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THE POWER OF CHRISTIAN CHARACTER.

RUSSELL CECIL.

“Having your conversation honest among the Gentiles; that, whereas they speak against you as evildoers, they may by your good works, which they shall behold, glorify God in the day of visitation.” 1 Pet. 2:12.

“For so is the will of God, that with well doing, ye may put to silence the ignorance of foolish men.” 1 Pet. 2:15.

“Neither as being lords over God’s heritage, but being ensamples to the flock.” 1 Pet. 5:3.

I wish to speak to you this morning, brethren, on The Power of Christian Character. Observe that I emphasize Christian. A good character, in the ordinary sense as understood by the world, is a valuable possession, the reputation for which at least all men appreciate and desire, but a Christian character is a rarer possession and is of priceless value to the Church and the world. This is the character which the Christian should cultivate by reason of his relation to Christ and under the tuition of the Word and Spirit of God. It is the result of the process of sanctification which begins with conversion and continues to the end, until the Christian is made like unto his Lord.

I have selected three passages suggesting different aspects of the subject, and indicating successive steps in the discussion. Taken together, I think you will see how they represent the tremendous significance and weight of Christian character in the work of the kingdom of God on earth. They are like splendid jewels strung upon a golden thread, the thread representing Christian character, and the jewels representing such special manifestations of it as are denoted in these three passages. The unity of the subject will appear as we proceed with the discussion.

DR. GIRARDEAU AS A PHILOSOPHER.

THORNTON WHALING.

I rejoice to hear that the Rev. Dr. G. A. Blackburn is engaged in preparing the "Life and Letters" of the Rev. Dr. John L. Girardeau. Dr. Girardeau's life-record and services for the Church offers a fine field for a rich, instructive and intensely interesting biography. His biographer will be embarrassed with the riches of his theme, for Dr. Girardeau was a many-sided man, who was *facile princeps* in quite a number of different spheres, and who filled a large place in the eye of the Church as preacher, theologian, teacher, writer and ecclesiastic. But there was one department in which he possessed unsurpassed scholarship and in which he showed remarkable gifts, and yet for various reasons the Church at large has failed for a time to appraise him at his true value in the field of philosophy, and in the future when calm, catholic judgments have been reached by the general mind of the Church he is destined to be rated as a great philosophic thinker, in fact taking high rank in the list of the philosophers of the world in our day.

The reasons for the Church's temporary failure to appraise him at his true value as a philosopher are evident. As a flaming, eloquent, inspiring preacher, possessed of every gift necessary to convince the reason and fire the heart of the populace, he attracted such commanding and general attention as to obscure in the public mind for a season, his possession of those entirely different order of gifts which make the philosopher or metaphysician. And when the great preacher proved to be a theologian and teacher of the first order the conclusion was that his outfit of gifts and achievements was exhausted; and when as an ecclesiastic, debating the most difficult questions under the eye of skilful antagonists, he proved one of the most formidable of controversialists, it was scarcely to be suspected that the flaming preacher, the learned theologian, the wise teacher, the powerful debater would have another order of gifts

of a still higher kind and in still higher degree, viz.: the patient and penetrating intellect, the protracted induction of many particulars, the masterful synthesis which grouped details in grand generalizations, the analytic power which resolved the most intricate problems into their simplest elements, boldness and restraint, daring and balance, all combined in stretching the tether of human reason to its utmost limit and yet never losing the sanity and poise which overstepped the bounds of just reflection or speculation.

In addition to this, our day is not a metaphysical period. For the time being, philosophy is at a discount. The writings of Plato, Kant, Cousin and Hamilton are not as widely read as a generation or two ago. Science, physical science popularized, the novel, biography, history made easy by dropping the difficult out of sight, the magazine, the newspaper, these make the staple of general reading. And even scholars decry philosophy and taboo metaphysics as if it were dim cloudland beyond the reach of human intelligence. Of course this is a temporary and passing phase. It is a sign of essential shallowness and mental incapacity. The reign of reflection and the rights of true science can not be forever disallowed. The time will come when knowledge of the phenomenal will not satisfy, when the voice of right reason and the deliverances of faith will be heard and philosophy will come to the throne. Meantime the philosopher, if he has "fit audience," has also a small one, and Dr. Girardeau, though doing a great work in this most important field and leaving invaluable philosophic discussions behind him (which have since been published), has not yet secured the recognition which his merit as a philosopher deserves. The season is at hand, the Church today does not appreciate as she will tomorrow or the next day, that without philosophy there is no theology and without theology there is no religion. And when this passing craze for the shallow and the popular has passed and the old demand of reason and faith for the real and the metaphysical is again respected, the philosopher of the Church will receive his rightful crown.

I venture to add, though treading on delicate ground, and yet I may venture as one who disagreed with him on some of the

issues involved, that the ecclesiastical controversies which agitated the Church from 1883 to 1890, for a season prevented some minds from impartially and judicially recognizing the full merits of Dr. Girardeau. No fault is here imputed to any one on this account; it was an inevitable result of the circumstances of the hour. And it has passed or is fast passing away. The time must speedily come when the judicial weighing of the "Philosophic Discussions" and the "Freedom of the Will" must procure for their author a higher distinction, I think, than any of those merited distinctions already his as preacher, theologian, teacher, writer and ecclesiastic, viz.: Our Church will decide that he is her greatest philosopher.

Dr. Girardeau's standpoint is that of the Scotch School of Common Sense, though he had that oecumenical acquaintance with the history of philosophy which enabled him to ground most of the doctrines of that School in the catholic conclusions to which the great thinkers of all the ages have come as the result of their reflective inquiries. Plato, Aristotle, Philo, Kant, Cousin, Jacobi, Fichte, Schilling, Hegel were at his fingers' ends as truly as Hamilton, Stewart and Reid. The philosophic reflections of Athanasius Origen, Augustine, Calvin, Edwards, scattered through their writings had all been mastered by him. In short, these names are merely samples recalled by an old student's memory, and the whole field of the world's metaphysical thought as far as reduced to writing had passed under his studious and thoughtful gaze. Nor was his philosophic reading confined to dusty tomes or classic productions, but the latest word uttered by any writer of any School had in him an instant and critical hearer. For example, Bain, Spencer, Fiske, Royce, Bowne, Ladd, James, all were subjected to the inspection and review of his searching metaphysical judgment and criticism. He belonged to the Scotch School, not because he knew no other, but he belonged to the Scotch School because he knew all the others and knew that the essential doctrines of that School were confirmed by the catholic conclusions of the philosophers not of a passing day but of the ages and of the world. He was not a slavish or timid adherent of the School of Common Sense, for he brought into still clearer explication,

subjected to more searching analysis, and set on still more evident right relationship to each other, some of the fundamental doctrines of this School, and in these respects his chief merit as a philosopher is to be found. While not exhausting the specifications, I will proceed to mention some of the particulars in which Dr. Girardeau has made a distinct advance in his exposition of the philosophy of Common Sense:—

First. His exposition of consciousness contains distinctly new elements of truth as compared with the doctrine upon this subject advanced by any of his predecessors in this School. Consciousness, perception and immediate knowledge are one and the same with Dr. Girardeau. He differs from Reid's view, that we are conscious of the act of perceiving an external object but not of the object itself, and he differs from the view of Hamilton that we are conscious of the act of perceiving the external object, Dr. Girardeau maintaining that the act of perceiving the external object and the consciousness of that object are identical—it is impossible to distinguish between the perception of an external object and the consciousness of that object. In the clear and irrefragable establishment of this position, our Southern philosopher has rendered an invaluable service to the cause of natural realism as opposed to the theory of representative perception in all of its forms of hypothetical realism, hypothetical dualism or cosmothetic idealism, for Hamilton's view that we perceive the external object as distinct from the consciousness of that object logically involves the doctrine of representative perception though in its most unrecognized and sublimated form, especially when it is coupled with Hamilton's further view that the external object of perception is modified by the mind, in fact is itself but a mode of the stimulated nervous organism or sensorium. Dr. Girardeau's doctrine is necessary in order to save the day for a philosophic exposition of the *dictum* of common sense, as all men naturally hold it, that in sense perception we are directly conscious of an external object with which we know ourselves to be immediately in contact. The perceiving act is itself an act of consciousness, for if not, consciousness can only have a mediate knowledge through perception of the external world and the

whole doctrine of our immediate consciousness of the reality of the material object is surrendered.

Dr. Girardeau further advances the Scottish philosophy in his proof that consciousness is not a generic but a special faculty with a catholic relation to all the other faculties. Consciousness cannot be the genus under which all the cognitive powers are reduced as species, because by its very nature and definition consciousness is immediate knowledge, but these are faculties of mediate knowledge, as memory, imagination, thought (in the narrow sense of conception), and to force these into unity would be to rub out that necessary and invaluable distinction between immediate and mediate knowledge so vital to philosophy, theology and religion. In inconsistently holding that all forms of cognition are modes of consciousness, and that therefore we really know nothing which we do not immediately know the great Scotch philosopher Hamilton laid himself open to the charge that the human mind can not know God, the soul, substance, cause, those great realities which can only be mediately known. In unduly elevating the importance of immediate knowledge and depressing the value of mediate knowledge, Hamilton was guilty of a philosophic sin, from which the insight of Dr. Girardeau would save this School, through the doctrine that consciousness or perception, internal and external, is the faculty of immediate knowledge, while there are co-ordinate faculties of mediate knowledge, the representative, the thinking and the believing faculties. The supreme import and scientific value of mediate knowledge is a doctrine central to any sound philosophy, and Dr. Girardeau gave it a setting and a defense, validating it in the forum of right reason in higher degree than any of the philosophers of this School, or for that matter, any of the current philosophers of the past. The key to many of the problems which distress the modern mind and perplexes much of so-called modern theologizing is in this evidently patent but much neglected distinction, whose clear recognition can alone reduce to order our theories as to the powers and operations of the human reason and enable us to see, for example, that though we can not bring God into the field of consciousness and therefore immediately know Him, we can,

through the synthesis of faith and thought, have a valid though mediate knowledge of God, which enables us to say that we really know Him.

Second. Dr. Girardeau's exposition of the philosophic nature of faith is one of his chief contributions to this great science. In fact it is impossible to find in the entire history of philosophic thought so thorough and exhaustive an analysis and discussion of the psychology of faith on the one hand and on the other of its logical and rational relations to the realm of ontology. A much needed service is rendered here which clears up many perplexing questions which have for ages afflicted philosophy and theology. As to its psychology, faith is one of the mediate cognitive powers. In Dr. Girardeau's system, the human reason or intellect is the genus distributed into the two species; first, immediate knowledge or consciousness or internal and external perception and second, mediate knowledge, still further distributed into the three co-ordinate faculties, the representative, the thinking, the believing. The most important point here is to distinguish between the thinking faculty or the power of thought and the believing faculty or the power of faith. All the other cognitive powers of the soul, including thought, are confined within the region of the phenomenal. The knowledge which they furnish begins with consciousness in the form of perception of our own mental modes or perception of external objects; then next the representative faculty in the form either of memory or imagination reproduces this perceptive knowledge or combines it in new relations or shapes. But no new elements can be added, for it is impossible to re-present anything which has not been first presented. Then the thinking faculties works over in its processes the materials which have been furnished by the perceptive or representative faculty, but thought cannot transcend the phenomenal realm to which both perception and representation are confined, for it builds percepts into concepts, it receives the products of the presentative or representative power and adds nothing save thought relations in creating its own thought products; the human reason is still moving in the phenomenal world through the operations of all these faculties. But it is the very nature of the believing

faculty, of the power of faith to transcend thought or the phenomenal realm in the apprehension of occult or transcendental realities. This contrast between thought and faith, between the thinking and the believing faculty, while both are modes of reason received the singular and illumining emphasis it needed in Dr. Girardeau's philosophy. Many philosophers fail to grasp the distinction between the concepts and abstract notions which thought builds and the beliefs and faith-judgments which the believing faculty delivers, and hence they grope in total darkness before such questions as to the Knowableness or Unknowableness of God. Their philosophy makes no provision for the reply that while thought can not conceive Him, the believing faculty can apprehend and truly know Him. The true distinction is not between faith and knowledge, but between thought-knowledge and thought-judgments and faith-knowledge and faith-judgments.

These beliefs exist first, in the form of latent aptitudes or fundamental laws of belief at the root of the believing faculty, and while they furnish the conditions of experience they are elicited into formal expression by experience itself. That is, the operations of the perceptive, representative, comparative or thought faculties furnish the occasions upon which as necessary and immediate inferences from the data furnished by these powers the mind or reason affirms these beliefs or faith-judgments, in which new elements of cognition and reality are added to the products of the other cognitive powers. Such for example are our convictions as to Space, Duration, Substance, Cause, Personality and the Infinite. None of these are concepts or notions built by thought or the elaborative or comparative faculty, and which therefore can be analyzed into the elements out of which they are constructed. They are inconceivable or incogitable in the sense that the thinking faculty did not make them nor can it resolve them into their constituent parts; but they are not unknowable or incognoscible, because the believing faculty apprehends and knows them. They can not be comprehended by thought, but they are affirmed and known by faith.

If pressed for a definition of faith, Dr. Girardeau would answer, that it is intellectual assent grounded upon testimony. It therefore discharges a double office; first, it is a voucher for the other powers as when for example we perceive an external object and therefore immediately know or are conscious of its presence, we say we believe in its existence. We do not mean that our consciousness or immediate knowledge of the object is one with our faith; they are not the same. We know the object through consciousness and this knowledge is buttressed by the faith we have in the testimony of our consciousness. Our faith sustains this catholic relation to all our cognitive powers, presentative, representative, comparative; we know through these powers and we know through the faith we have in these powers. In other words our faith in the testimony of these faculties is a knowledge that these powers in their normal activities are trustworthy. Secondly, faith discharges another office in originating knowledge which is beyond the reach of the other cognitive powers. "Our believing power forms judgment as to existence beyond the reach of consciousness and thought. They are faith-judgments; and faith-judgments are as valid grounds of knowledge as are thought-judgments." The contribution which Dr. Girardeau has rendered to philosophy and theology in making clear and scoring deep these distinctions, entitles him to the philosophic crown. The antinomies with which philosophers have struggled can all be settled here; the antilogies of Kant, Hamilton and Mansel, all disappear before this ripe and rational philosophy. The conciliation of reason and faith which has been the dream of countless aspiring minds is an accomplished fact for reason has no higher power than faith, and the human intellect finds its glory as a wondrous organism made by its divine Author, to know both Him and His World in its believing faculty by which transcendental realities and the Infinite God are brought within the reach of human apprehension and knowledge. The student who had learned these great principles from Dr. Girardeau had a guide which directed him safely through all the mazes and perplexities of modern thought, and was unscathed and unharmed by the fierce conflict which false and opposing philoso-

phies waged upon the truth. Here, evidently was the key to true philosophy and he who was ever privileged, as many of us are grateful we were, to hear this master expounder of his own philosophy, explain and enforce his doctrine of faith in the fields of psychology, ontology and theology have found no subsequent reason to doubt that the everlasting rock was solid beneath our feet. The philosophy of religion has therefore had no abler exponent or more convincing expounder in the history of our Church and the time has come when his reward is sure for the service he has done for multitudes of students, and which he will continue to do for all who will carefully read the books which he has left behind him. His "Philosophic Discussions" ought to be a text-book in all our Theological Seminaries.

Third, Dr. Girardeau's doctrine as to the Will is a distinct philosophic and theological advance in this vexed field. According to his view, the will is the power in which the causal efficiency of the soul resides and through which the man determines or originates his own acts. The will, therefore, in a derived, dependent and limited sense is a first cause, that is, the will originates not new being in the sense of substance, but originates phenomenal changes within the soul itself. In the analysis of the will there is found besides this inherent spontaneity or causal efficiency; first, a *nisus* toward action produced by the impulse of the feelings upon the will, described in the terms conation or the *velleitas* of the schoolmen, and second, deliberate election, choice, volition or the *arbitrium* of the scholastics. The distinction between the freedom of the man and the freedom of the will has no rightful place, since the will is the very power of action through which the freedom of the man is expressed, and if the will be enslaved or necessitated, the man is enslaved or necessitated. The distinction between liberty and ability also disappears, for to say a man is able to do holy acts is to affirm that he is free to do these acts, and to deny his ability to do holy acts, is to deny his freedom to do these acts. Of course, liberty and ability may be affirmed in one sense of the man, and then be both denied in another sense to the same man, but ability cannot be affirmed of this man

and then in the same reference liberty be denied him. The distinction between natural and moral ability has no real validity, for the only natural ability must of necessity be moral if it have any existence at all. To deny moral is also to deny natural ability. A valid distinction of great value which would be of great service is that between natural—moral ability and spiritual ability. The first may and does exist in multitudes of cases, while the second is not possessed. The terms necessity and liberty with Dr. Girardeau are correlatives. Necessity may mean first, the relation between resistless physical force and the effect it produces, the necessity of co-action or compulsion; or second, it may mean the relation between any influence and the results which certainly and unavoidably flow from it—what is termed moral necessity. Viewed in reference to the first kind of necessity, liberty is the absence of compulsion or the power to do as one pleases without constraint or restraint. Considered in reference to the second kind of necessity, liberty is the power to act voluntarily but unavoidably, or it is the power to act voluntarily but contingently. Freedom to act voluntarily but unavoidably consists with certainty or moral necessity, since the spontaneity or dispositions or *habitus* of the soul determines the acts; but the power to act voluntarily but contingently is inconsistent with any kind of necessity, since a contingent act is one which may or may not happen. The liberty of contingency therefore, and the power of contrary choice—*facultas aliter se determinandi*—are one and the same.

This brings up the age-long debate between the advocates of Necessitarianism or Determinism or moral necessity or certainty on the one hand and those who maintain that the Freedom of the Will necessarily and always involves the power of otherwise determining or choosing between alternatives, in other words the Power of Contrary Choice. Dr. Girardeau's skill and patience and philosophic insight are seen in the successful way in which he threads the mazes of this intricate and perplexing theme. He holds the theory of Determinism in reference to God and the elect angels and glorified saints and the human will of Christ, for it is evident that in these cases the holy dis-

positions or subjective spontaneity effectively control the volitions and acts. The theory of Determinism also holds in relation to fallen and unregenerate men whose unholy dispositions of necessity control their volitions and acts, since by their sins they are deprived of communion with God the only source of holiness and since the penal sentence of the violated law rests upon them. But Determinism will not explain the stragetic case of Adam. His dispositions were all holy, but his volition to sin traversed and dashed down those dispositions. In order to fit Adam for his probation—not to make him free—there was added to his spontaneity the power of contrary choice. He was given Freedom of the will not in the sense of the power to act voluntarily, but in the sense of the power to act contingently, that is of otherwise determining or choosing between alternatives. And in the exercise of this power of contrary choice he overrode his own holy spontaneity and dispositions, and since his sin severed the bond which united him to God and brought upon him the curse of the law, his holy dispositions were substituted by unholy dispositions and he came under the penal necessity of expressing these sinful dispositions by corresponding volitions and acts—a necessity which his descendants share with him. Nor will Determinism apply fully to the case of regenerate and imperfectly sanctified men, who have two subjective spontaneities, the one holy, the other sinful, and whose choice sometimes approves the one sometimes the other. And even in the case of unregenerate men, Determinism while holding in the spiritual realm, does not always hold in the natural, civil or merely moral spheres. The conduct of life, the administration of government, our judgments of self and others, are all grounded on the belief that men have the power within these limits of otherwise determining. This is not a deliverance of consciousness, but it is an inference which men well nigh universally draw from the data of consciousness.

But the case of Adam is the test which explodes Determinism or moral necessity as a complete theory of the will or an exhaustive interpretation of the Freedom of the Will. If Adam's subjective dispositions must effectively control his will, then Adam would have remained holy until this day; for it is not

supposable that God gave him unholy dispositions at creation, for this would make God the real author of Adam's sin and would make it impossible to impute guilt to the sinner who sinned by necessity from the very nature which God created within him. Adam as a non-elect probationer, had the power of otherwise determining, and in the use of this perilous form of freedom or power of contrary choice, he sinned in the very teeth of his own holy inclinations and dispositions. Dr. Girardeau's wonderful powers of analysis, and the combined acuteness and penetration with which he saw into the heart of every problem, robbed of all its accidental or non-essential qualities, is nowhere more evident than in the striking and convincing discussion in which he expounds the first sin of our first parents. Following a clue which had been given by Bishop Butler he shows how the blind impulses or appetencies implanted in Adam's original constitution were the avenues through which the temptation to the first sin came. Hunger or the desire for the beautiful fruit, and curiosity or the desire for greatly increased knowledge, were appetencies which had no moral quality in themselves and which could receive moral quality only as they were directed to forbidden objects. These blind impulses were aroused and inflamed not by the subjective spontaneity but by the art of the tempter in addressing Eve. Nor was the force which they possessed derived from any previous activity of the understanding, on the contrary they determined the views of the understanding as to the desirability of the forbidden objects; so that without deriving motivity from subjective dispositions or without precedent acts of the understanding, these blind impulses smote directly upon the will and clamored for gratification. The exact function of the will was to elect between the motives springing from the holy spontaneity and the gratification for which the appetencies begged. The will had the power to approve either in this supremely stragetic test case. In the case of Adam instead of the blind impulses of hunger and curiosity, we must substitute the powerful appetencies and sympathies which bound him to Eve and which he elected to endorse rather than his own holy inclinations or dispositions, though it meant that he must break with his God and ruin his race. Dr. Girar-

deau has put his finger upon the solution of the puzzle right at this point and his commentary on the first sin is as fine an illustration of philosophy and theology combined as can be found in the history of the American Church.

Our distinguished philosopher has to a certain extent been misunderstood by some, who failed to grasp his whole doctrine of the Will. He was in part a Determinist, that is in the several cases of God, the elect angels, glorified saints, our Lord's human will, unregenerate men as under a penal necessity of sinning; but according to his view, Determinism is not a completely satisfactory theory for it does not provide for the case of Adam, or partially sanctified regenerate men, or fallen and unregenerate men in the field of the natural and the merely moral. In particular this theory fails to discriminate as it should between motives as final and efficient causes. The theory asserts that the motives or the intention effectually control the decision of the will, and this is usually interpreted to mean that the motives as efficient cause necessitate in one specific direction the election of the will. This throws the seat of inherent causality in the soul from the will to the motives or desires and revolutionizes the catholic beliefs of the race and the conclusions of sound philosophy; moreover it misinterprets the function of motives which serve as the final causes in accordance with which the will acts and not necessarily as efficient causes controlling and mastering the will. For example, the glory of God is the final cause of man's salvation, but it is not the efficient cause which secures this result and the motives or intention show us the end which the will has in view, but they are not the efficient cause of the will's action, for that efficient cause is the will itself. Again, the theory that the last view of the understanding decides and determines the election of the will is contradicted by the instance of the blind impulses or appetencies which without and prior to endorsement by the understanding smote upon the will and ask for indulgence. These impulses are called blind by Butler, precisely because independently of the understanding they seek gratification; of course, they emerge in consciousness or the soul would know nothing of them, but their motivity or impulsive powers is in

no wise due to the understanding. In this capital example, both of these aspects of Determinism are negated and vetoed, and its sufficiency as a complete theory of Free-Agency in all of its possible forms is disproven.

But I cannot pursue this subject further—Dr. Girardeau's "Freedom of the Will in its Theological Relations" expounds these views with a sun-like clearness and a massive simplicity which are a delight to the earnest student. The human mind has made in this book its farthest advance into this vexed and debated field. And the Signal Service rendered is to show that Calvinism is in the most essential harmony with the only sound and rational philosophy. I wish that this able and convincing discussion were mastered by all our ministers and officers, and the inevitable result would be the calm and immovable conviction of the rationality, as well as Scripturalness of that system of doctrine which Paul, Augustine, Calvin, the great Reformed Confessions and a long list of theologians all hold as the sum and substance of the revealed Word and as in perfect harmony with right reason, when the insight of a real philosopher obtains for us the reason's true deliverances.

This is a very inadequate representation of the cogency and convincingness of Dr. Girardeau's views upon these great themes and of the value of his other discussions of the standing problems of the human reason, for scattered through his works one will find a complete philosophy, not formally, but virtually elaborated. He is one of our two greatest leaders and thinkers; for Dr. Dabney and Dr. Girardeau are twin stars, different though equal in power and glory. Dr. Dabney excelled also in the realm of philosophy, and his "Sensualistic Philosophy" and "Practical Philosophy" are unsurpassed in their respective fields; and the philosophic affinities between our two Southern thinkers are very marked, belonging to the Scsame School, employing different terms often but in as substantial and striking agreement as two remarkably original inquirers could well be. As a theologian, Dr. Dabney, like Dr. Hodge, lived long enough to complete his system and reduce it to systematic and organic written form. And I think the future will also assign Dr. Dabney the very highest rank as an unrivalled ex-

pounder of the philosophy and theology of Calvinism in their applications to civics, scientific politics, economics, true sociology and the philosophy of history. Dr. Girardeau largely confined himself to the perennial problems of pure philosophy and his extensive philosophical library showed his mastery of the thinking of all the world's masters in this realm and upon the basis of this occumenical knowledge he builded the structure of his life-work in the erection of his philosophical system; and when the coming revival of philosophy, which is as sure to come as the human reason remains the same with its inexorable demands for satisfaction in the reduction of all its knowledge to unity in the valid and philosophic knowledge of the First Cause and the First Substance, shall have arrived, then Dr. Girardeau will receive the crown which is his due as the Philosopher of the Southern Presbyterian Church.