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I. ST. JOHN'S ARGUMENT FROM MIRACLES.

1. We are so accustomed to regard John's Gospel as a sweet, tender evangel, that we are apt to leave out of view its argumentative character. John himself, however, in his twentieth chapter, teaches us to avoid this mistake: "Many other signs truly did Jesus in the presence of his disciples, which are not written in this book; but these are written that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God."

If we understand this passage, John does not mean that the preceding part of his book is wholly occupied with an account of various miracles. They have their place along with other things—other things, and, it may be, better things; for our Lord is represented as saying (xiv. 11), "Believe Me, that I am in the Father, and the Father in me; or else believe me for the very works' sake." What emphasis is to be placed on that pronoun Me, what unfathomable depths of meaning are involved in it, no finite intellect can know. They who are most spiritually minded see in Christ, more than others do, the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father, and beholding it as in a glass, are changed into the same image from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the Lord. Perhaps no one ever apprehended this divine glory more fully than did the beloved disciple; but he was preserved from the narrowness of depreciating, much more of despising the argument from miracles; in which, indeed, he would have been untrue to the ancient and sacred beliefs of his race. Hence, in addition to other things, we find in the first twenty chapters of his Gospel

III. THE FATHERHOOD OF GOD.[1]

In the controversy between Principal Candlish and Professor Crawford, the main question of disagreement was as to man's original relation to God. Dr. Candlish affirmed that Adam, in Eden and unfallen, sustained to God the servile relation alone; while Dr. Crawford contended that he sustained both the servile and filial relations. The one denied and the other asserted God's common fatherhood of the race.

Our question goes back and inquires about *Adam as he was* and *man as he ought to be.*

But in the interests of clearness, it is incumbent upon the discussion to expound the two relations, noting the specific differences between a son and a servant.

1. They differ as to their *genesis.* A servant may become such in a great variety of ways: by birth, by divine creation, by free choice, by misfortune, by purchase, by theft, by war, and the like. A son, on the other hand, can become such by the following methods alone: by divine creation, by generation, by regeneration, by adoption. The possible ways of superinducing upon a human creature the servile relation are almost infinite, while those by which the filial relation is constituted are very few.

2. They differ as to the *character of the moral government* under which they live. Both are under moral government, but the servant is under that moral government where the rectoral feature is prominent, while the son is under that moral govern-

[1] *The Fatherhood of God.* Being the first course of the Cunningham Lectures, delivered before the New College, Edinburgh, in March, 1864. By Rob. S. Candlish. D. D., Principal of the New College, Edinburgh, and Minister of Free St. George's Church, Edinburgh. With a supplementary volume containing reply to Dr. Crawford, with answers to other objections and explanatory notes.

The Fatherhood of God. Considered in its general and special aspects, and particularly in relation to the Atonement, with a review of recent speculations on the subject and a reply to the strictures of Dr. Candlish. By Thomas J. Crawford, D. D., Professor of Divinity in the University of Edinburgh.

ment where the disciplinary feature is outstanding. One is under rule in the state, the other under rule in the house. One is under God's magisterial government, the other under his fatherly government. To the servant, God is Lord and Master; to the son, he is Father and Friend. The subject of rectoral moral government may at the same time be the subject of disciplinary moral government. The two relations, the servile and the filial, may co-exist upon the same person at one and the same time. There is no inherent incompatibility. Christ was both the Servant and Son of his Father.

3. They differ as to the *regulative motive of obedience.* Both are under law, and the obligation of perfect obedience presses equally upon both. The servant is just as much bound to obey his master as the son is to obey his father. *Fear*—it need not be slavish, and in Adam unfallen and in Christ it certainly was not—is the inspiring motive with the servant. He dreads the consequences of disobedience. The penalty everywhere and always obtrudes itself upon him. The drawn sword is to him the final reason for obedience. However much pleasure he may find in service, he can never forget that it is duty. The requirements of his master may be anything else than irksome, but he can never forget his position; he can never forget that he has a master who holds a lash with the authority to use it. The supreme motive is a sense of duty. On the other hand, *love* is the ruling motive with the son. The injunctions of a parent rise into privileges rather than into cold duties. There is a sympathy between the father and the child. There is between them a community of blood and heart. Of course sin has made, among men, the normal abnormal, the natural unnatural; but in the glorified state, the saints, as servants, will obey out of a holy reverence for and pleasure in authority, and, as sons, from a motive of holy love to the divine Father.

4. They differ as to the *ground of their expectation of reward.* The servant pleads his work; the son his privileges. The servant is dealt with upon the naked principle of justice; the son according to the riches of paternal goodness. The servant fixes his eye upon his merits; the son upon his father's heart. The servant regards himself as a wage-hand; the son as an interested partner.

The servant presents his claim, and points to the contract; the son expresses his wishes, and appeals to his father's love. Both expect rewards for their work; but the servant stands upon right, and claims his in the name of the contract; the son stands upon paternal goodness, and asks in the name of fatherly affection. Both have rights to their respective rewards; but the right of a servant grounds itself in the justice of a law-court; that of a son in the justice of a father's house.

5. They differ as to the *design had in their punishment.* The offending servant is dealt with in the name of naked justice. The officer of law takes him in hand. Retributive justice pursues him with sword in hand. The design in inflicting punishment upon him is simply and solely to effect the righteous and necessary connection between guilt and punishment. All other consequences are incidental and secondary. The good of the offender is thrust into the background. He is punished because he *deserves* punishment. The offending son, on the contrary, is dealt with in the name of fatherly discipline. His sufferings, as caused by his father, are not punitive in their nature, but corrective. The object is the son's improvement. There is a heart of love behind the hand which deals the stroke. The child's sufferings, as inflicted by his father, are not penal and rectoral, but reformatory and beneficent.

6. They differ as to the *freedom and fulness of access into the presence of their superiors.* The servant may be intimate, but he is less so than the son. There is not the same wealth of communion, the same nearness of approach, the same confidence. The servant is farther from his master than the son is from his father. The one is received in some presence-chamber; the other at the familiar fireside. The one must stand with head uncovered, or kneel in humble reverence; the other may move in and out, through the rooms of the mansion, and frequent the hallowed places about the dwelling. The highest attainable position of the servant is that of the unfallen angels who minister as flames of fire about Jehovah's burning throne; while the redeemed son is admitted into the mansion on the light-covered hills beyond the stars, and permitted to pillow his head on his Father's bosom.

The position of the servant before the throne is sublime; but the position of the son in the Father's house is indescribable.

Now, the precise question is, What was man's original relation to his Creator? Was he a servant only? or was he both a servant and a son? Manifestly, if there were an inherent incongruity between the two relations, the question could not be asked; but the foregoing marks of contradistinction show that no such incongruity exists, and that the same person may, at the same time, be the son and subject of his father. The Prince of Wales is at once the son and subject of Queen Victoria.

Upon this question the Scriptures are the only competent and credible authority. Reason, as a source of information on the subject, is to be ruled out, because incompetent to speak to the question. The fact of creation proves man to be the responsible subject of the Creator; but it gives no intimations of the sonship of man, for all lower animals are the creatures of God, and it is incompetent to argue from their creaturehood to their sonship. Reason cannot disprove the fatherhood of God. On this question it is silent; it can speak neither to the one side nor to the other. It can accept whatever the Scriptures may teach.

Dr. Candlish undertakes to disprove the original paternity of God by an argument ingeniously constructed and very readable:

"Whatever God as Creator makes, he must rule. If it is not to rule him, he must rule it. And he must rule it in all its actings and workings; through all the stages of its development. . . . If it is inert matter that is to be ruled, the law will be of a material or physical kind, whether mechanical or chemical. . . . . But now, let what is to be ruled be, not inert matter, but beings possessed of animal life, having the capacity of feeling and the power of voluntary motion; with the sensational propensities we call instincts, and the dawnings of intelligence, which render them teachable, as they are unfolded in growing shrewdness from the lowest to the highest order of brutal tribes. The sort of law by which such beings are ruled—the law of instinct, and, it may be added, in a measure, of experience, —is adapted to their sentient and motive natures. . . . But if the creatures to be ruled be possessed of intelligence and conscience, his rule becomes government, properly so called; government worthy of himself; . . . a rational and moral government, by means of a law and judgment of which reason and the moral sense take cognizance. . . . Thus it would seem, from the nature of the case, creation implies rule and government. The Creator must, of very necessity, be a ruler and governor, unless his creation is to be independent of himself. And as regards his intelligent creatures, his rule or government must be, in the proper forensic sense, legal and judicial, if it is to be adapted to the constitution and relative

position of the persons to be governed. . . . Where is the idea of fatherhood? Is there, at this stage, and so far as the inquiry has hitherto been pushed, any room for it at all? Is it not rather excluded? . . . Let it be taken for granted that the Creator is a living, personal intelligence, distinct from his own creation, and in particular distinct from his own intelligent creatures, who are themselves, as he is, living, personal intelligences. It may be clearly shown, and certainly inferred, that he must, as Creator, govern them, and govern them in a manner suited to their organization or constitution, as being made capable of owning righteous authority and reasonable law, and, therefore, capable of receiving recompense and retribution. Standing to them in the relation of their Creator, he must of necessity stand to them in the relation, as thus explained, of their ruler, their sovereign lawgiver and just judge. These apprehensions of God, and of his relation to the rational and responsible inhabitants of his universe, are of the essence of all belief in him, and all worship of him. They originate, and what is more, they fully explain and vindicate, both belief and worship. But the paternal relation, the fatherhood of God, has no place among them." (Pp. 10–14).

But when the validity of this argument has been conceded, that which has been proved is the Creator's lordship, and that which has been disproved is man's independence. The question of divine fatherhood and human sonship has not been touched. If the two relations, the servile and the filial, were mutually exclusive of each other, then the argument establishing the one would bar the other; but the two relations are not thus contradictory, and so the argument in proving man's subjectship fails to disprove his sonship.

Prof. Crawford charged this inconclusiveness upon Dr. Candlish, and sought to match his argument from creatureship to subjectship by the following reasoning, which proceeds from divine love as a premise to God's fatherhood as the conclusion:

"Be it assumed, then, that 'God is love,' and that his being so 'springs out of the very necessity of his nature.' Be it further assumed that, in the exercise of that love, which is thus allowed to be 'essential to his manner of being,' he has brought into existence a race of intelligent and moral creatures, 'created in his own image and after his own likeness,' with reference to whom he must have been disposed equally to manifest his love and maintain his righteous authority. And yet farther, be it assumed that these rational and moral creatures, as bearing the image of him by whom they were made, *have something more* to distinguish them from other creatures '*beyond the bare fact of intelligent responsibility*,'—that they have the capacity of knowing, loving, desiring, trusting, serving, and enjoying him; and that the very sum of all the duties which they owe to him is nothing else than *love*, as the natural and fit response to that love wherewith their Creator hath first loved them.

"It may be that in this last supposition there are some things that will not be

readily, if at all, conceded. But why not? There is surely nothing unreasonable in it. The 'image or likeness of God' cannot surely be held to consist in anything *so barely intellectual or so coldly judicial* as a mere capacity of 'understanding the divine will, and feeling a sense of responsibility under it.' If this were all that is implied in bearing the divine image, what then are we to think of God himself, whose image it is? In that case, we must evidently divest the character of God of some of the most essential and most adorable of its attributes. One thing we certainly know, that the *restored image* of God in the souls of men, when regenerated by the Holy Spirit, includes in it, not only 'intelligent responsibility,' but such a conformity to God in knowledge, righteousness and holiness as prompts them to love him and cleave to him with all their heart. And if so, we cannot think that it was otherwise with the primal image of God as it was impressed on our progenitors. Undoubtedly, to love God, to trust in him, to delight in his fellowship, to submit to his appointments, and cheerfully to obey his will, was part of the original constitution of the human soul before sin had ruined and depraved it.

"And what then? May we not reasonably conclude that God, having brought such creatures into being, 'will not forsake the work of his own hands'? Having so far acted towards them as a father in giving them existence and imparting to them his own likeness, we cannot suppose that he will thereafter leave them orphans. The same love which originally moved him to the creation of them will move him still to watch over them with paternal care, and to provide for them with paternal kindness and liberality. And even when, like prodigal sons, they have departed from him, forfeited by their sins all title to his favor, and striven as far as they could to dissever, or at least to disown, the bonds of their relation to him, it is no incredible thing that his fatherly love may still yearn after them, and may devise means whereby, without prejudice to the authority of his law and the majesty of his government, his banished ones may, if penitent, be restored to the comforts of his home and the endearments of his fellowship" (Pp. 15–17).

Professor Crawford overlooks the distinction between a *relation* and an *affection*. The love of God is an attribute of the divine nature, and may manifest itself towards the servant as well as the son. If God be regarded as sovereign and man as a subject, and nothing more, still his affectionate nature could display itself in governmental and ruling acts and provisions directed towards this human subject. As a matter of fact, he is a loving king. In the single sphere of government, it may be of the wealthiest kind. The argument cannot proceed directly from the existence of love in the divine bosom to the relation of God as a father. The nature of the love must first be determined as parental, which is the very matter in issue. But to do Professor Crawford full justice, he ought to be allowed to say, "I have little confidence in such reasonings, whether as regards the divine sovereignty or the divine fatherhood."

While distrustful of any purely speculative reasoning on the subject of the fatherhood of God, we must admit that Adam knew his *status* before God. If he were a mere subject, he must have known the fact, and if he were created a son as well as a subject, he must have known and rejoiced in it. We cannot conceive of a matter so important and so radical to duty being concealed from him. He must have known his *status* to render intelligent service and worship. Consequently, if he were the created son of God, the divine fatherhood would have been an article in natural religion, and a complete and comprehensive theology of natural religion would report it to us. But through the fall some of the contents of natural religion—the religion of Adam unfallen—were lost, and are not now discoverable without the aid of revelation; and so far as we can see, this doctrine of the original fatherhood of God is, upon the supposition that it was a content of Adam's knowledge, now lost to the race, and stands in need of republication in the volume of inspiration. Hence we take the ground that the question of God's common fatherhood of the race must be answered at the bar of "the law and the testimony," and not at the bar of the reason unenlightened by revelation. The answer, when obtained from this source, will be perfectly reliable.

I. After tracing a series of fatherhoods and sonships, the inspired and infallible evangelist reaches Adam, and, employing the precise formula which he had used in all other cases, says, "Adam which was the son of God." (Luke iii. 38.) The same relation which Seth sustained to Adam, Adam sustained to God, if the genealogical record is to bear its face meaning. If, therefore, it can be affirmed in any proper sense that Adam was the father of Seth, it may be affirmed in the very same sense that God was the father of Adam. The fact of the descent, and not the method, is affirmed. It would be false to reason that Adam is the product of divine generation as Seth is the product of human generation. This record only asserts the fact of divine paternity, and leaves it to other scriptures to tell us that the relation was constituted, not by generation, but by creation.

Because "son" is not in the Greek original, Dr. Candlish objects to its being put there. He says:

"In reality, there is no idea suggested in this whole pedigree, or family-tree, but that of descent—son descending from the father until Adam is reached, whose descent is from no human father, but must be said to be of God. There is nothing of real fatherhood and sonship, as a permanent and personal relation, asserted here. Or if it be held to be asserted in the case of the first father named, why not in the case of the others also? But, on that supposition, in strict consistency, Adam must be regarded as sustaining a relation of true and proper personal fatherhood to each and all his descendants individually, and so must all the others down the line. The truth, I repeat, is, that the words 'the son' have no right to be in the genealogy at all. The phrase throughout should be, 'which was of.'"

True, the question is one of descent, but of what sort of descent? As the words "which was of" are applied to tell the relation between Seth and Adam, what else can they mean than "son of"? And the phrase necessarily has this meaning throughout the genealogical table. Why change its meaning when you get back to Adam? Was it impossible for him to have been the son of God by creation? Is it inherently wrong for him to sustain such a relation? Is it contradictory of other passages of the Scripture? If so, where are they? Why this objection to the reading, "Adam which was the son of God," as an equivalent of the elliptical Greek, "which was of God"? Dr. Candlish admits that it is a case of "son descending from father, until Adam is reached; whose descent is from no human father, but must be said to be from God." If he had only written, "whose descent is from no human father like the others, but from a divine Father," he would have described Adam's case as it was.

II. The next passage asserts of the human race what the preceding one asserted of Adam in particular. It is a quotation from the Athenian, Aratus, made by Paul in his famous address delivered from Mars' Hill, "For we are also his offspring." (Acts xvii. 28.)

The ultimate design of the apostle in this address before the Areopagus was to assert and vindicate the claims of Christianity upon the faith and conduct of men; and his proximate end, or means to his main end, was to convince the men of Athens of the utter unreasonableness and absurdity of idolatry. To do this, the apostle begins by reminding them of the religious aptitudes of the human soul, which an old mystic describes as an "unutterable sigh for God," and which their multiplied altars proved that they

felt: "I perceive that in all things ye are too superstitious." He then appeals to them in the name of their divine creation, preservation, and paternity, not to liken the Godhead to graven images of gold, silver and stone. The argument may be stated: "Ye men of Athens, ye feel impelled to worship some being, as your devotions in your temples and at your altars testify. But this being is to you the 'unknown God,' as the inscription upon one of your altars declares. Now this unknown God I have come to make known to you. By him all things were created, and he dwells not in temples made with hands. He gives life, and breath, and all things. He has made all nations of one blood, and determined their times and the bounds of their habitation. He invites all to seek after him, and he is not far from any of us. In him we live, and move, and have our being. He is our Father as well as Creator, and we are his offspring. Inasmuch as he is our Father, it is a shame that we liken him to images of gold, silver and stone. Therefore your idolatry is wrong, because it is a degradation of him who is confessedly your own Father." The whole argument hinges upon the paternity of God.

But is not this a mere *argumentum ad hominem?* Did not the apostle assume, merely for the sake of the special occasion, the truth of the quotation from the heathen poet? Was he not arguing the question simply from their point of view? This is the interpretation of Dr. Candlish:

> "Paul quotes this verse of the heathen poet for a purpose in an argument *ad hominem.* He does not quote it as inspired, nor does his quoting it make it inspired. . . . Here, however, we have not a text of Scripture at all, unless Paul's citation of it is believed to canonize it. We have simply an uninspired verse of poetry, of which that consummate master of oratory avails himself most happily on a special occasion for a special purpose. And neither his comment, nor the verse itself, can be legitimately brought forward as of divine authority, beyond the special occasion and the special purpose." (P. 23.)

This attempt to fritter away the meaning of this passage is born of sheer desperation. As an argument, it "begs the question." It subjects the wisdom of God to the shameful stoop of resorting to mere trickery to silence objectors and establish the gospel. Has it come to this, that an inspired apostle, when he fronts an intelligent audience, must plant himself upon that which

he believes to be false in order to establish what he regards as true? "We are his offspring," cried the apostle; but the statement was untrue, and he knew it; and yet he grounds an argument for Christianity upon it! Has he been reduced to jugglery with terms? Is his cause weak? Are reasons scarce? Is he a dissembler? Would he speak that which was false to prove that which was true? Is this the method of inspired argumentation? Has God stooped to contend for the mastery with man in the arena of debate? This commentary of Dr. Candlish upon that masterly address before the *elite* of Athens degrades it to the arts of the sophist and the stump-politician.

This phrase, "we are also his offspring," meant to its author and to the men of Athens, *We are the offspring of Jupiter.* The very essence of the *argumentum ad hominem* requires the debater to assume the correctness of the position of his opponent, and then show that his conclusion does not follow from his own premise. It is the opposite of the *argumentum ad rem*, which assumes that the premise is both materially and formally correct, and deduces conclusions of a like nature. If Paul, on this occasion, was employing the former species of argumentation, he must have employed the quotation from Aratus in the identical sense which it had in the minds of his auditors. If he imported into the phrase any other idea than that which it really involved, then he made a material change in their premise, and so barred himself from reasoning to their silencing. This quotation meant to the men of Athens, *we are the offspring of Jupiter;* to Paul, *we are the offspring of God.* The two propositions are substantially different, and the *argumentum ad hominem* is inapplicable.

Undoubtedly this verse, as it stood upon the page of the heathen poem, was uninspired; but when the pen of inspiration transcribed it upon the page of the sacred volume, and made it a fundamental postulate in an argument against idolatry and for the truth of Christianity, it was canonized. There the words were the vehicle of a heathen idea; here they are the vehicle of a divine doctrine. Inspiration changed their meaning, for Paul did not quote Aratus in the sense in which he wrote. We are his cast-off offspring.

III. Dr. Crawford adduces the parable of the Prodigal Son as a proof of "the general paternity of God." (Luke xv. 11–32.)

"It seems to me impossible to put any fair or just interpretation on this parable, without assuming that general paternity which God, as our creator and preserver, may be held to sustain towards all men as his intelligent creatures, and recognizing the subsistence of this relation as at once a most serious aggravation of their sins, and a most powerful motive to urge them to repentance. On the opposite assumption, the parable ought to have begun thus: 'A certain king had two subjects,' or, 'A certain master had two servants.' But who, in that case would have discerned in it the same matchless power and pathos by which, as it actually stands, it is characterized? Evidently its whole point is lost and its scope perverted, if we suppose it to be in any other character than that of a son who had wandered from the paternal home; that the person represented by the prodigal is joyfully welcomed by the Great Father when returning to him." (P. 44.)

To this exposition Dr. Candlish objects on both critical and doctrinal grounds. He charges this exegesis with violating that canon which forbids "drawing doctrinal conclusions from the minute and incidental details of illustrative narrations or stories." It is true that there is an interpretation which deduces too much from the parables and figures of Scripture, and there is another interpretation which falls short of extracting their full meaning. A safe exposition, therefore, must content itself with following these accepted laws of interpretation.

1. The central truth of the parable must be given a controlling influence over all details of circumstances and incidents. Meaning is to be given to the details, consequently, only as they may minister to the main doctrine.

2. Regard must be had to "the analogy of faith"—the great *trend* of revelation—and particularly to the immediate context. Consequently, those details may have meanings which are in harmony with the spirit of the Bible and of the immediate context.

3. Whatever is circumstantial and incidental in the parable cannot be made the basis of a doctrine not elsewhere revealed. Such matters can be used only as collaterals.

4. "We should not assume anything to be non-essential except when, by holding it fast as essential, the unity of the whole is marred and troubled." (*Trench.*)

Now, will the application of these rules bar Prof. Crawford's interpretation? By an application of the principle of the adage,

"A man is known by the company he keeps," the scribes and Pharisees sought to break down the influence of Christ: "This man receiveth sinners, and eateth with them. If he be not like them, why does he keep such associations?" To defend his character against this reproach, he spake the parables of the Lost Sheep, the Lost Piece of Money, and the Prodigal Son. The argument in the latter is: If it is not disgraceful for the father to receive the prodigal son with such assurances and exhibitions of welcome on his repentance, it surely cannot be disgraceful in Christ to associate with sinners with a view to persuading them to return to their divine Father's house. The doctrine of the parable is the doctrine of reconciliation, but the reconciliation of a father and son, rather than of a king and subject. The divine paternity is the very pith of the parable, and violates none of the foregoing rules, but harmonizes them all.

Dr. Candlish expounds the parable:

"Let it be conceded that the prodigal represents sinners generally, the sinners with whom our Lord was accused of being too familiar. The parable is his defence against that accusation, and nothing more. And what is his defence? Virtually it is this: He is the elder brother in the Father's house. He puts it to his accusers to say whether he best sustains the character and does the part of the elder brother, by acting as he is wont to act, in the way that seems to them so objectionable, or by behaving, as they would have him behave, like the elder brother in the parable." (P. 131.)

The elder brother in the parable has usually been regarded as representing the carping Pharisees and scribes, who blamed Christ for associating with sinners; and the view of Dr. Candlish, which makes him represent Christ as, in the opinion of his accusers, he ought to be, is peculiar and surprising. It can hardly be that all commentators have so badly missed the passage.

IV. Biography delights to point out the marks of similarity and difference between the descendants of a common parentage. Traits of mind, methods of thought, forms of expression, characteristics of heart, habits of life, inclinations of the moral nature, physical features, are all made the subjects of comparisons. The qualities of the parent are expected and sought for in the child; and when one man shows decided marks of likeness to another, we are disappointed if there is not a blood-relation between them.

The fourth argument for God's fatherhood of the race, as distinguished from his special fatherhood of believers, appeals to the family-likeness between God and man, and quotes the text: "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him." (Gen. i. 27.)

It is this divine image, imprinted in the very morning of his creation, that mainly differentiates man from the balance of creation, and constitutes the ground of his sovereignty over all lower orders of earthly creatures. As the image and superscription upon the Roman coin determined the question of allegiance and tribute, so do the image and superscription of God upon the indestructible soul of man determine his position and duty before God. Bearing that image, he owes obedience and tribute to him who had the right thus to stamp and subscribe his moral character. Bearing that likeness (sadly defaced, it is true), not merely as a coin, but as a *person*, the natural expectation would be that he was the child of the Being whom he so closely resembles. We could rest in this belief if it were not contradicted. Nowhere in the Scriptures is it contradicted. Of course we are writing about Adam as he was, and man as he ought to be.

In the *regeneration* we are "renewed in the whole man after the image of God." The qualities which are renewed are those which were lost, "knowledge, righteousness and true holiness." (Col. iii. 10; Eph. iv. 24.) It is universally conceded that in regeneration we become the sons of God; but the qualities which are communicated in regeneration, and expanded in sanctification, are "knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness," or the elements which go to make up the image of God. But Adam was created in the image of God, and so possessed these three constituents. Now, it is difficult to see why the re-creation of man in the image of God constitutes him a son, while the first creation of him in the very same image constituted him only the servant of God. Why does the *restoration*—in the regeneration of the Spirit—of the lost qualities of "knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness" evince the regenerate to be sons of God, when the very same qualities, given in the first creation to Adam, proved only a servile relation? We cannot answer. If the possession of the image of God by the regenerate is the evidence

of their sonship, then the possession of the very same image by Adam ought to evidence his sonship. And furthermore, the regenerate are imperfect. The image does not, at the beginning at least, stand out with perfect clearness and beauty; and yet these imperfections do not destroy the fact of their sonship; but Adam and Eve, as they came fresh from their Creator's hand, bore the divine likeness without spot or blemish. If the possession of an imfect image of God by the Christian proves him to be the son of God, the possession of an immaculate image of God by Adam and Eve must prove them to be the children of God.

We have been writing about Adam as he was, and man as he ought to have been. We turn now to man as he is; and the formula which expresses his relation to his God since the fall is, *A proscribed subject and an outcast son.* As a judge, God has withdrawn from him the rights and privileges of a citizen, and left to him nothing but the contents of the curse; and as a father, he has ejected him from his house, disinherited him of his patrimony, and made him a stranger and an alien. These were the acts of a righteous Judge and Father predicated upon human guilt. Man's present *status*, therefore, reveals the enormity of human guilt, the pathos of human sorrow, and the glory of divine grace. The guilt was of that heinous and parricidal nature which constrained a just and loving Father to banish his son with one final word of command forever from his presence; the misery is that of a wicked and abandoned son, who might have stood but a little lower than an angel, starving among swine in a foreign country; and the grace is that of Christ, which regenerates the heart of the degenerate son, and reinstates him in his Father's house and heart.

The sentimental theology of to-day prates much about "the fatherhood of God" and "the solidarity of the race" as constituting the ground of atonement and of the universal hope of mankind. But this theology forgets far more than it remembers. It forgets that "the fatherhood of God" was completely disrupted by the fall, and vacated of all its contents to man, except wrath and indignation, which were emptied upon him without stint. It forgets the "solidarity of the race" is only in sin, and that it is electing grace alone which has broken up that "solidarity." It forgets that, while

God still has a Father's heart, he is a Father only towards his own children; and he emphasizes the fact that the non-elect are not his children, but "the children of the devil." It forgets that every father has the inalienable right to specify the terms upon which he will be reconciled to his expelled son, and that God has laid down his ultimate conditions in Jesus Christ. It is an awful delusion which would lead men to trust in a "fatherhood" which does not exist, and in a "race-solidarity" which grace has destroyed. God is an angry and outraged Ruler, who has proscribed the sinful citizen, and he is an angry and outraged Father, who has disinherited his disobedient child. Sin is thus revealed in its enormity, and hope appears only in the atonement of Jesus. The doctrine of election saves theology from universalism.

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