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THE CHURCH'S OPPORTUNITY AMONG STUDENTS AT STATE INSTITUTIONS.

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Two or three important statements need to be made at the outset.

1. Church and State must continue to be divorced, yet they must be mutually helpful.

2. The State cannot undertake religious instruction, because it must be wholly impartial toward creeds and denominations, and without a creed there can be no religious instruction that is fundamental and far-reaching.

3. There is not merely a place but a crying need for church schools, if the church is to be maintained.

Among Protestants there is no serious advocacy of the union of church and state, though in certain sections of our country the pulpit seems unable, when the conflict is raging, to keep itself unspotted from politics. Great care should be exercised at this point. Again socialism, which has such a firm footing in many parts of the country, is not so much a union of church and state as it is the supplanting of the church by the state, a very serious menace. The rational position is that of mutual helpfulness between church and state. This article concerns one phase of the church's opportunity to help the state, in the moulding of the character of those lives that are to control the state.

The second statement above is possibly open to question, but the state thinks it cannot undertake religious instruction and

DR. GIRARDEAU AS A THEOLOGIAN.

THORNTON WHALING.

Dr. Girardeau was the most philosophic of theologians, but his interest in philosophy was not for its own sake, but for the necessary service which true philosophy renders to a sound theology. The two cannot be divorced and the attempt, as in Ritschlianism and that strange abortion, Pragmatism, only ends in the importation of a radically false and vitiating philosophy under a slender disguise into the theological system. In fact the two are united in the Revealed Word, for there is a biblical philosophy as there is a biblical theology; and we can not really accept the Revealed theology if we refuse the Revealed philosophy—they are so builded together as to be one and inseparable. The three great departments of philosophy, ethics, psychology, ontology or metaphysics proper, all have adequate representation in the inspired Word. Ethics, which treats of such subjects as the nature, ground, standard of duty and like topics, evidently constitutes a considerable section of Revelation, and Christian Ethics infallibly taught in the Bible is an indispensable part of the divine book, which ought, by the way, to receive more attention than it does in our theological education and pulpit exposition. Psychology, which treats of the mental and psychical powers and activities of the human being, is both presupposed and unfolded in the Word, so that a biblical psychology is an easy and evident science. If the Bible does not teach that man is a spiritual being with capacities, to perceive, remember, know, believe, feel and will, then nothing can ever be taught in the languages of men. Ontology or metaphysics in the narrow sense which treats of fundamental reality is wrought into the very texture of the revealed Word, in its testimony to the existence of God, Spirit, Matter, Cause, Substance and the relations between these. Christian Theism and Natural Theology in perfect form are not the unaided discoveries of human reason, but are republished

and expounded in the Written Word. Philosophy in this sense of the biblical ethics, psychology and ontology underlies the whole structure of the theology of redemption which is thus builded upon these philosophic pre-suppositions. Dr. Girardeau's profound interest in philosophy therefore rested upon the base of the inherently necessary service which as an ally and handmaid philosophy must render to the "queen of all the sciences."

At the same time, Dr. Girardeau was one of the most biblical of theologians. Careful grammatical and logical exegesis, according to the most approved methods of interpretation so as to teach the real meaning of the Word were applied and when the deliverances of the divine Revelation were reached they were accepted without a question as final and authoritative. But he regarded it as a legitimate and necessary procedure for the scientific and systematic theologian to take these deliverances into the forum of human reason and to interrogate philosophy whether it had any words to speak in confirmation or elucidation of the inspired teachings. And exactly at this point his chief distinction as a theologian of the very first order appears, that he married philosophy and theology with consummate skill into a harmonious union where no discordant and contradictory words were spoken by the two parties so happily and fittingly mated in this great expounder's system. He is a master in showing how the divine reason in the Book and human reason in philosophy both speak with consenting voice upon every theme where they make common or joint deliverances, and even in the strictly supernatural realm where the divine testimony alone is heard, he still remains the philosophic master in showing that philosophy has no word of counter or divergent testimony to utter. This is the title by which he holds the future and the evidence that he will surely come to his own in the recognition that he is entitled to the loftiest place as an interpreter of the Calvinistic theology, for he is without any superior in the signal skill and success with which he demonstrates that theology is endorsed and confirmed by philosophy wherever philosophy speaks at all, and that in no case does true philosophy utter a word of protest or dissent

from the teachings of a sound and scriptural theology. False systems like Pelagianism, Socinianism, Arminianism, the new theology in all its forms, are ground to powder, not simply by showing that they have no support in God's Word, but that they also have no standing before a rational philosophy. And upon the unsurpassed skill with which he discharges this highest function of the systematic theologian, his renown will finally rest, when the sober judgment of an informed church has come to appraise him at his true value.

It deserves to be added also that Dr. Girardeau was a loyal and consistent *Confessional* theologian. All the Reformed Symbols were much used and quoted by him and the Westminster Standards in particular were first set in their proper relations to the Scriptures as clearly taught therein; and then second, with no less clearness these Standards were set in their right relations to right thinking and approved truth. He had an extensive acquaintance with the writings of the Westminster divines which illuminated and guided his use of the Westminster Symbols. There was no other theologian with whom he had greater mental and spiritual affinities than with John Calvin himself, and the great Genevan has never had one who more thoroughly and carefully mastered his Institutes and other books than our Columbia professor. He was no slavish follower of the great Reformed theologian, but when he differed from him it was only after the most careful and mature reflection. No theologian of our day has studied Calvin more, lived with him longer or understood him better. There were striking intellectual and spiritual affinities between the two, coming of the same race and built largely on the same model as to mental constitution. Both original minds of the first order, both philosophic by the very necessities of their individual endowments, and both architectonic by inevitable instinct. While widely read in both ancient and modern theology, Calvin and Thornwell influenced him more largely than any others. As a student at Charleston College and Columbia Theological Seminary he came under the spell of the great Dr. James Henley Thornwell, then at the zenith of his career as a preacher and teacher. Though never a student in the class-room of Thorn-

well, either at the South Carolina College or Theological Seminary, the impress of his fellow-Carolinian was deeply scored upon the heart and mind of the young minister who finally came to fill so worthily the same chair of theology in the Columbia School. These names will always be united in the splendid history of that noble school and the theology of Thornwell and Girardeau will doubtless continue to represent for generations the spirit of this favored Seminary. It was Dr. Girardeau's good fortune to succeed Dr. Thornwell after an interval of some years and building upon the good foundation laid by his predecessor, to carry on to virtual completion his own system of theology. Dr. Girardeau's debt to Thornwell was a large one, not so much for the amount of positive contributions made to his thinking and his system, as for the impulse and spirit communicated to him by his predecessor.

I. In selecting some specimens of Dr. Girardeau's theologizing, the *first* instance which falls to be mentioned is found in the field of *Introductory Theology* in his answer to the objection that theology cannot really be a science, because it involves an infinite and therefore an inconceivable and indefinable element, and since the thinking faculty which is the organ of science cannot handle an inconceivable element, there cannot therefore be a valid theological science.

Our theologian's reply is, that every science begins with an indemonstrable, inconceivable and indefinable element. Such is the Soul with which Metaphysics begins. Such is personality with which law begins, continues and ends. Such is life with which Medicine deals. Such is Substance, upon which all the physical sciences rest. The infinite is no more indefinable than is the Soul, Life, Substance. Further, the infinite is a *datum* furnished by Revelation. If the Scriptures are proven to be from God, theology may accept an infinite God as validly as the other sciences their *principia*. Moreover, it is incorrect to represent the infinite God and his perfections as reached by the thinking faculty alone. The statement of the Pseudo-Dionysius that we reach the infinite God by causation, negation and eminence is philosophically false. In arguing from causation, we use the category of cause which

is not a concept or the product of the thinking or logical faculty, but is a fundamental belief. In reaching the infinite attributes of God we do not negatively think away all limitations or imperfections; as for example with the attribute of power, which is again not a concept produced by the thought power, but which is a fundamental faith. In no case do we perceive, imagine or conceive the attributes of God, but we believe them. Nor can we by way of eminence heighten finite concepts by the thinking faculty or the power of logical elaboration until we reach the infinite. Pile Pelion upon Ossa, add finite to finite and you still have the finite. While the infinite is not reached by the discursive understanding or the thinking faculty in the narrow and correct sense of the power which forms concepts, yet we do have a valid apprehension and real knowledge of the infinite. Upon conditions of experience through the knowledge by the thinking faculty of the finite around us and within us there is developed that fundamental law of belief which enables and necessitates the apprehension and knowledge of the infinite, thus reached by faith or belief, which is as truly rational knowledge as is thought or the discursive understanding or the faculty of logical elaboration. The infinite is known by a faith-judgment which is as true an exercise of reason as is the formation of concepts by the thought power in the technical sense.

How are these fundamental faiths or beliefs, *e. g.*, in the infinite, substance, cause known? They are at first latent underneath consciousness in the form of aptitudes or tendencies or laws, but upon the conditions of experience they appear in consciousness in the form of beliefs. It must be noted that though we are conscious of the beliefs, we are not conscious of the things believed. The beliefs appear immediately in consciousness, but the objects about which the beliefs are concerned do not immediately present themselves to consciousness and are therefore not immediately known. We are conscious of a belief in personality, substance, cause, the infinite in its three forms—as the infinite God, infinite space, infinite duration, but we are not conscious of personality, substance, cause, the infinite in any of its forms. The beliefs thus appearing in consciousness are of the nature of internal percepts and by the thinking faculty can be

wrought over into concepts and thus be made the objects of metaphysical analysis and logical elaboration. But the transcendent realities to which these beliefs relate are not percepts, and they cannot be wrought over into concepts by the thinking faculty; substance, cause, the infinite are neither percepts nor concepts, but they are fundamental faiths or beliefs reached by a different faculty from that which builds concepts out of percepts as does the thinking faculty in the technical sense, and this faculty which some philosophers denominate intuition, Dr. Girardeau describes as faith or the believing faculty.

The question recurs, of what avail is it from the standpoint of science for the thought-power to have concepts of these beliefs when it cannot form concepts of the transcendent realities with which these beliefs are concerned? The answer is, the thinking faculty can certainly deal with the manifestations or phenomena of these transcendent realities; and it is just these phenomena which furnish the material of the largest part of all the sciences. Moreover, the thinking faculty as one rational power, can receive from the believing faculty as another rational power, the contributions which faith or belief makes to the science which is in process of construction, and such contributions are made by belief to all the sciences physical, metaphysical and theological. Theology is in no sense singular because elements which transcend the thinking or concept building power, enter into every science and such elements are the contributions of fundamental faiths or belief which are necessary and well-nigh universal. In addition, there is a wonderful synergism of thought and faith, of the thinking and the believing faculty, in combining their processes and results. Thought is concerned with both matter and form, that is, both with the truth and the logical shape of the materials with which it deals, and thought presides over all logical processes so as to secure not only scientific form but also scientific truth as the result. Faith in the same way presides as co-sovereign in securing truth in its contributions toward the combined result. It deserves to be said, that it is the same man who perceives and thinks and believes and reasons; and if thought can receive the results of the representative and representative powers and employ them in its

own peculiar processes, why not receive the contributions of these fundamental beliefs, of which the chief is our belief in the infinite, and employ them also. Further, of course, in one sense it is obviously true that the infinite is indefinable because the infinite God is the ultimate being. There is no higher genus under which He can be subsumed as a species, and there can be no lower species into which his whole essence may enter. But yet in another sense He may be defined as for example the genus being is of two kinds, finite and infinite, and the specific difference is that which distinguishes the infinite from the finite. Theologians who deny in one sense that the infinite God is conceivable or definable, yet in another sense, proceed to give us a definition, as for example, the Westminster divines who assign God to the *genus* spirit, and then proceed to give his specific qualities in his attributes—"God is a spirit infinite, eternal and unchangeable in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness and truth."

In this way our philosophic theologian shows us that theology can not be justly impeached as a science upon the ground that it contains an element which is inconceivable in that the thinking faculty cannot compass it, for the same objection would vitiate all the sciences inasmuch as each one in turn employs elements marked by the same character of inconceivability by the logical understanding, but all these elements alike belong to the category of valid knowledge reached by the human reason in its highest mode of exercise in that faculty which is the seat of first principles or fundamental faiths or beliefs. The infinite therefore is as surely known by the reason as the finite, though of course, by a specifically different rational power, and theology justly and scientifically uses the infinite in its organization and construction.

If space permitted Dr. Girardeau's definition and distribution of theology, his reduction of Mysticism and Romanism to Rationalism, his masterly argument for plenary verbal inspiration upon necessary philosophic grounds would be presented for some exposition, but the reader is referred to his "Theological Discussions" for the complete and satisfactory

enunciation of his strikingly original views upon these great themes.

II. His Statement of the Arguments for the Divine Being in the field of Theology proper is worthy of note.

He proposes to give a reflective construction of the spontaneous processes by which the native tendencies to believe in the infinite God are developed into actual faith. The argument is neither exclusively *a priori* nor exclusively *a posteriori*, but a combination of both. The statement is sometimes made that the *a priori* argument is one from cause to effect, and the *a posteriori* argument is one from effect to cause. The first part of the statement is too narrow because not simply the law of casuality, but all the fundamental beliefs of the mind are employed, and the second part is also too narrow in that the argument is based upon all the conditions of experience. In brief, "The argument for the existence of God is derived from the fundamental laws of our constitution in connection with the facts of experiences."

In the actual construction of the argument, we first use the fundamental law of existence, by which upon actual experience we necessarily affirm existence of ourselves and the world around us. We use next the law of casuality, which elicited into expression by conscious experience, forms the faith-judgment that every perceivable existence and every phenomenal change must have had a cause. This part of the argument is two-fold: (1) First beginning from the *contingency* and *changeableness* of the world. That the world is contingent and changeable, we know by consciousness and observation. Whatever is contingent and changeable began. If the world began, it must have had a cause. This cause must have been either in itself or out of itself. If in itself, it was spontaneously produced, which is neither conceivable nor believable. If the cause was out of itself it must have been a necessary, self-existent first cause, for if it were contingent you strike the regression to infinity of a series of finite contingent causes, which cannot be accepted, as each one of the series is contingent and what is true of all the parts is true of the whole. We are conducted therefore to a necessary first cause. (2) The argument

may proceed from the *finiteness* of the world. That is finite which is limited and conditioned. We know ourselves to be limited and conditioned by consciousness. Matter is limited and conditioned because divisible into parts, each of which limits and conditions the other. The world of matter and spirits is thus limited and conditioned and therefore finite. Whatever is finite began. If it began, it had a cause. This cause must be in itself or out of itself. If in itself, it is spontaneously produced which makes the world both cause and effect at one and the same. If the cause was out of itself, it must have been a necessary first cause, or you strike the regression to infinity of a contingent series. We arrive therefore at a necessary first cause.

The argument next employs the law of substance, in accordance with which we immediately infer that properties inhere in a substance, or mediately infer upon the perception of the manifestation of power that this power is to be construed as an attribute and referred to a substance or essence in which it inheres as a quality. This fundamental faith is of use to prevent our interpretation of the first cause with Herbert Spencer as an "infinite and eternal energy," and to lead to the knowledge that the first cause is also the first substance in which the power manifest in causation inheres as an attribute. The argument next uses the law of *personality*. We are indubitably convinced that we are persons and we ask the Spencerian evolutionist how an impersonal force, which they affirm the first cause to be, could have evolved into personal beings, possessing marks which are not implied in the evolving force, or inquire of the Pantheist how impersonal substance which is his first cause, could have been wrought over into personal substances, possessing this high mark of personality which his original substance did not wear. We can give no other just account of our own personality than to affirm personality of the first cause. "The argument next advances from the fundamental law of belief in the infinite to the infinity of the substantive, personal first cause." This belief in the infinite developed upon conditions of experience is native to the human mind as shown by the belief in infinite space and infinite duration and the well-nigh

universal belief in the infinite God; and sufficient reasons can be given to show why it is not admitted as absolutely universal. In fact the finite and infinite are correlatives and the knowledge of them is correlative. It is impossible to know one without knowing the other. The mode in which they are known are different; the faculties by which they are known are not the same. The finite is known by the presentative, representative and thinking faculties; the infinite is known by the believing faculty. But the one knowledge is just valid as is the other. We have now been conducted to a necessary, substantive, personal, infinite first cause. This is the Cosmological argument in substance, which is not complete by itself but needs to be complemented by the teleological or as Kant calls it the physic-theological argument. In fact they are not different argument, but branches of the one indivisible, inseparable proof of the divine existence. As God is one the proof of His existence is one.

The teleological argument is based upon the fundamental laws of unity, causation and sufficient reason. Amidst the bewildering complexity of the world round about us, the human reason is forced to seek and find a principle of unity by the very necessities of its constitution. This fundamental faith is satisfied by the impression of order which pervades all the complicated phenomena of nature and history and signally gratified by the marvellous adaptations which reign both in the realm of the great and the small in the natural world. From the analogy of human experience we are forced to affirm a final cause for all this wide supremacy of orderliness and law, and also to postulate an efficient cause as it organizing and guiding intelligence. Combined with this the law of sufficient reason, whether contemplated as a law of thought or of objective reality, requires the affirmation of a cause of adequate wisdom and power to account for all the beautiful harmony and rational purpose which evidently pervades nature through and through, in the vast procession of the planets and in no less degree in the realm of the infinitesimal which the microscope reveals. When united with the Cosmological argument the teleological therefore conducts us to an infinite personal first cause and first substance

who is the Creator and as well the organizer and governor of the world.

Dr. Girardeau gives us a just and profound criticism of the so-called ontological argument as presented by Anselm and afterwards modified though not improved by Leibnitz. Anselm's argument is that we have the concept of an absolutely perfect being which involves as one of its elements necessity of existence, and this in turn actual existence. Kant's criticism is very acute, as follows, viz., that to pass from the concept of an *ideal* perfect being to that of an *actual* perfect being requires either an analytical or synthetical judgment. Now if it be an analytical judgment, which affirms in the predicate something already contained in the subject, we have made no advance, for we may deny objectivity or *actuality* both of the subject and the predicate. If it be synthetical which affirms in the predicate something not already contained in the subject, as actuality or objectivity of existence is affirmed in the predicate of an ideal or subjective existence in the subject, then the judgment must not be assumed but proved, which remains to be done in some other way; and the argument is worthless. Dr. Girardeau's criticism is equally weighty and philosophic to the effect, that there can be no concept of an absolutely perfect being, and an argument built on this hypothesis is therefore vitiated. A concept is built by the thought power out of material furnished by the percepts of the presentative or the re-presentations of the representative power. Thought, therefore, cannot transcend consciousness. It is unphilosophic to say that we can perceive or represent God, and therefore the thought faculty can form no concept of Him, and to build an argument on this imaginary foundation leads of course, only to imaginary results. The road by which the human reason passes from the finite to the infinite is negatively not the path of sense-perception, nor of the representative power in its two forms of memory or imagination, nor of the thinking faculty or the discursive understanding or faculty of logical elaboration which builds or handles concepts, but it is a royal highway along which the noblest rational power or the believing faculty travels. The infinite is a faith-judgment. It is called by some the product of rational intuition, but in-

tuition is too equivocal a term, employed as it is to denominate the presentative power. The infinite is reached by the human reason through its highest power or function, when all its other and lower powers developed by experience have done their work and discharged their functions, then the reason in its highest power and faculty, viz.: faith, or the believing faculty, affirms, apprehends and knows the infinite. It is a fundamental faith or belief native to the human reason which needs only the concrete facts of experience to develop it from latency into actual and inevitable expression.

Dr. Girardeau, of course, uses with great force the moral argument for the divine being and also the argument equally valid from man's religious nature; but the largest contribution in this section of theology has been his demonstration of the unity of the cosmological and teleological arguments as furnishing the one indivisible proof of God's existence. He has shown how every part of man's constitution and all the facts of experience combine their consentient testimony to this great basal truth of philosophy and theology that there is an infinite, personal, necessary first cause and first substance who is the Creator and organizer and governor of the world. And in the nature of the case, he could have rendered no higher service than to place this argument on an absolutely impregnable philosophic foundation.

III. In the department of Anthropology, his doctrine of the origin of the first sin in the free and unhindered self-determination of the first man and his account of the derivation of the guilt of the first sin to the whole human race shows his combined philosophic and theological gifts in the highest degree. No theory which holds that Adam's spontaneity effectively controlled his volitions, can meet the demands of philosophy for a rational account of this sin or can escape the objections which theology would bring that God is inevitably made the author of this first sin on this hypothesis. If Adam's holy spontaneity had determined infallibly his volitions, he would have remained holy unto this day. In the use of the perilous power of the self-determination of the will, given to him to fit him for his probation, he freely and unnecessarily originated

his own sinful volition and act and as a result, his own sinful spontaneity and dispositions. However false the theory of the self-determination of the will may be in its universal application to men now, no other hypothesis will meet the necessities of the case in the instance of the first man and the first sin.

But we are more especially concerned with the explanation of the imputation of the guilt of the first sin to the whole race which is presented by Dr. Girardeau. There are three theories which fall to be considered: 1st, Parentalism; 2d, Realism; 3d, Federal Headship. Of these in their order:

(1) Parentalism is the explanation which Arminianism offers as best solving the difficulties of the case. The following are the objections which in substance, Dr. Girardeau presents as showing the untenableness of Parentalism. First, the Arminians themselves, admit that the visitation of the bitter consequences of Adam's sin upon his descendants could not be vindicated unless these were joined with the decree to permit the first sin further provision through redemption to remove the consequences of that sin. Wesley, Fletcher Watson admit that Parentalism will not by itself bear the strain which is put upon it, unaided by the subsequent arrangement made by grace to remove the penal and spiritual consequences of our first parents' sin. But a thing intrinsically unjust in itself cannot be made just by subsequent action relating thereto. Moreover, the Arminian cannot prove that redemption removes for all Adam's descendants all the consequences of the Adamic sin and hence so far as some of Adam's descendants are concerned, the intrinsic injustice of Parentalism remains unmodified by subsequent provisions made by grace. Secondly, having admitted the essential injustice of Parentalism the Arminian inconsistently proceeds to argue its justice as shown in the analogous case of the ordinary parental relation and its consequences upon children. They maintain that it is at the same time unjust and just—only one of the many striking instances of the necessary inconsistencies of Arminianism. But the ordinary parental relation really furnishes no sufficient analogue. For Arminians admit that the sufferings of the race are in some sense punishments. Death, temporal, spiritual, liability to death eternal,

are not simply misfortunes or calamities. The Pelagianizing deliverance of some modern Arminians that human sufferings and corruption are in no sense penal is not truly representative of Evangelical Arminianism. Now, if they are punishments, guilt must be somehow present, for in God's moral government there cannot be punishment without guilt. If the children are punished for their parents' sin, they are in some sense guilty of these sins. But it is contrary to express Scripture teachings to hold the children guilty on account of their parents' sin, though they do suffer on account of the evil deeds of their parents. If children cannot be dealt with retributively on account of their parents' sin, then Adam's descendants cannot be dealt with retributively on account of his sin. And the Arminian attempt to show an Analogue between the ordinary parental relation and Adam's relation to his posterity is evinced to be vain. Adam must have been something more than a parent, or his posterity could not be adjudged to be guilty on the account of his first sin and punished therefor.

Thirdly, the theory of Parentalism involves that guilt and corruption by propagation pass from Adam to his posterity, or the doctrine that like begets like. This theory is incapable of proof in the moral realm, and its justice cannot be established. It is also impossible to show why on this doctrine only the consequences of the first sin are visited upon the race. No rational account of this limitation can be offered. It is as illegitimate on this theory to fail to impute the consequences of other sins to the posterity as to fail to impute the consequences of other sins to Adam himself. Further on this theory of propagation, Adam when regenerated, would have begotten regenerated children, and regenerated parents today ought infallibly to have today regenerated children. Fourthly, Parentalism cannot be adjusted to the analogy so clearly taught in the Scripture as existing between the first Adam and the second Adam. On this hypothesis there is no analogy and Paul's parallel in Romans and Corinthians instead of bravely walking on two stout legs, hops lamely along in a hap-hazard and inconsequential manner. Fifthly, Parentalism as expounded by Arminians makes justification either for Adam or his descendants impossible. Evangel-

ical Arminian theology makes no mention of the limitation of the time as to probation even in the case of Adam himself, and emphatically denies that his descendants had in him a strict legal probation. If Adam were still obedient he could not claim justification on the Arminian theory, for there has been no limitation of time at the expiration of which justification could be given as a boon; and if he were still obedient, his descendants could not claim justification, for they have not been offered a legal probation in him, by standing which the reward of justification would be given. If one wishes to see the Arminian theory of Parentalism ground to powder between the upper and nether millstone of philosophy and theology, let him read in Dr. Girardeau's book on "Calvinism and Evangelical Arminianism", Part I., Section III., Subsection I., "Objections from Divine Justice"—and he will find one of the finest pieces of polemic theology which modern literature affords.

(2) Realism is next to be considered, which is liable to the following objections: first, it is but an extreme form of Parentalism and the arguments which expose the falsity of the one, expose the falsity of the other. Secondly, the theory is not only inconceivable, but incredible and contradictory to the teachings of reason. That the spiritual substance of the whole race was created as one essence in our first parent, and then by propagation divided and subdivided over and over again to secure a separate substance or essence for each individual of the race involves a partition or material division of spiritual being which is counter to its very nature. It is as offensive to human reason as the Romish doctrine that the bread and wine are changed into the body and blood of our Lord, although our senses still perceive the bread and wine. To tell us that the immaterial spiritual essence can be divided into myriads of millions of particles, as it were, is not simply to offer the reason a mystery but an essential contradiction of the very nature of indivisible spiritual substance.

Thirdly, on this theory the limitation of the imputation of guilt to the first sin would be impossible, for Adam's other sins were just as truly committed by all those who were psych-

ically and substantially one with him. The guilt of all subsequent parents in all their sins would accumulate upon their descendants who were just as truly numerically identical with them as they were with the first parent. Fourthly, this theory would make the human nature of our Lord actually sinful, for if his human soul was a part of the one substance or essence which sinned in Adam, both the consequent guilt and corruption which followed must have attached itself to him as truly as to any other descendants who were no more involved in this sin than was he. There is no possible escape from the fact that Realism necessitates the conclusion that the human nature of our Lord was both guilty and corrupt prior to its assumption into personal union with his divine nature and the question is an insoluble one how that guilt and corruption could have been removed so as to make his human nature sinless after the incarnation. Fifthly, the analogy between Adam and Christ is destroyed as effectually as on the theory of Parentalism. Numerically one with Adam the attempt has been made to show that we are numerically one with our Lord, which involves, of course, the hypothesis that the human nature which our Lord assumed was the whole human race, and the hypothesis destroys itself by its necessary and suicidal inconsistencies. If however, the realist hold that we are numerically one with Adam and representatively one with Christ, he makes Paul so lame and inconsequential a talker that the whole Christian world must be convicted of a colossal blunder in believing for two thousand years that the great Apostle to the Gentiles was a mighty thinker and master theologian.

(3) Federalism or the explanation of consistent Calvinism now remains. First, it is universally admitted that God entered into a covenant with Adam which included his posterity so that they are involved in his first sin, and if Parentalism in its ordinary form, or in the form of Realism cannot consistently with justice account for the judicial condemnation and sufferings of the race, the only conceivable hypothesis is that of strict legal representation. Secondly, the analogy between Christ and Adam shows our first parent must have been the legal representative of his seed. This is the biblical and theo-

logical key to the department of anthropology and Dr. Girardeau gives it great emphasis. Thirdly, the appeal to the general judgment of men favors the representative instead of the parental relation as existing between Adam and his posterity. We do not judge a child to be guilty of a parent's acts, but if one legally represents another, we hold the man responsible and blameworthy for his representative's acts. This may seem to disparage the parental relation, but it still makes the parent to propagate the race with its essential and inseparable qualities, and as the parental head of the race no one so fitted as Adam to be the federal head and representative of his posterity. All the emphasis wisely possible may be placed on the closeness of the parental relation as furnishing the ground on which the federal relation was built.

Fourthly, the key-question here relates to the justice of the federal constitution. If God established this relation then it must be just on the principle announced in the interrogatory. "Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?" Further, it is easy to evince the benevolence of this constitution, in that it limits the time of probation to a definite and terminable period limits the persons on probation to one amply competent for his stupendous task, and perhaps limits also the area of temptation in the case of the representative to one precise command. But the representative principle could not be thus benevolent unless it were also just. In addition, if it be said that representation is incompatible with justice because it allows the represented parties no voice in deciding that the representative principle shall be employed in their case, the answer is obvious that on such a ground as this the subjects of the divine government share with God in the administration of His government. They must elect Him, approve His policies, endorse His administration or else His government is impeached of injustice. But God is an absolute sovereign, and furnishes the best of all governments as controlled by infinite love and justice, employing infinite wisdom and power. Moreover, it is impossible to prove that the federal constitution is intrinsically unjust. If it be asserted to be contrary to a fundamental intuition of justice, let the exact nature of the intuition or

faith be shown, and the respects in which it is offended clearly proven. It is certainly supposable that God saw it equally fair to collect all mankind into unity upon a federal head who had a glorious and easy opportunity to acquire confirmed holiness and life for all as to allow each man to stand upon his own foot with the hazard of all falling and then with the representative principle excluded no redemption possible for any. If it be further objected that federal representation is unjust in that it gives the constituents no suffrage in choosing their federal head, then the same reply obtains that on this ground the subjects become co-administrators and co-sovereigns in the divine government. Moreover, God is better qualified to choose a competent and qualified Federal Head than would the whole race be, if they could be summoned in a vast mass-meeting for this purpose. Besides, the Federal Head chosen was the one best fitted for this great position, appointed when in the maturity of his splendid powers, amply able to stand and win the glorious prize of justification for himself and his posterity, the parental head as no one else could be of the race, and feeling as no one else could the pressure of the awful responsibilities which rested upon him. As a conclusive and crushing reply to the charge that representation involving the imputation of another's guilt is intrinsically unjust, the answer must be made that one clear case of the employment of this principle is a sufficient reply. Now Christ furnishes us that clear case. He suffered even unto death and only three suppositions are possible. First, that he suffered without the imputation of any guilt, which would impeach the divine government; second, that he suffered because of the imputation of his own guilt, which amounts to blasphemy; or third, he suffered because of the imputation of another's guilt. which is the principle in hand. There are several important distinctions which must be recognized in construing this doctrine: For example, the distinction between the imputation of one's own conscious and subjective guilt and the imputation of another's conscious and subjective guilt. The failure to appreciate the force of this distinction accounts for much irrelevant argumentation against the representative principle and the doctrine of substitution. There

is a further distinction between the consent of one to be a representative of his constituents and the consent of constituents to be represented by the Federal Head. The two cases are not analogous, and because the first and second Adams consented to act as representatives cannot be argued as involving that their constituents must consent to be thus represented. The distinction between the derivation of responsibility upwards from constituents to their Federal Head and downwards from the Federal Head to his constituents must not be overlooked as throwing the two cases entirely out of analogy. Nor must we forget the difference between the eternal Son of God and the finite subjects of the divine government, because he was under no obligation to law, he voluntarily consented to be the sponsor and representative of his people, but that furnishes no ground upon which to argue that his people must consent that he shall be their representative.

Fifthly, if the principle of representation be excluded on the alleged ground of injustice then in no case can it be admitted; and the salvation of a race of lost sinners becomes an impossibility. It is evident that no transgressor of the divine law can deliver himself from its penalty, and it is equally evident that no one disabled even unto death by the corrupting influences of sin can recover himself from their deadly power. But representation involving substitution is inadmissible, and the sinner must lie down forever with his doom. It may be said that representation issuing in the imputation of guilt is different from representation issuing in the imputation of righteousness. But the objector forgets that the first Adam was perfectly holy, easily able to stand and win the promised confirmation in holiness for himself and his posterity; and had this been the result no voice would have been raised in protest, but how does difference in result alter the nature of the principle involved. It might be said that had the representative principle been ruled out and each individual stood upon his own foot, more would have secured the reward of justification than are saved through Christ. But the precedent of the fallen angels is against this hypothesis. Adam's case discounts it. If with all his maturity and holiness and tremendous

responsibilities he fell, the chance of each individual as in turn he was born into the world would seem to have been less hopeful of standing until confirmed in holiness, especially when the evil example and influence of the first parent is remembered. And when any and perhaps all fell, their case would be forever hopeless, for representation involving substitution and imputation are the cornerstones of the structure of redemption, and all the wide wonders and transcendent glories of the religion of grace, of the theology of the Gospel, are extinguished in midnight darkness, if this great central principle both of the theology of natural religion and of the Gospel of God's grace, viz., Federal representation, is neglected and denied.

IV. In Christology, Dr. Girardeau's construction of the doctrine of the person of Christ is one of his most striking and original contributions to theological science.

Christ's personality is divine both prior to and subsequent to the incarnation. There is no divine human person as the result of his assumption of human nature into union with the divine nature. There is the one unchangeable divine person; and just as the divine nature undergoes no change so the divine personality neither suffers change. There is no human personality attached to the human nature which enters into this union. There is the creation of a new nature, viz.: the human nature of Christ; there is the constitution of a new relation, viz.: that between the person of Christ and his human nature; there is the institution of a new medium of manifestation, viz.: the human nature which affords a human ground for the expression of Christ's divine personality. There are three constituents in this union, the human nature, the divine nature and the divine person, which is the bond of union between the other two. The human nature in Christ is without human personality and expresses itself through the divine personality with which it is united through the incarnation. Of course, the divine nature and the divine person are eternally and inseparably united. As a consequence of this hypostatic or personal union of the two natures, there results two distinct but related consciousnesses and two distinct but related wills, and there is also a communion of the attributes of the two natures in the person of

Christ but no communication of the attributes of the one nature to the other. The orthodox doctrine requires the assumption that human nature may be entire without human personality. Some personality is required in order to its completeness but not in every case human personality. Christ's human nature is not absolutely impersonal, but it has subsistence in his divine person.

The key question therefore in Christology is, What is personality? The answer is that our conviction of personality is native. It springs from a fundamental faith or law of belief elicited into expression upon the conditions of experience. As an original principle it is incapable of resolution or definition, but it may be described both negatively and positively. Negatively, it must exclude all the elements common to man and the lower animals, the bodily appetites and sensations, whatever intelligence, feelings and will the animals have in common with man, and consciousness also, for the brutes are undoubtedly conscious. It must exclude all the attributes which Christ has in common with men, for the Scriptures teach us that he possesses the entire human essence without personality. Individuality, intelligence, feelings, will, moral qualities, with the consciousness of their operation belong to the essence of human nature and are therefore excluded. They may furnish the basis which personality requires for its existence and its action, but they are not the elements which constitute personality. Personality must exclude also any element which does not belong to man in every stage of his history. The freedom of the will in the sense of the self-determination of the will therefore must also be ruled out. For while at creation to fit him for probation, man was possessed of this perilous power and in its exercise originated the sinful spontaneity or disposition which now enslaves him, he has not now the power to the contrary to originate a new and holy spontaneity or disposition. He may appropriate his already determined evil spontaneity in the way of elective concurrence, but the power of self-determination in the sense of choosing holy inclinations of soul has been lost and therefore self-determination cannot be made as claimed by many philosophers and theologians, an essential element in the

description of personality. It must exclude any element which cannot be affirmed of the person of the Son of God, or more widely of any of the persons of the trinity. Personality in the Godhead is the archetype of which personality in human nature is the ectype, for while there is no analogue between God as infinite and man as finite, between the incommunicable or modal attributes of God and man's natural endowments, yet there is in other respects a fundamental likeness between God and man and the communicable or determinative divine attributes are shadowed in the reason and moral nature of man. Moral responsibility therefore in the strict sense cannot belong to personality because it does not attach to the divine persons. It belongs to the essence of human nature and not to human personality as such. Personality is accompanied by responsibility in man but not in God, somewhat as self-determination belongs to man in one of his estates but not in another.

Positively personality may be described, generically as supposing an individual being, what in theology is called a substance, marked by intelligence, feelings, will, moral qualities and the consciousness of their operations. These are not the constituents but they are the conditions of the energy of personality. They are spontaneous in their activities and in this respect we have one of the fundamental differences between the activities of the essence and the activities of the person. Next, specifically personality involves the conviction which an individual being has of its identity. A lower animal cannot have this conviction of self-identity and hence we do not hold them responsible for actions committed long previously. But a man at sixty is conscious that he is the identical individual being that he was at twenty and hence at sixty he is held responsible for the sins committed at twenty. Sameness of individual being belongs to man and the lower animals, but they do not know it and he does, hence this knowledge belongs to him not as an individual being simply, but as a person. Another peculiar element in personality is the power of reflective activity by which the spontaneous activities of the essence are deliberately appropriated as the basis of deliberate action. All the constituents of the essence are spontaneously active, but reflection belongs to

the person and not to the essence. It is this power of reflective activity in addition to the conviction of personal identity which makes the personality of man an image of the personality of God. To quote Dr. Girardeau's own statement exactly, "Personality is the knowledge of its identity possessed by an individual being and its reflective activity upon the spontaneous conditions of intelligence, feelings, will and moral qualities furnished by its essence."

No philosophic theologian has advanced further into the heart of this standing problem of philosophy and theology than has the great Columbia professor in his discussions upon this theme in explication of this doctrine and the use which he makes of his view of personality is evident without further comment or exposition.

V. In Lotenology, the doctrine of adoption receives from Dr. Girardeau a fuller and richer development than at the hands of any preceding theologian.

At creation, Adam was both God's servant and God's son. A careful exegesis of Scripture gives this result. This sonship was threefold, first, natural, in that Adam was a spiritual being, possessed of reason, conscience, emotions and will. Secondly, it was spiritual, in that at creation man was perfectly righteous and holy with spiritual life permeating every faculty of his being. Thirdly, it was legal, in that he had certain rights as a member of God's family, contingently it was true and liable to be lost by sin, but these rights were his as long as obedience continued. Now, Adam's sin lost him both his spiritual and legal sonship, but his natural sonship remained. He could not be other than God's son in this sense, and this sonship will endure unchanged forever whatever the effect sin may have on man's other relationships to God.

It is argued that Adam could not have been both a servant and a son at one and the same time, because a servant is the subject of God's retributive moral government and a son is under disciplinary or fatherly rule and these two as incompatible cannot co-exist. The answer is that upon the testimony of Scripture, our Lord was both a servant and a son and therefore ; it is historically proven that the two are not necessarily contra-

dictory. In addition, believers are both servants and sons. Further, one may be at one same time under retributive and disciplinary government. Such again was the case with our Lord. He redeemed us from the curse of the law by being made a curse for us and through sufferings he was made perfect as the captain of our salvation: bearing the retributions of the law and at the same experiencing not the corrective but perfective processes of fatherly discipline. These considerations prove that there is nothing inherently contradictory in the position that Adam was both servant and son under retributive disciplinary government. His case as innocent was different from that of the sinner considered as unredeemed and unregenerate or considered as redeemed and regenerate. As unredeemed the sinner is no sense under fatherly discipline but solely under retributive moral government. As redeemed the saved sinner is in no sense under retributive moral government, for all its penalties have been exhausted for him by his substitute, but he is solely under disciplinary fatherly rule both as corrective and perfective. Adam both as servant and son was under retributive moral government, for had he obeyed as a servant he would have secured the reward of justification and had he obeyed as a son he would have secured on the same principle of distributive justice the reward of confirmation in the Father's family. And as a son he was also under fatherly rule with a view to perfective growth through filial obedience. There is nothing contradictory in his sustaining this dual relation to moral government in its two species of retributive and disciplinary government. Moreover that Adam was a son is shown by the fact that re-creation or regeneration restores the lost spiritual sonship. Those who are born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God are given the right to legally become the sons of God because they are already by the rebirth made the spiritual children of God. If it be objected that on this view our Lord as a substitute for his people must obey both as a servant and as a son in their belief, the reply is that exactly this is the teachings of the Scripture and sound theology must adjust its system to embrace this truth. As a servant his obedience imputed on the condition

of faith secured the justification of the believer; as a son his obedience imputed on the condition of faith secures the adoption of the believer.

As to its nature adoption is not to be confounded with regeneration, for while regeneration conditions faith, adoption is conditioned upon faith. Regeneration is a creative act by which we are really and spiritually made the children of God, adoption is a legal act by which we are authorized to take our places in God's family, by which we are formally transferred from the devil's family into God's family. Regeneration adapts us to our place in God's family, adoption authoritatively and legally introduces us into it. Regeneration makes us God's children, adoption recognizes and treats us as God's children. Adoption is also to be distinguished from justification in that they terminate on different relations; justification is directed towards the subject or servant, adoption is directed toward the child. Justification secures confirmation in God's rectoral regard, adoption secures confirmation in his fatherly regard. Justification introduces the regenerated sinner into the society of the righteous considered as a polity, adoption introduces the regenerated sinner into God's family. Justification secures for a servant the rewards of moral government, adoption conveys a title to the inheritance of an heir.

The exact *locus* of adoption in the theological system is shown in the following statement, the water symbolizing the subjective in character and nature includes under it regeneration and sanctification, the blood symbolizing the objective change in relations or *status* includes under it justification or adoption. In Dr. Girardeau's own words, "Adoption is an act of God's free grace, whereby for the sake of Christ, he formally translates the regenerate from the family of Satan into his own and logically confirms them in all the rights, immunities and privileges of his children." As to its grounds adoption rests on the eternal purpose of God the father, union with the Son of God *naturally*, union with the Son of God spiritually, and union with the Son of God *federally* as the representative and Federal Head of his people. On this ground God the Father imputes the righteousness of Christ to his people, which means that he

imputes Christ's filial obedience to his people. And this is the immediate ground of their adoption as distinguished from their justification whose immediate ground is the obedience of Christ as a subject and servant. The Rights, the Duties, and the Evidences of Adoption are all presented by Dr. Girardeau with a clearness and cogency which will amply repay careful study, and the minister who desires to be himself fed with the "finest of the wheat" in order that in turn he may be prepared to "feed the flock of God" can do no better than to linger long and lovingly over the treatment of adoption in the volume of "Theological Discussions."

Such are some of the key-positions in Dr. Girardeau's theological system and they are offered simply as specimens or illustrations, and perhaps many others would have been equally pertinent and illustrative. He touched no theological topic which he did not both adorn and discuss with signal power. And while the writer is alone responsible for the exposition, yet so deeply sacred in his memory are many of the formulae in which his theological teacher stated his views that in some cases those formulae would come unsolicited in the very form in which they were received. But the memory of his students will cease sooner or later in this world to report the record of his teachings and upon his books must finally and permanently depend his fame and influence. And the conviction is a certain one that the world of scholarship and the kingdom of God will "not willingly let die" the contributions which he has made to philosophy and theology in his "Philosophical Discussions," his "Theological Discussions, Calvinism and Evangelical Arminianism" and "The Will in its Theological Relations." One is sometimes tempted to regret that like his great contemporary, Dr. Dabney, he had not completed in articulate shape his system and given it in symmetrical and finished form to the Church. Had he done so his immediate influence and renown would have been the greater, but his permanent work and fame will be the larger because he chose instead of publishing a completed system to publish these profound discussions to which he devoted his ripe powers and in which in some cases, certainly in the specifications given in this article, he has penetrated

farther into the heart of some of the great mysteries and doctrines of our faith than any of his predecessors had done. These discussions which would scarcely have fitted into a text-book designed for class-room use, will be the study of choice and able spirits and he is destined to be a theologian for theologians, the *magister magisterum*. And in the long run he elected wisely when he gave himself to the production of these penetrating and profound researches into selected doctrines, which will enable him to render this larger and more influential service to the Church.

The type of theology which he represents is one which will always be needed: intensely philosophic and intensely aggressive at one and the same time. In the vast sweep of the ages that system which is most rational will be most commanding and influential and the theologian can do no higher service than first to extract by sound exegesis the contents of the Scripture, and then to demonstrate, wherever it can be done, the reasonableness of the Scriptural teachings in the sense of the harmony between Scripture and reason, and when this can not be done to demonstrate at least that the Scriptural teaching does not contradict the deliverances of the rational power. Whatever popular opinion may say today or tomorrow or upon any passing human day, the reason is the deepest thing in man, and he does the business of a theologian best who sets the Scripture and reason in right relations with each other. No theologian of our day has wrought more diligently or more successfully at this task than Dr. Girardeau and his reward, though deferred for a season, is sure. Combined with this as a necessary corollary was the aggressiveness of his theological type, which could not keep the peace with opposing systems because of their unscriptural and irrational character. A Calvinism which smiles indiscriminately upon all its historical opponents has lost its vitality and is in danger of burial. Dr. Girardeau was professor of Didactic and Polemic Theology, and he must be both in order to be either. While having the largest charity for all of God's people, he did not construe this to be a reason for failing in loyalty to God's truth or for failing to expose false doctrine in any of its forms. He saw no reason to apologize

for the faith in which the most of God's people have lived and died and knew no other policy than to expound, defend and propagate it—all in the most stalwart, manly, Christian way of course. An aggressive Calvinism, buttressed by Scripture and supported by reason will win the day; and this is the type which our theologian represented. May he have an ever increasing host of successors!

The splendid service which he rendered as teacher and author, adds lustre to the Columbia Theological Seminary, of which he was a professor for nearly a score of years, and upon the list of its honored sons whether as student or professor his name stands first. The theology of Thornwell and Girardeau must always be the type for which this institution stands. Its history demands it. Its constituency are pledged to it. The loyal sons of their *alma mater* would consent to nothing else. After all is said and done, the Chair of Systematic Theology is the king professorship and determines the type of theology for which the institution stands. Thornwell, Girardeau, and the able teacher who now fills the Chair which they once adorned, have wisely shaped the spirit and decided well the type of which this Seminary is the exponent. And an appreciative Church appraises at its true value the service which they have rendered, and counts with calm confidence upon its continuance for the coming days. The Southern Church can never forget the services rendered by that splendid line of professors, both of the past and the present, who have enriched the history of this noble institution and who have enriched also the life of the Church which they served, and at the head of this list stands the name of

JOHN L. GIRARDEAU.