the very beginning of life. It has determined the results of propagation through all the geological ages and in all organic orders. It is the determining law of species, and gives us the orderly forms of life. If it were made known simply that life is propagated in other worlds, sober science would promptly affirm the reigning of the same law. The offspring are a reproduction of the parentage, not only in anatomical structure and physiological constitution, but also in qualities of instinct and disposition. This is clearly seen in the higher animal orders. The lion of the present is the lion of all previous generations. The ferocity of the tiger is a derivation from its earliest parentage. The meekness and gentleness of the lamb of to-day were in the blood of the paschal lamb many ages ago. Man himself is the most striking exemplification of this law. Historically, the diversities of human condition are very great. There is a vast scale from the lowest barbarism up to the highest civilization. The habits of life engendered by location and the modes of subsistence widely differ. Governments, religions, customs, all things which strike the deepest into the nature of man, equally differ. Yet in all the constitutive qualities of humanity man is always and everywhere the same. This universal and abiding identity is a genetic transmission from the progenitors of the race down through all its generations. . . . As the law of genetic transmission rules in all the forms of propagated life and determines the likeness of the offspring

to the parentage, and as it was sufficient for the transmission of the primitive holiness to all the race, it must be a sufficient account of the common native depravity. To deny this sufficiency is to assume that simply under the law of nature the moral corruption of Adam would not have been transmitted to his offspring, and consequently that they must have been born in holiness. To assume an intervention of retributive justice, on the ground of a common participation in the sin of Adam, as the only sufficient account of the universal native depravity, is to imply the same results. . . . The sufficient account is in the law of genetic transmission. There is no requirement in either nature or scripture or reason for any other."

Indisputably, this tenet is the central principle of the Arminian anthropology and soteriology. Its destruction will, for Methodists, necessitate the construction of a new theology. Let us now unfold its logical implications, and see what they are, and how tenable they are.

1. This hypothesis logically denies the penal character of our Adamic inheritances. The law of heredity, even in the hands of extremists, does not inculcate, *ex necessitate*, the offspring in the crime of the parent, and judge them worthy of a like condemnation. The rugged sense of mankind buffets with scorn the damnation of the child for the father's sin. The child of a thief is not, *ipso facto*, a thief himself; neither does a lewd parentage necessitate unclean children. That law is barbaric which punishes the son for his father's transgression. On the contrary, the children of such lineage are often perfectly exemplary. Were it not so, crime committed by one ancestor would forever damn the whole line. The scriptures are equally explicit upon this point. "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son: the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him." It follows, therefore, from reason, from jurisprudence, and from scripture, upon this hypothesis of a mere parental connection with Adam, that all our inheritances from him must be of a non-penal character whatever else may be said about them. Adam's position in Eden was that of a parent only; the parent miscarried when put upon probation; the re-

sults of the miscarriage must be inevitably entailed upon all his posterity; yet not as punitive evils, but only as pitiful misfortunes, as natural predispositions, as weaknesses of constitution. According to the logic of the system, and according to some of its exponents, native depravity is not native demerit; it is sin in the sense of abnormality and disorder, but it is not guilt, amenable to damnation. Original sin is thus resolved into original calamity. Sin improper; not sin proper.

But it may be asked, "Wherein consists the gravity of such consequences? Suppose the results as here indicated be admitted in their baldest form, what prevents their acceptance?" The reply is twofold.

(1) The holders of this hypothesis cannot construct a theodicy; they cannot vindicate God in connection with the race's moral and spiritual history. They admit the facts of depravity and death—the fact that all children are born into the world depraved, and that all men are born to die—that these results come without their personal agency, and that they cannot be put out of their destiny by their most earnest and intelligent endeavors. In other words, under this hypothesis no man is responsible for his depravity or his death. How can God be justified in thus depraving man's character, albeit he does not punish for the depravity, and in thus putting all men to death indiscriminately, who have committed no evil? The Calvinist challenges the Arminian to vindicate God in creating all men so hurt in their bodies that they all inevitably go down to the grave, and so damaged in their moral constitutions that they inevitably commit personal sin and fall under his damnation. Whether the inheritance from Adam be conceived as penal or not, it, with fearful uniformity, brings man to the grave, and, apart from the atonement of Christ, just as inexorably lands him in hell. In such a system, death and hell are ultimately the results of a non-penal connection with Adam's sin, which no man voluntarily established for himself. Let us put the case sharply in interrogatory form, "Why did God take away the character of Judas, and kill his body?" The Arminian will answer, "Because he rejected Christ." But, "Why did he reject Christ?" The answer must be, "Because he was depraved." But, "Why was he depraved?" The answer must be,

“Because he happened to be the son of a sinful father.” Then the whole catastrophe was the result of an unfortunate birth-connection, which God constituted, and over which Judas had no control. The logic of the parentalists grounds death and hell in an unfortunate birth. The son perished, under the righteous and merciful government of God, for the father’s sin! This, in our judgment, is far harder than the doctrine of the Calvinist, who traces these same results to the guilt which man contracted in Adam; in his scheme the son and the father were confederated together to do evil, were conspirators against the kingdom of God, and shared like treatment in the divine court-room, because they shared alike in the crime with which they were charged. Calvinists teach that men suffer because they were *particeps criminis*; Arminians, because they were *particeps naturae*. With the one evil is grounded in a common criminality; with the other, in a common humanity. According to the one, men die because they are sinners; according to the other, because they are human. Does God smite babies just because they are human? Monstrous!

(2) The inferences from the position that native depravity is not guilty and blameworthy cannot be harmonized with the scriptures. A sound exegesis bars the parentalistic hypothesis as much as a sound theodicy excludes it. From a large list of passages one or two will be selected as proof-texts.

Psalm li. 5: “Behold, I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me.” The parentalistic interpretation of this text thus renders its meaning: I was born of one who was guilty, and who was infected with corruption. But the word translated “Iniquity” generally means guilt; yet it does not necessarily and exclusively have this signification, and so the dictionary does not settle the question beyond dispute. But it is contrary to the fundamental ethics of the Old Testament to conceive of marriage and its necessary consequences as iniquitous and sinful in themselves. If David derived his depraved nature from his mother in consequence of the fact that he was born of her tainted substance, then the conclusion must follow that marriage is in itself unclean; and this conclusion is contrary to the scriptures. The traditional interpretation is the only tolerable one, that David here means to utter his conviction that the sin of which he was

guilty sprang out of a depravity which had made him a sinner from the very moment of his conception.

Genesis viii. 21: "The imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth." This language teaches, in defiance of exegetical jugglery, that this evil imagination did not arise in man, but was in him from the very commencement as innate blameworthiness. "Declarations in general of a constitutional character of the human heart are not declarations of a distinct, determinable volition of the individual, but declarations of the constitutional character of human nature."

Mark vii. 20: "That which cometh out of the man, that defileth the man; for from within, out of the heart of men, proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, blasphemies: these are they which defile a man." Our Lord roots these evils in the heart, and pictures them as springing from it spontaneously and universally. A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a tree that is without any moral character bring forth such fruit. Men do not gather grapes from bramble vines, nor figs from thistle bushes. According to parentalists all these evil fruits result from an unfortunate and irresponsible moral weakness and spiritual deformity.

Ephesians ii. 3: "Among whom we also had our conversation in times past in the lusts of our flesh, fulfilling the desires of the flesh and of the mind; and were by nature the children of wrath, even as others." After reminding the Ephesian Christians of their former state, the apostle declares that they, as well as all other Jews and heathen, were by nature the children of wrath. Their very natures were the objects of divine wrath. Their innate, natural, constitutional characters with which they had been born, were the objects of God's punitive justice. Underneath personal and self-determined acts of sin, underneath the rejection of Christ, there lies something in man's very nature which exposes him to the retributive wrath of God. These two impingements—the one upon the equity of God in ordaining the law of taint by entailment, and the other upon that sound and sober exegesis which finds all divine movements against men based, not upon the accident of birth, but upon criminality—sufficiently discount the hypothesis of "depravity without demerit."

2. The doctrine of parentalism logically imports the propagation of moral and spiritual character by the law of genetic transmission, without, however, propagating the ethical qualities of the character. The children of fallen Adam have inherited his depraved character, because of the operation of the law that "like begets like," but his children are not culpable on account of the inheritance; it follows, therefore, that the Adamic character was transmitted, but not its ethical quality. The exact derivation from Adam is "depravity without demerit." The difficulties upon this point are at least twofold: (1) It is just as impossible to separate character and its ethical quality as it is to separate substance and attributes, or the matter of sin and the quality of sin. Character, when the word is not played upon for a purpose, implicates the notion of moral quality. What sort of a moral thing is "depravity without demerit?" (2) But if the disjunction between character and moral quality could be successfully effected it is next to impossible to see how character could be propagated by genetic transmission. Character is spiritual in its nature, and cannot be bred like physical qualities. The whole notion is materializing and debasing in its nature. If the conception were true, a Society for the Breeding of Improved Characters would be the desideratum of our times, and we might have character fanciers as well as pet-stock fanciers. The redemptive problem would be to change the breed of mankind.

3. This law of genetic transmission should rule in the instance of regenerated and sanctified parents, and determine their offspring in subjective holiness. Why should the Adamic connection prevail in such instances and not the immediate connection? Why should the child follow the Adamic parentage and not the regenerate parentage? It is answered by the parentalists that it is because in the present life the sanctification is not complete. Then why does not the child of regenerated parents come into being with partially sanctified characters, so as to be like its parents, partly holy and partly unholy? But the Arminian theology teaches a doctrine of entire sanctification, and so the reply cannot be made in respect to such that their children are not born holy because they are imperfectly sanctified. To this phase of the question the parentalists reply, "The regenerate or sanctified

state is specially a gracious state, and not of the original constitution of man." The fact that it is gracious limits the operation of the law. But the law is, The child must be like its parentage. In regeneration a new nature is imparted, by the Spirit, it is true, but the change is really in the nature of the parent, and according to the law ought to go out from the parent into the offspring, and condition his being. If Adam had stood his probation, his holiness would have been propagated. There is no escape from the conclusion, that this law must logically erect a line of regenerate men, who could truthfully say, "We have Abraham to our father."

4. The hypothesis of the parentalists destroys the parallelism between the "First" and the "Second" Adams. The career of the race began under moral government modified by the covenant of works, and that career must be finished under moral government modified by the covenant of grace. Each of these covenants had heads who were the parties of the second part in the covenants. Each Adam sustained the same relation to his posterity, "As in Adam, . . . so in Christ." If the first Adam's public and representative relation to his posterity under the first covenant were only parental in its nature, then the second Adam's public and representative relation to his posterity under the second covenant must have been parental also, else there is no real propriety in designating him the second Adam, and there is no true parallelism between them. If the Adamism of the first covenant was only parental, then the Adamism of the second covenant is paternal also. But the very supposition that justification is derived from the second Adam by genetic transmission is absurd in the extreme. Watson admits the parallelism of some sort, and the admission carries away the notion of a parental headship from both covenants. But in another place this subject will be more carefully discussed.

Inasmuch as the parental union between Adam and his ordinary descendants implicates the doctrine of depravity without demerit, and inasmuch as it implicates the genetic transmission of character, and inasmuch as it implicates the generation of a regenerate line from a regenerated ancestry, and inasmuch as it implicates the destruction of the Pauline parallelism between the two Adams, we are bound to dismiss this hypothesis of a mere

parental union as the formative, ruling, principle in theology, and its dismissal is the dismissal of Arminianism.

5. The hypothesis, that like begets like, if applied for the explanation of original sin, requires the assumption of a "species" sinner. According to a sound science, not every quality of organic life is propagable, but only such qualities as are specific—such qualities as are essential to the identity of the species. The properties of any given group of organic beings are classified as essential qualities and accidental qualities. The essential qualities are those which constitute the identity of the group and are inseparable from it; the accidental qualities are those which may be taken away from the group without in the least affecting its integrity and completeness. The propagation of these essential qualities is necessary to the perpetuation of the species; but the accidental qualities may or may not be reproduced in the offspring. If original sin be propagable, if it appears uniformly and unavoidably in every generation of the human race and in every individual of each generation, it would be at once put into the category of the essential qualities of the group of beings called man, and would be necessary to the very identity of the race. Man without it would not be man, but some other sort of being. We would thus be compelled to think of "the new creature" of the gospel as a distinct "species" of man, and not as "the old man" transformed and transfigured in moral and spiritual character. Is regeneration a transmutation of "species"? If so, then we would have a *genus homo*, differentiated into a species sinner, and a species saint. Then all the principles of natural science would require the law of generation—the law that like begets like—to rule both species, and so deriving by generation a line of saints as well as a line of sinners.

Such a classification is clearly inaccurate. There is strictly and scientifically speaking no *genus homo*, and there is no species sinner, and no species saint. The human race is a species, and those qualities which are propagated by generation are the essential qualities of mankind, so that the law, like begets like, when applied to man, means that every child is human. Sin is one of the accidents, not one of the essentials, of human nature. It can be detached entirely from humanity without destroying its iden-

tity. Every descendant is sinful, but the controlling law is not the law that like begets like. Saints and sinners are not two species of mankind, but two moral varieties of men; and the persistency of the one variety—the sinful—is not explainable by the law that “like begets like,” causes the father to beget idolatrous sons, then demands of logical and natural consistency, applied to the other variety—the variety of saints.

6. Neither does the second commandment, as is contended, necessitate the assumption that sin is a *virus* in the blood, descending from father to son, indefinitely, as scrofula is supposed to be propagated. The sanction of the second commandment is in these words, “For I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me, and showing mercy unto thousands of them that love me and keep my commandments.” It is God, not nature, who is the active agent in the “visiting”; the thing visited is “iniquity,” not the consequences of sinning; the subjects of the visitation are those children which “hate me,” not all children descended from wicked parents. The language is definitive and descriptive of the *persons* “visited,” and not explanatory of the *mode* of the visitation. It tells us *which* sons will be visited with iniquity, not *how* they will be visited. But if the commandment has its eye upon the law that like begets like, then its annexed reason would be centered in the fact of the mode of the descent of iniquity from father to son.

If the “iniquity is visited” by propagation, by the law that like begets like, why should it be arrested at the third or fourth generation? The father being idolatrous, the son would be idolatrous, by the application of our natural law; the grandson would, for the same reason, be idolatrous also; then the great-grandson would, by the operation of the same law, be likewise idolatrous, and still further, the great-great-grandson, the fourth generation, would also be idolatrous under the reign of the same law; now why would the law cease to operate at this point, at the fourth remove from the original? The logic of the case would demand its operation *ad infinitum*.

But it is said that God stays the operation of the law, “like begets like,” at the fourth generation by his almighty power.

But how can this be when the great-great-grandson (the fourth generation) is, by the terms of the hypothesis, himself an idolater, and so the fountain of a new series of generations? If the law, "like begets like" causes the father to beget idolatrous sons, then the same law ought to require that the great-great-grandson beget idolatrous sons, seeing he himself is an idolater. There would seem to be no principle by which to arrest the operation of the law, once it has been put in motion.

But let us suppose that the son of the idolatrous father, instead of following his father, repents, and "loves God and keeps his commandments," then the second part of this great commandment requires that God "show him mercy"; being a son of an idolatrous father, he ought to be visited with iniquity, but loving and obeying God he is entitled to mercy. Which principle will rule in such a case, the law of nature, or the law of grace? Has not the complication arisen in consequence of taking the matter out of the sovereign hand of God, and placing it in the hand of the impersonal law of nature—the law that like begets like?

There is another crushing difficulty with this interpretation. If the mode of the visitation of the "iniquity" be by propagation, by the law that like begets like, then the "mercy" ought to be thought of as descending to its beneficiaries in the same mode. Is any man reckless enough, in advocating a theory, to teach that "mercy" "runs in the blood"?

We come back to the conclusion that the language of the second commandment is definitive and descriptive of the persons whom God will on the one hand, smite, and on the other bless. He will smite down to the third and fourth generation, indefinitely, those who "hate" him, and will bless thousands, an indefinite number, all those who "love" him. There is not in it a scrap of dogmatism about the law of like begetting like.

7. The eighteenth chapter of Ezekiel annihilates this Arminian contention, that original sin is a virus in the blood, transmitted from father to son under the operation of the law that like begets like. The Jews in the Babylonish captivity, standing upon this very premise, charged their unhappy situation upon their ancestors. "The fathers," said they, "have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are on edge." Our fathers, they said,

did the sinning, and we are doing the hurting for it. "As I live, saith the Lord God, ye shall not have occasion any more to use this proverb in Israel." Then he lays down the principle of his moral administration, and that principle is not the law that like begets like, which law he expressly repudiates as applied to his moral government. "The soul that sinneth, it shall die." This is God's moral law. The soul that does the sinning is the soul that shall do the suffering; the teeth that eat the sour grapes are the teeth which will experience the hurting. "If a man be just, and do that which is lawful and right, . . . he is just, he shall surely live, saith the Lord God." If this just man beget a wicked son, what will be the result? Will the law that like begets like reign over the case? The prophet says, "If he beget a son that is a robber, . . . he shall not live; he hath done all these abominations; he shall surely die; his blood shall be upon him." But suppose this just man beget a good son, what will be the result? "If he beget a son that seeth all his father's sins which he hath done, and considereth, and doeth not such like, . . . he shall not die for the iniquity of his father, he shall surely live." Here is God's reduction of the active principle of his own administration, "The soul that sinneth, it shall die." No matter what may be its ancestry, whether good or bad, its own moral facts will determine the divine treatment of it. A good ancestry cannot sanctify a bad son; a bad ancestry cannot damn a good son. "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son: the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him."

It would seem to be impossible to square this scripture with the doctrine that sin or holiness "runs in the blood" with the doctrine that the natural headship of Adam is the determining law of God's administration in the earth. The theologian would seem to be driven to some other principle of explanation than that found in the natural law of propagation, the law that like begets like.

II. The realistic mode of construing the Adamic union and of tracing its consequences in our race history has never been a dogma of the church, though it has had many eminent expositors

and defenders. There are several important variations of the general conception of the hypothesis. In modern times Jonathan Edwards taught it under the notion of a "constituted oneness, or identity, of Adam and his posterity"; Dr. S. J. Baird, in his *Elohim Revealed*, sets it forth under the notion of a numerical unity; and Dr. Shedd, in his *History of Doctrine, Theological Essays*, and his *Dogmatic Theology*, exhibits the same doctrine under the form of a specific unity. The essence of the doctrine is the same; the divergence is in the mode of its conception and statement. All hold that Adam and his posterity were some sort of a real, substantive unit, so that what the unit did every individual comprised in the unit did. Edwards thought that this unit was constituted by the sovereignty of God, and that his power was the cause of its continuity; Dr. Baird conceived of the unit as mathematical, and set up this interpretative language, "Our oneness does not express the fact merely that we and Adam are alike, but that we are thus alike because the forces which are in us and make us what we are were in him, and are numerically the same which in him constituted his nature and gave him his likeness. The body which is impelled by two diverse forces, x and y , moves in the direction of neither of them, but in that of a different force, z , the resultant of the two; yet is neither of the forces lost, but merely modified, each by contact with the other. The new force, z , is simply x modified by y . So, in the successive generations of the human race, so far as their traits are the result of propagation, so far as they are the offspring of their parents, theirs are but the same identical forces which were in their parents, only appearing under new forms." Adam he conceived as the race-unit, and the "parallelogram of forces" is resorted to as explanatory of his history.

Dr. Shedd states, expounds, and defends the doctrine of specific unity by elaborate and formal argumentation. Concerning the existence of a specific human nature he says, "In the order of nature, mankind exists before the generations of mankind; the nature is prior to the individuals produced out of it." This specific nature is then invested with rational and voluntary powers: "But this human nature, it must be carefully noticed, possesses all the attributes of the human individuals, for the indi-

vidual is only a portion and specimen of the nature. Considered as an essence, human nature is an intelligent, rational and voluntary essence, and accordingly its agency in Adam partakes of the corresponding qualities." This generic human nature did not exist in abstract form, but was at the very first individualized and personalized in the Adam of Eden: "Adam, as the generic man, was not a mere receptacle containing millions of separate individuals. The genus is not an aggregation, but a single, simple essence. As such, it is not yet characterized by individuality. It, however, becomes varied and manifold by being individualized in its propagation, or development into a series. . . . The individual, as such, is consequently only a *modus existendi*, the first and antecedent mode being the generic humanity, of which this subsequent serial mode is only another aspect or manifestation." It follows, therefore, that when Adam sinned, the human genus sinned, and, inasmuch as it is a law of propagation that the whole of the genus must descend into each of the species, every individual propagated by Adam must be a sinful, depraved and guilty creature. If there could be a transmutation of species, in time a holy child might appear as a sporadic character; but as this whole evolutionary hypothesis is, according to Dr. Shedd, a delusion, and as the species is always persistent and uniform, such a result is an impossibility; and so the race-history must be persistently and uniformly sinful, except as supernatural grace may interfere in the production of exceptions. "The individual Adam and Eve were no more guilty of this first act (of sinning), and of the whole of it, than their descendants are, and their descendants are as guilty as they."

There is a deep distinction between the parentalists and the realists. In the first scheme, the depravity of the race is conceived as an evil, but non-penal, inheritance; in the second, the very substance of human nature is conceived as corrupted and guilty and criminalized, and as so passing down to all mankind from the original pair.

There are many grave objections to realism, which bar its theological acceptance.

1. It rests upon a very doubtful, if not absolutely false, philosophical basis. It is well known what a long and furious contro-

versy once raged in all the universities of Europe between realists and conceptualists or nominalists, and that the best results of that debate were with the nominalists. The stoutest advocates of the Scotch or Common Sense School of Philosophy—Reid, Brown, Hamilton—are, at least, modified conceptualists. The *universalia ante rem* of the schoolmen is abstract reality, a contradiction in terms; the *universalia in rem* is only the individual by another name; the *universalia post rem* is the psychological concept derived by the mind from an examination of individuals and only symbolizes objective reality. The realistic explanation is based upon an exploded philosophy, and is encumbered by all that besets that philosophy. There is no such realistic entity as *humanity*. It is an abstract term.

2. Realism implicates the propagation of Adam's personality by traduction. We know nothing of an impersonal humanity, having concrete and objective existence. Humanity conceived as impersonal has no substantive being; it exists only to thought; it has only ideal, conceptual existence. In the first instance, personalized humanity and Adam were identical. If that humanity was transmitted to posterity, *ex traduce*, it was not first depersonalized and then transmitted, but it was transmitted in its personal form. We are compelled to think of personality as of the essence of humanity. It follows inexorably from this premise that the personality of Adam was transmitted by generation to each of his descendants, so that the formula is exactly and literally true, Adam was every man and every man was Adam. There are but two conceivable modes of escape from this absurdity: (1) It may be assumed that generic humanity had its own generic personality, and that it is this generic personality which is transmitted to posterity. This supposition, however, would necessitate the doctrine of a dual personality in Adam, and inferentially in every parent; for, *ex hypothesi*, Adam had a generic personality, that which belongs to humanity, and in addition thereto his own specific and private personality. The same would be true of every parent; but we are conscious that we are one person and not two. (2.) The other alternative refuge from the absurdity which makes every man a personal Adam is the assumption that all personalities are generated out of the personality of Adam, so as to

give each man a distinct personality of his very own. Then it must follow that personality can be propagated like bodies. But what is the real difference between propagating the personality of Adam and propagating the person of Adam? The theory must not resile from the generation and propagation of personality itself; nor must it recoil from the propagation of Adam's person, since there is no generic person to be propagated, and since the creative power of God cannot be introduced to relieve the difficulty. It is of the very essence of the theory that the generic humanity, which was created in connection with Adam, has, by successive naturalistic abscissions, furnished each individual with his human essence and personality. We come back then to our initial charge, that realism implicates the propagation of Adam's entire personality, or a fractional part of it, to each of his descendants.

3. Realism implicates the divisibility of the soul. One of the most orthodox doctrines in philosophy is the simplicity and unity of the soul; for if the soul can be divided, all its faculties can be divided, else you may have all the faculties of the human spirit inhering in one fraction of the essence and the other fraction without any faculties whatsoever, and consequently utterly impotent. Conceive of the faculties as distributed between Adam and Cain, and then you must think of Cain as having some of Adam's memory and some of his consciousness. This is such an absurdity that metaphysicians teach with uncompromising dogmatism the simplicity and indivisibility of the human soul, and a rational argument for the immortality of the soul has been founded upon its very indiscerptibility. Divisibility has for ages been set down as one of the differentiating marks of matter. According to traducianism, generation is precisely the mode by which the Adamic unit is broken up into the multitude, without the interposition of any divine fiat. Dr. Shedd admits the charge of divisibility, but seeks to void the argument by postulating that it is a divisibility that does not imply materiality. But that sort of divisibility is an appeal to our ignorance, for his proposition in this respect is utterly unthinkable; and what does he or any one else know about a divisibility that does not divide, for his

premise carries that absurdity. But let us grant the premise for argument's sake, and it still remains that he admits the point charged, namely, the divisibility of the soul—its essence, its faculties, its dispositions, its memory, its consciousness, its personality, its moral and spiritual history. Each descendant has the whole soul of Adam, or a part of it: if the whole, then each man is Adam himself; if a part, each man is a fraction of Adam; and if he is a fraction of Adam, what proportion of himself is himself and what proportion is Adam? If the whole genus of man was in Adam, and only a fraction of it descends to the individual, is the individual a complete man? "If there may be division and derivation of invisible substance in the case of the body, there may be in the case of the soul. It is the invisibility and imponderability that constitutes the difficulty, and if this is no bar to propagation in respect to the physical part of man, it is not in respect to the psychical part." The assumption of two distinct laws of propagation, the one psychical and the other physical, seems to be born of the exigencies of debate rather than of the exegesis of the case.

4. Realism fails to ground our responsibility for the first sin. If the theory fails in this respect, it fails at the very point which it was designed to strengthen and relieve of difficulty. "The human nature acted in and with the two sinless individuals (Adam and Eve) in and with whom it was created. In them it was tempted by Satan, and yielded to the temptation." But impersonal nature cannot act, be tempted, yield to temptation, etc. So we have the hypothesis of "the free agency of mankind in Adam." "The first sin of Adam, being a common sin, not an individual sin, is deservedly and justly imputed to the posterity of Adam upon the same principle upon which all sin is deservedly and justly imputed, namely, it was committed by those to whom it is imputed." The object is to ground the righteousness of the imputation of the guilt of Adam's first sin to his posterity, and that ground is alleged to be participation in it by those to whom it is imputed. Otherwise the imputation would be undeserved and unjust. The participation was organic and substantial: the generic nature sinned by using the personality of Adam, or by

using a personality of its own; for nothing less than a personality possesses free agency, and nothing less than a free agent is capable of being tempted, of yielding to temptation, of committing sin. If the race committed the first sin by acting through the generic personality, we come back to the doctrine that Adam had a dual personality, and further, to the position that the species is responsible for the acts of the genus. But if the race in sinning in Adam used Adam's personality and free agency, what has been gained in the argument? In every true sense of the supposition, Adam, not the race, did the sinning. Realism construes the "nature" as acting through the "personality"; it therefore makes the nature the seat of free agency instead of the personality, as in the orthodox philosophy. How can I be held responsible for what the nature does? The attempt to show that the "I" of each of Adam's children was present in and with the generic nature, so that in some substantial sense that "I" sinned and fell with him, seems a jugglery with language. There was a sort of participation of the posterity in that first sin, else there could have been no imputation; but if that participation were merely a participation of nature—a mere community of substance in the act of sinning, a mere summation of mankind in a unit at the moment of sinning—while such a conception might explain the depravity of the race, it cannot explain the guilt of that depravity. A corruption of heart, so originating, would be unfortunate and ruinous, but in no strict sense of the word could it be guilty. Men do not feel that the child is guilty on account of birthmarks; yet those marks may be hideous deformities. The birth-deformities of character are felt by all men, and declared by scripture to be immoral and hell-deserving: these psychical deformities could not have originated in the same manner as the physical deformities, else monstrosities of body would be as culpable as native monstrosities of soul.

5. Realism implicates our participation in all ancestral history. On the supposition of a real numerical or specific oneness of mankind with Adam, every individual, derived from him by ordinary generation, is a sharer in all his deeds. If, on account of that oneness, as is alleged, each man participates in the guilt

and depravity of Adam's first act of sin, upon the same ground and for the same reason every descendant must be a moral and spiritual partaker in the entire physical and psychical history of Adam, at least up to the moment of the birth of Cain, the moment of the first individuation and personalization of the generic nature. Dr. Shedd seeks to void this conclusion by saying, "The acts of Adam and Eve after the fall differed from the act of eating the forbidden fruit in two respects: 1. They were transgressions of the moral law, not of the probationary statute. 2. They were not committed by the entire race with and in Adam." This rejoinder does not set aside the inference of a unity of race-history based upon the oneness of race-nature. (1) If the acts of Adam and Eve after the fall were not race-acts, those before the fall must have been such. (2) The probationary statute under which the first sin was committed was rooted in the moral law, and so cannot on this ground be differentiated from subsequent sins of the Eden pair. (3) If it was the nature of the Eden-law, as being positive and probationary, which grounded the participation in the first sin, the whole ground is shifted. The central position of realism is that the oneness was in essence; hence the downflow of guilt and depravity; hence the change of the statute from a probationary one to a moral one could not affect that oneness, and so could not affect the downflow of consequences: the assumption is a change of premise from a realistic basis to a federal basis. (4) If "unity of nature and participation" ground imputation, then as long as there is unity of nature there must be participation, and so imputation; until the birth of Cain there was numerical and specific unity of nature, and there must have been participation of all mankind, not only in all the sinful acts that lie between these two boundaries—the creation of man and the birth of Cain—but in every act of every kind, for it is the genus as qualified by Adam that descends into the species. There is no good reason for restricting the qualities to that of the first sin alone. Now, one of those acts in the interval preceding the birth of Cain was the parental act which individuated him, and so the logic runs into the absurdity of making mankind the father of Cain, and, further, as Cain was a part of mankind, he was, at least partly, the father of himself. "Imputation, even in this

case," says Dr. Shedd, "would not lie upon any individual persons of the posterity, for there are none, but only upon the non-personalized nature." What an inconsistency! The first sin of Adam lies upon personalized posterity, but the second and subsequent sins of Adam and Eve lie only upon non-personalized nature! Then what nature was transmitted from Adam to posterity, the personalized or the impersonalized? If the personalized, it was Adam's person; if the impersonalized, then all of Adam's acts are transmitted, for here is precisely where they lie, namely, upon the non-personalized nature. Theology has found the task of defending the imputation of Adam's first sin hard enough; it certainly will not accept the responsibility of defending the imputation of Adam's whole history to his children.

But this implication has a wider and more complicated application. Generic humanity, as deposited by creation in the first pair, was qualified by their conduct, and as thus qualified was transmitted by generation to each individual of posterity; each individual, thus receiving it, qualified it by his own conduct, and then transmitted it to his own offspring, and so on to the end of time. Thus the humanity of each individual has been qualified by a long line of ancestry. The practical results are singular and in some instances startling. What if Adam was regenerated before the birth of Cain! The first son of man qualified humanity with murder, and ought to have propagated a line of murderers to the end of time! Noah qualified it as it was deposited with him with righteousness, and ought to have propagated a line of righteous and obedient sons! Abraham qualified it with faith, and the Jews were right in saying, "We have Abraham to our father"! The principle must rule the series. How many times has an individual of this generation been saved and lost in his ancestry! What, under these implications, would be the *status* of that child which is born of a believing mother and a non-believing father!

6. Realism attributes creative power to parents. "In every case of the generation of organisms, there is no production of any really new substance by creature-parents, but only a reorganizing of existing particles. But we believe a soul is a spiritual atom,

and is brought into existence out of non-existence. Have human parents this highest creative power?" Dr. Thornwell¹ mentions two wonders which realism must achieve. "It first propagates the nature, and next, as the indispensable condition of the nature, it creates the person in whom the nature is to appear. The person is as truly the effect of the causal energy of the parent as the communication of the nature. Here there occurs to us a difficulty which we crave to have solved. The nature of Adam and his posterity, we are told, is one, because it descends to us by generation. The essence of generation is to reproduce the same. If, now, the law of generation establishes an identity of nature between child and parent, why not also an identity of person? If the person is as truly its product as the nature, how comes it that the generated person should be different, while the generated nature is the same? If to generate is to propagate, why not the person be propagated as well as the nature?" If my personality was not propagated, then it was created; if created, it was either by God or by my parents; it was not by God, according to the traducian hypothesis; then it must have been created by my parents. Then the creature owes worship to its creator.

7. Realism destroys the parallelism between Adam and Christ. This parallelism is drawn by Paul in the fifth chapter of the Romans. "As by the offence of one (Adam) judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one (Christ) the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life: for as by one man's (Adam's) disobedience many were made (constituted) sinners, so by the obedience of one (Christ) shall many be made (constituted) righteous. . . . As sin hath reigned unto death, even so might grace reign through righteous-

¹ In Lec. XIII., Vol. I., *Collected Writings*, Thornwell advocates Realism; but in his Review of Baird's *Elohim Revealed*, published in the same volume, he vigorously combats Realism. How is the inconsistency to be explained? Was he a Federalist or a Realist? The lecture was written in 1859, and the review in 1860. Consequently his last and matured views were against Realism. For proof, see *Southern Presbyterian Review* for July, 1876. His editors ought not to have presented the writings of this great master with such inconsistencies. Dr. Thornwell never prepared the lecture for publication; it was discovered by his editors, and given to the public by them. Dr. Thornwell, however, sent the review to the press himself.

ness unto eternal life by Jesus Christ our Lord." In the fifteenth chapter of First Corinthians the same comparison is made in sharp language: "As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." These scriptures, supported as they are by others, teach that condemnation and justification come in the *same mode*, but through different persons. One man, Adam, offended against God, and so brought condemnation and death upon all his posterity; another man, Christ, pleased God, and so brought justification and life upon all his posterity. The persons are antithetical; their work is antithetical; their posterities are different—of the first, all mankind, of the second, elect mankind; of the first, all descended from him by ordinary generation, of the second, all descended from him by extraordinary generation—that is, by regeneration; but the mode by which the consequences of the antithetical conduct of these two Adams descended to their respective posterities is parallel. As comes justification from Christ, so came condemnation from Adam, and *vice versa*. The true *Adamic principle* is the one which will run this parallelism. At this point the realistic principle utterly breaks down, and discloses its unscripturalness.

The following points are necessary to show the real parallelism. (1) We are to see two Adams in comparison—the Adam of Eden and the Adam of Calvary. (2) We are to see two posterities—the posterity of the first Adam and the posterity of the second Adam. These posterities are constituencies, both designated by the sovereign authority of God—all mankind were, by the elective appointment of God, made the constituency of Eden, and some mankind by the same sort of election were made the constituency of Calvary. In both cases the reasons for the divine choices are hidden. We can no more divine the reason of God in making all mankind parties to the covenant of works than we can discover his reason for making elect mankind the parties to the covenant of grace. (3) We are to see in the parallelism the first Adam sinning, offending God, and the second Adam pleasing God, doing righteously. Both were metaphysically peccable; both were metaphysically able to stand their respective probation. (4) A judgment of condemnation was passed judicially upon the first Adam, embracing in the judgment all his posterity; a judg-

ment of judicial justification was passed upon the second Adam, including in that judgment all his elect posterity. (5) Death as a penalty followed the sentence of condemnation; life as a gift of grace judicially followed the sentence of justification. (6) These results flowed down to the respective posterities from the two heads in the same manner. As by Adam, so by Christ. The *Adamic principle* must be such a one as will run this parallelism as a weaver's shuttle flies back and forth in the loom.

Will realism meet and satisfy the demand? It is claimed that it will interpret the covenant of works: will it interpret the covenant of grace? The Calvinistic theology is clear and strong in teaching that Christ is the federal head of his elect posterity; that his righteousness is immediately imputed to the elect; that upon the ground of that imputed righteousness God pronounces a judgment of justification upon the people of Christ; that he then infuses a subjective character of holiness, beginning the infusion in regeneration and perfecting it in the gradual work of sanctification. Is there in our theology anything like a generic redeemed humanity, unified in Christ and individuated in his elect people by regeneration? Is the humanity of the elect sanctified in the second Adam as it is alleged to have been corrupted in the first Adam? The very notion of a generic redeemed humanity carries us to the mystical theory of the atonement. The order in soteriology is (1) justification and (2) sanctification; the parallel order in anthropology must be (1) condemnation and (2) depravity. The realistic order in anthropology is (1) depravity and (2) condemnation; and the parallel order in soteriology ought to be (1) sanctification and (2) justification; but this order cannot be maintained in soteriology, and its failure under grace proves its incorrectness under law. In respect to the two heads—Adam and Christ—character preceded and grounded legal standing; that is, Adam was first depraved and then guilty, and Christ was first righteous and then justified. But in respect to both posterities legal relations preceded and grounded character; that is, all men were first guilty, and because guilty, corrupt, and the elect are first justified, and then sanctified. These orders are not chronological, but logical. Because God justifies the elect, he sanctifies them, and because he has condemned men

he creates them in a state of depravity. "As in Adam, so in Christ." The realist must be willing to apply his Adamic principle to the second Adam, else it is not truly Adamic.

Dr. Shedd labors to break down this deadly parallelism, but he unconsciously puts the head in comparison with the posterity, while Paul compares head with head, and posterity with posterity. Again, because some things which may be affirmed of Christ cannot be affirmed of Adam, he leaps to the conclusion that the parallel has been improperly drawn by the federalist, but the precise point in the comparison is the *mode* of the descent of results from heads to members, and the affirmation is that the descent follows the same order under the two covenants. In order to vitiate the argument, he draws five points of difference between the case under the covenant of works, and that under the covenant of grace: (1) "Christ suffered freely and voluntarily for the sin of man, but Adam's posterity suffered necessarily and involuntarily." But neither Paul nor the federalist denies this proposition; but the error of its author consists in representing Christ and Adam's posterity as antithetical: the parallel is drawn between the wrong parties. Rightly constructed, it would read: Adam was a free agent under the covenant of works, and Christ was a free agent under the covenant of grace. (2) "Christ was undeservedly punished when he suffered for the sin of man; but Adam's posterity are not undeservedly punished when they suffer for the sin of Adam." Here the false comparison is repeated. There was a sense, too, in which Christ did deserve his sufferings; but the parallel rightly constructed runs: Both Adam and Christ were dealt with righteously by God. (3) "Christ was a substitute when he suffered, but Adam's posterity are principals." Again we see the false comparison. Adam was a substitute when he sinned; Christ was a substitute when he wrought out redemption. (4) "The purpose of Christ's suffering is expiatory; that of the suffering of Adam's posterity is retributive." Again we see the false comparison of persons. Both these propositions are true, but they do not touch the Pauline antithesis. (5) "The guilt of Adam's sin did not rest upon Christ as it does upon Adam's posterity." But the point is not relative to Adam's posterity; but does the guilt of Adam rest upon Christ by imputation? We

submit, the parallelism has not been broken down, and that the proposition still stands, "As in Adam, so in Christ;" and, further, that realism cannot run this parallelism, and because it cannot, it must be abandoned as a fruitless hypothesis in theology.

8. Realism seriously compromises the sinlessness of Christ. Theology teaches that the Son of God took to himself, in his incarnation, a true body and a reasonable soul, a *bona fide* human nature. That nature which he thus assumed must have been one of three kinds—generic humanity in its entirety, or a fractional part of generic humanity, or a human nature created especially for him by the supernatural power of God out of the substance of the Virgin Mary. The hypothesis denies that it was a new creation, and that supposition is at once eliminated. Insurmountable difficulties encumber the idea that Christ's humanity was the genus of the human species; for if Christ assumed generic humanity, he redeemed generic humanity, so that, if any be lost, his humanity is saved, while his person is in hell; but, according to a sound philosophy, the whole genus must descend into each of the species, while according to this hypothesis the genus is in heaven and the species in hell. If Christ assumed generic humanity as a whole, he took to himself that humanity which was corrupted in Eden, and which has been still further qualified by the sinful history of the race. The only supposition that is tenable for a moment is that the human nature which Christ took was a fractional part of generic humanity derived by him from his mother, but this fraction was a part of the corrupt and guilty whole, and was consequently itself guilty and corrupt. In either case, then, whether Christ's humanity was generic or specific, it was depraved, and the scriptures are thereby contradicted. The only escape from this disastrous consequence is the assumption that Christ's humanity was sanctified in the very moment of his miraculous conception. But the doctrine of the miraculous conception does not thoroughly relieve the case. (1) The human nature of Christ was, *ex hypothesi*, about four thousand years older than the miraculous conception; if it was sanctified by that miracle, it was corrupt during all the period preceding the incarnation: "As such simply, his human nature was like that of Mary and David, fallen and sinful." In the pre-incarnate period,

Christ's human nature existed, not individuated, it is true, but really and truly existed before conception and birth, and as thus existent, was sinful and fallen, not being sanctified until the miraculous conception. The implications are two, (a) the pre-existence of the human nature of Christ, and (b) pre-existence in a fallen and sinful state. The fraction of the generic human nature which Christ assumed was not your or my segment, else we would have had our fraction appropriated by another person, and we would have been non-existent; but the human nature which Christ assumed was his own appropriate abscission; its existence antedated the incarnation, and up to the moment of conception was unholy. (2) If the human nature of Christ had such a pre-existence, the incarnation was necessary for other than redemptive ends, or the supralapsarian soteriology is correct. (3) If Christ's human nature was sanctified by his miraculous conception, then he was antecedently to that moment unholy and in need of sanctification. Theology knows the doctrine of the justification of Christ as a federal head, but it is ignorant of any need for his purification in the subjective sense. Realism implicates the moral character of Christ, and if that character be even flected or blemished to any degree, the redemptive sacrifice which he made is vitiated. The doctrine infolds dangers to salvation itself.

Resumé of the argument against realism: (1) Its anthropology rests upon an exploded philosophy. (2) It implies the propagation of personality as well as the propagation of nature. (3) It postulates the divisibility of the soul. (4) It fails to ground our responsibility for the sin of Adam. (5) It entails all ancestral history upon posterity. (6) It imputes creative power to parents. (7) It destroys the Pauline parallelism between the two Adams, and the mode of the transmission of their bane and blessing to their respective posterities. (8) It involves the sinlessness of Christ.

III. The Adamic principle is, as to its nature, *federal*. The nature of our union with the two Adams, and the nature of our interest in the sin of Adam in Eden, and the nature of the participation of the elect in the redemption of Christ, are determined and defined by covenants, and not by the fact that Adam happened to be the first father of the race, nor by any realistic identity

between him and the race. The basis is in a contract, sovereignly made by God.

In attempting to conceive the case, we may think of man's career as having been originally projected under a naked form of law, or under some modified form of law. Moral government, pure and unconditioned, places its subject upon a perpetual probation; makes no provision for the termination of the contingencies of his surroundings, nor for the removal of the possibilities of his falling, nor for his recovery in case he does fall; its demand is for perfect and perpetual obedience while the probationer is exposed at every moment of time and at every point of duty. Its language to its subject is, "Obey perfectly, and while you obey, and only so long as you obey, shall you live; disobey at any moment or in any particular, or to any degree, and that instant you die." It consequently makes the probation of its subject coextensive with the duration of his being; there is no provision for justification. Under such a scheme there is no possibility of redemption; for a law that demands perpetual innocence from a perpetual probationer demands, on its obverse side, the perpetual death of the transgressor. Suppose a substitute under such a scheme of government, and that substitute would be, like the principal, upon a never-ending probation; he could never reach a moment in time nor a point in his vicarious work where the sovereign could say, "It is enough; I am satisfied, the law is satisfied, and every interest involved is conserved." The career of the substitute would be perpetually exposed in consequence of his perpetual peccability, and consequently the fate of his beneficiaries would always be in jeopardy. That man never had any history under naked law is proved by the fact that God is to-day dealing with him under a conditioned form of government. That first condition was the covenant of works, which was superimposed in Eden by God in the exercise of his sovereignty. The language of this modified form of law was, "Obey for a limited period of time, and in respect to a particular matter, and then live for ever." Here was a provision for terminating the probation, and granting justification to the subject. As to the particular specified, Adam sinned, and failed to secure the promised blessing. Having begun his moral history under a modified

form of government, God now superimposed another modification, the covenant of grace, the language of which is, "Obey in a substitute, or federal head, the penal and preceptive law, for a limited time, and then be forever justified." Christ gloriously succeeded under these conditions, and secured the justification of all his elect people. Man's whole moral history began under a pactional form of government, and it must be completed, in heaven or in hell, under that same form.

Every covenant has parties, stipulations and sanctions. The parties to the first covenant were God, as representing the Trinity, as the party of the first part; and Adam, as representing all those descending from him by ordinary generation, as the party of the second part: the union between Adam and his posterity was made by the sovereign will of God. The parties to the second covenant were God and Christ—God as representing the Trinity, and Christ as representing the elect; the union of Christ and the elect was made by the sovereign will of God. The stipulation of the first covenant was, explicitly, obedience to a positive prohibitory statute, and implicitly to the entire moral law; in the second covenant the requirement was obedience to the preceptive and penal parts of the moral law: the probation in both was limited. The sanctions of both covenants were life and death—justification and condemnation.

The fundamental form of God's government over man is the *representative*. The constructive principle in anthropology and soteriology is the representative. All merit is pactional; all demerit is pactional. All facts in man's moral history are to be construed as the results of keeping or violating God's covenants. The interpretative principle in all theology is the federal—the principle of substitution and imputation under covenants.

A full exposition and defence of the federal theology is forbidden by the limits necessary to this article; nor is fullness of exposition and defence needed, because it is the historic system of Protestant theology, and well-known of all who have even a small acquaintance with the Queen of the Sciences.

R. A. WEBB.